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Preface
The deistic movement in eighteenth-century America is a fascinating but sadly
neglected chapter in the history of American thought. In this anthology, I have
collected and commented on the most pertinent deistic texts, many of them
long out of print, and prefaced the whole with an introductory essay that
examines the historical and intellectual background to the curious career of
American rational religion as well as its influence on subsequent theological and
philosophical thought. Selections have been gleaned from the major books and
periodicals of the deistic movement, and this necessarily means that important
but less central sources-such as selections from the writings of Joel Barlow or
articles from the Newburgh Mirror-have been omitted. In dealing with a
tradition that has as rich and extensive a literature as American deism, certain
sacrifices must be made, however reluctantly.
I make no pretense ofproviding in this volume a social or political history of
the American Enlightenment. Instead, I focus squarely on an examination and
interpretation of deism in order to unravel its philosophical, theological, and
ethical tenets. Those readers who wish to supplement this intellectual history
with broader and more concrete treatments may consult the titles listed in the
bibliographical essay, including my own Rational Infidels: The American Deists
(1992).
Two editorial comments are in order here, one structural and the other
stylistic. First, chapters 3 through 10 are introduced by short essays in which I
provide summaries and pertinent historical information. The first two chapters,
containing selections from Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson respectively, employ a slightly more complicated format. In addition to the usual
preliminary essays, I also preface each of the selections in the Franklin chapter,
and many in the Jefferson one, with individual introductions that focus on their
specific historical backgrounds and underscore their thematic continuity. Most
of the Franklin and Jefferson selections are taken from private correspondence
and journal memoranda rather than from systematic treatises or books. As a
consequence, it seemed important that the reader have some idea of the two
men's correspondents as well as the context of their remarks. Given the number
of readings in each of the first two chapters, the least confusing ( although
perhaps slightly cumbersome) strategy seemed to begin each selection with
short explanatory prefaces.
Second, in preparing material for each of the ten chapters, I have corrected
obvious misprints and idiosyncratic spellings that found their way into the
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eighteenth-century sources from which I worked. At times I have also altered
punctuation to facilitate comprehension of more convoluted passages. In most
instances, however, I have retained typical eighteenth-century stylisms, spelling, and grammar.
I wish to extend my thanks to the staff members of the following libraries
who aided me in my research: Andover Library, Harvard Divinity School; Houghton Library, Harvard University; Lamont Library, Harvard University, Musselman Library, Gettysburg College; and Ellen Clarke Bertrand Library, Bucknell
University.
The comments of Professors Roderick S. French ( George Washington University) and Mark A. Noll (Wheaton College) on an earlier draft of this book
rescued it from a number ofambiguities and downright gaffes, and I wish to take
this opportunity both to thank them for their painstaking advice and to absolve
them from responsibility for any errors offact or interpretation that may remain.
Professor Jeffrey Turner (Bucknell University) graciously and expertly helped
me translate the quotations from classical sources in the Thomas Jefferson
chapter. Cynthia Miller, my editor at the University Press of Kansas, has been a
constant source of good humor and support. Cynthia Ingham, my copyeditor,
has been especially helpful. Her patient and meticulous reading of the manuscript both amazed and humbled me. My colleagues at Gettysburg CollegeLisa Portrness and Chan Coulter (Philosophy) and Lou Hammann (Religious
Studies )-sustained me with generous measures of gracious patience, encouragement, and wit. As partial recompense, I dedicate this volume to them.
Finally, Kirn Daubman has been my mainstay in this and past projects. The
American Deists is also dedicated to her as an inadequate but heartfelt tribute.

Introduction
An Age of Infidelity
On 6 August 1759, an alarmed Ezra Stiles of Newport, Rhode Island, wrote
the following note to Thomas Clap, president ofYale College: "Deism has got
such Head in this Age of Licentious Liberty that it would be in vain to try to
stop it by hiding the Deistical Writings: and the only Way left to conquer &
demolish it, is to come forth into the open Field & Dispute this matter on even
Footing-the evidences of Revelation in my opinion are nearly as demonstrative as Newton's Principia, & these are the Weapons he used." 1
If upset in 1759 over what he feared was an age of infidelity, Stiles was
positively distraught nineteen years later when he succeeded Clap as Yale's
president. Efforts by him and other Christians in the intervening period to
quell the influence of"Deistical Writings" by arguing for the reasonableness of
revealed religion had failed miserably. In fact, deistic rebuttals of such attempts
proved so persuasive that toward the end of Stiles's administration Yale was
perceived as a hotbed of what the orthodox establishment of the day indiscriminately labeled "infidelity." Lyman Beecher, who entered Yale in 1793,
later recalled that the "college was in a most ungodly state. The college church
was almost extinct. Most of the students were skeptical . . . . That was the day
of the infidelity of the Tom Paine school. Boys that dressed flax in the barn, as
I used to, read Tom Paine and believed him .... Most of the class before me
were infidels, and called each other Voltaire, Rousseau, D'Alembert. " 2 Beecher
almost certainly exaggerated the extent to which infidelity infected the Yale of
his youth. But even if his recollections are not completely trustworthy, they
shed interesting light on a belief that was widely held in late eighteenth-century
America: Deism was alive and well in the colleges.3
The perception of Yale's apostasy was not unique. A 1789 alumnus of
Dartmouth College recalled that his fellow students were "very unruly, lawless,
and without the fear of God" and lamented that ten years later "but a single
member of the class of 1799 was publicly known as a professing Christian. " 4
Virginia's College of William and Mary acquired the dubious reputation toward century's end as a training ground for "infidelity and .. . the wild politics
ofFrance." 5 By 1799, the College of New Jersey (Princeton) had "only three
or four [students] who made any pretensions to piety. " 6 Even conservative
Boston's Harvard had succumbed. William Ellery Channing, describing his
years (1794-98) there as a student, ruefully recalled that the college "was never
in a worse state than when I entered .... The French Revolution had diseased

Introduction

2

the imagination and unsettled the understanding of men everywhere ... . The
tone of books and conversation was presumptuous and daring. The tendency
of all classes was to scepticism." 7 Officials at Harvard obviously shared Channing's concern. In 1791 they had banned and publicly burned Edward
Gibbon's Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire on the grounds that its thesis
was uncomplimentary to the Christian faith. Three years later, when young
William Channing matriculated, each incoming student was presented with
a copy of Richard Watson's Apology for the Bible. The hope was that this treatise, a polemic against Thomas Paine that accused him of employing "Railing
for reasoning, vulgar and illiberal sarcasm in the room of argument," 8 would
exercise a salutary influence on Harvard's young scholars. That hope was not
met. The wave of deistic infidelity that Ezra Stiles had deplored as far back as
1759 continued to swell throughout the academy for the rest of the century.
Its pervasiveness may not have been as entrenched as popular and horrified piety contended, but there was a good amount of fire behind the
smoke.
Nor were colleges the only breeding grounds of deistic "Licentious Liberty." In the second half of the eighteenth century, its presence also became
increasingly obvious-and, to the Christian churches, increasingly worrisome
-in the society at large. Newspapers, journals, and magazines published article
after article on deism, most of which spawned scores of furious or delighted
responses. Urban tradesmen gleefully discussed the uproar in public houses
over pipes and tankards, even though only a handful of them probably bothered to read any of the debate's broadsides. Hundreds of city dwellers flocked
to meetinghouses, out of either curiosity or conviction, to listen to addresses
defending deism's religion of nature. Moreover, such "lowbrow" interest was
mirrored in "high" society. The artist John Trumbull recalled attending a dinner party hosted by Thomas Jefferson in 1793 at which "free-thinking" sentiments dominated the table talk. The final straw for Trumbull was when Senator Giles of Virginia "proceeded so far at last, as to ridicule the character,
conduct and doctrines of the divine founder of our religion-] efferson, in the
mean time, smiling and nodding approbation. " 9 Individuals who had no access
to genteel salon conversation organized fraternal clubs ip which to debate and
promulgate deism's principles, while others founded societies to stem its odious influence. And a sizable portion of the period's private correspondence was
devoted to either outraged denunciations or fervent defenses of it.
Predictably, the churches observed the growing popularity of deism with
horror. Men of the cloth blasted infidelity from their pulpits, titillating their
parishioners' imaginat;ions with lurid (and largely fictional) accounts of the
deists' debauched lifestyles. A favorite clerical strategy was to associate, if not
to outright identify, the movement with the Antichrist. As one clergyman
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gloomily predicted, "Our Zion must die without an helper" while deistic infi<leis laugh at her "dying groans." When it became obvious that such individual
broadsides were relatively ineffective, the churches moved to a more collective
and militant offensive. The Methodist Episcopal church urged a national day
of fasting and prayer in 1796 to stem the tide of deism. The General Assembly
of the Presbyterian church followed suit two years later-adding, with typical
Calvinist earnestness, that divine wrath would descend on America unless she
turned away from deism. 10
Ironically, the Christian establishment's rather hysterical campaign against
deism drew attention to the movement it otherwise might not have received.
Deism's challenge to Christian hegemony was real but probably not as grave
as the orthodox community supposed. In launching a full-scale attack on the
new infidelity, churchmen shoved it center stage, thereby increasing its audience and its converts. Philip Freneau was more correct than not when he said
Paine's Age of Reason would never have enjoyed the popular notoriety it did
without the Christian establishment's constant and virulent bombardment of
it.ll When Elihu Palmer boasted toward century's end that there were "thousands and tens of thousands of deists" in America, 12 he might have added a
note of gratitude to Christian leaders for their unwitting assistance in recruitment.
In short, the period in which the deistic controversy raged in the Early
Republic was an exciting one. As Charles Dickens later said of the French
Revolution, it was the best of times and the worst of times, depending on
which side of the debate one's allegiance fell. There was an electricity in the air.
It painfully shocked some, such as Uzal Ogden, who thundered that deism
"more became a lunatick, than a person in the enjoyment of his rational faculties!" and then clenched his point by asking: "When the restraints of religion
are dissolved, what can be expected, but that men should abandon themselves
to the impulse of their passions?" 13 Yet that same electricity stimulated others
to see in deism the dawning of a new age-the age of rational religion and
freedom of conscience-in which universal benevolence and justice would prevail. Then, in the words of Tunis Wortman of New York, "we can only expect
to arrive at that ultimate state of perfection of which the human character is
susceptible .. .. Persecution and superstition, vice, prejudice and cruelty will
take their eternal departure from the earth. National animosities and distinctions will be buried in eternal oblivion. " 14 Verbal volleys such as these were
hurled back and forth across the barricades, often bursting with much flash but
little damage. One thing, however, is clear. Regardless of whether the issue
scorched or inflamed, its heat generated one of the first large-scale intellectual
controversies in the young Republic, embroiling clerics, literati, statesmen, students, and laypersons alike. The debate between deism and Christianity even-
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tually extended far beyond the purely religious sphere, touching political, ethical, social, and philosophical nerves along the way. And although the controversy's intellectual and emotional fury burnt itself out for all practical purposes by 1811, its legacy remained. After the deistic challenge, Christian sensibility in the United States would never be quite the same.

What was the nature of this movement which so horrified some and enraptured
others? Although there is no simple answer to this question, the following
laudatory description of deism, written in 1801 by Elihu Palmer, the chief of
the American deists, provides a starting point.
Deism declares to intelligent man the existence of one perfect God,
Creator and Preserver of the Universe; that the laws by which he governs the world, are like himself immutable, and of course, that violations
of these laws, or miraculous interference in the movements of nature,
must be necessarily excluded from the grand system of universal existence; that the Creator is justly entitled to the adoration of every intellectual agent throughout the regions of infinite space; and that he alone
is entitled to it, having no copartners who have a right to share with him
the homage of the intelligent world. Deism also declares, that the practice of a pure, natural, and uncorrupted virtue, is the essential duty, and
constitutes the highest dignity of man; that the powers of man are
competent to all the great purposes of human existence; that science,
virtue, and happiness, are the great objects which ought to awake the
mental energies, and draw forth the moral affections of the human
race. " 15
This preliminary statement of deism's tenets provokes a number of questions. Why did conservative churchmen condemn as a tool of the Antichrist
such a seemingly inoffensive system, while liberal ones as well as non-Christians
welcomed it as the harbinger of a new age of reason and emancipation? Why
did orthodoxy see deism, "the practice of a pure, natural, and uncorrupted
virtue," as the vehicle by which individuals abandoned themselves, in Uzal
Ogden's words, "to the impulse of their passions"? How did those who fervently declared the existence of "one perfect God" acquire reputations for
atheism and infidelity? Moreover, despite the burden of such calumny, why did
the ranks of self-proclaimed deists swell throughout the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries? Finally, how is it that American deism, a widespread and
militant movement, suddenly fizzled out, almost overnight, by 1811? In order
to answer these and other questions, it is necessary to examine American deism
against its broader social and intellectual backdrop.

Introduction

Enlightenment and the New Learning
Deism was a child of the Enlightenment-that period in Western thought
roughly coterminous with the eighteenth century, which is often somewhat
misleadingly labeled the "Age of Reason." The Enlightenment as an intellectual and popular movement accommodated a wide diversity of perspectives as
well as personalities and hence resists airtight, comprehensive definition. It is
better understood as an interpretive way oflooking at the world than an intransigent body of beliefs and doctrines. As Carl Becker argued, the Enlightenment
ethos was a "climate of opinion," not a chiseled-in-stone dogma. 16 Still, despite
divergence of opinion among Enlightenment savants, there is enough family
resemblance between their ideas to allow for the postulation of five general
tendencies that capture the movement's uberhaupt orientation. The extent to
which individual thinkers emphasized each of them certainly differed, but as a
matter of degree rather than kind.
First, Enlightenment savants systematically defended experience and reason, rather than aprioristic speculation, as the twin foundations of human
knowledge. They were, as Charles Taylor put it, "epistemological innovators,"17 breaking with the traditional Aristotelian model of deduction from
inherited first principles and relying instead on observation and induction.
Their primary reason for rejecting Aristotelianism was what they saw as its
unwarranted and impractical appeal to such mysterious categories as substance,
final causation, and innate ideas. ( Curiously, many Enlightened authors failed
to see that they themselves often resorted to analogous explanations in their
own writings-proof that each generation of intellectuals has its own blindspot.) In place of such arcane standards, the Enlightenment savants argued that
human experience and rational analysis were the only barometers of legitimate
knowledge. Scrutiny of experience supplied the raw material from which
reason's logical operations could infer meaningful generalizations. Armchair
speculations that spun elaborate a priori schema without benefit of empirical
grounding were, at best, pleasant diversions. But they were not to be taken
seriously.
Second, this epistemic appeal to empirical reason catapulted the study of
nature-or "natural philosophy"-into the spotlight. Close study of physical
phenomena became obligatory in the Enlightenment intellectual's search for
universal lawlike patterns and explanations. Moreover, the methodology of the
natural sciences was accepted as both a necessary and sufficient standard in any
arena of investigation. Nature and nature's laws were uniform and all-encompassing, incorporating human and social relations as well as physical ones. To
understand the realm of nature, then, was to understand everything, at least in
principle. Consequently, to master the natural sciences was to command all
disciplines.
Third, the new empiricism's reliance on experience and nature encouraged
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a deep-seated suspicion of authority. Savants were quick to challenge traditional answers and received models, whether they were philosophical, ethical,
theological, or political. The book of nature, not the dusty tomes of either the
church or the Scholastics, were the first and final court of appeal. This disencumbrance from authority and hidebound tradition was seen, as Immanuel
Kant put it, as "man's release from self-imposed tutelage. Tutelage is the inability to use one's natural powers without direction from another. This tutelage
is called 'self-imposed' because its cause is not any absence of rational competence but simply a lack of courage and resolution to use one's reason without
direction from another. Sapere aude!-Dare to reason! Have the courage to
use your own minds!-is the motto of enlightenment. " 18
Fourth, the Enlightenment's distrust of authority, as well as its optimistic
faith in the liberating power of human reason, focused its attention on social,
political, and normative issues. This in turn led to a humanitarian espousal of
the primacy of individual freedom and political equality, most often expressed
in the "social contract" model of society endorsed by reform-minded figures
such as John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Denis Diderot. The basic
assumption behind this championing of individual liberty was that greater
understanding of social laws would inevitably lead to the rationalization of
human behavior, just as a fuller comprehension of physical laws would result in
the conquest of nature.
Finally, this confidence in reason's ability to eliminate political evils as well
as ignorance encouraged a deep faith in the eventual and inevitable perfection
of both society and human knowledge. As Ernst Cassirer correctly pointed out,
"No other century is so completely permeated by the idea of intellectual progress as that of the Enlightenment. " 19 This exuberant confidence colored all
areas of human inquiry and endeavor, and thinkers such as Jean Le Rond
d'Alembert presumed that enlightenment would continue to extend the penetrating beam of reason until all facets of existence were illuminated.
The discovery and application of a new method of philosophizing, the
kind of enthusiasm which accompanies discoveries, a certain exaltation
of ideas which the spectacle of the universe produces in us-all these
causes have brought about a lively fermentation of minds. Spreading
through nature in all directions like a river which has burst its dams, this
fermentation has swept with a sort of violence everything along with it
which stood in its way.
The upshot? "Natural science from day to day accumulates new riches .... The
true system of the world has been recognized, developed, and perfected. " 20
The golden age, in short, was at hand.
The immediate intellectual sires of the Enlightenment's exuberant advoca-
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cy of empirical reason, natural philosophy, and reform were three seventeenthcentury Englishmen: Francis Bacon (1561-1626), John Locke (1632-704),
and Isaac Newton (1642-1727). Their influence on eighteenth-century
thought (and, by association, deism) can hardly be exaggerated. They defended and legitimized a new way of perceiving the world which was often
referred to by Enlightenment thinkers as the "New Learning."
Bacon set the stage in The Great Instauration (1603) and Novum Organum (1620) by advocating what he took to be a revolutionary system of
inductive logic that broke with the Aristotelian model of "syllogistic" reasoning. The old model, according to Bacon, was methodologically inadequate
because it ignored the lessons of experience and concentrated exclusively on
the deduction of logical implications from abstract first principles. True, such
deductions often resulted in logically impeccable inferences. But because the
first principles or "notions" on which the system was built were a priori and
untested, the syllogistic arguments generated from them reduced to little more
than vapid speculations possessing neither explanatory power nor utility. As
Bacon remarked, "The syllogism consists of propositions, propositions of
words; words are the signs of notions. If, therefore, the notions (which form
the basis of the whole) be confused ... there is no solidity in the superstructure. " 21 And since the first principles usually were "confused," given their complete detachment from the realm of experience, Bacon concluded that "demonstration by syllogism" lets "nature skip out of its hands." 22
In place of the traditional deductive model, Bacon proposed a method that
took as its starting point not abstract first principles but concrete data gleaned
from experience. This data in turn was manipulated-experimented on-and
refined, until the observer was able to discern patterns or functional correlations in nature's operations, which then were used to generate hypothetical
explanations and lawlike principles. The old deductive logic, in sum, dealt only
with words and propositions, thereby shutting itself off from the real world of
experience. Bacon's new system proceeded inductively, by examining experience and then inferring rational generalizations from it, and so firmly grounding itself in reality. This concentration on nature and experience, Bacon assured
his readers, not only provided a more solid foundation for human knowledge
than the Aristotelian model, but also imbued reasoning with an instrumentality-a practical calculus by which to manipulate and subdue nature-that syllogistic logic failed to supply. And for Bacon, as for his eighteenth-century
intellectual descendants, knowledge and utility were synonymous. This switch
in emphasis from idle speculation to instrumental reason is apparent in the
following passage from The Great Instauration:

The art which I introduce ... is a kind of logic; though the difference
between it and the ordinary (or syllogistic logic] is great; indeed im-
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mense. For the ordinary logic professes to contrive and prepare helps and
guards for the understanding, as mine does; and in this one point they
agree. But mine differs from it in three points especially; viz., in the end
aimed at; in the order of demonstration; and in the starting point of the
inquiry. For the end which this science of mine proposes is the invention
not of arguments but of works; not of things in accordance with principles, but of principles themselves; and not of probable reasons, but of
designations and directions for works. And as the intention is different,
so accordingly is the effect; the effect of the one being to overcome an
opponent in argument, of the other to command nature in action. 23
Bacon's call for a scientific methodology that took experience rather than
abstract speculation as its raw material struck a responsive chord in his contemporaries. The specifics of his proposed system were not without their detractors: Thomas Hobbes, for example, was one of the new logic's harshest critics.
But even if the intellectual world declined to endorse Bacon's method unanimously, it did applaud the spirit of his efforts. His championing of empirical
reason, as well as his insistence that knowledge should properly aim for the
"invention of arts," inspired the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with a
heady vision of continuous scientific progress.
The perceived merits of Bacon's condemnation of syllogistic logic were
underscored by the appearance oflsaac Newton's Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica ( 1687) and Optics ( 1704 ). These works provided the eighteenth century with a theory of physical reality that demonstrated to everyone's
satisfaction the superiority of observation, experiment, and mathematical calculation to abstract speculation. As Newton himself proudly asserted in describing his methodology, "Hypotheses nonfingo" [ "I do not feign hypotheses"].
This claim, in retrospect, may be too strong. But as far as the Enlightenment's
advocates of the New Learning were concerned, Newton's model dramatically
embodied the empiricist method earlier outlined by Bacon.
In the preface to his Principia, Newton carefully delineated the empiricist
boundaries of his methodology: "The whole burden of [natural] philosophy
seems to consist in this: from the phenomena of motions to investigate the
forces of nature, and then from these forces to demonstrate the other phenomena. "24 Beginning, then, with a careful observation of the phenomenon of
motion, Newton constructed a systematic model of physical reality that comprehensively and mathematically showed the material order to be rational and
explicable in terms of incontrovertible and uniform laws. Mystery and caprice
were thereby expunged from nature, by means of"principles ... deduced from
phenomena and made general by induction, which is the highest evidence that
a proposition can have." 25 Physical reality revealed itself to be a clockwork
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mechanism of intricate and fail-safe precision. Material bodies, regardless of
their location or level of complexity, could be explained by the laws of inertia,
change of motion, and reaction. Moreover, given the demonstrated fact that
"Nature is very consonant and conformable to her self," human manipulation
of nature's laws became an actual as well as a logical possibility.
Certainly Newton's mechanistic model did not claim to unriddle all of
physical reality. The origin of the "Attractions" of "Gravity, Magnetism and
Electricity," he conceded, "may be perform'd by impulse, or by some. other
means unknown to me. " 26 But regardless of the ultimate impetus for the rational operations definitive of physical reality, two things were obvious to Newton: first, that the material order displayed rationality and design; second, that
"this most beautiful system of the sun, planets, and comets could only proceed
from the counsel and domination of an intelligent and powerful Being. " 27 This
Primordial Mover, whose presence was deducible from the apparent orderliness of nature, was removed from physical events, serving as their first cause but
only indirectly operating through unvarying natural law. But its existence was
indisputable-although the Marquis de Laplace, working from a Newtonian
framework a century later, would triumphantly assert that his astronomical
schema had no need of the "God hypothesis."
Newton, in short, provided the eighteenth century with a dramatic verification of the soundness of Bacon's empiricist method. He also bequeathed to
it the intellectual assurance that reality was lawlike and that its orderly uniformity pointed to the existence of a rational deity. Alexander Pope thus spoke for
his entire generation when he later celebrated Newton and the New Learning
with the famous couplet: "Nature and Nature's laws lay hid in night;/ God
said, Let Newton be, and all was light."
While Newton charted nature's laws, thereby demystifying the cosmos,
John Locke did the same for the laws of reason, undertaking no less a task than
the elucidation of "the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge,
together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent." Moreover, he did so in good New Learning fashion, proceeding from the "historical,
plain method" of inquiring into "the original of those ideas ... which a man
observes." 28 In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), Locke
claimed that the "ground of belief' was experience. The five senses provided
the human intellect-which itself was a potentiality (the famous tabula rasa)
for the absorption or imprinting of experience-with the raw material of
thought and reflection. Sense data, or "simple ideas," were consequently the
basis of all human knowledge . Complex ideas were generated from simple ones
by the mental function of association: The intellect compared simple ideas,
noting their similarities and differences, and then abstracted from them to
make lawlike principles.
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The mind makes the particular [ or simple] ideas, received from particular objects, to become general; which is done by considering them as
they are in the mind, such appearances, separate from all other existences, and the circumstances of real existence, as time, place, or any
other concomitant ideas. This is called abstraction, whereby ideas, taken
from particular beings, become general representatives of all of the same
kind, and their names general names, applicable to whatever exists conformable to such abstract ideas. " 29
Inductive generalization from sensory experience, then, was the origin of
abstract, scientific postulations. The truth value of any knowledge claim could
be established either by appealing to sensory experience or by testing for the
logical coherency of associations of simple ideas. Meaningful speculation and
reliable discourse, for Locke, never strayed from these twin epistemic foundations. Appeals to "mysterious" standards such as innate ideas or subjective,
psychological certainty were unnecessary.
In formulating the grounds of legitimate belief, Locke described what
soon came to be regarded as mental laws, which were just as immutable as
Newton's physical ones. They were also deemed universal in application, cutting across the entire range of human beliefs. Even the knowledge supposedly
furnished by divine revelation was answerable to the standards of experience
and reason. If pronouncements that posed as revelatory proved upon reflection to be irrational or counterintuitive, they were prima facie candidates for
rejection. Locke, a more or less orthodox Christian, saw the theological import of his thesis and awkwardly hedged his bet by insisting that "genuine"
instances of revelation were "above," not "contrary to," reason. 30 But his
empiricist analysis of the nature and extent of human knowledge cast grave
doubts in the minds of many on the verisimilitude of beliefs that claimed divine origin.
The New Learning's emphasis on experience and nature, then, was
founded on Bacon's advocacy of instrumental reason, Newton's demonstration that physical nature conforms to universal laws, and Locke's analogous
claim in the realm of human psychology. Their work served as the basis for the
Enlightenment's confidence that reality was rational and hence capable of
being understood by rational human minds. The study of nature provided
evidence of order, harmony, and regularity in the physical cosmos. The study
of reason revealed the same attributes in the human faculty of understanding.
Reality more and more appeared as a vast continuum whose laws applied with
clocklike precision to all facets of existence. And the meticulous charting of the
lawful operations of the cosmic clockwork, all felt assured, would inevitably
lead to perfection in human knowledge, virtue, and happiness.
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Liberal Christianity and British Deism
The influence of Bacon, Newton, and Locke was soon apparent in all areas of
intellectual endeavor, and religion was no exception. 31 Some churchmen were
horrified at the theological implications of the New Learning. Although Newton did not reject the possibility of divine intervention (or miracles) and Locke
retained faith in Christian revelation, their respective systems undercut the
likelihood of rational belief in either. Similarly, although Bacon characterized
his new logic as a reinforcement of the scriptural primacy assigned to humans,
his strident denunciations of a priori first principles cut at the heart of many
orthodox doctrines. This tension became increasingly obvious to the trio's
defenders as well as their critics and often prompted the latter to reject the New
Learning outright. Such a dismissal, however, was rare. Most clerics saw Baconian logic, Newtonian physics, and Lockean psychology as supporting evidence
for the existence of the Christian God. The lawlike orderliness of the cosmos
as well as the mind, in their estimations, clearly pointed to the necessity of an
intelligent and benevolent Supreme Architect.
Moreover, Bacon's claim that legitimate reasoning was inductive rather
than aprioristic convinced them that knowledge of God's existence was attainable through an investigation of nature. Consequently, many churchmen, particularly in Britain, accommodated the new Learning in their writings by positing a distinction between "natural" and "revealed" theology. The former
generally focused on naturalistic design arguments for the existence and attributes of God. The latter concentrated on distinctively Christian dogmasthe Trinity, the divinity of Jesus, miracles, and scriptural revelation-which
were incapable of being discovered by the light of experience or understood by
human reason. Following Locke's suggestion in the Essay, the liberal or "latitudinarian" theologians of the eighteenth century insisted that Christian dogma was above rather than contrary to reason and complemented rather than
contradicted natural theology's claims. Thus Samuel Clarke (1675- 1729), one
of Newton's close associates, argued that Christianity's supernatural revelation
was congruent with natural theology, even if its dictums were necessarily faithbased and hence outside the purview of rational analysis. 32 Similarly, George
Cheyne (1671-1743), physician and fellow of the Royal Society, argued that
the inherited taint of original sin hindered human reason from acquiring on its
own an adequate knowledge of God. Therefore, natural religion needed the
aid of divine revelation. 33
In spite of its self-assuredness, liberal theology's marriage of natural reason
and supernatural revelation was an uneasy one. Apologists such as Clarke and
Cheyne who enthusiastically absorbed the New Learning while retaining their
faith in Christian doctrine tended to give away with their left hand what they
took with their right. They embraced the assumption that reality was an im-
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mense mechanism operating in accordance with rational and immutable laws
of nature and hence capable of being fully understood through experience and
human reason. But they pulled back-arbitrarily, some thought-when it
came to traditional Christian dogma, thereby suggesting that the postulated
lawlike character of reality was not so immutable or rational after all.
This tension sparked the emergence of British deism, a movement that
attempted to formulate a "pure" religion of nature by expunging from it elements of Christian supernaturalism. The campaign was launched by John
Toland (1670-1722), who published his Christianity Not Mysterious (1696)
one year after the appearance of Locke's liberal tract The Reasonableness of
Christianity. Toland claimed-much to the embarrassment of Locke, who
publicly disassociated himself from Toland's deism-to base his arguments on
the New Learning's empiricist model of knowing. Toland asserted that a credible natural religion must display logical consistency, even at the expense of
traditional Christian articles of faith. He therefore discounted the possibility of
miracles and divine revelation, the former because they were contrary to experience, the latter because it was beyond the reach of reason and therefore not
bona fide knowledge. The deistic Supreme Craftsman was as rational as his
creation, and Toland considered it unworthy as well as illogical of the Architect
of Reason to communicate in less than rational ways or to violate the system
of natural laws he had established.
Anthony Collins (1676-1729) agreed with Toland and surpassed him in
his attack on supernatural religion. Arguing that the pure religion of nature and
reason had been perverted by superstitious priestcraft, Collins's Discourse on the
Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion ( 1724) indirectly challenged
ecclesiastical authority by describing sacred Scripture, the basis of that authority, as irrational and incomprehensible. While Collins directed his attack specifically against biblical prophecy, his contemporary Thomas Woolston (16691733) took on the doctrine of miracles. In his Discourses on the Miracles of Our
Saviour(l727-29), he concluded that the New Testament's account ofJesus's
miracles was as "broken, elliptical and absurd" as any tale "told of any imposter
... in religion" and that even the early church fathers interpreted scriptural
miracles in only a figurative, allegorical way. 34
A rash of deistic treatises denouncing the claims of revealed Christianity
appeared in subsequent years. 35 Although they were not especially acute from
a philosophical or theological perspective, they stirred up enough controversy
to keep the movement in the public eye. Undoubtedly the most influential
was one written by Matthew Tindal (1657-1733). His Christianity as Old as
the Creation (1730) quickly became known as the "Deist Bible" and was, of all
the British deistic works, the best reasoned and most comprehensive defense
of the religion of nature. Tindal argued that revealed as opposed to natural
theology was not based on the "Nature and Reason of things" but rather on
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superstition and wishful thinking. He offered as an antidote to supernaturalist
confusion the following rule: If any putatively revealed truth differs in even the
slightest detail from experience or reason, it is to be condemned and rejected. 36 This represented a radical break with Locke's liberal attempt to salvage Christian revelation. For Tindal, there was no appreciable distinction
between a proposition "above" and a proposition "contrary to" reason. One
was perhaps a bit less mysterious than the other, but neither ultimately proved
satisfactory to a rational mind. In addition, Tindal denied the divinity of Jesus,
claiming that the notion was an invention of priestcraft; held that the Scriptures demanded veneration of an ethically unworthy deity who displayed capriciousness, jealousy, and arbitrary cruelty in his dealings with hwnans; and
concluded that true religion-the religion of nature, stripped of all priestly
superstitious embellishment-was both logically and ethically superior to
Christianity.
The deistic movement in Britain carried to its logical theological conclusion
the New Learning initiated by Bacon, Newton, and Locke. It rejected revealed
religion as contrary to hwnan as well as divine reason and insisted that the
"Great Book of Nature" and the "Light of Reason" were better guides to a
knowledge of both God and morality than scriptural or priestly dogma. Although frequently accused of atheism by their contemporaries, the British
deists were not disbelievers so much as religious and ethical reformers. They
accepted the existence of a Supreme Architect and argued that his presence was
demonstrable through reason and experience. They took as their task the
methodical critique of an ideology-supernaturalist Christianity- which they
believed had subverted the original reasonableness and purity of religious sentiment. In doing so, they posed a sweeping threat to orthodox religion's hegemony, which far surpassed the liberalizing tendencies oflatitudinarian Christianity. An indignant Jonathan Edwards accurately captured the deists' radical
point of departure in his History of the Work of Redemption (1773), when he
said they
wholly cast off the Christian religion, and are professed infidels. They
are not like the Heretics, Arians, Socinians, and others, who own the
Scriptures to be the word of God, and hold the Christian religion to be
the true religion, but only deny these and these fundamental doctrines
of the Christian religion: they deny the whole Christian religion. Indeed, they own the being of a God; but deny that Christ was the son
of God, and say he was a mere cheat; and so they say all the prophets
and apostles were: and they deny the whole Scripture. They deny that
any of it is the word of God. They deny any revealed religion, or any
word of God at all; and say that God has given mankind no other light
to walk by but their own reason. 37
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Deism Comes to America
New ideas that arise from and agitate cosmopolitan settings trickle down only
gradually, if at all, to provincial societies-especially colonial ones. People who
settle a frontier are understandably more concerned with adapting to their
environment and establishing a foothold than with philosophizing. Such was
the case with the American colonies in the early eighteenth century. Although
urban growth and native culture were on the rise, the colonies in the first half
of the eighteenth century still tended to import their books and ideas from
Britain and, to a lesser extent, France. As a result, there was generally a lag
between the emergence of new thought on the Continent and its arrival in
America.
American exposure to the New Learning was no exception to this rule. The
works of Newton, Locke, and Bacon arrived only in 1714, as part of an excellent collection dispatched from England to Yale by Jeremiah Dummer. Before
that date (and for some time afterward) Yale students were taught an undiluted
Aristotelian physics, learning that the earth was at the center of the universe
and that the four elements were the basic constituents ofreality. 38 Harvard was
somewhat more progressive, having taught Copernicanism since the mid-seventeenth century; even so, Newton's system was introduced there only in the
late 1720s. 39 Moreover, all colonial colleges relied on a Scholastic model of
logic, particularly as defended by the Puritan divine William Ames, which
stressed Aristotelian deduction from abstract first principles. 40 After the Dummer gift, however, the New Learning quickly caught fire and spread throughout the American schools. Princeton's curriculum reflected it by 1746,41 and
by midcentury students as well as a handful of reading laypersons were familiar
with, even if somewhat still confused by, the new way of thinking.
Locke, Bacon, and Newton may have been too rich a diet for many in the
colonies to digest comfortably. But by the 1750s, the more accessible works of
the Scottish common sense philosophers had arrived on the scene, and they
exerted a profound impact on American Enlightenment thought. (The American deists proper, with the notable exceptions of Benjamin Franklin and especially Thomas Jefferson, appear to have been slightly less influenced by them.)
The members of the Scottish school, particularly Francis Hutcheson and Thomas Reid, discussed the implications of empiricism in language that was usually
more easily understandable than that of the Enlightenment's three luminaries.
They also argued that ordinary experience was trustworthy, providing knowledge of the objective world that was, if not absolutely certain, at least probable
and testable. Even before David Hume raised the specter of skepticism, perceptive critics had voiced unease over Locke's insistence that the idea of reality is
all that the human mind immediately knows. If this was the case, these critics
concluded, the knower could never be confident that his or her ideas of the
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objective realm actually corresponded to it. The Scottish philosophers conntered these early winds of skepticism by arguing that commonplace ideas derived from sense perception were reliable because the mind possessed certain
"necessary" or "self-evident" intuitive faculties by which knowledge could be
safely appraised and the sciences, moral as well as physical, established. Such a
defense of common sense empiricism, regardless of its philosophical strength,
provided the American Enlightenment with the fonndation for the empiricist
method it sought. 42
Britain's legacy ofliberal Christianity likewise arrived in the colonies during
the first half of the eighteenth century. John Tillotson's Principles of Natural
Religion (1675) and William Wollaston's Religion of Nature Delineated
( 1722) were the two most widely read of the many liberal attempts to reconcile
the New Learning with Christian revelation, although Clarke and Cheyne
were also known. As in Britain, liberal theology became popular with all but the
most conservative representatives of organized Christianity in colonial America
(including even that redoubtable exemplar of Puritanism, Cotton Mather). 43
Its influence was so far-reaching that Harvard College fonnded the Dudleian
Lectures in 1755 for the express purpose of "the proving, explaining, and
proper use and improvement of the principles of Natural Religion. " 44
Less welcomed by the religious establishment was the colonial importation
of British deism. Members of the upper class and intelligentsia read Toland,
Collins, and Tindal. Alexander Pope and Joseph Addison, with their watereddown versions of deism, were two of the colonists' favorite authors. More
accessible to the general reading public than actual deistic works were scores of
anti.deistic tracts, such as Charles Leslie's Short and Easy Method with the Deists
( 1697) and John Leland's View ofthe Principal Deistical Writers ( 1754 ). These
and similar apologetics, dipped into by laypersons whose curiosity had been
piqued by clerical denunciations of deism, often had the disconcerting effect of
converting their readers to the religion of nature. Sometimes the lapse into
"infidelity" was only temporary. Joseph Hawley (1723-88), a cousin of
Jonathan Edwards's, became so infected while studying at Harvard that he
soon refused to countenance "any Doctrine upon the mere authority of God's
word," 45 but he returned to the fold in 1762. Similarly, the Reverend William
Bliss (1728-1808) "was deeply plunged in their system for many years" after
a youthful encounter with anti.deistic polemics. 46
But for others, including the young Benjamin Franklin, deism took hold.
Initially intrigued by writers such as Leland and Leslie, Franklin graduated to
Collins and Tindal and by the age of seventeen was a convinced deist. Although later in life he moderated his earlier enthusiastic advocacy of deism, he
never abandoned his regard for natural religion nor his distrust of Christian
dogma. In any case, whether the individual commitment to deism was short-
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lived or permanent, it is clear that its radical critique of supernatural religion
was well known in the colonies by rnidcentury. The reading public imbibed it
directly from antideistic tracts or deistic texts themselves, and the illiterate or
nonreading layperson absorbed it indirectly from pulpit denunciations. It is
little wonder that in 1759 a scandalized Ezra Stiles (who in his own youth
had briefly flirted with deism) 47 called the period an "Age of Licentious Liberty."
The New Learning's emphasis on empirical reason and natural philosophy
prompted different forms of "infidelity" in different countries, depending on
the specific social and intellectual climate. In England, for example, where the
Church of England had at least tacitly endorsed a relatively liberal Christianity
since the days of Archbishop Laud, Enlightenment criticisms of orthodoxy
assumed the shape of a mild deism that was sometimes scarcely discernible
from latitudinarianism. France's autocratic political structure, as well as the
entrenched and oppressive dominance of its Catholic establishment, often
pushed disgruntled Enlightenment savants into outright atheism. But American infidelity avoided both of these extremes. More militant than British rational religion but less radical than French atheism, American deism can be seen
in retrospect as falling between the two in both its concrete tenets and its
general mood. Although there are any number of reasons why deism on the
American shore adopted this character, the three primary ones are: the Calvinist tradition against which it reacted; the steady infiltration into North America
of French Enlightenment ideals; and the experience of national independence.

Calvinism
Aspects- of the theology associated with John Calvin ( 1509-64) were embodied in the Church of England's Thirty-nine Articles. But the seventeenthcentury English Puritan movement, which called for drastic doctrinal reformation and a return to spiritual, ecclesial, and ethical purity, wholeheartedly
endorsed what has since come to be known as "Calvinism" proper. Puritan
dissenters who eventually found their way to the Massachusetts Bay Colony
did so with the express goal of creating a society-the "New Jerusalem"-in
which church and state, Moses and Aaron, "were coordinate authorities,
strengthening each other jointly to enforce the moral law." 48 Early New England, inspired by what it saw as its mission to build a Zion in the wilderness,
became for all practical purposes a social and political theocracy. Nor was the
Calvinist ethos limited to New England. It also extended, although not as
ubiquitously, to the middle Atlantic and southern colonies. Regardless of
whether the denomination was Congregational or Anglican, Presbyterian or
even Quaker, the unrelenting presence of Calvinist theology was a staple, to
one extent or another, in most colonial Christian sects.
American Calvinism's doctrinal beliefs and style of theologizing were nei-
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ther static nor monolithic. New England Congregationalism focused on issues
and adopted an ecclesial structure that differed, for example, from its Presbyterian counterpart in the middle colonies, and there was a certain degree of
theological pluralism among the clergy. 49 Despite such diversity, Calvinism in
the colonial period tended to revolve around the "Five Points" defined by the
Synod of Dort in 1618-19. This statement originally had been hammered out
as a response to Arminianism, a "heretical" offshoot which held that human
beings are capable of freely accepting the divine gift of grace and therefore play
an important cooperative role in their salvation. 50 In opposition, the authors of
the Five Points followed Calvin by insisting that God chooses whom to save
and whom to condemn; that Christ's sacrifice guarantees the salvation of
some-the "elect"-but not all; that all individuals are utterly reliant for their
salvation on Christ's atonement because of their innate depravity; that selection by God for spiritual regeneration is irresistible; and that those individuals
redeemed by divine grace are incapable of falling from it-that is, they "persevere" in grace.
But the Five Points were not sin1ply a reaction to a seventeenth-century
heresy. In the Calvinist mind, they were also a codification of the theological
consequences of two historical "covenantal" invitations extended to humanity
by God, as described in Scripture. The first of these was known as the "covenant of works"; the second, the "covenant of grace."
The details of the first invitation are recounted in Genesis. God placed the
parents of the race, Adam and Eve, in the Garden of Eden and promised them
a paradisiacal existence as well as dominion over creation. In return, he asked
for their obedience to his will, as symbolized by his injunction against their
partaking of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil. The quid pro quo
was simple: In exchange for God's blessings, humans need only perform the
meritorious actions or works entailed by the divine request for obedience. Thus
the primordial contract between God and humans became known as the covenant of works.
The outcome of this invitation is, of course, familiar. According to Scripture, Adam and Eve succumbed to temptation, violated their end of the agreement by disobeying the divine command, and hence nullified the original
contract. In just retribution, God rescinded his blessings and punished the
aboriginal couple's sinful disobedience with death-physical and, more significantly, eternal, the never-ending torment of irrevocable separation from God.
In addition, according to the logic of spiritual genetics defended by St. Augustine in the fifth century and accepted by Calvinists, all of Adam's offspring
inllerited the taint as well as the consequences of this first act of disobedience.
Human beings, initially created pure and good, were forever cursed with the
blemish of original sin and hence were utterly depraved, morally as well as
rationally. Try as they might to walk the straight and narrow, their acquired
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corruption would inevitably lead to willful disobedience to God's laws. Their
works would fall short of the mark.
The utter failure of the first covenant, then, left the human race adrift on
a horizonless ocean of hopeless and inescapable wickedness. But, as foretold by
the prophets and revealed in the New Testament, God bestowed on suffering
humanity a way out, a second chance, as it were, for spiritual regeneration. This
new opportunity was provided by the sacrifice of Christ. Adam's original transgression was paid for through the Son of God's vicarious atonement. This
merciful divine action extended a second invitation to humanity: the covenant
of grace. Although individuals remained tainted after the atonement, utterly
corrupt in mind and will, its occurrence ensured that those who humbled
themselves, recognized and confessed their complete depravity, and accepted
Christ as their Savior would be spared the eternal death with which Adam's
iniquity had burdened his descendants. There was no question of such a salvation being earned by the sinner; rather, it was freely given without regard to
individual works. However, the elect could prepare themselves for God's irresistible infusion of grace by acknowledging their impotence to save themselves
and throwing themselves on the undeserved capital of Christ's sacrifice.
The Synod ofDort's Five Points were an attempt to express in credal terms
this scripturally based covenantal history. It is understandable why it so vigorously opposed Arminian tendencies: The Calvinist scheme of salvation could
in no way countenance the suggestion that humans were capable of freely
effecting their redemption through works. Such a presumption flew in the face
of the historical "fact" of Adam's disobedience and the consequent nullification of the first covenant. Even more to the point, it trivialized the crucial
significance of Christ's atonement and its instauration of the new covenant of
grace.
Regardless of its sectarian differences, American Calvinism in the eighteenth century accepted the plan of salvation suggested by scriptural accounts
of the two covenants and canonized by the Synod ofDort. In particular, as one
recent commentator has pointed out, Calvinist divines in America especially
focused on "the problem raised by the absolute responsibility of individuals for
their behavior even when they were evil by nature and could not resist grace. " 51
The immediacy of this dilemma preoccupied Calvinist clergy as well as laypersons, nudging them in the direction of incessant introspection and soul-searching. That God's power, knowledge, and goodness were absolute was unquestionable. Attention consequently turned from God to man in the search for a
way to understand the precarious human condition as well as for psychological
signs of a regenerative infusion of undeserved grace. The central question was
how to know if one was elected for salvation. The answer was simple in theory
but arduous in practice: Search within, humble the passionate and self-asserting
ego, cultivate patience, and cling to Christ. As the Puritan divine Jonathan
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Mitchell succinctly put it: "Pursue and follow home in self-examination, by
applying and considering the Scripture-evidences of a state of Salvation, and
searching whether they be found in thee." 52
This preoccupation with introspective delvings into the psyche in the hope
offully realizing one's inherent corruption and possibly discerning evidences of
grace gave rise to a curious internal dialectic peculiar to Calvinism. If receptivity
to God's invitation entailed humbling oneself to his majesty by acknowledging
utter depravity, the proper course for an individual was a no-holds-barred declaration of war on the self and all of its necessarily wicked pretensions and
vanities. But the primary weapon in this struggle consisted precisely of the self's
ability to burrow into its own depths. The goal was to abase the self to the
extent that Christ's love could enter within, but the way to achieve this end was
through unceasing meditation on the self and its vileness. The bizarre nature
of this quest was not lost on early Calvinists. In his 1607 Auto-Machia, a
didactic poem immensely popular in both British and colonial Calvinist circles,
George Goodwin spelled out in uncompromising terms the implications of the
struggle:
I sing my SELFE: my Civil Warrs within;
The Victories I howrely lose and win;
The dayly Duel, the continuall Strife,
The Warr that ends not, till I end my life. 53
The dialectic of self recruited in the war against self, generated by the
demands of Calvinism's scheme of salvation, was complemented and exacerbated by yet another paradoxical aspect of the struggle for grace: the war of reason
against reason. Calvinism in America enjoyed a long tradition of emphasizing
the cultivation of the intellect. Calvinist clergy were noteworthy among American clerics for their training in languages, theology, and natural philosophy.
Their sermons were often learned discourses which aimed to educate as much
as edify congregations. The theological impetus for this intellectual inquiry was
linked to the demand for incessant self-examination. Just as there were observable psychological signs of God's workings in the human soul, so the natural
realm was imbued with evidences of divine presence and intention, apparent to
anyone with the skill to discern them. But since Adam's fall had corrupted the
self, it likewise had depraved the reason. Consequently, in the intellectual pursuit of God, the Calvinist searcher had to employ a faculty that again was
ultimately untrustworthy. Its limits had to be tested and ascertained, and the
way to do this was through its exercise. When coupled with the demand to wage
an unceasing war against the self, this injunction to discover the limitations of
reason through rational inquiry gave rise to a sometimes incompatible mixture
of anti-intellectual piety and meticulous rationalism. As Perry Miller writes,
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in certain aspects the Puritan appears an antirationalist, but in others he
is exceedingly rational; he attacks with fury those misguided zealots
who jump to the conclusion that religion can dispense with learning,
ministers with education, saints with knowledge, or converts with the
fullest possible understanding, not only of theology, but of science and
philosophy. Puritan writers can pity the insignificance of human reason,
and in the next breath sing the praises of the human mind. 54
For many orthodox Calvinists, these unsettling conflicts gave salvation a
bleak but hopeful nature. After all, as one recent commentator has insightfully
noted, the worshipper's confusion and despair over his or her ambiguous situation was inextricably linked to a complementary "ecstasy about Christ's
atonement and the bliss of the saved. " 55 The "Civil Warr" of self against self
and reason against reason was, by virtue of human depravity, ultimately
doomed to defeat. But, in the context of Calvinism's peculiar dialectic, such
inevitable defeat was a necessary condition for occasional victory.
However, for other Calvinists, the tensions generated by their religion's
bifurcated attitude toward self and reason were psychologically overwhelming.
This painful situation only worsened with the arrival in America of the New
Learning, with its accent on clarity and its championship of the mind's ability
to fathom reality as well as freely pursue the good. Caught between these two
antithetical worldviews, it was inevitable that the more liberal segments of the
Calvinist community would begin to veer toward the New Learning by stressing the rationalist strain in their religion at the expense of the pietistic one.
Calvinist divines gravitated from revealed to natural theology and so emphasized the role of human rationality that many of them, such as Ebenezer Gay
(1696----1787) and Ezra Stiles (1727-95), came dangerously close to affirming
Arminian doctrine-that humans, by the use of unaided reason, could come to
know God's will and save themselves through their own efforts. 56 This obviously entailed the denial (if only tacit) that reason and self were as utterly
depraved as orthodox Calvinism had it. Such rationalist challenges to Calvinism's dialectic even prompted some clergy to renounce their Puritan heritage
and return to the more liberal Anglican church. (Yale College was especially
scandalized by such a denominational exodus in the 1720s.) But most of them
remained in the Calvinist fold and attempted, sometimes awkwardly, sometimes masterfully, to accommodate the New Learning to the theology of the
Five Points.
American Calvinism's uneasy acceptance of both piety and rationalism propelled it toward a crisis, which came in the 1740s with the intercolonial religious revival now known as the "Great Awakening." 57 Sparked by "enthusiasts" such as George Whitefield (1714---70), Gilbert Tennent (1703-64), and
Jonathan Edwards (1703-58), the Great Awakening was in many respects an
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effort on the part of orthodox Calvinists to derail Arminian and rationalist
challenges to the traditional Puritan scheme of salvation. Insisting that the
Christian faith had been poisoned by ungodly defenses of human reason and
freedom of determination, the leaders of the revival called for a return to a
religion of the heart that stressed the traditional pietistic standards of
acknowledgement of complete depravity and introspective preparation for regeneration. Soul-searching, fear, and self-abasement, not reason or works, were
the necessary conditions for salvation. The inherent corruption of human nature, the inability of individuals to save themselves through either good intentions or efforts, and the irremediable inefficacy of reason to fathom the ways
of God were expounded in fire-and-brimstone sermons calculated to whip
listeners into a frenzy of horror and submission that would draw them back to
traditional piety. As Tennent thunderously warned in a 1741 sermon, the
misguided advocates of Arminianism and liberal Christianity
keep Driving, Driving, to Duty, Duty, under this Notion, That it will
recommend natural Men to the Favour of GOD, or entitle them to the
Promises of Grace and Salvation: And thus those blind Guides fix a
deluded World upon the false Foundation of their own Righteousness;
and so exclude them from the dear Redeemer. All the Doings of
unconverted Men, not proceeding from the Principles of Faith, Love,
and a new Nature, nor being directed to the divine Glory as their highest End, but flowing from, and tending to Self, as their Principle and
End; are doubtless damnably Wicked in their Manner of Performance,
and do deserve the Wrath and Curse of a Sin-avenging GOD. 58
Embroiling New England as well as the middle and southern colonies, the
Great Awakening seemed just the antidote to liberal tendencies longed for by
the faithful. And, in fact, it did restore, at least for a while, widespread religious
fervor. But it failed in the long run to stem the tide of either liberal Christianity
or natural religion. Even more to the point, it had the ironic effect of actually
nurturing the growth of deism in America.
There are two reasons for this unintended and undesired consequence of
the Awakeners' efforts. First, their revivalist message inadvertently encouraged
the very Arminian tendencies they hoped to forestall. Even as Edwards in his
pulpit and Whitefield in his open meadow preached the orthodox doctrines of
utter depravity and salvation of the elect, they also, in keeping with the Calvinist dialectic, exhorted their listeners to try to throw off sloth, open themselves
to divine grace, and work toward their own conversion and ultimate regeneration. It is difficult to see how the Awakeners could have avoided this mixed
signal, since the very purpose of a revival is to encourage sinners to mend their
evil ways and return to a godly state. But it is precisely this message of spiritual
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self-determination, conveyed with gripping eloquence and fiery passion, that
sank in----especially since many in the Awakeners' audiences were already leaning toward Arminianism from sheer weariness with traditional Calvinism. The
Awakeners' unintentional espousal of Arminian autonomy undercut the very
fidelity to doctrinal literalness they hoped to revive.
Moreover, the Great Awakening polarized and brought to the foreground
the conflict between rationalism and traditional piety which had been brewing
for the last few decades. Many colonials, attracted to the New Learning but
bound by emotional ties to Calvinism, had tried to keep a foot in both camps
by explaining away fundamental differences between the two worldviews. After the Great Awakening-despite its unwitting bow to Arminianism-such
compromises became increasingly difficult. Battle lines were clearly established
between orthodoxy and liberalism, pietism and natural theology, and they split
what had hitherto been a more or less solid Calvinist hegemony into several
doctrinal splinter groups. The Great Awakening, then, paradoxically ended the
Puritan ideal of a theologically homogeneous Zion in the wilderness. As Alan
Heimert has noted, the Awakening was not so much a successful revival of
Calvinism as "the dying shudder of a Puritanism that refused to see itself as an
anachronism. " 59
The almost suicidal theological convulsions of the Great Awakening were
among the factors that prepared the way for the subsequent popularization of
deism in America. First, the splintering and dissolution of the earlier Calvinist
hegemony created a climate of theological and speculative ambivalence, which
rescued American deism from the need to protect itself by adopting the harsh
and uncompromising infidelity of the French savants. True, deistic sensibilities
were savaged by the American Christian establishment, and secular penalties
for heresy remained on the law books well into the first years of the Republic.
Yet for all that, American deists were spared the relentless secular and ecclesial
persecution their continental counterparts endured. Colonial and Early Republic deism certainly was angry and militant, but the demise on the American
short of orthodox hegemony for the most part prevented it from sliding into
paranoiac hysteria.
Second, the legitimization of liberal theology that the Great Awakening
unwittingly helped to foster enhanced receptivity to the later defense of a
religion of nature. Many observers of the emotional frenzy fanned by the revival were horrified and disgusted by such displays of passionate enthusiasm
(even if, like Benjamin Franklin, they were also reluctantly stirred by them at
times). The perceived irrationality of such episodes only underscored an Enlightenment-tinctured conviction in the superiority of reason as an arbiter in
both secular and theological beliefs. Moreover, the revival's renewed emphasis
on the increasingly distasteful doctrines of human depravity and elected salvation highlighted in their estimations the merits of the New Learning's human-
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istic alternative of self-determination and rationality-especially since Calvinism's own injunction about cultivation of the mind had uncomfortably prepared the way for acceptance of these ideals.
Finally, the spiritual and philosophical vacuum created by the erosion of
widespread fidelity to Calvinism's orthodox worldview provided a point of
entry for new religious perspectives. Since the climate of opinion was already
sympathetic to the claims of rationalism and liberal religion, the uncompromising naturalism of deism, which stressed reason, human dignity, and ethical
responsibility, was seen by many as a logical and saving foundation on which to
construct a new religious system. The deistic Temple of Reason and Humanity,
in short, arose from the rubble of the orthodox New Jerusalem.

The French Influence and the Spirit of Independence
Colonial and Early Republic deism was primarily an outgrowth of British New
Learning. Bacon, Newton, and Locke represented the triune court of authority to which American liberal religionists most often appealed, along with, to
a lesser extent, the common sense philosophy of Reid and Hutcheson. Still, the
mood of French Enlightenment thought was not unfamiliar to the colonists.
Its influence was admittedly less pervasive than that of British rationalism, if for
no other reason than the obstacle oflanguage. But the gradual importation of
French ideals affected American infidelity in at least two ways.
First, the harsh anticlericalism of the French savants provided an exhilarating example to many American thinkers chafing under what they took to be an
unjustified degree of ecclesial influence. Men of the cloth in the American
colonies (particularly in New England) traditionally had enjoyed what today is
an almost unimaginable scope of spiritual and moral authority. They were not
simply the religious and intellectual leaders of their communities. They also
often assumed the roles of social and political watchdogs, condoning or condemning lifestyles and mores from the vantage point of a spiritual wisdom
difficult for the layperson to gainsay. Even after the overt Calvinist hegemony
began to crumble in the early eighteenth century, the clergy as a class was still
endowed in the popular mind with a patina of almost inviolable authority.
French anticlericism, with its mocking denunciations of priestly venery and
ecclesiastical corruption, helped break the sacrosanct aura surrounding the
clergy, just as the British New Learning eroded the indisputability of orthodox
dogma. Both tendencies encouraged the bold criticisms of institutionalized
Christianity hurled by the American deists.
Second, and more significant, the ideals of the French Enlightenment bequeathed to American deism a radical ethical and political flavor that British
deism by and large lacked. The republican orientation of French thought, with
its emphasis on the brotherhood of humanity, natural and inalienable rights,
and social equality, was imbibed by colonial thinkers long before the American
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Revolution. Exposure to French radicalism began as early as the French and
Indian War, which brought American soldiers into contact with French officers
familiar with and sympathetic to political liberalism. Although orthodox
American churchmen deplored the religious infidelity that many of the Gallic
officers championed, most were still captured by the latter's visions of political
equality and fraternity. In 1759, for example, Ezra Stiles condemned the "vitiated morals of Deism" disseminated through colonial exposure to French
Enlightenment thought.6() But just one year later, he preached to his Newport
congregation a sermon whose radical political tone clearly mirrored the very
French influence he had earlier castigated.
We are planting an Empire of better Laws and Religion. Everyone that
has any acquaintance with the Laws must be sensible that so many have
been retained at home from the catholic Times, so many of contrary
Import and Decision, ... and lastly so many by no means adapted to
the Circumstances of this country, not to observe that many are obsolete, that it is almost infinitely difficult for Lawyers themselves to decide
what is true law. In short, the Law is so voluminous and indecisive that
it is high Time to throw it up and assume an Institute de novo, more
intelligible and adapted to the state of the British Nation in the present
age.61
These were heady words in 1760, but they reflected a growing dissatisfaction on the part of Americans for "obsolete" laws and sociopolitical structures
that to some degree was prompted by exposure to the republican ideals of the
French Enlightenment. These ideals transformed many American thinkers,
including Franklin, Ethan Allen, and Jefferson, into unabashed Francophiles.
Inspired by the savants' claim that reason and equality were the twin pillars of
both individual felicity and social justice, they and other colonial figures looked
to French radicalism as an exemplar for their own political development.
The American Revolution and the subsequent formation of the Republic
impressed on the minds of many the fundamental correctness of the French
goals of liberty, equality, and universal emancipation. Moreover, the rousing
example of the subsequent French Revolution only underscored that conviction. It is little wonder that Yale students in 1793 proudly called one another
Voltaire, Rousseau, and d'Alembert. For them, as for many other Americans,
the French Enlightenment's philosophical defenses of personal and intellectual
freedom were dramatically vindicated by the turn of political events in both the
United States and Europe. Human reason had been tried and tested against
the ramparts of civil and ecclesial despotism and had prevailed.
Although American enthusiasm for French thought began to wane after
the horrible excesses of the Terror, Early Republic deists for the most part
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remained sympathetic with its radical ideals. They were convinced that complete freedom of conscience depended on sweeping political and social
changes. Like the French thinkers whom they so admired, deists such as
Jefferson, Allen, Paine, Philip Freneau, and Elihu Palmer believed that ignorance, fear, poverty, and superstition had their roots in political and ecclesial
authority. To eliminate the one without likewise destroying the other, they
reasoned, was merely to cut off one of the Hydra's heads. Consequently,
American deism, particularly in its final, overtly militant stage, championed
social as well as religious reform, calling for the complete separation of church
and state, universal education, and a free press. Some supporters also advocated
an end to slavery and equal legal rights for women. Deism's political radicalism
came to be viewed-and correctly so--as posing as much of a danger as its
denunciations of revealed religion, and critics were quick to point out that
deistic sentiments, if left unchecked, could destroy social stability as well as
Christian faith . The Reverend Robert Hall, in his Modern Infidelity Considered
with respect to Its Influence on Society(l801), was one of those who saw that the
French-inspired political radicalism of American deism had moved it away from
the earlier mild and intellectual British variety.
The effort of [American] infidels, to diffuse the principles of infidelity
among the common people, is another alarming symptom peculiar to
the present time. Hume, Bolingbroke, and Gibbon addressed themselves
solely to the more polished classes of the community, and would have
thought their refined speculations debased by an attempt to enlist disciples from among the populace. Infidelity has lately grown condescending: bred in the cloisters of the learned and afterwards nursed in
the lap of voluptuousness and of courts; having at length reached its full
maturity, it boldly ventures to challenge the suffi:ages of the people,
solicits the acquaintance of peasants and mechanics, and draws whole
nations to its standards. 62
Although Hall's sarcasm was heavy-handed, it nonetheless accurately captured the distinctively egalitarian nature ofAmerican deism. It was a movement
that sought to push the exercise of reason out of the confines of the scholar's
study and the aristocrat's salon into the street, tavern, and household. It took
the ideal ofintellectual freedom more seriously than did its British counterpart,
insisting that the emancipation of the mind from superstition and fear ultimately depended on the establishment of an educated and politically free
populace. But this conviction, although borrowed from French radicalism,
stopped short of advocating the wholesale destruction that characterized the
French Revolution. Part of the reason for this moderation was the atmosphere
of relative civil and religious freedom in which American deism flourished. But
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another factor was the deep-seated belief shared by American deists that
changes in attitudes, values, and social structure could not be coerced through
violence and intimidation. "Reason, righteous and immortal reason," as Elihu
Palmer put it, was the key to the liberation of the human spirit from poverty,
oppression, and ignorance. The sword might eventually have to replace the
printing press as a weapon of emancipation, but only as a final resort. 63

The Maturing of American Deism
Edmund Burke, the British champion of Christian orthodoxy as well as American independence, triumphantly asked in 1790: "Who, born within the last
forty years, has read one word of Colins [sic], and Toland, and Tindal, and
Chubb, and Morgan, and that whole race who called themselves Freethinkers?
Who now reads Bolingbroke? Who ever read him through? " 64 This rhetorical
snort, so typical of Burke, was partly justified. By 1790 British deism which
Burke conventionally styled "free thought," had run its course. Still, Burke's
victory cry was premature. Had he known, the great orator would have been
shocked and grieved that deism, while relatively moribund in England, was
alive and well in the American republic he so admired.
In fact, it was just coming into its own, entering that stage of maturity from
which it would play a major role in the next two decades of the young
Republic's intellectual and religious life. Although isolated advocates of deism
had resided in the American colonies since the first quarter of the eighteenth
century, the steady proliferation of the New Learning, the breakup of Calvinist
hegemony, the osmosis of French radicalism, and the exuberantly optimistic
examples of the American and French revolutions had created by the 1790s a
climate of opinion in which deistic sensibilities were popularly cultivated and
publicly proclaimed. Contrary to Burke, Americans not only read Tindal and
Toland; they absorbed their deistic messages and elaborated on them. "Free
thought" was in the air, and orthodoxy was troubled. The "Age of Licentious
Liberty" Ezra Stiles bemoaned in 1759 had arrived with a vengeance.
Several historians of ideas have distinguished between a "moderate" and a
"militant" stage in American deism, with the former falling roughly in the first
three-quarters of the eighteenth century and the latter finishing it out and
extending into the first decade of the next.65 This division, although convenient, is somewhat misleading. Those individuals in the first part of the century
who considered themselves deists instead of orthodox or liberal Christians
usually subscribed to most of the "radical" religious beliefs of a Collins, Toland,
or Tindal. They rejected (or at least were extremely dubious of) such traditional
Christian doctrines as revealed knowledge, the divinity of Jesus, original sin,
miracles, eternal damnation, and the Trinity. Their concept of God was that of
a Supreme Architect who served as the original cause of uniform physical laws
and whose existence and nature could be inferred rationally from an exarnina-
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tion of those laws. Like their British counterparts, they argued that natural
philosophy was the highest form of worship as well as the best avenue for
knowledge of things divine. If the American deists of this period are appraised
in terms of their philosophical distance from the tenets of orthodox Christianity, they clearly were anything but "moderate." Instead, they were intellectual
and theological radicals.
Still, it is undeniable that American deism toward century's end took on a
harsher tone and was more vocal than it had been in earlier periods. PreRepublic deists, as a general rule, were less apt to openly acknowledge allegiance to rational religion. Indeed, they displayed a marked aversion to trumpeting their disagreement with (and in some cases contempt of) Christianity's
worldview. They shied away from proselytizing and only rarely allowed themselves to even hint in public their heterodox leanings. Individual confessions of
infidelity, when made, were normally confined to safe circles-salon conversations with select acquaintances or private correspondence. This functional difference in tone and public expression is what separated moderate from militant
deists more than any disagreements in their orientation or worldview.
There are three primary reasons for the diffident tone of the early American
deists. The first is that many of the older converts, such as Benjamin Franklin,
in fact were somewhat ambivalent in their private endorsements of heterodox
theological beliefs. They were too close in age and temperament to the heyday
of American Calvinism, too immersed in its cultural and intellectual milieu, to
forsake it easily or entirely. Although they intellectually rejected most if not all
ofits five essential doctrines, they often found themselves torn in their religious
persuasions between the claims of the enlightened mind and those of
tradition's heart. Franklin, for instance, never quite reconciled his deistic conviction that physical reality was explicable in terms of immutable and absolute
mechanistic laws with his Calvinist-inspired suspicion that providential or miraculous interventions in the cosmic machinery's functions were both logical
and actual possibilities. Still, the ambivalence ofAmerican deists in the first part
of the eighteenth century should not be overstated. Although they sometimes
were uncomfortably caught between two competing worldviews, their primary
allegiance was to the deistic one.
A second and more substantial reason for American deism's early reticence
can be traced to a concern for social and economic stability. Many colonial
intellectuals who privately professed the tenets of deism were both suspicious
and contemptuous of what they considered to be the "mob." They recognized
all too well that deism's call for the exercise of reason and its promotion of
egalitarianism struck at the roots of class privilege as well as political and ecclesiastical authority. It was but a short step, in their estimation, from calling into
question traditional scriptural and clerical authority to doing the same with
economic and social relations. And this in turn could open the floodgates to
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social upheaval, sweeping away the established political structures of the day.
Christianity seemed a necessary check against the unruly and leveling tendencies of "King Mob." Deism was a rational person's religion; but the general
populace-illiterate, passionate, and envious of their social betters-was anything but rational. Better to allow the mob to retain its faith in conventional
Christian beliefs until such time as it was better educated and less unpredictable. Even if those beliefs were false, they at least had the social utility of
controlling the destructive tendencies of the rabble ( through the threat of
eternal damnation) and encouraging its members to be content with their
social and economic lot (through the promise of eternal and conveniently
otherworldly bliss). As late as 1786, Benjamin Franklin disingenuously expressed this sentiment when he cautioned an unknown correspondent (possibly Tom Paine) against the publication of a popular tract on deism: "I would
advise you, therefore, not to attempt unchaining the Tyger, but to burn the
Piece before it is seen by any other Person; whereby you will save yourself a
great deal of Mortification from the enemies it may raise against you, and
perhaps a good deal of Regret and Repentence. If men are so wicked as we see
them with religion, what would they be if without it. " 66
Franklin's advice is interesting because it reflects the extent to which
American deists of an older generation adopted the nonpolitical flavor of earlier
British deism. But it is also interesting in that it hints at the third major reason
for American deism's early moderation: the threat of "Mortification from the
enemies" of deism. In this Franklin was quite correct. Loyalty to orthodox
Christianity was still strong in America even in 1786, and those who set themselves against it could expect social opprobrium. But during the first half of the
eighteenth century, when deism was just beginning to gain a foothold, the risks
of open "infidelity" were even greater. Although the theocratic hegemony of
Puritan New England began to break apart following the Great Awakening,
the influence of Calvinism remained strong. It is not surprising that early sympathizers with deism adopted a cautious, moderate tone. They had too much
to lose in bucking the entrenched, even if partially declawed, Christian establishment. Dissenters had little to fear in the way of actual legal persecution by
midcentury from the surviving Calvinist community, but they were still susceptible to a loss of reputation, a diminution of the likelihood of professional
advancement, and public scorn.
The shift in tone between early and late eighteenth-century American
deism notwithstanding, there is an obvious philosophical continuity running
throughout the entire movement. This is not to suggest that all deists agreed
on all points. Like the overall Enlightenment ethos, American deism was a
general orientation rather than a unanimously endorsed set of doctrines. As an
editorial in the Prospect, a leading deistic newspaper, observed in 1803, the
deists had "no intention to impose a creed upon men ... we know that among
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those who believe that the religion of nature is the only true religion, there are
shades of difference in their opinions." But, "these differences are inconsiderable-less, much less, than those which are every day exhibited in every part of
the christian world." Consequently, the Prospect claimed, it is possible "to state
with simplicity, and delineate with correctness the prominent features" of
American deism. 67 An examination of the writings of the deistic authors collected in this anthology-Franklin, Jefferson, Allen, Volney, Paine, Palmer, and
Freneau-as well as the articles in The Temple ofReason, the Prospect, and The
Theophilanthropist, reveals that these "prominent features" include the critique
of Christianity; reflections on reason, nature, and God; and ethical theory.

Deism's Critique of Christianity
American deism's crusade against Christianity attacked on two fronts. First, it
charged that the supernaturalistic worldview advocated by Christianity was
illogical because it mandated belief in propositions that violated both the lessons of experience and the principles of reason. Second, it normatively condemned Christian orthodoxy for its historical record of intolerance and persecution as well as its scriptural depiction of the deity as a capricious and wicked
celestial tyrant.
Regardless of the extent to which they differed on finer points of analysis,
the American deists unanimously rejected the triune concept of God and the
divinity of Jesus. The former was dismissed because it struck the deists as an
obvious logical impossibility. The notion of a God who is simultaneously three
substances yet one substance violated, in their estimation, one of the very
foundations of rational thought and discourse: the principle of noncontradiction. As such, it could not even be classified as one of those mysterious
Lockean truths "above but not contrary to" reason. It was meaningless, so
nonsensically paradoxical that no rational person could assent to it.
Similarly, the orthodox dogmas of the incarnation and resurrection were
dismissed by the deists as irrational superstitions. The infinite and eternal could
not possibly embody itself as a finite and historical man and still remain fully
divine. Such a suggestion, once again, did violence to the principle of
noncontradiction: How could an entity be fully human and yet fully divine at
the same time? Moreover, the claim that a dead man could reanimate after
three days in the grave ran contrary to the lessons of experience. The perceived
uniformity of nature cried out against such an egregious rupture of the fabric
of universal law.
The deistic denial of the resurrection extended to a disbelief in all other
orthodox accounts of miracles. For the deists, a miracle by definition constituted an infraction of the regular and predictable operations of physical reality.
If God occasionally intervened in the mechanistic orderliness of nature by
miraculously suspending its lawlike operations, only one of two conclusions
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could be drawn. Either the deity was playing an ad hoc game of patch-up,
trying by supernatural intervention to mend weaknesses or disfunctions in the
cosmic machine; or physical reality, despite its apparent uniformity and mathematical regularity, did not in fact possess these attributes but was instead
manipulated in mysterious ways by a whimsical and arbitrary God. The first
conclusion, the deists reasoned, was unacceptable because it reduced God to
a less-than-perfect entity-to a faulty or careless Architect who so botched the
original design and execution of reality that endless repairs were necessary to
bolster the structure. The second conclusion was equally unacceptable, insofar
as it violated ordinary experience as well as the more sophisticated discoveries
of natural philosophers such as Newton. There was no compelling evidence
whatsoever to suggest that reality did not operate solely according to the dictates of immutable and rational laws. Anecdotal accounts of miraculous intervention, then, when weighed against empirical data and mathematical demonstration, lacked credibility. The deists thus were in complete agreement with
the analysis of miracles David Hume offered in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding(I748): "A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and
as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof
against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument
from experience can possibly be imagined. " 68
Nor did the American deists confine their skepticism to the doctrine of
miracles. They also criticized and rejected another of Christianity's central
tenets: revealed knowledge. Sectarian beliefs supposedly originating from divine revelation, according to the deists, were ultimately untestable by any
nonsectarian standard of truth, such as reason or experience. The orthodox
community nonetheless argued for the reliability of "revealed" truths on two
grounds: that they were recorded in sacred Scripture, which itself was deemed
inspired and inerrant, and that a believer who accepted revelatory precepts was
psychologically convinced of their truth. But Scripture, the deists countered,
was internally inconsistent as well as intrinsically unbelievable in places. Jefferson, Paine, and Palmer went to great pains to expose what they took to be the
textual errancy of Scripture. Moreover, Volney, in his masterful comparative
study of the world's religious traditions, showed that each sect claimed infallible
revelation as its foundation and that these revelations often contradicted one
another. Finally, the justification of revelation on the basis of the certainty with
which it was accepted likewise was rejected. As Locke had argued in his Essay
on Human Understanding, subjective conviction was no guarantee of the truth
of a proposition. Such certainty revealed information about the mind of the
believer but in no way shed light upon the truth value of his or her belief
In challenging the authority of revelation and Scripture, the American
deists obviously rejected the orthodox Christian notion of faith. For the deists,
faith-based propositions were nothing more than the probable conclusions of
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inferential arguments, inductively arrived at through the observation and
analysis of empirical data. Hence orthodoxy's claim that faith is a nonrational,
grace-inspired assent to supernatural tenets was dismissed as a needless obfuscation of a transparently logical process.
Just as the illogical nature of orthodox Christianity offended the deists'
sense of rational propriety, so its perceived immorality violated their strong
sense of justice. There were two standard normative objections to Christianity
to which its deistic opponents most often appealed. The first was that its sectarian dogmatism bred intolerance of dissenting perspectives and outright persecution of those who maintained their right to a free conscience. Franklin,
Jefferson, and Paine were particularly angered and disgusted by what they saw
as historical Christianity's narrow-minded unwillingness to countenance heterodoxy in religious persuasion.
Moreover, most deistic critics argued that Christianity's insistence on scriptural inerrancy forced it into the position of mandating belief in a capricious
and vindictive deity, who practiced with impunity all the destructive passions
that surely would have been condemned in a human agent. Such a double
standard was unjustifiable and unworthy of the Author of nature. Nor did the
moral character of Jesus escape criticism. Some deists, such as Jefferson and
Franklin, considered the Galilean to be the paragon of human virtue, even
though they denied his divinity. But others, including Palmer, disagreed. As
they saw it, the Jesus portrayed in Scripture performed numerous acts of pettiness and spite and defended as virtuous such human weaknesses as humility
and meekness. True, he occasionally espoused ethical proverbs that were normatively praiseworthy and rational, but there was no system to his moralizing.
Nor was there anything especially original, much less divinely inspired, about
it. The maxims New Testament writers attributed to Jesus had been expounded earlier-and, for the deists, much more cogently-by the Greek and
Roman philosophers.

Reason, Nature, and God
In many ways, the American deists were more empiricist in their epistemology
than Locke and more mechanistic in their natural philosophy than Newton.
Locke, a liberal Christian, had allowed for the legitimacy of divinely revealed
knowledge that was nonrational ( although not irrational). Newton, mystic that
he privately was, left open the possibility that the Supreme Designer periodically intervened in a miraculous, nonmechanistic way in the otherwise lawlike
operations of the cosmic machine. But neither of these possibilities was acceptable to the American deists.
Reason, experience, orderliness, lawlike functionality-these were the primary characteristics of the worldview of American deism. Ordinary experience
disclosed an orderliness in physical reality that abstract, mathematical analysis
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afterward demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt. That the human intellect
was capable of discerning the rational nature of physical reality in turn pointed
to the fact that humans themselves were preeminently rational creatures. This
only made sense, inasmuch as they were but an aspect of the larger physical
whole, and the parts reflected the nature of the whole. Besides, Locke clearly
revealed the laws of thought by which the human intellect operated, laws as
objectively verifiable as Newton's natural ones. The human intellect, then, was
a microcosm of the rational universe. As such, it was excellently qualified to
elucidate and describe reality.
The American deists interpreted the perceived orderliness and rationality of
human and physical reality as a clear demonstration of the existence of an
equally orderly and rational deity. Most of them concurred with Ethan Allen's
claim that the observed lawlike nature of reality demanded that it be the deliberate and intelligent product of a First Cause. This standard deistic appeal to
a combination of causal and design arguments for the existence of God was not
an especially strong claim. After all, David Hume had persuasively argued that
the mere appearance of orderliness in nature in no way entailed intelligent,
purposeful design by a rational First Cause and that to assume otherwise was
to indulge in question-begging. 69 But this was a logical point the deists were
either ignorant of or chose to ignore. For them, the existence of God was
demonstrable, in a posteriori fashion, from an examination of and reflection on
the world of experience. The Book of Nature, not sectarian "holy" writings,
was God's true revelation. The study of nature was consequently one of the
highest forms of worship and veneration.
Although the American deists fervently believed in the existence of a deity-they were not atheists, contrary to their orthodox critics' favorite
charge-they maintained an agnosticism regarding the divine nature. True,
certain insights into God's essence could be gleaned by observing and inferring
from his creation. Since reality was rational, for example, God must likewise be
rational. Since the lawlike operations of nature were conducive to the wellbeing of humans, God was also benevolent. But little else could be known
about God's character. It is important to note, however, that this assumption
of divine unknowability was based not so much on mysterious dogma or supernaturalistic awe as on what the deists took to be a very rational principle: The
finitude of the human intellect was incapable of fully comprehending divine
infinitude. Humans were imbued with a spark of the divine reason and so were
privy to a limited knowledge of the divine. Ultimately, however, awareness of
God's essence was beyond the race's ken.
The American deists recognized abstract, speculative reason, but they, like
other Enlightenment figures, assigned to it a relatively minor role. Far more
important to them was the Baconian notion of reason as instrumental, utilityladen, and promotive of good works rather than merely of elaborate argurnen-
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tations. Reason, according to the American deists, was capable of liberating
humanity from superstition as well as political oppression, from ignorance as
well as material want. Its instrumental character necessarily laid open the promise of continuous progress in the natural and human sciences. This identity
between reason and utility only underscored, in the minds of the deists, the
importance of technological knowledge. Some of them, such as Franklin and
the authors of The Theophilanthropist, became ardent cheerleaders of Enlightenment science, seeing in it the salvation of humankind. Other deists, such as
Freneau, were less sanguine. But all of them, from the moderate to the more
militant, were equally convinced that reason was and ought to be the vehicle
of concrete instrumentality. A priori speculation and arid syllogizing were at
best useless, at worst dogmatic and conducive to supernaturalistic bigotry.

Ethics
American deism from first to last focused attention on ethical issues. It reflected
on the nature of virtue and vice, as well as the necessary conditions for the good
life, and argued that the most appropriate way of showing reverence for the
God of nature was by living virtuously. In keeping with its instrumentalist
orientation, American deism's emphasis on ethical issues had a pragmatic
agenda: the clarification of the means by which to maximize individual and
social felicity. The assumption was that eliminating those factors that breed
exploitation, oppression, ignorance, and superstitious fear would make room
for the practical and spiritual perfection of society. Just as important, because
virtuous behavior in the eyes of the deists was rational behavior, it was the
natural and ultimate goal of human beings.
The ideal of moral perfection, on a social as well as individual level, occupied
the American deists more than any other single issue. Franklin, with almost
mathematical precision, worked out a moral calculus and argued that human
virtue, as Aristotle had suggested, was a matter of habituation to good works.
Jefferson considered the primary end of religious belief to be the promotion of
virtue and admired Jesus (although not institutionalized Christianity) because
of what he took to be the purity of the Nazarene's ethical principles. Allen,
Paine, and Volney all declared that virtuous behavior was the highest form of
worship and the chief duty of humankind. Freneau argued that the light of
divine reason within each individual was, if harkened to, a sufficient guide for
moral perfection. And Elihu Palmer, the greatest of the American deists, provided the movement with a systematic ethical theory based on the principles of
"reciprocal justice" and "universal benevolence." He contended that ethical
principle was independent of the will or even command of a deity but was
instead grounded in human reason and psychobiological principles. This represented the first major naturalistic ethical theory defended by an American
thinker, and both its postulates and conclusions were deistic to the core.
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But American deists were more than just theoretical ethicists. They were
also, to one degree or another, reformers, actively disseminating their moral
conviction that reason and tolerance were the cornerstones of a free society and
a happy individual existence. In their writings and speeches they campaigned
for freedom of conscience, separation of church and state, the elimination of
slavery, the emancipation of women, universal education, an end to economic,
political, and ecclesiastical privilege, and the decentralization of government.
Their ardent republican sympathies and their fearless opposition to Federalist
sentiments probably earned them almost as much hatred as did their unabashed religious heterodoxy. But public censure and even occasional legal
persecution were relatively ineffective as impediments to deistic activism. The
movement continued as an outspoken and often strident conscience of the
nation-particularly through the gadfly stings of The Temple of Reason, the
Prospect, and The Theophilanthropist-until the beginning of the nineteenth
century.

Deism's Demise
The deistic movement in America did not long survive the eighteenth century.
The Theophilanthropist came to a dismal conclusion in 1811. Paine had died
two years earlier, Palmer five . Jefferson would linger on until 1826, but he
remained as reluctant to publicize his religious views as ever. Philip Freneau,
deism's bard, whose eloquence celebrated the God of nature, had the unhappy
distinction of being the last of the American Enlightenment deists. By the time
he died in 1832, deism as an influential and aggressively outspoken movement
had been finished for two decades.
The demise of American deism is partly attributable to the fact that its
leading spokesmen died out as the eighteenth century turned into the nineteenth. Without the direction of firebrands such as Paine and Palmer, the
militancy that characterized the movement in its heyday was impossible to
sustain. But it is equally true that the "temple of reason" laboriously constructed by rational religionists began to collapse under its own weight. Conceptual weaknesses in its Enlightenment-based foundation became increasingly apparent as the years progressed-structural cracks that not even a Paine
or a Palmer could have adequately patched. American deism ultimately lost
currency because the New Learning that served as its philosophical base ceased
to exercise the intellectual authority it once had. The deistic worldview, fixed
squarely on the Enlightenment's allegiance to mechanism and rationalism,
began to be perceived as simplistic to the point of distortion. This increasingly
negative appraisal of deism's basic assumptions proceeded along two parallel
paths: a critique of the immaculately rational system it defended, and the
charge that its account of God was inadequate.
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Hume's Challenge to Mechanism70
The fundamental conceptual prism through which the American deists interpreted reality was the Newtonian mechanistic model. For them, the universe
was analogous if not identical to a cosmic machine whose various parts causally
interacted with mathematically predictable precision. The algorithmic key to
understanding the cosmic machine was the system of natural laws ordained and
set in motion by the supremely rational First Cause. These immutable and
uniform laws governed the material realm in such a way that there was no
possibility of physical phenomena deviating from the preordained blueprint.
This meant that causal relations within the universe were necessary ones: The
cosmic machine must operate in the way it does. Even the slightest deviation
from the set chain of causal relations would shatter the rational integrity of the
system as a whole. Given this cosmological assumption, it is not surprising that
the American deists denied the possibility of miraculous interventions in the
established nexus of physical causation. Such supernatural ruptures would violate the mechanistic harmony of creation as well as the majestic omnirationality
of God. It would also destroy the possibility of natural philosophy.
To the eighteenth-century deists, exhilarated as they were by a heady diet
of scientific discoveries and inventions that seemed to corroborate Newton's
system, the validity of the mechanistic model was self-evident. It was also a clear
advance over traditional cosmologies, such as Aristotle's, which obfuscated
more than clarified the nature of reality. Finally, the pristinely simple cosmos of
Enlightenment mechanism possessed an austere beauty that appealed to the
neoclassical aesthetic and intellectual sensibilities of a generation that valued
clarity above all else. But as the eighteenth century waned, the earlier confidence in a mechanistic universe began to crumble.
David Hume's devastating critique of the assumption that the idea of causation actually corresponded to objective "fact" was the first hammer-blow to
the cosmic machine. Hume originally launched his attack in his 1739 Treatise
of Human Nature. But, as he later admitted, the book's first edition "fell
deadborn from the press," and as a consequence his examination of the concept of causation attracted little attention for a generation. Subsequent editions, however, hit the mark and succeeded in casting doubt on one of the
fundamental tenets of Enlightenment deism.
In his Treatise, Hume granted that humans have an idea of causation, and
he likewise conceded that it was the keystone of the natural sciences. He also
acknowledged, in good empiricist fashion, that this concept, like all ideas, originated in experience. Considering the nature of the concept of causation, the
experience that gave rise to it must have been one of a relationship between
objects or events. So far, so good. Neither Newton nor his American followers
would have disagreed.
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But then Hume dropped his philosophical bombshell. An unprejudiced
examination of the experience of physical relationships, he claimed, revealed
but three kinds: contiguity, priority in time, and constant conjunction. In other
words, objects or events were experienced as proximate to one another, temporally related to one another such that one always preceded the other, or
inevitably conjoined. What experience did not and could not convey was any
"necessary connexion" between the objects or events related in any of these
ways. Instead, causation was merely inferred on the basis of "association,"
which in turn arose from repeated experience of the three types of relations.
Necessary causal connections, then, were neither empirically observable nor
logically deducible from the scrutiny of physical relations. This conclusion
obviously struck at the very heart of Newtonian mechanism, grounded as it
was in the assumption that necessary causal relations were both self-evident and
the objective foundation on which natural philosophy based its cosmological
case. 71 Hume's assault on the deterministic integrity of the Newtonian machine may not have been as dramatic as a supernaturalist defense of divine
intervention, but it was much more damaging. It denied that reality was as
lucidly explicable as the deists maintained and, in doing so, called into question
the reach of human reason as well as the trustworthiness of natural philosophy.
It would be misleading to suggest that Hume's argument devastated late
eighteenth-century advocates of the Newtonian worldview. Many of themparticularly the American deists-were too dazzled by mechanism's totalizing
vision to pay much attention to Hume's rather arcane analysis of causation.
Even Hume himself admitted that his philosophical skepticism was best confined to the intellectual's library and that a practical person would do well to
act as if necessary causation was an objective fact. But his denial of necessary
causation contributed to new winds that began to blow across the Enlightenment landscape, eventually stirring the dust enough to expose a fault in the
deterministic machine defended by rational religionists.

Mechanism and Alienation
Hume's attack on the notion of necessary causation, despite his woeful claim,
was not completely deadborn. It did exercise a few of the more discerning
thinkers of his generation; Kant, for one, graciously acknowledged that it
awoke him from his "dogmatic slumber." Still, Hume's philosophical skepticism failed to reverberate immediately throughout the wider community. But
a second crack appeared in the mechanistic model of reality which, although
more psychological than philosophical in nature, did make its presence felt.
The abstractly immaculate model defended by the American deists and
enthusiastically appealed to as a self-evident demonstration of both the
clocklike regularity of physical law and the omnirationality of God began to
grate on early nineteenth-century sensibilities. What had earlier been regarded
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as an awe-inspiring cosmos rich with scientific potentiality increasingly came to
be viewed as a forlorn and lifeless desert. In the minds of many, the mechanistic
universe was an austere, impersonal, and forbidding place whose mute expanses, in spite of the deistic insistence on providential design, remained indifferent to the human condition. How could a machine do otherwise? Blaise
Pascal in the seventeenth century had anticipated this unease with his plaintive
cry that the eternal silence of infinite space filled him with terror, but for the
most part the eighteenth century's Enlightenment-bred optimism drowned
out his voice. It was not until the advent of the nineteenth century, when the
cosmic machine's impersonal perfection began to alienate more than enrapture, that Pascal's prophetic warning was taken seriously. Edwin Burtt expressed the nature of this alienation when he wrote that its overpowering presence tended to reduce humanity's self-image to that of a
puny irrelevant spectator (so far as a being wholly imprisoned in a dark
room can be called such) of the vast mathematical system whose regular
motions according to mechanical principles constituted the world of
nature .... The world that people had thought themselves living ina world rich with color and sound, redolent with fragrance, filled with
gladness, love and beauty, speaking everywhere of purposive harmony
and creative ideals-was crowded now into minute corners of the brains
of scattered organic beings. The really important world outside was a
world hard, colorless, silent and dead. 72
Burtt has nicely captured the sense of displacement that Enlightenment
mechanism came to inflict on nineteenth-century intellectuals and reading
laypersons alike. In their minds, the Newtonian system not only reduced humans to cogs in the machine; it also, as Burtt pointed out, rendered them
irrelevant. The nagging, protoexistentialist forlornness bred by such an impersonal cosmology had bothered even some of the deists themselves. Franklin
attempted to inject more warmth into the clockwork universe by clinging to
the notion of special providences. Freneau, at the other end of the historical line
of American deism, tried to ameliorate the detached coldness of mechanism by
infusing it with elements of romanticism that smack of the later transcendentalist movement. Each of the other American deists had insisted, although
usually rather vaguely, that the divine First Cause, in spite of his aloof, impassable nature, looked upon humankind with a benign benevolence. But the
mathematically abstract worldview that served as the underlying assumption of
their rational religion tended to belie such claims, and this became increasingly
apparent as well as oppressive to the early nineteenth-century mind.
Closely linked to the psychological sense of alienation bred by mechanism's
sterile cosmos was the unsettling suspicion, which later matured to a cardinal
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tenet of American romanticism, that humans were not the austerely rational
creatures portrayed by either deism or the Enlightenment's New Learning.
Hume, of course, had already cast philosophical shadows on the adequacy of
human reason with his epistemic skepticism. But as the nineteenth century
unfolded, a different impetus to skepticism, this time sparked by Kant and the
German Idealists, began to emerge. The conviction that reason was a sure
guide to the nature of both physical and human reality was dismissed as an
extravagant presumption. There were depths within the human soul impervious to rational investigation, depths that could only be dimly fathomed by
harkening to one's moods, intuitions, and passions. To ignore this darker side
of the human condition was to run the risk of stifling one's nature, ofretarding
one's potential for insight. It encouraged a smug complacency and false optimism, dividing subject from self and providing a falsely simplistic blueprint of
humanity and the universe. Once again, it was Pascal who had anticipated this
change of direction two centuries before. "What will become of you then, 0
man," he had asked, "who try by your natural reason to discover what is your
true condition? ... Know then, proud creature, what a paradox you are to
yourself. Be humble, impotent reason; be quiet, imbecile nature: know that
man surpasses man infinitely. " 73
Pascal's contemptuous dismissal of reason as "impotent" was a far cry from
Elihu Palmer's enraptured "righteous and immortal reason," but it better
suited the mood of the early nineteenth century. It also pointed to what in
retrospect can be seen as one of the fundamental weaknesses of the deistic
worldview. For all the sincerity of their humanistic ideals, the American deists
endorsed a philosophical anthropology that simplistically objectified the human spirit. Given their fidelity to mechanistic Newtonianism and its accompanying rationalism, such a view of human nature was perfectly consistent; it was
also shallow. In their efforts to extend the domain of scientific method to all
arenas of investigation, they tended to ignore or dismiss those elements in
experience that resisted such incorporation. In the case of their analysis of what
it meant to be human, this resulted in a radical desubjectivization of persons:
Humans were little more than animated physical objects which, like all other
objects, necessarily conformed to immutable natural laws. The sole obstacles to
humanity's recognizing its determined place in the vast scheme of things were
superstition and ignorance. Remove these hindrances, and individuals would
naturally accommodate their thoughts and actions to the rational order of
which they were a part. The cosmic machine would then operate perfectly at
the human level, and individual felicity as well as social progress would inevitably ensue. 74
But this type of humanism, very much like the cosmological mechanism
that served as its foundation, in fact was rather lifeless and flew in the face of
ordinary experience. Humans are not predictably rational cogs in a complex
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world machine, and this became more and more apparent to critics ofEnlightenment deism. Instead, as Kant asserted in his Critique of Pure Reason, humans occupied a unique place in the scheme of things. They were, to some
degree, bound by the same rational laws as all other elements of nature. But,
Kant continued, humans also possessed freedom and an interior existence that
distinguished them from the physical system of bodies in motion. They were
in one respect akin to the "starry heavens above," but they were also to a
certain extent unpredictably free of mechanistic restraints. This paradoxical
combination of disparate dimensions filled Kant with "ever new and increasing
admiration and awe," as well it should have. It also echoed Pascal's point when
he said of humans, "What a paradox you are to yourself." But the fact that
humans cannot and should not be regarded as just another class of rationally
analyzable material bodies by and large escaped the American deists. In their
zeal to liberate individuals from the burdens of superstition and the shackles of
irrationality, they unwittingly reified them into exclusively rational entities
reminiscent of Rene Descartes's description of humans as embodied thinking
substances.
Deism in America, then, revolved around an Enlightenment view of reality
as well as reason that began to crack under its own weight at the beginning of
the nineteenth century. Its mechanistic cosmology, based as it was on the
assumption of the objective existence of necessary causal connections, was
called into question-on empiricist grounds-by David Hume. Less technically, mechanism's portrayal of reality as an impersonal system of deterministic
relations bred an uneasy sense of alienation, in which the individual felt adrift
in a world, as Burtt put it, devoid of "color and sound, ... gladness, love and
beauty." Similarly, its Baconian-inspired belief that reason was a sufficient instrument for the complete illumination of both physical and human nature
grew increasingly unacceptable as early nineteenth-century transcendentalists
promoted the existential as well as epistemic centrality of moods, affections,
and intuitions. In short, the twin principles on which the deistic worldview
rested tended to oversimplify reality, reason, and the human condition, reducing each of them to a limpid but unidimensional set of explanations. The
richness of experience, in all its bewildering diversity, was sacrificed for the sake
of a deceptive lucidity, and such an unfortunate trade-off eventually served to
undermine American deism's credibility.

The Eclipse of the God ofNature
The Enlightenment ethos, with its optimistic confidence that reality was preeminently rational and hence susceptible to human exploration and manipulation, reflected what one recent commentator has styled the "profound human
need for a manageable universe. " 75 The savants of the Enlightenment, fired by
the promise of Newtonian mechanism and Baconian logic, were confident that
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reality could be systematized, that the realm of phenomena was reducible to
easily classifiable categories and explanations, and they pursued this vision with
zeal. All of reality, physical as well as human, psychological as well as social, was
subsumable in their minds to a single set of scientific principles which, once
discovered, would reveal to the inquirer both the inner workings of nature as
well as the means of managing it. Ambiguity and open-endedness, not to
mention mystery, were antithetical to this fervent will to systematize. The
presence of such elements pointed to a lapse of reasoning or a gap in the data,
not to any intrinsic aspect of reality itself Clarity in knowledge of the world was
an obtainable goal, because the universe itself was manifestly rational. And
clarity was valuable because it served as the necessary condition for manageability. True, the Enlightenment savants exulted in the discovery of new insights
and delighted in the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. But abstract inquiry
into the secrets of nature was never their ultimate aim. The final goal of all
natural philosophy, as Bacon had insisted, was the promulgation of arts and
inventions. Only in this way could nature be subdued and individual felicity as
well as social progress ensured.76
This urge to manage reality was inherited by the American deists. All of
them, even the protoromantic Freneau, were captivated by the promise of
science and technology, seeing both as markers on the highroad to a golden
age of reason and plenty. This desire, this "profound need" to control reality
by eliminating from its descriptions the final vestiges of ambiguity and uncertainty, also influenced the deists' reflections on God.
Like so many other Enlightenment thinkers, the American deists modestly
claimed that a full understanding of divine nature was beyond the ken of humans, even though the divine's existence was logically deducible from an observation of the workings of natural law. This agnosticism was in principle
grounded in the a priori assumption that God possessed such unbounded attributes as absolute power, absolute knowledge, and timelessness and that the
finitude of human reason prevented it from fully comprehending these infinite
qualities. They could be safely posited as abstractions but never understood in
and of themselves.
Even so, the God of the deists was a quite nonmysterious entity whose
essence consisted of the same rationally ascertainable and predictable features
as those encountered in the natural realm. This is not to say that the deists
rather cynically regarded their God as nothing more than a convenient deus ex
machina. But it is the case that, despite their agnostic protestations, God for
them was an uncomplicated being whose nature and operations were transparent to the rational inquirer. In the reified atmosphere of the temple of reason,
the divine became the First Cause simpliciter, the sustainer of the universe
whose essential traits were reflected in the bountiful order mapped by natural
philosophy. He was purely rational and hence unambiguous; supremely be-
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nevolent and consequently trustworthy; unable or unwilling to intervene supernaturally in the established physical order and therefore predictable. The
deistic God, in short, was a manageable deity, the fail-safe engine of an immaculate cosmic machine. For the deist eager to eliminate disorder from the
universe, such a deity was a vast improvement over earlier anthropomorphic
descriptions of God as passionate and unpredictable.
But there was a price to be paid for this flawlessly rational and comfortably
manageable God. He ascended to ethereal heights, taking on a metaphysical
abstractness that carved an unbridgeable gulf between his austere rationality
and the religious needs of human beings. The God of nature, for all the deistic
rhetoric about his benevolence and providential design, assumed the aloof
character of an absentee landlord, so far removed from the everyday existence
of ordinary people as to be completely indifferent to their petitions and worship. For the Enlightenment savant primarily concerned with charting the
uniform workings of physical reality, such a distant God was convenient. It
meant,;i rationally grounded universe as well as a God who would not interfere
with the uniformity essential to the success of natural philosophy and technology. For the deist, this concept of an absentee God made perfect sense. However, for an increasing number oflaypersons and intellectuals at the beginning
of the nineteenth century, such a manageable deity was anything but fulfilling.
God as the distant, inaccessible, almost mathematical First Principle was perhaps capable of engendering an awed, intellectual appreciation. But his abstract
and nonmysterious character utterly failed to encourage the affective adoration
or trust so vital to the religious temperament. The God of nature was not a
mysterium tremendum et fascinans.77 Instead, he--or more appropriately, itwas a formula, a cosmological premise, incapable of arousing empathy, love, or
fear.
The manageable God of the American deists was thus too transcendent,
too removed from the realm of ordinary human needs and aspirations, to
provide individuals with either an experience of religious communion or emotional sustenance. It was increasingly difficult for the post-Enlightenment mind
to take him seriously. His majestic aloofness, far from inspiring confidence in
the immutability of the divine plan, began to strike many as disconcerting
impotence. To invoke Pascal once more, the religion of nature's Supreme
Architect was the God of the philosophers, not of Abraham, Isaac, or Jacob. An
awareness of such a God might satisfy the intellect, but it left the passions cold
and the heart heavy. He was every bit as alienating as the closed, deterministic
cosmos he had set in motion.
Even more damaging, he was really rather superfluous. As Baron d'Holbach, the French atheist, contemptuously said in his System of Nature, the
deistic concept of God was a "useless" one. 78 It was increasingly unnecessary
to explain how the system of natural laws operated, since continuing investiga-
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tion suggested that the cosmic system was self-regulating, and hence it dismally
fell short of the emotional comfort demanded by popular religiosity. The
American deists, of course, would have disagreed with both these points. But
by the time Paine died in 1809, the intellectual climate as well as popular
opinion was against them.
One immediate upshot of American deism's fall was that new, post-Enlightenment forms of infidelity took its place. American transcendentalism,
championed by figures such as Ralph Waldo Emerson, Bronson Alcott, Margaret Fuller, and Henry David Thoreau, challenged Christian orthodoxy as
well as Enlightenment rationalism with its unique blend of German idealism,
nature mysticism, and Yankee pragmatism. Just as eighteenth-century college
students had devoured the works of Voltaire and Paine, so their successors
eagerly read and discussed Emerson's essay on nature and transcripts of his
revolutionary address to the Harvard Divinity School. Social reformers such as
Robert Owen and Frances Wright, excited by the liberal visions of European
utopian socialists, assailed the tenets of supernaturalist religion but did so from
a conceptual and temperamental basis different from that of the American
deists. Wright and Owen were more interested in emancipating the individual
from social irrationalities and injustices than in exploring the natural realm and
deducing from it a rational alternative to Christian orthodoxy. Their religious
infidelity was corollary to their social agenda-not, as was the case with American deism, the nucleus around which reformist zeal revolved. 79
A second outcome was that Christian orthodoxy, sensitive to the spiritual
vacuum created by the aridity of the deistic worldview, hurled itself into the
frenzied excesses of what has come to be known as the "Second Great Awakening." This nationwide revivalist movement, lasting from roughly 1780 to
1830, was characterized by its emphasis on personal piety, salvationism and
anti-intellectualism.80 Its success in consolidating and extending "popular religion"-which, like its twentieth-century counterpart, stressed biblical fundamentalism and political conservatism-was dramatic. Between 1820 and
1830, for example, Methodist membership doubled. By the first decade of the
nineteenth century, Baptist membership had increased tenfold, and the number of Baptist congregations mushroomed from five hundred to over twentyfive hundred. The number of evangelical preachers exploded in the same period, swelling from some eighteen hundred in 1775 to almost forty thousand
by 1845.81 In short, religious populism in the early nineteenth century overwhelmed the nation, eclipsing the deistic threat that had so effectively challenged eighteenth-century orthodoxy. As the century progressed, both transcendentalism and utopian socialism would be replaced by Darwinian-inspired
forms of infidelity, and the fires fanned by the Second Great Awakening would
cool. But before their own deaths, each in its own way buried the remains of
Enlightenment deism once and for all. There would be other challenges to
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orthodoxy in the United States, but none as widespread or militant as the one
launched by eighteenth-century rational religionists.

The Legacy of Deism in America
For all its weaknesses and what in retrospect can be seen as occasional naivete,
deism bequeathed a lasting legacy to American thought. It failed to endure as
either a national movement or a religious alternative to Christianity, but it did
succeed in functioning as a catalyst for change in both the theological and
social arenas.
Rant and rave as eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century orthodox ministers might against the religion of nature, they learned a valuable lesson from
it: Theological speculation could not ignore the discoveries and methodology
of the natural and human sciences. True, the immediate reaction of orthodoxy
to deism-the Second Great Awakening-was a besieged reu·eat into biblical
fundamentalism and religious enthusiasm. But the more reflective men of the
cloth realized that the way to counter this new form of infidelity was to speak
its language and face it on its own turf. As Ezra Stiles had suggested in the mideighteenth century, natural philosophy was a double-edged sword that could
be drawn as easily in defense of Christianity as against it, and many American
clergy later took this point to heart.
In the years that followed the deistic challenge, Christian theologians increasingly stressed the importance of rational inquiry in their apologetics. They
still insisted, of course, on the primary role of supernatural revelation, but their
style as well as arguments reflected a newly discovered awareness that a viable
religious perspective must speak to both the intellect and the passions. This led
to a new theological method that, as one twentieth-century historian noted,
"gravitated toward the connotation it had for the Deists: intellectual assent to
a definable proposition." 82 Leonard Woods of Harvard's Andover Seminary
proclaimed in 1830 that the ultimate test for the formulation of Christian beliefs
was that they be expressed in "language which shall carry them to the mind of
every enlightened Christian and philosopher with perfect clearness." Lyman
Beecher, who had been a stalwart foe of deism in his youth, was later so convinced of the importance of reason in Christian belief that he rather intemperately dismissed mysticism as irrational and rebuked those enthusiastic Christians
who "love to dream amid the repetition of beautiful uncertain sounds, and
glittering undefined images." 83 And the very orthodox Reverend Alexander
Campbell, in a notorious 1829 debate with Robert Owen over the evidences
of Christianity, chided American Christians for their failure to invoke rational
apologetics, using phrases that might have been lifted from a deistic tract.
Scepticism and infidelity are certainly on the increase in this and other
countries. Not, indeed, because of the mildness of our laws, but because
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of the lives of our professors, and a very general inattention to the
evidences of our religion. The sectarian spirit, the rage of rivalry in the
various denominations, together with many absurd tenets and opinions
propagated, afford more relevant reasons for the prevalence of scepticism than most of our professors are able to offer for their faith. 84
American theologians, then, tended to absorb certain elements of the rational religion they sought to refute. What was initially a forensic strategy
gradually matured into a spirit of rational inquiry that gained widespread acceptance, at least among the clergy. There remained, of course, influential
segments in the Christian community that refused to compromise. But notwithstanding their resistance, eighteenth-century deism had set in motion a
new approach to theological questions that could not be denied. John
Macquarrie, a twentieth-century Anglican theologian, has expressed this point
well. Although he is specifically referring to the Enlightenment impact on
contemporary theology, his words could just as well apply to deism's influence
on nineteenth-century American Christianity. "In ... important respects,"
Macquarrie says, "we remain inevitably children of the Enlightenment. Some
of its lessons can never be unlearned. We cannot go back to the mythology of
a former age, or to its supernaturalism, or to the spiritual authoritarianism of
an infallible church or an infallible Bible. " 8 5 At least in the American context,
the impossibility of such a regression is partly due to the influence of the eighteenth-century American deists. They failed to replace Christianity with the
religion of nature, but their example served to ameliorate the extremism and
refine the sensibility and methods of American theology. Deism, in short,
helped to awaken Christianity in the United States from its dogmatic slumber.
But American deism was not just a religious movement. On a more fundamental level, it attempted a comprehensive worldview, which sought to construct on an Enlightenment base a systematic defense of certain ethical, political, and social principles that stemmed from and complemented its theological
ones. Influenced by the liberalism of thinkers such as Locke and the French
savants, the American deists were strident republicans and ardent defenders of
a humanism that stressed freedom of conscience and expression, separation of
church and state, and universal public education. Their social agenda correlated with their underlying conviction that reality was rational and that humans
were capable of fully comprehending its mysteries. The advance of free inquiry,
unchecked by state or ecclesial oppression and unintimidated by public sanction, was the necessary condition for the fulfillment of reason's promise and the
emancipation of the human spirit. Thus Franklin, ambivalent though his relationship to deism was, tirelessly campaigned for doctrinal toleration. Jefferson's
many projects included writing legislation that promoted freedom of conscience and public education as well as attempting to fashion a coherent ethical
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system that ensured equality of treatment under the law for all individuals.
Paine and Palmer never tired of condemning church and state alliances as
viper's nests of oppression, and Palmer went so far as to call for the abolition
of slavery, the emancipation of women, and an end to the brutal abuse of
Native Americans. Volney suggested in his Ruins that a nation that refused to
encourage free and rational inquiry doomed itself to extinction, and Ethan
Allen thundered in his Oracles that the only legitimate standard of appraisal or
action was reason. Finally, Freneau's poetry time and again returned to the
themes of freedom of conscience and the insidious consequences on both
individual and society of superstition, doctrinal exclusivity, and social elitism.
Convinced as they were that the full exercise of reason and the inauguration
of a golden age of scientific progress as well as social prosperity could only be
nurtured in an environment that respected diversity of opinion and freedom of
thought, the American deists assumed the role of reform agitators. Their aim
was to emancipate the individual from obstacles to the full development of his
or her rational potentiality, and such an enterprise, in their eyes, included the
elimination of political as well as religious shackles. As suggested earlier, the
deists' militant championship of republican and humanistic ideas probably
earned them as many enemies as did their assault on traditional Christianity.
But for these advocates of the religion of nature, the two were inseparable.
Repression was repression, regardless of whether it was ecclesial or political in
origin.
The deistic movement in America, then, functioned as a goad that continuously irritated and occasionally thumped the public conscience. In fulfilling this
purpose, it helped to consolidate those social and political ideas that, whether
lived up to in actual practice or not, have become associated with the American
ethos. It is too much to claim that the humanistic social agenda advocated by
the deists was solely or even primarily responsible for subsequent reforms in
education, that their campaign for freedom of conscience directly resulted in
the establishment of the federal constitutional separation clause, or that their
advocacy of the rights of slaves produced ameliorating legislation. Too many
other social, economic, and political factors were at work in each of these areas
to confirm a direct causal link between deistic agitation and eventual reform.
But the humanistic ideals touted by late eighteenth-century deism contributed
to a climate of opinion that, along with other factors, set the republican mood
of the young nation. As is the case with deism's influence on subsequent
American theology, its primary function in the social arena was catalytic. It
continuously hammered home the need for reform, for emancipation, and for
respect of individual differences and, in so doing, stirred discussion and debate
about the proper relationship of the individual to society. The deistic challenge
enraged some and delighted others, but few politicians or private citizens remained indifferent to its demands for social justice and freedom of conscience.
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American deism both failed and succeeded. As a movement that sought to
supplant supernaturalist orthodoxy with rational religion, to build shining
temples of reason on the crumbling ruins of Christian churches, it fell short of
the mark. But as a catalyst for reform in theological method as well as social and
political practices, deism left to the young Republic a lasting and far-reaching
bequest. Such an accomplishment would hardly have satisfied many of the
rational religionists, particularly the more militant Paine and Palmer, but it was
no small achievement. Their campaign for free and rational religion and social
justice-notwithstanding modern dismissal of their overly simplistic assumptions about reality and the human spirit-was a grand and noble experiment.
The reader today may not agree with the optimistic rationalism of a Franklin,
Palmer, or Freneau, but he or she can scarcely escape being challenged by it.
In the final analysis, such an accomplishment is a victory, for readers as well as
the deists.
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Benjamin Franklin
I Believe in One God, Creator of the Universe

As suggested in the Introduction, American deism is better understood as a
general philosophical orientation that allowed for a certain amount of flexibility
in individual belief than a set-in-stone catechism of infallible and obligatory
doctrine. There was obviously a nucleus of belief shared by all deists, giving
them a distinct intellectual identity: conviction in an orderly, rational universe,
as well as a rational and benevolent deity; a distrust of metaphysical speculation
and scriptural authority; and advocacy of empirical methodology and a concomitant scorn of such supernaturalist tenets as revelation; a denial of the
divinity of Jesus and the triune God; confidence in human progress; and an
emphasis on the utility of virtue. But integral to this core of deistic thought was
the fact that it accommodated a great deal of interpretive leeway. Some deists,
for example, applauded Jesus' ethical teachings so long as they were stripped of
their supernaturalist and ecclesial "corruptions"; others deplored them. Most
deists accepted the immortality of the soul, but a few denied the possibility. Yet
others were convinced that the divine reveals itself only through the lawlik:e
operations of the physical order, while some were willing to grant that God at
least in principle is capable of "special" providences in the moral realm. In
short, the credal tolerance deism so ardently advocated allowed for a wide
latitude in personal belief among its proponents but did not result in the reduction of the movement to a laissez-faire hodgepodge of amorphously private
opinion. This flexibility was especially apparent in deism's early stage, when
some sympathizers attempted to straddle the traditional world of orthodoxy
and the Enlightenment one of rationalism. Very often, in fact, it was (and is)
difficult to distinguish a moderate deist from a liberal Christian.
Benjamin Franklin (1706---90), the first noteworthy American advocate of
deism, was one of those caught in the middle. He clearly was not an orthodox
Christian, but neither was he as unequivocally deistic in his thinking as
Jefferson, Paine, or Palmer. Rooted in tradition but baptized in the New Learning of Bacon, Newton, and Locke, Franklin's religious orientation was a sometimes uneasy balance between the two, with the pendulum more to the rationalist than the Christian side. He is best characterized as an ambiguous deist.
The equivocalness of his religious thought emerged quite early. Although
he tells us in the Autobiography that he was reared "piously in the Dissenting
way" by Calvinist parents and "religiously educated as a Presbyterian," young
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Franklin dropped whatever overt allegiance he might have had to the gloomy
theology of the Westminster Confession by the time he was sixteen. Like so
many other adolescents who rebel against an orthodox upbringing, he initially
hurled himself in the opposite direction and at the age of nineteen wrote a
precocious treatise, A Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity, Pleasure and Pain,
defending dogmatic materialism. Two features about the Dissertation shed
light upon the fundamental ambiguity of Franklin's religious perspective. In
the first place, the essay, which claims to be a series of logical inferences from
Newtonian mechanism, arrives at conclusions reminiscent of (although not
identical to) the very Calvinist doctrine Franklin thought he had rejected: an
insistence that physical events as well as human destinies are predetermined by
divine power and knowledge. Moreover, Franklin soon rejected this Calvinistcum-mechanistic treatise, correctly fearing that its reasoning posed a threat to
moral rectitude, and eventually came to see the habituation of virtue as the
centerpiece of an authentically religious life. But it is arguable that the change
in philosophical direction had its distant origins in Franklin's youthful absorption of Cotton Mather's Bonifacius(l710), an essay that stressed the everyday
utility of Christian virtue. As Franklin himself confesses in the Autobiography,
Mather's work "gave me such a turn of thinking, as to have an influence on my
conduct through life; for I have always set a greater value on the character of
a doer ofgood than on any other kind of reputation."
The point is that the initial composition and the eventual repudiation of the
Dissertation reflect the young Franklin's tense and at times conceptually unstable mixture of traditionally orthodox and radically Enlightened currents.
The attraction and repulsion between the two reemerged time and again in
most of his subsequent reflections on religion. This is not to say that Franklin
was a confused or sloppy thinker, but only that he, like so many of his generation, mirrored the religious uncertainly of the day. Franklin grew to intellectual
maturity during a conceptual watershed, in which Enlightenment rationalism
challenged but did not yet supplant the traditional Calvinist ethos. It was perhaps inevitable that his thinking should reflect both.
Even so, Franklin was more deistic in his orientation than not. This is apparent from an examination of the three central assumptions around which his
religious worldview revolved. First, he was convinced that all varieties of religious sentiment and all credal expressions contain some element of truth, and
the rational person therefore should refrain from narrow-mindedly repudiating
any of them. But he also believed that most religious systems had allowed
doctrinal misconstructions and irrational bigotries to distort their intuitions on
the truth . Consequently, it is equally unwarranted for a rational person to
endorse any of them wholeheartedly. For Franklin, all systematic attempts to
explain nature and God are prone to error, particularly when they indulge in
a priori "metaphysical reasoning" ( an approach that Franklin himself, except in
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his youthful and soon lamented Dissertation, always shunned). The wise individual, as Franklin points out in his 1738 letter to his parents, avoids the temptation of dogmatizing about religious questions and instead follows the dictates of reason in evaluating them.
But how does reason enable humans to separate doctrinal wheat from
chafil By directing the powers of understanding to an examination of experience and nature. Franklin early on had read Locke's defense of an empiricist
epistemology, becoming convinced that all ideas originate from and can be
judged according to sensate experience. In theological terms, this implied that
the book of nature and the lessons of ordinary experience are capable of shedding light upon the existence as well as the character of the deity. For Franklin,
the study of physical and human nature discloses an orderliness that cannot be
gratuitous but instead is only explicable if the existence of a rational and allpowerful First Cause is posited. Moreover, as he argues in On the Providence of
God in the Government of the World ( 1732 ), an examination of natural operations reveals that they are conducive to the well-being of humans, thereby
leading to the assumption that the First Cause is also benevolent and compassionate. It is but a short step from the acknowledgement of divine benevolence
to the postulate that the most appropriate way for humans to adore the deity
is to imitate his goodness through the cultivation of virtuous behavior and that
such behavior will be rewarded, in this life as well as the next. As Franklin has
Poor Richard say, "What is serving God? 'Tis doing Good to Man." These
three tenets-that a rational and omnipotent God exists, that he is benevolent,
and that humans ought to imitate his goodness and will be judged in terms of
their success in so doing-are supported by reason. Other specifically Christian
doctrines-the divinity of Jesus, the resurrection of the body, divine revelation,
miracles, and so on-are not and thus may or may not be correct. As Franklin
said toward the end of his life, they are "questions I do not dogmatize upon"
(letter to Ezra Stiles, 9 March 1790). But given his suspicion of"metaphysical
reasoning" as well as his certitude that nature is uniformly lawlike and hence
explicable in rational terms, it is understandable that Franklin was less sanguine
about their truth.
The second fundamental assumption of Franklin's religious worldview is as
deistic in tenor as the first: his insistence on the rationality as well as practicality
of a virtuous life and his concomitant conviction that the noblest way of serving
and worshipping the deity is in the regular performance of good works. All of
the American deists concentrated on moral questions; Elihu Palmer even wrote
one of the most sophisticated ethical treatises of the Early Republic. But
Franklin's preoccupation with the ideal of moral perfection bordered on obsession. From his earliest to his final writings, regardless of the subject matter,
Franklin rarely missed an opportunity to bring up the issues of virtue and moral
progress. In fact, he seriously contemplated writing a tract on virtue, although

53

Benjamin Franklin

54

public and private responsibilities prevented him from doing more than outlining his thoughts in the Autobiography or distilling them, through Poor Richard, into the succinct moralistic maxims so familiar to schoolchildren.
Franklin's intoxication with moral perfection, as well as his no-nonsense,
quasi-mathematical program for cultivating the virtues, has been the brunt of
much subsequent criticism. The usual charge is that Franklin the ethicist is
more of a bookkeeper than a reflective thinker, substituting an unimaginative
calculus of ethical checks and balances for a genuinely sophisticated treatment
of the moral life. This criticism has undeniable merit. Although there is a disarming quaintness to Franklin's famous plan for the daily exercise of virtues
(such as temperance, silence, order, frugality, and industry), it can also be read
as the facile musings of a self-satisfied and rather shallow moralist. But when
examined against the backdrop of his deistic worldview, Franklin's remarks on
moral perfection shed a good deal of their seeming flimsiness.
Franklin was convinced that moral progress is dependent on two necessary
conditions: a rationally consistent attitude of benevolence and tolerance, and
a single-minded fidelity to virtuous behavior. The first condition reflects the
lawlike and predictable essence of both deity and nature, as well as Franklin's
belief that error-prone humans have no logical or normative justification for
dogmatic intractability. The second is based on the Aristotelian assumption
that virtue is a learned behavior instead of an innate quality and that the most
rational way to cultivate it is through concrete habituation to good works.
Franklin did not discount the importance of good intentions, but, as in his SelfDenial Not the Essence of Virtue ( 1735 ), he insisted that the ultimate test of
moral development is in the doing, not the contemplating. Otherwise, it is too
easy for humans to succumb to lazy or self-indulgent behavior and weasel out
of moral culpability by claiming that the spirit is willing, even if the flesh is
weak. For Franklin, such a gross discrepancy between motive and act is too
irrational to serve as an excuse for malfeasance. Since the private intentions of
an individual can never be fully appraised by others, the only remaining criterion for ethical evaluation is ostensible behavior. Moreover, a methodical effort
to perform virtuous actions, even if the deeds initially are done reluctantly or
with an ill will, eventually conditions individuals to virtue in such a way that
they ultimately come to desire what originally they merely endured: the consistent performance of good works.
In short, Franklin, like all the American deists, sought an objective, naturalistic
means by which to nurture and gauge virtue, one that would be accessible to all
rational humans because it was disabused of mysterious appeals to innate predispositions or supernaturalist entreaties to divine grace. Read in this light, his mathematical regimen for the cultivation of virtue appears more profound.
The third and final conviction around which Franklin the deist constructed
his worldview was an Enlightenment-influenced faith in the perfectibility of
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society and individuals. In common with all American deists, Franklin had
complete confidence that science was the vehicle through which both natural
forces and human irrationality would be tamed. Unlike the other deists ( except
perhaps Jefferson), Franklin was also an accomplished scientist and so had firsthand experience on which to base his estimation. The scientific charting of
natural and psychological laws would usher in the age of reason if society only
learned to tolerate dissent and encourage the free interplay ofideas--or at least
so Franklin believed in his more optimistic moments. In keeping with his fundamental ambiguity, he was not always so hopeful. For example, in a letter to
Joseph Priestley (8 February 1780) which praises science's progress in technology and physics, Franklin also laments its apparent inability to foster equal
advancement in morality: "0 that moral Science were in as fair a way of Improvement, that Men would cease to be Wolves to one another, and that
human Beings would at length learn what they now improperly call Humanity!" In an even more remarkable display of pessimism, Franklin advises an
unknown correspondent (possibly Paine) to refrain from publishing a treatise
on deism, on the grounds that the manuscript's critique of revealed religion
might damage the inducements to morality contained in orthodox Christianity. And "if men are so wicked as we now see them with religion, what would
they be if without it."
However, these occasional moments of cynicism are less characteristic of
Franklin than his expressions of exuberant optimism. Instead, they are the
cautionary remnants of a Calvinist background. More typical is Franklin's ardent defense of religious tolerance, as seen is his Dialogue between Two Presbyterians (1735), or the cool-headed, rationalistic faith evident in his Articles of
Belief and Acts of Religion (1728) and Doctrine to be Preached (1731).
Franklin's religious perspective may have uncomfortably waffled throughout
the years between Calvinist gloom and enlightenment optimism, but when
considered in its entirety, it is remarkably consistent for a thinker of his generation. As he reaffirmed at life's end, "I believe in one God, Creator of the
Universe. That he governs it by his Providence. That he ought to be worshipped. That the most acceptable Service we render to him is doing good to
his other Children. That the soul of Man is immortal, and well be treated with
Justice in another Life respecting its Conduct in this. These I take to be the
fundamental Principles of all sound Religion, and I regard them ... in whatever Sect I meet with them." With only minor exceptions, few subsequent
deists would have disagreed with this eloquent profession.

A Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity,
Pleasure and Pain ( 1725)
The earliest (and, in many ways, the most philosophically ambitious) ofFranklin's
works, the Dissertation was intended as a response to William Wollaston 1s (1660--
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1724) liberal tract The Religion of Nature Delineated. Franklin was a young
journeyman in a London printing house when he dashed offthe Dissertation, and
its strict defense ofthoroughgoing mechanism reflects the youthful iconoclasm and
intellectual self-assuredness with which it was written. But Franklin was soon to
shed his exuberant confidence in the Dissertation Js thesis. Although one hundred
copies ofit were printed, Franklin quickly destroyed most of them, fearing that the
dissemination ofhis treatise would «have an Ill Tendency.» In later life he wrote
an essay (now lost) repudiating the Dissertation Js conclusions, and in his Autobiography, he listed the early work as one of his lifeJs «erratas. JJ
Considering FranklinJs subsequent emphasis on the importance of «truth, sincerity and integrity, in dealings between man and man,» it is obvious why he
came to regret and reject this early venture into "metaphysical reasoning. JJ Starting from the affirmation ofan all-powerful and supremelygood deity, Franklin >s
Dissertation infers that reality is mechanistic in nature, that humans are thereby
without free will, that desire for pleasure and aversion to pain are the ubiquitous
sources of motivation and behavior, and that human actions, given their deterministic character, are morally indifferent. In sum, the Dissertation defends a
dogmatic, quasi-Hobbesian materialism and concludes that everything is as it
must be and that everything is good because ordained by an all-good God.
The Dissertation Js historical interest lies in the fact that it pushes deismJs postulation of a perfectly lawlike deity as well as its endorsement of Newtonian
mechanism into a radical denial offree will, ethical responsibility, and human
progress. Ibis was a step conventional deists obviously 1vere unwilling to take, insofar as it undercut their Enlightenment faith in the progressively liberating effects, societal as well as normative, of reason. Franklin soon realized that his defense of a pervasive materialism was not so much a brieffor deism as a reductio
ad absurdum repudiation of it, and he consequently backed off. But his eventual
renunciation of the Dissertation's mechanistic conclusions never dampened his
fundamental trust in basic deistic tenets.

Sect. 1. Of Liberty and Necessity
I. There is said to be a First Mover, who is called GOD, Maker ofthe Universe.
II. He is said to be all-wise, all-good, all powerful.
These two Propositions being allow' d and asserted by People of almost
every Sect and Opinion; I have here suppos'd them granted, and laid them
down as the Foundation of my Argument; What follows then, being a Chain
of Consequences truly drawn from them, will stand or fall as they are true or
false.
III. If He is all-good, whatsoever He doth must be good.
IV. If He is all-wise, whatsoever He doth must be wise.
The Truth of these Propositions, with relation to the two first, I think may
be justly call'd evident; since, either that infinite Goodness will act what is ill,
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or infinite Wisdom what is not wise, is too glaring a Contradiction not to be
perceiv'd by any Man of common Sense, and deny'd as soon as understood.
V. If He is all-powerful, there can be nothing either existing or acting in the
Universe against or without his Consent; and what He consents to must be good,
because He is good; therefore Evil doth not exist.
Unde Malum? has been long a Question, and many of the Learned have
perplex'd themselves and Readers to little Purpose in Answer to it. That there
are both Things and Actions to which we give the Name of Evil, is not here
deny'd, as Pain, Sickness, Want, Theft, Murder, &c. but that these and the like
are not in reality Evils, Ills, or Defects in the Order of the Universe, is demon strated in the next Section, as well as by this and the following Proposition.
Indeed, to suppose any Thing to exist or be done, contrary to the Will of the
Almighty, is to suppose him not almighty; or that Something ( the Cause of
Evil) is more mighty than the Almighty; an Inconsistence that I think no One
will defend: And to deny any Thing or Action, which he consents to the existence of, to be good, is entirely to destroy his two Attributes of Wisdom and
Goodness.
There is nothing done in the Universe, say the Philosophers, but what God
either does, or permits to be done. This, as He is Almighty, is certainly true: But
what need of this Distinction between doing and permitting? Why, first they
take it for granted that many Things in the Universe exist in such a Manner as
is not for the Best, and that many Actions are done which ought not to be
done, or would be better undone; these Things or Actions they cannot ascribe
to God as his, because they have already attributed to Him infinite Wisdom
and Goodness; Here then is the Use of the Word Permit; He permits them to
be done, say they. But we will reason thus: If God permits an Action to be done,
it is because he wants either Power or Inclination to hinder it; in saying he
wants Power, we deny Him to be almighty, and ifwe say He wants Inclination
or Will, it must be, either because He is not Good, or the Action is not evil,
(for all Evil is contrary to the Essence of infinite Goodness.) The former is
inconsistent with his before-given Attribute of Goodness, therefore the latter
must be true.
It will be said, perhaps, that God permits evil Actions to be done, for wise
Ends and Purposes. But this Objection destroys itself; for whatever an infinitely
good God hath wise Ends in suffering to be, must be good, is thereby made
good, and cannot be otherwise.
VI. If a Creature is made by God, it must depend upon God, and receive all
its Power from Him; with which Power the Creature can do nothing contrary to
the Will of God, because God is Almighty; what is not contrary to His Will, must
be agreeable to it; what is agreeable to it, must be good, because He is Good; therefore a Creature can do nothing but what is good.
This Proposition is much to the same Purpose with the former, but more
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particular; and its Conclusion is as just and evident. Tho' a Creature may do
many Actions which by his Fellow Creatures will be nam'd Evil, and which will
naturally and necessarily cause or bring upon the Doer, certain Pains (which
will likewise be call'd Punishments,) yet this Proposition proves, that he cannot
act what will be in itself really ill, or displeasing to God. And that the painful
Consequences of his evil Actions (so call'tl) are not, as indeed they ought not
to be, Punishments or Unhappinesses, will be shewn hereafter.
Nevertheless, the late learned Author of The Religion of Nature ... , has
given us a Rule or Scheme, whereby to discover which of our Actions ought
to be esteem'd and denominatedgood, and which evil: It is in short this, "Every
Action which is done according to Truth, is good; and every Action contrary
to Truth, is evil: To act according to Truth is to use and esteem every Thing
as what it is, &c. Thus if A steals a Horse from B, and rides away upon him, he
uses him not as what he is in Truth, viz. the Property of another, but as his own,
which is contrary to Truth, and therefore evil." But, as this Gentleman himself
says (Sect. 1. Prop. VI.) "In order to judge rightly what any Thing is, it must
be consider' d, not only what it is in one Respect, but also what it may be in any
other Respect; and the whole Description of the Thing ought to be taken in:"
So in this Case it ought to be consider'd, that A is naturally a covetous Being,
feeling an Uneasiness in the want of BJs Horse, which produces an Inclination
for stealing him, stronger than his Fear of Punishment for so doing. This is
Truth likewise, and A acts according to it when he steals the Horse. Besides,
if it is prov' d to be a Truth, that A has not Power over his own Actions, it will
be indisputable that he acts according to Truth, and impossible he should do
otherwise.
I would not be understood by this to encourage or defend Theft; 'tis only
for the sake of the Argument, and will certainly have no ill Effect. The Order
and Course of Things will not be affected by Reasoning of this Kind; and 'tis
as just and necessary, and as much according to Truth, for B to dislike and
punish the Theft of his Horse, as it is for A to steal him.
VII. If the Creature is thus limited in his Actions, being able to do only such
Things as God would have him to do, and not being able to refuse doing what God
would have done; then he can have no such Thing as Liberty, Free- Will or Power
to do or refrain an Action.
By Liberty is sometimes understood the Absence of Opposition; and in this
Sense, indeed, all our Actions may be said to be the Effects of our Liberty: but
it is a Liberty of the same Nature with the Fall of a heavy Body to the Ground;
it has Liberty to fall, that is, it meets with nothing to hinder its Fall, but at the
same Time it is necessitated to fall, and has no Power or Liberty to remain
suspended.
But let us take the Argument in another View, and suppose ourselves to be,
in the common sense of the Word, Free Agents. As Man is a Part of this great
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Machine, the Universe, his regular Acting is requisite to the regular moving of
the whole. Among the many Things which lie before him to be done, he may,
as he is at liberty and his Choice influenc'd by nothing, (for so it must be, or
he is not at liberty) chuse any one, and refuse the rest. Now there is every
Moment something best to be done, which is alone then good, and with respect
to which, every Thing else is at that Time evil. In order to know which is best
to be done, and which not, it is requisite that we should have at one View all
the intricate Consequences of every Action with respect to the general Order
and Scheme of the Universe, both present and future; but they are innumerable and incomprehensible by any Thing but Omniscience. As we cannot know
these, we have but as one Chance to ten thousand, to hit on the right Action;
we should then be perpetually blundering about in the Dark, and putting the
Scheme in Disorder; for every wrong Action of a Part, is a Defect or Blemish
in the Order of the Whole. Is it not necessary then, that our Actions should be
over-rul'd and govern'd by an all-wise Providence? How exact and regular is
every Thing in the natural World! How wisely in every Part contriv'd! We
cannot here find the least Defect! Those who have study' d the mere animal and
vegetable Creation, demonstrate that nothing can be more harmonious and
beautiful! All the heavenly Bodies, the Stars and Planets, are regulated with the
utmost Wisdom! And can we suppose less Care to be taken in the Order of the
moral than in the natural System? It is as if an ingenious Artificer, having
fram'd a curious Machine or Clock, and put its many intricate Wheels and
Powers in such a Dependance on one another, that the whole might move in
the most exact Order and Regularity, had nevertheless plac'd in it several other
Wheels endu'd with an independent Self-Motion, but ignorant of the general
Interest of the Clock; and these would every now and then be moving wrong,
disordering the true Movement, and making continual Work for the Mender;
which might better be prevented, by depriving them of that Power of SelfMotion, and placing them in a Dependance on the regular Part of the Clock.
VIIL If there is no such Thing as Free-Will in Creatures, there can be neither
Merit nor Demerit in Creatures.
IX. And therefore every Creature must be equally esteem'd by the Creator.
These Propositions appear to be the necessary Consequences of the former.
And certainly no Reason can be given, why the Creator should prefer in his
Esteem one Part of His Works to another, ifwith equal Wisdom and Goodness
he design'd and created them all, since all ill or Defect, as contrary to his
Nature, is excluded by his Power. We will sum up the Argument thus, When
the Creator first design'd the Universe, either it was His Will and Intention
that all Things should exist and be in the Manner they are at this Time; or it
was his Will they should be otherwise i.e. in a different Manner: To say it was
His Will Things should be otherwise than they are, is to say Somewhat hath
contradicted His Will, and broken His Measures, which is impossible because
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inconsistent with his Power; therefore we must allow that all Things exist now
in a Manner agreeable to His Will, and in consequence of that are all equally
Good, and therefore equally esteemed by Him.
I proceed now to shew, that as all the Works of the Creator are equally
esteem'd by Him, so they are, as in Justice they ought to be, equally us'd.

Sect. II. Of Pleasure and Pain
I. When a Creature is form'd and endu'd with Life, 'tis suppos'd to receive a
Capacity of the Sensation o/Uneasiness or Pain.
It is this distinguishes Life and Consciousness from unactive unconscious
Matter. To know or be sensible of Suffering or being acted upon is to live; and
whatsoever is not so, among created Things, is properly and truly dead.
All Pain and Uneasiness proceeds at first from and is caus'd by Somewhat
without and distinct from the Mind itself. The Soul must first be acted upon
before it can re-act. In the Beginning of Infancy it is as if it were not; it is not
conscious of its own Existence, till it has receiv'd the first Sensation of Pain;
then and not before, it begins to feel itself, is rous'd, and put into Action; then
it discovers its Powers and Faculties, and exerts them to expel the Uneasiness.
Thus is the Machine set on work; this is Life. We are first mov'd by Pain, and
the whole succeeding Course of our Lives is but one continu'd Series of Action
with a View to be freed from it. As fast as we have excluded one Uneasiness
another appears, otherwise the Motion would cease. If a continual Weight is
not apply'd, the Clock will stop. And as soon as the Avenues of Uneasiness to
the Soul are choak'd up or cut off, we are dead, we think and act no more.
II. Ibis Uneasiness, Whenever felt, produces Desire to be freed from it, great
in exact proportion to the Uneasiness.
Thus it is Uneasiness the first Spring and Cause of all Action; for till we are
uneasy in Rest, we can have no Desire to move, and without Desire of moving
there can be no voluntary Motion. The Experience of every Man who has
observ'd his own Actions will evince the Truth of this; and I think nothing
need be said to prove that the Desire will be equal to the Uneasiness, for the
very Thing implies as much: It is not Uneasiness unless we desire to be freed
from it, nor a great Uneasiness unless the consequent Desire is great.
I might here observe, how necessary a Thing in the Order and Design of
the Universe this Pain or Uneasiness is, and how beautiful in its Place! Let us
but suppose it just now banish'd the World entirely, and consider the Consequence of it: All the Animal Creation would immediately stand stock still,
exactly in the Posture they were in the Moment Uneasiness departed; not a
Limb, not a Finger would henceforth move; we should all be reduc'd to the
Condition of Statues, dull and unactive: Here I should continue to sit motionless with the Pen in my Hand thus-and neither leave my Seat nor write one
Letter more. This may appear odd at first View, but a little Consideration will
make it evident; for 'tis impossible to assign any other Cause for the voluntary
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Motion of an Animal than its uneasiness in Rest. What a different Appearance
then would the Face of Nature make, without it! How necessary is it! And how
unlikely that the Inhabitants of the World ever were, or that the Creator ever
design'd they should be, exempt from it!
I would likewise observe here, that the VIIIth Proposition, in the preceding Section, viz. That there is neither Merit nor Demerit, &c. is here again
demonstrated, as infallibly, tho' in another manner: For since Freedom from
Uneasiness is the End of all our Actions, how is it possible for us to do any
Thing disinterested? How can any Action be meritorious of Praise or Dispraise,
Reward or Punishment, when the natural Principle of Self-Love is the only and
the irresistible Motive to it?
III. This Desire is always fulftll'd or satisfy'd.
In the Design or End of it, tho' not in the Manner. The first is requisite,
the latter not. To exemplify this, let us make a Supposition; A Person is
confin'd in a House which appears to be in imminent Danger of Falling, this,
as soon as perceiv'd, creates a violent Uneasiness, and that instantly produces
an equal strong Desire, the End of which is freedom from the Uneasiness, and
the Manner or Way propos'd to gain this End, is to get out of the House. Now
if he is convinc'd by any Means, that he is mistaken, and the House is not
likely to fall, he is immediately freed from his Uneasiness, and the End of his
Desire is attain' d as well as if it had been in the Manner desir' d, viz. leaving the
House.
All our different Desires and Passions proceed from and are reducible to this
one Point, Uneasiness, tho' the Means we propose to ourselves for expelling of
it are infinite. One proposes Fame, another Wealth, a third Power, &c. as the
Means to gain this End; but tho' these are never attain'd, if the Uneasiness be
remov'd by some other Means, the Desire is satisfy'd. Now during the Course
of Life we are ourselves continually removing successive Uneasinesses as they
arise, and the last we suffer is remov' d by the sweet Sleep of Death.
IV. The fulfilling or Satisfaction of this Desire, produces the Sensation of
Pleasure, great or small in exact proportion to the Desire.
Pleasure is that Satisfaction which arises in the Mind upon, and is caus' d by,
the accomplishment of our Desires, and by no other Means at all; and those
Desires being above shewn to be caus' d by our Pains or Uneasinesses, it follows
that Pleasure is wholly caus'd by Pain, and by no other Thing at all.
V. Therefore the Sensation of Pleasure is equal, or in exact proportion to the
Sensation of Pain. As the Desire of being freed from Uneasiness is equal to the
Uneasiness, and the Pleasure of satisfying that Desire equal to the Desire, the
Pleasure thereby produc' d must necessarily be equal to the Uneasiness or Pain
which produces it: Of three lines, A, B, and C, if A is equal to B, and B to C,
C must be equal to A. And as our Uneasinesses are always remov' d by some
Means or other, it follows that Pleasure and Pain are in their Nature inseparable: So many Degrees as one Scale of the Ballance descends, so many exactly

61

Benjamin Franklin

62

the other ascends; and one cannot rise or fall without the Fall or Rise of the
other: 'Tis impossible to taste of Pleasure, without feeling its preceding proportionate Pain; or to be sensible of Pain, without having its necessary Consequent Pleasure: The highest Pleasure is only Consciousness of Freedom from
the deepest Pain, and Pain is not Pain to us unless we ourselves are sensible of
it. They go Hand in Hand; they cannot be divided.
You have a View of the whole Argument in a few familiar Examples: The
Pain of Abstinence from Food, as it is greater or less, produces a greater or less
Desire of Eating, the Accomplishment of this Desire produces a greater or less
Pleasure proportionate to it. The Pain of Confinement causes the Desire of
Liberty, which accomplish'd, yields a Pleasure equal to that Pain of Confinement. The Pain of Labour and Fatigue causes the Pleasure of Rest, equal to
that Pain. The Pain of Absence from Friends, produces the Pleasure of Meeting in exact proportion. &c.
This is the fixt Nature of Pleasure and Pain, and will always be found to be
so by those who examine it.
One of the most common Arguments for the future Existence of the Soul,
is taken from the generally suppos'd Inequality of Pain and Pleasure in the
present; and this, notwithstanding the Difficulty by outward Appearances to
make a Judgment of another's Happiness, has been look'd upon as almost
unanswerable: but since Pain naturally and infallibly produces a Pleasure in
proportion to it, every individual Creature must, in any State of Life, have an
equal Quantity of each, so that there is not, on that Account, any Occasion for
a future Adjustment.
Thus are all the Works of the Creator equally us'd by him; And no Condition of Life or Being is in itself better or preferable to another: The Monarch
is not more happy than the Slave, nor the Beggar more miserable than Croesus.
Suppose A, B, and C, three distinct Beings; A and B, animate, capable of
Pleasure and Pain, Can inanimate Piece of Matter, insensible of either. A
receives ten Degrees of Pain, which are necessarily succeeded by ten Degrees
of Pleasure: B receives fifteen of Pain, and the consequent equal Number of
Pleasure: Call the while lies unconcern'd, and as he has not suffer'd the former,
has no right to the latter. What can be more equal and just than this? When the
Accounts come to be adjusted, A has no Reason to complain that his Portion
of Pleasure was five Degrees less than that of B, for his Portion of Pain was five
Degrees less likewise: Nor has B any Reason to boast that his Pleasure was five
Degrees greater than that of A, for his Pain was proportionate: They are then
both on the same Foot with C, that is, they are neither Gainers nor Losers.
It will possibly be objected here, that even common Experience shews us,
there is not in Fact this Equality: "Some we see hearty, brisk and chearful
perpetually, while others are constantly burden'd with a heavy Load of Maladies and Misfortunes, remaining for Years perhaps in Poverty, Disgrace, or
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Pain, and die at last without any Appearance of Recompense." Now tho' 'tis
not necessary, when a Proposition is demonstrated to be a general Truth, to
shew in what manner it agrees with the particular Circumstances of Persons,
and indeed ought not to be requir'd; yet, as this is a common Objection, some
Notice may be taken ofit: And here let it be observ'd, that we cannot be proper
Judges of the good or bad Fortune of Others; we are apt to imagine, that what
would give us a great Uneasiness or a great Satisfaction, has the same Effect
upon others: we think, for Instance, those unhappy, who must depend upon
Charity for a mean Subsistence, who go in Rags, fare hardly, and are despis'd
and scorn'd by all; not considering that Custom renders all these Things easy,
familiar, and even pleasant. When we see Riches, Grandeur and a chearful
Countenance, we easily imagine Happiness accompanies them, when oftentimes 'tis quite otherwise: Nor is a constantly sorrowful Look, attended with
continual Complaints, an infallible Indication ofUnhappiness. In short, we can
judge by nothing but Appearances, and they are very apt to deceive us. Some
put on a gay chearful Outside, and appear to the World perfectly at Ease, tho'
even then, some inward Sting, some secret Pain imbitters all their Joys, and
makes the Ballance even: Others appear continually dejected and full of Sorrow; but even Griefitselfis sometimes pleasant, and Tears are not always without their Sweetness: Besides, Some take a Satisfaction in being thought unhappy, (as others take a Pride in being thought humble,) these will paint their
Misfortunes to others in the strongest Colours, and leave no Means unus'd to
make you think them thoroughly miserable; so great a Pleasure it is to them to
be pitied; Others retain the Form and outside Shew of Sorrow, long after the
Thing itself, with its Cause, is remov'd from the Mind; it is a Habit they have
acquir'd and cannot leave. These, with many others that might be given, are
Reasons why we cannot make a true Estimate of the Equality of the Happiness
and Unhappiness of others; and unless we could, Matter[ s] of Fact cannot be
opposed to this Hypothesis. Indeed, we are sometimes apt to think, that the
Uneasinesses we ourselves have had, outweigh our Pleasures; but the Reason
is this, the Mind takes no Account of the latter, they slip away unremark'd,
when the former leave more lasting Impressions on the Memory. But suppose
we pass the greatest part of Life in Pain and Sorrow, suppose we die by Torments and think no more, 'tis no diminution to the Truth of what is here
advanc'd; for the Pain, tho' exquisite, is not so to the last Moments of Life,
the Senses are soon benumb'd, and render'd incapable of transmitting it so
shaiply to the Soul as at first; She perceives it cannot hold long, and 'tis an
exquisite Pleasure to behold the immediate Approaches of Rest. This makes an
Equivalent tho' Annihilation should follow: For the Quantity of Pleasure and
Pain is not to be measur' d by its Duration, any more than the Quantity of
Matter by its Extension; and as one cubic Inch may be made to contain, by
Condensation, as much Matter as would fill ten thousand cubic Feet, being
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more expanded, so one single Moment of Pleasure may outweigh and compensate an Age of Pain.
It was owing to their Ignorance of the Nature of Pleasure and Pain that the
Antient Heathens believ'd the idle Fable of their Elizium, that State of uninterrupted Ease and Happiness! The Thing is intirely impossible in Nature! Are
not the Pleasures of the Spring made such by the Disagreeableness of the
Winter? Is not the Pleasure of fair Weather owing to the Unpleasantness of
foul? Certainly. Were it then always Spring, were the Fields always green and
flourishing, and the Weather constantly serene and fair, the Pleasure would pall
and die upon our Hands; it would cease to be Pleasure to us, when it is not
usher'd in by Uneasiness. Could the Philosopher visit, in reality, every Star and
Planet with as much Ease and Swiftness as he can now visit their Ideas, and pass
from one to another of them in the Imagination; it would be a Pleasure I grant;
but it would be only in proportion to the Desire of accomplishing it, and that
would be no greater than the Uneasines:rsuffer'din the Want ofit. The Accomplishment of a long and difficult Journey yields a great Pleasure; but if we could
take a Trip to the Moon and back again, as frequently and with as much Ease
as we can go and come from Market, the Satisfaction would be just the same.
The Immateriality of the Soul has been frequently made use of as an Argument for its Immortality, but let us consider, that tho' it should be allow'd
to be immaterial, and consequently its Parts incapable of Separation or Destruction by any Thing material, yet by Experience we find, that it is not incapable of Cessation of Thought, which is its Action. When the Body is but a little
indispos'd it has an evident Effect upon the Mind; and a right Disposition of
the Organs is requisite to a right Manner of Thinking. In a sound Sleep sometimes, or in a Swoon, we cease to think at all; tho' the Soul is not therefore than
annihilated, but exists all the while tho' it does not act; and may not this
probably be the Case after Death? All our Ideas are first admitted by the Senses
and imprinted on the Brain, increasing in Number by Observation and Experience; there they become the Subjects of the Soul's Action. The Soul is a mere
Power or Faculty of contemplating on, and comparing those Ideas when it has
them; hence springs Reason: But as it can think on nothing but Ideas, it must
have them before it can think at all. Therefore as it may exist before it has
receiv' d any Ideas, it may exist before it thinks. To remember a Thing, is to have
the Idea of it still plainly imprinted on the Brain, which the Soul can turn to
and contemplate on Occasion. To forget a Thing, is to have the Idea of it
defac'd and destroy'd by some Accident, or the crouding in and imprinting of
great variety of other Ideas upon it, so that the Soul cannot find out its Traces
and distinguish it. When we have thus lost the Idea of any one Thing, we can
think no more, or cease to think, on that Thing; and as we can lose the Idea of
one Thing, so we may of ten, twenty, a hundred, &c. and even of all Things,
because they are not in their Nature permanent; and often during Life we see
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that some Men, (by an Accident or Distemper affecting the Brain,) lose the
greatest Part of their Ideas, and remember very little of their past Actions and
Circumstances. Now upon Death, and the Destruction of the Body, the Ideas
contain'd in the Brain, (which are alone the Subjects of the Soul's Action)
being then likewise necessarily destroy'd, the Soul, tho' incapable of Destruction itself, must then necessarily cease to think or act, having nothing left to
think or act upon. It is reduc'd to its first unconscious State before it receiv'd
any Ideas. And to cease to think is but little different from ceasing to be.
Nevertheless, 'tis not impossible that this same Faculty of contemplating
Ideas may be hereafter united to a new Body, and receive a new Set of Ideas;
but that will no way concern us who are now living; for the Identity will be lost,
it is no longer that same Self but a new Being.
I shall here subjoin a short Recapitulation of the Whole, that it may with
all its Parts be comprehended at one View.
1. It is suppos)d that God the Maker and Governour of the Universe, is infinitely wise, good, and powerful.
2. In consequence of his infinite Wisdom and Goodness) it is asserted, that
whatever He doth must be infinitely wise and good.
3. Unless He be interrupted, and His Measures broken by some other Being,
which is impossible because He is Almighty.
4. In consequence of His infinite Power, it is asserted, that nothing can exist
or be done in the Universe which is not agreeable to His Will) and therefore good.
5. Evil is hereby excluded, with all Merit and Demerit; and likewise all preference in the Esteem of God, of one Part of the Creation to another. This is the
Summary of the first Part.
Now our common Notions ofJustice will tell us, that if all created Things
are equally esteem'd by the Creator, they ought to be equally us'd by Him; and
that they are therefore equally us'd, we might embrace for Truth upon the
Credit, and as the true Consequence of the foregoing Argument. Nevertheless
we proceed to confirm it, by shewing how they are equally us'd, and that in the
following Manner.
1. A Creature when endu)d with Life or Consciousness) is made capable of
Uneasiness or Pain.
2. This Pain produces Desire to be freed from it, in exact proportion to itself.
3. The Accomplishment of this Desire produces an equal pleasure.
4. Pleasure is consequently equal to Pain.
From these Propositions it is observ'd,
I. That every Creature hath as much Pleasure as Pain.
2. That Life is not preferable to Insensibility; for Pleasure and Pain destroy
one another: That Being which has ten Degrees of Pain subtracted from ten of
Pleasure, has nothing remaining) and is upon an equality with that Being which
is insensible of both.
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3. As the first Part proves that all Things must be equally u.rd by the Creator
because equally esteem'd; so this second Part demonstrates that they are equally
esteem'd because equally us'd.
4 . Since every Action is the Effect of Self- Uneasiness, the Distinction of Virtue
and Vice is excluded; and Prop. VIII. in Sect. I. again demonstrated.
5. No State ofLife can be happier than the present, because Pleasure and Pain
are inseparable.
Thus both Parts ofthis Argument agree with and confirm one another, and
the Demonstration is reciprocal.
I am sensible that the Doctrine here advanc'd, if it were to be publish'd,
would meet with but an indifferent Reception. Mankind naturally and generally love to be flatter' d: Whatever sooths our Pride, and tends to exalt our
Species above the rest of the Creation, we are pleas' d with and easily believe,
when ungrateful Truths shall be with the utmost Indignation rejected. "What!
bring ourselves down to an Equality with the Beasts of the Field! with the
meanestpart of the Creation! 'Tis insufferable!" But, (to use a Piece of common
Sense) our Geese are but Geese tho' we may think 'em Swans-, and Truth will be
Truth tho' it sometimes prove mortifying and distasteful.

Articles of Belief and Acts of Religion ( 1728)
Written just three short years after the Dissertation, Franklin's Articles of Belief
and Acts of Religion reflects his subsequent distrust of "metaphysical reasoning,''
his increasing preoccupation with ethical issues, his dissatisfaction with orthodox
Christianity, and his faith in the deistic God of nature and reason. ''Disgusted,»
as he tells us in the Autobiography, with the rigidly sectarian and exclusively
scriptural sermons of Calvinist ministers, Franklin ceased his intermittent attendance of one of Philadelphia's Presbyterian churches and wrote the Articles and
Acts as a guide for his own private worship and contemplation. As he laconically
notes, "I [turn'd] to the Use of [the Articles}, and went no more to the public
Assemblies.''
While the Dissertation is a dispassionate exercise in logical speculation, the
Articles and Acts is a deeply personal statement ofFranklin's deistic sympathies. It
stresses a pragmatic religion ofnature in which orderliness, moral rectitude, selfimprovement, and rational devotion are the keynotes. Franklin deliberately
avoids references to Christian dogma, instead substituting humanistic expressions
of confidence in a lawlike and benevolent dei-ty. The litu1JJical readings he selects
are culled from poets and liberal theologians, not from Scripture or the Westminster Confession. The Articles and Acts, in short, is the catechism ofa man who
has renounced orthodox Christianity as well as dogmatic materialism. It is one of
the most touching and succinct of all deistic creeds.
One feature ofFranklin's litu1lfy has especially exercised the imagination and
ingenuity of subsequent commentators: its suggestion that the "Author and Fa-
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ther» ofall creation has «created many Beings or Gods,» each having «jor himself
oneglorious Sun, attended with a beautiful and admirable System ofPlanets.» It
is difficult and perhaps impossible at this point to determine how seriously
Franklin took this polytheistic tenet or from where he might have derived it. The
statement is reminiscent ofPlato's account in the Timaeus of the Demiu1:!Je's creation ofa plurality oflesser gods, but there is no conclusive evidence that Franklin
was acquainted with this particular dialogue. A more likely explanation of the
notion's source would be Franklin's familiarity with the works of thinkers such as
John Ray, Richard Blackmore, and Archbishop Fenelon (mentioned in the Articles and Acts), all of whom theorized about the possibility of multiple gods corresponding to multiple worlds. At any rate, the polytheistic speculations in
Franklin's private catechism rarely reemerge in his subsequent writings. Its expression ofdeistic beliefin a «wise and good God, who is the Author of our [rational] System» is, on the other hand, a constant theme.
The Articles and Acts presumbly consisted of two distinct sections. The second
part, if Franklin ever actually wrote it, is now missing.
First Principles
I Believe there is one Supreme most perfect Being, Author and Father of the
Gods themselves.
For I believe that Man is not the most perfect Being but One, rather that
as there are many Degrees of Beings his Inferiors, so there are many Degrees
of Beings superior to him.
Also, when I stretch my imagination thro' and beyond our System of Planets, beyond the visible fix'd Stars themselves, into that Space that is every Way
infinite, and conceive it fill'd with Suns like ours, each with a Chorus ofWorlds
for ever moving round him, then this little Ball on which we move, seems, even
in my narrow Imagination, to be almost Nothing, and my selfless than nothing, and of no sort of Consequence.
When I think thus, I imagine it great Vanity in me to suppose that the
Supremely Perfect, does in the least regard such an inconsiderable Nothing as
Man. More especially, since it is impossible for me to have any positive clear
Idea of that which is infinite and incomprehensible, I cannot conceive otherwise, than that He, the in.finite Father, expects or requires no Worship or Praise
from us, but that he is even INFINITELY ABOVE IT.
But since there is in all Men something like a natural Principle which
enclines them to DEVOTION or the Worship of some unseen Power;
And since Men are endued with Reason superior to all other Animals that
we are in our World acquainted with;
Therefore I think it seems required of me, and my Duty, as a Man, to pay
Divine Regards to SOMETHING.
I CONCEIVE then, that the INFINITE has created many Beings or Gods, vastly
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superior to Man, who can better conceive his Perfections than we, and return
him a more rational and glorious Praise. As among Men, the Praise of the
Ignorant or of Children, is not regarded by the ingenious Painter or Architect,
who is honour'd and pleas'd with the Approbation of Wise men and Artists.
It may be that these created Gods, are immortal, or it may be that after
many Ages, they are changed, and Others supply their Places.
Howbeit, I conceive that each of these is exceeding wise, and good, and
very powerful; and that Each has made for himself, one glorious Sun, attended
with a beautiful and admirable System of Planets.
It is that particular wise and good God, who is the Author and Owner of
our System, that I propose for the Object of my Praise and Adoration.
For I conceive that he has in himself some of those Passions he has planted
in us, and that, since he has given us Reason whereby we are capable of observing his Wisdom in the Creation, he is not above caring for us, being pleas'd
with our Praise, and offended when we slight Him, or neglect his Glory.
I conceive for many Reasons that he is a good Being, and as I should be
happy to have so wise, good and powerful a Being my Friend, let me consider
in what Manner I shall make myself most acceptable to him.
Next to the Praise due to his Wisdom, I believe he is pleased and delights
in the Happiness of those he has created; and since without Virtue Man can
have no Happiness in this World, I firmly believe he delights to see me Virtuous, because he is pleas'd when he sees me Happy.
And since he has created many Things which seem purely design'd for the
Delight of Man, I believe he is not offended when he sees his Children solace
themselves in any manner of pleasant Exercises and innocent Delights, and I
think no Pleasure innocent that is to Man hurtful.
I love him therefore for his Goodness and I adore him for his Wisdom.
Let me then not fail to praise my God continually, for it is his Due, and it
is all I can return for his many Favours and great Goodness to me; and let me
resolve to be virtuous, that I may be happy, that I may please Him, who is
delighted to see me happy. Amen.

1. Adoration

2. Petition.

3. Thanks.

Prel. Being mindful that before I address the DEITY, my soul ought to
be calm and Serene, free from Passion and Perturbation, or otherwise elevated with Rational Joy and Pleasure, I ought to use a
Countenance that expresses a filial Respect, mixt with a kind of
Smiling, that signifies inward Joy, and Satisfaction, and Admiration.
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Owise God,
My good Father,
Thou beholdest the Sincerity of my Heart,
And of my Devotion;
Grant me a Continuance of thy Favour!

(1)
Powerful Goodness, &c.
0 Creator, 0 Father, I believe that thou art Good, and that thou art plea~d
with the Pleasure of thy Children.
Praised be thy Name for ever.
(2)
By thy Power hast thou made the glorious Sun, with his attending Worlds;
from the Energy of thy mighty Will they first received their prodigious Motion,
and by the Wondrous Laws by which they move.
Praised be thy Name for ever.
(3)
By thy Wisdom hast thou formed all Things, Thou hast created Man, bestowing Life and Reason, and plac'd him in Dignity superior to thy other earthly
Creatures.
Praised be thy Name for ever.
(4)
Thy wisdom, thy Power, and thy GOODNESS are every where clearly seen; in the
Air and in the Water, in the Heavens and on the Earth; Thou providest for the
various winged Fowl, and the innumerable Inhabitants of the Water; Thou
givest Cold and heat, Rain and Sunshine in their Season, and to the Fruits of
the Earth Increase.
Praised be thy Name for ever.
(5)
I believe thou hast given Life to thy Creatures that they might Live, and art not
delighted with violent Death and bloody Sacrifices.
P,raised be thy Name for ever.
(6)
Thou abhorrest in thy Creatures Treachery and Deceit, Malice, Revenge, Intemperance and every other hurtful Vice; but Thou art a Lover of Justice and
Sincerity, of Friendship, Benevolence and every Virtue. Thou art my Friend,
my Father, and my Benefactor.
Praised be thy Name, 0 God, for ever.
Amen.
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After this, it will not be improper to read part of some such Book as Ray's
Wisdom of God in the Creation or Blackmore on the Creation, or the Archbishop ofCambray's Demonstration of the Being ofa God;* &c. or else spend
some Minutes in a serious Silence, contemplating on those Subjects.
Then Sing
Milton's Hymn to the Creator**
These are thy Glorious Works, Parent of Good!
Almighty: Thine this Universal Frame,
Thus wondrous fair! Thy self how wondrous then!
Speak ye who best can tell, Ye Sons of Light,
Angels, for ye behold him, and with Songs,
And Choral Symphonies, Day without Night
Circle his Throne rejoicing. You in Heav'n,
On Earth, join all Ye Creatures to extol
Him first, him last, him midst and without End.
Fairest of Stars, last in the Train of Night,
If rather thou belong'st not to the Dawn,
Sure Pledge of Day! That crown'st the smiling Morn
With thy bright Circlet; Praise him in thy Sphere
While Day arises, that sweet Hour of Prime.
Thou Sun, of this Great World both Eye and Soul
Acknowledge Him thy Greater, Sound his Praise
In thy Eternal Course; both when thou climb'st,
And when high Noon hast gain'd, and when thou fall'st.
Moon! that now meet'st the orient Sun, now fly'st
With the fix'd Stars, fix'd in their Orb that flies,
And ye five other Wandering Fires, that move
In mystic Dance, not without Song, resound
His Praise, that out of Darkness call'd up Light.
Air! and ye Elements! the Eldest Birth
Of Nature's Womb, that in Quaternion run

*Ed.: John Ray, The Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of the Creation (London, 1691); Richard Blackmore, Creation: A Philosophical Poem (London, 1712); and
Fenelon, Archbishop of Cambrai, A Demonstration of the Existence and Attributes of
God, Drawn from the Knowledge of Nature, from Proofs Purely Intellectual, and from
the Ideas of the Infinite Himself, second edition (London, 1720).
**Ed.: From Paradise Lost, Book 5, vv. 153-56, 160-204.
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Perpetual Circle, multiform; and mix
And nourish all Things, let your ceaseless Change
Vary to our great Maker still new Praise.
Ye Mists and Exhalations! that now rise
From Hill or steaming Lake, dusky or grey,
Till the Sun paint your fleecy Skirts with Gold,
In Honour to the World's Great Author rise.
Whether to deck with Clouds th' uncolour' d Sky
Or wet the thirsty Earth with falling show'rs,
Rising or falling still advance his Praise.
His Praise, ye Winds! that from 4 Quarters blow,
Breathe soft or loud; and wave your Tops ye Pines!
With every Plant, in Sign of Worship wave.
Fountains! and ye that warble as ye flow
Melodious Murmurs, warbling tune his Praise.
Join Voices all ye living Souls, ye Birds!
That singing, up to Heav'n's high Gate ascend,
Bear on your Wings, and in your Notes his Praise.
Ye that in Waters glide! and ye that walk
The Earth! and stately Tread, or lowly Creep;
Witness if I be silent, Ev'n or Morn,
To Hill or Valley, Fountain or Fresh Shade,
Made Vocal by my Song, and taught his Praise.
Here follows the Reading of some Book or part of a Book
Discoursing on and exciting to MORAL VIRTUE
Petition
Prel. In as much as by Reason of our Ignorance We cannot be Certain
that many Things Which we often hear mentioned in the Petitions
of Men to the Deity, would prove REAL GOODS if they were in our
Possession, and as I have Reason to hope and believe that the
Goodness of my Heavenly Father will not withhold from me a suitable Share of Temporal Blessings, ifby a VIRTUOUS and HOLY Life I
merit his Favour and Kindness, Therefore I presume not to ask such
Things, but rather Humbly, and with a sincere Heart express my
earnest Desires that he would graciously assist my Continual
Endeavours and Resolutions of eschewing Vice and embracing Virtue; Which kind of Supplications will at least be thus far beneficial,
as they remind me in a solemn manner of my Extensive DUIY.

71

Benjamin Franklin

72

That I may be preserved from Atheism and Infidelity, Impiety and Profaneness,
and in my Addresses to Thee carefully avoid Irreverence and Ostentation,
Formality and odious Hypocrisy,
Help me, 0 Father
That I may be loyal to my Prince, and faithful to my Country, careful for its
Good, valiant in its Defence, and Obedient to its Laws, abhorring Treason as
much as Tyranny,
Help me, 0 Father
That I may to those above me be dutiful, humble, and submissive, avoiding
Pride, disrespect and Contumacy,
Help me, 0 Father
That I may to those below me, be gracious, Condescending and Forgiving,
using Clemency, protecting Innocent Distress, avoiding Cruelty, Harshness and
Oppression, Insolence and unreasonable Severity,
Help me, 0 Father
That I may refrain from Calumny and Detraction; that I may avoid and abhor
Deceit and Envy, Fraud, Flattery and Hatred, Malice, Lying and Ingratitude,
Help me, 0 Father
That I may be sincere in Friendship, faithful in Trust, and impartial in Judgment, watchful against Pride, and against Anger (that momentary Madness),
Help me, 0 Father
That I may be just in all my Dealings and temperate in my Pleasures, full of
Candour and Ingenuity, Humanity and Benevolence,
Help me, 0 Father
That I may be grateful to my Benefactors and generous to my Friends, exerting
Charity and Liberality to the Poor, and Pity to the Miserable,
Help me, 0 Father
That I may avoid Avarice, Ambition, and Intemperance, Luxury and Lasciviousness,
Help me, 0 Father
That I may possess Integrity and Evenness of Mind, Resolution in Difficulties,
and Fortitude under Affliction; that I may be punctual in performing my
Promises, peaceable and prudent in my Behaviour,
Help me, 0 Father
That I may have Tenderness for the Weak, and a reverent Respect for the
Ancient; that I may be kind to my Neighbours, good-natured to my Companions, and hospitable to Strangers,
Help me, 0 Father
That I may be averse to Craft and Overreaching, abhor Extortion, Perjury, and
every kind of Wickedness,
Help me, 0 Father
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That I may be honest and Openhearted, gentle, merciful and Good, cheerful
in Spirit, rejoicing in the Good of Others,
Help me, 0 Father
That I may have a constant Regard to Honour and Probity; that I may possess
a perfect Innocence and a good Conscience, and at length become Truly Virtuous and Magnanimous,
Help me, Good God,
Help me, 0 Father
And forasmuch as Ingratitude is one of the most odious ofVices, let me not
be unmindful gratefully to acknowledge the Favours I receive from Heaven.

Thanks.
For Peace and Liberty, for Food and Raiment, for Corn and Wine, and
Milk, and every kind of Healthful Nourishment,
Good God, I Thank thee.
For the Common Benefits of Air and Light, for useful Fire and delicious
Water,
Good God, I Thank thee.
For Knowledge and Literature and every useful Art; for my Friends and
their Prosperity, and for the fewness of my Enemies,
Good God, I Thank thee.
For all thy innumerable Benefits; for Life and Reason, and the Use of
Speech, for Health and Joy and every Pleasant Hour,
Good God, I Thank thee. ...

Doctrine to Be Preached (1731)
Franklin describes himself in his Autobiography as an inveterate scribbler ofprivate reflections, passing thoughts, and outlines ofplanned (but often never written) works. This selection, probably composed in 1731, appears to have been a
memorandum Franklin intended to work up into a public discourse--possibly to
be delivered at a meeting of the Philadelphia ]unto Society, which Franklin had
founded in 1727. It is not known whether he actually «preached,, this doctrine at
some time, but the memo reemet;ged some forty years later in abbreviated form in
the Autobiography (see selections from the Autobiography, below).
The piece is an encapsulated account of Franklin,s deistic orientation, stressing the rational imperatives of virtue and knowledge.
That there is one God Father of the Universe.
That he [is] infinitely good, Powerful and wise.
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That he is omnipresent.
That he ought to be worshipped, by Adoration Prayer and Thanksgiving
both in publick and private.
That he loves such of his Creatures as love and do good to others: and will
reward them either in this World or hereafter.
That Men's Minds do not die with their Bodies, but are made more happy
or miserable after this Llfe according to their Actions.
That Virtuous Men ought to league together to strengthen the Interest of
Virtue, in the World: and so strengthen themselves in Virtue.
That Knowledge and Learning is to be cultivated, and Ignorance dissipated.
That none but the Virtuous are wise.
That Man's Perfection is in Virtue.

On the Providence of God in the Government
of the World ( 1732)
On the Providence of God, which Franklin recorded in his Commonplace Book,
appears to be the draft of a speech he delivered or intended to deliver to his «Pot
Companions» of the ]unto Society.
The essay is interesting on several counts. First, it indicates how far Franklin
had retreated by 1732 from his earlier denial in the Dissertation ofhuman freedom. In this piece, he still considers the deity to be all-powerful and supremelygood,
but he now thinks it reasonable to suppose that since God is also infinitely freethat is, totally unconstrained by externalities-he imparts a spark of divine freedom (along with power and goodness) to the creatures made in his image.
Moreover, Franklin argues that the omnibenevolent nature of God is such
that he neither arbitrarily predestines certain individuals to eternal damnation
and others to eternal bliss-a clear jab at Calvinism--nor totally distances himselffrom creation by leaving humans to the whimsy of chance. Neither course of
action would be worthy of a deity who is supremely wise, good, and powerful. Instead, Franklin concludes that, given the 'Power of the Deity,» the only rational
account of his relationship to creation is that he occasionally «interferes by his
particular Providence and sets aside the Effects which would otherwise have been
produced.»
It is not at all clear how we are to read this passage. If by «interferes by his
particular Providence'' Franklin means the deity directly intervenes in the system
of physical laws he has established-thereby, for example, magically preventing
otherwise inevitable natural disasters such as earthquakes-then he seems to have
stepped out of character, offering a most undeistic and obviously Calvinist doctrine of miracles and special providences. But there is no reason to suppose this is
what Franklin had in mind. Instead, it seems more plausible to interpret his
ar,gument as a defense ofthe assumption that divine providence can sway, without
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necessarily coercing, human sentiment away from evil and toward virtue. It is
significant, for example, that the illustration with which Franklin highlights his
point is a political rather than physical one: God's infinite goodness can prompt
him to interfere with wicked ambitions in such a way as to «deliver)) an oppressed
but righteous nation from the grip of a ''cruel Tyrant.)) This interpretation of
providence allows Franklin) in typical deistic fashion, to salvage divine power and
goodness without sacrificing either human freedom or the mechanistic orderliness
of the physical realm. At any rate, his rather murky attempt to accentuate the
benevolence of the deity, even to the extent ofpushing himselfinto a corner possibly
incompatible with his deism, only underscores Franklin)s growing preoccupation
with ethical matters.
Finally, it should be noted that Franklin )s discussion of divine attributes as
well as providence is based on inductive extrapolations from experience. Like all
deists, he was intensely suspicious of a priori metaphysical speculation or ecclesial
(and supposedly revealed) authority, believing instead that knowledge of the deity
is best gleaned from an examination of the «book of nature.)) His analysis of divine providence, as he says, is not founded on wlhe Authority ofany Books or Men
how sacred soever; because I know that no Authority is more convincing to Men of
Reason than the Authority of Reason itself»

When I consider my own Weakness, and the discerning Judgment of those
who are to be my Audience, I cannot help blaming my self considerably, for
this rash Undertaking of mine, it being a Thing I am altogether ill practis'd in
and very much unqualified for; I am especially discouraged when I reflect that
you are all my intimate Pot Companions who have heard me say a 1000 silly
Things in Conversations, and therefore have not that laudable Partiality and
Veneration for whatever I shall deliver that Good people commonly have for
their Spiritual Guides; that You have no Reverence for my Habit, nor for the
Sanctity of my Countenance; that you do not believe me inspir' d or divinely
assisted, and therefore will think your Selves at liberty to assent or dissent,
agree or disagree, of any Thing I advance, canvassing and siiling it as the private
Opinion of one of your Acquaintance. These are great Disadvantages and
Discouragements but I am enter'd and must proceed, humbly requesting your
Patience and Attention.
I propose at this Time to discourse on the Subject of our last Conversation:
The Providence of God in the Government of the World. I shall not attempt
to amuse you with Flourishes of Rhetorick, were I master of that deceitful
Science because I know ye are Men of substantial Reason and can easily discern
between sound Argument and the false Glosses of Oratory; nor shall I endeavor to impose on your Ears, by a musical Accent in delivery, in the Tone of
one violently affected with what he says; for well I know that ye are far from
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being superstitious [or] fond of unmeaning Noise, and that ye believe a Thing
to be no more true for being sung than said. I intend to offer you nothing but
plain Reasoning, devoid of Art and Ornament; unsupported by the Authority
of any Books or Men how sacred soever; because I know that no Authority is
more convincing to Men of Reason than the Authority of Reason itself It
might be judg'd an Affront to your Understandings should I go about to prove
this first Principle, the Existence of a Deity and that he is the Creator of the
Universe, for that would suppose you ignorant of what all Mankind in all Ages
have agreed in. I shall therefore proceed to observe: 1. That he must be a Being
of great Wisdom; 2. That he must be a Being of great Goodness and 3. That
he must be a Being of great Power. That he must be a Being of infinite Wisdom, appears in his admirable Order and Disposition of Things, whether we
consider the heavenly bodies, the Stars and Planets, and their wonderful regular Motions, or this Earth compounded of such an Excellent mixture of all the
Elements; or the admirable Structure of Animal Bodies of such infinite Variety,
and yet every one adapted to its Nature, and the Way of life it is to be placed
in, whether on Earth, in the Air or in the Waters, and so exactly that the highest
and most exquisite human Reason, cannot find a fault and say this would have
been better so or in another Manner, which whoever considers attentively and
thoroughly will be astonish'd and swallow'd up in Admiration.
2. That the Deity is a Being of great Goodness, appears in his giving Life
to so many Creatures, each of which acknowledge it a Benefit by their
unwillingess to leave it; in his providing plentiful Sustenance for them all, and
making those Things that are most useful, most common and easy to be had;
such as Water necessary for almost every Creature's Drink; Air without which
few could subsist, the inexpressible Benefits of Light and Sunshine to almost all
Animals in general; and to Men the most useful Vegetables, such as Corn, the
most useful of Metals as Iron, and the most useful Animals, as Horses, Oxen
and Sheep, he has made easiest to raise, or procure in Quantity or Numbers:
each of which particulars if considered seriously and carefully would fill us with
the highest Love and Affection. 3. That he is a Being of infinite Power appears,
in his being able to form and compound such Vast Masses of Matter as this
Earth and the Sun and innumerable Planets and Stars, and give them such
prodigious Motion, and yet so to govern them in their greatest Velocity as that
they shall not flie off out of their appointed Bounds nor dash one against
another, to their mutual Destruction; but 'tis easy to conceive his Power, when
we are convinc'd of his infinite Knowledge and Wisdom; for if weak and foolish
Creatures as we are, by knowing the Nature of a few Things can produce such
wonderful Effects; such as for instance by knowing the Nature only of Nitre
and Sea Salt mix'd we can make a Water which will dissolve the hardest Iron
and by adding one Ingredient more, can make another Water which will dissolve Gold and render the most Solid Bodies fluid-and by knowing the Na-
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ture of Salt Peter Sulphur and Charcoal those mean Ingredients mix'd we can
shake the Air in the most terrible Manner, destroy Ships Houses and Men at
a Distance and in an Instant, overthrow Cities, rend Rocks into a Thousand
Pieces, and level the highest Mountains. What Power must he possess who not
only knows the Nature of every Thing in the Universe, but can make Things
of new Natures with the greatest Ease and at his Pleasure!
Agreeing then that the World was at first made by a Being of infinite Wisdom, Goodness and Power, which Being we call God; The State of Things ever
since and at this Time must be in one of these four following manners, viz.
1. Either he unchangeably decreed and appointed every Thing that comes
to pass; and left nothing to the Course [of] Nature, nor allow'd any Creature
free agency, or
2. Without decreeing any thing, he left all to general Nature and the Events
of Free Agency in his Creatures, which he never alters or interrupts, or
3. He decreed some Things unchangeable, and left others to general Nature and the Events of Free Agency, which also he never alters or interrupts; or
4. He sometimes interferes by his particular Providence and sets aside the
Effects which would otherwise have been produced by any of the Above
Causes.
I shall endeavour to shew the first 3 Suppositions to be inconsistent with
the common Light of Reason; and that the 4th is most agreeable to it, and
therefore most probably true.
In the 1. place. If you say he has in the Beginning unchangeably decreed
all Things and left Nothing to Nature or free Agency. These Strange Conclusions will necessarily follow; 1. That he is now no more a God. 'Tis true indeed,
before he had made such unchangeable Decree, he was a Being of Power,
Almighty; but now having determin'd every Thing, he has divested himself of
all further Power, he has done and has no more to do, he has ty' d up his Hands,
and has now no greater Power than an Idol of Wood or Stone; nor can there
be any more Reason for praying to him or worshipping of him, than of such
an Idol for the Worshippers can never [be] the better for such Worship. Then
2. he has decreed some things contrary to the very Notion of a wise and good
Being; Such as that some of his Creatures or Children shall do all Manner of
Injury to others and bring every kind of Evil upon them without Cause; that
some of them shall even blaspheme him their Creator in the most horrible
manner; and, which is still more highly absurd that he has decreed the greatest
Part of Mankind, shall in all Ages, put up their earnest Prayers to him both in
private and publickly in great Assemblies, when all the while he had so
determin'd their Fate that he could not possibly grant them any Benefits on
that Account, nor could such Prayers be any way available. When then should
he ordain them to make such Prayers? It cannot be imagined they are of any
Service to him. Surely it is not more difficult to believe the World was made by
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a God of Wood or Stone, than that the God who made the World should be
such a God as this.
In the 2. Place. If you say he has decreed nothing but left all things to
general Nature, and the Events of Free Agency, which he never alters or interrupts. Then these Conclusions will follow; He must either utterly hide him self
from the Works of his Hands, and take no Notice at all of their Proceedings
natural or moral; or he must be as undoubtedly he is, a Spectator of every
thing; for there can be no Reason or Ground to suppose the first-I say there
can be no Reason to imagine he would make so glorious a Universe merely to
abandon it. In this Case imagine the Deity looking on and beholding the Ways
of his Creatures; some Heroes in Virtue he sees are incessantly indeavouring
the Good of others, they labour thro vast difficulties, they suffer incredible
Hardships and Miseries to accomplish this End, in hopes to please a Good
God, and obtain his Favour, which they earnestly Pray for; what Answer can he
make them within himself but this; take the Reward Chance may give you, I do
not intermeddle in these Affairs, he sees others continually doing all manner of
Evil, and bringing by their Actions Misery and Destruction among Mankind:
What can he say here but this, if Chance rewards you I shall not punish you, I am
not to be concerned. He sees the just, the innocent and the Beneficent in the
Hands of the wicked and violent Oppressor; and when the good are at the
Brink of Destruction they pray to him, thou, 0 God, art mighty and powerful
to save; help us we beseech thee: He answers, I cannot help you, 'tis none of my
Business nor do I at all regard these things. How is it possible to believe a wise
and an infinitely Good Being can be delighted in this Circumstance; and be
utterly unconcern' d what becomes of the Beings and Things he has created; for
thus, we must believe him idle and unactive, and that his glorious Attributes of
Power, Wisdom and Goodness are no more to be made use of
In the Third Place. If you say he has decreed some things and left others
to the Events of Nature and Free Agency, Which he never alters or interrupts;
Still you unGod him, if I may be allow'd the Expression; he has nothing to do;
he can cause us neither Good nor harm; he is no more to be regarded than a
lifeless Image, than Dagon, or Baal, or Bell and the Dragon; and as in both the
other Suppositions foregoing, that Being which from its Power is most able to
Act, from its Wisdom knows best how to act, and from its Goodness would
always certainly act best, is in this Opinion supposed to become the most
unactive of all Beings and remain everlastingly Idle; an Absurdity, which when
considered or but barely seen, cannot be swallowed without doing the greatest
Violence to common Reason, and all the Faculties of the Understanding.
We are then necessarily driven into the fourth Supposition, That the Deity
sometimes interferes by his particular Providence, and sets aside the Events
which would otherwise have been produc'd in the Course ofNature, or by the
Free Agency of Men; and this is perfectly agreeable with what we can know of
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his Attributes and Perfections: But as some may doubt whether 'tis possible
there should be such a Thing as free Agency in Creatures; I shall just offer one
Short Argument on that Account and proceed to shew how the duties of
Religion necessarily follow the Belief of a Providence. You acknowledge that
God is infinitely Powerful, Wise and Good, and also a free Agent; and you will
not deny that he has communicated to us part of his Wisdom, Power and
Goodness; i.e. he has made us in some Degree Wise, potent and good; and is
it then impossible for him to communicate any Part of his Freedom, and make
us also in some Degree Free? Is not even his infinite Power sufficient for this?
I should be glad to hear what Reason any Man can give for thinking in that
Manner; 'tis sufficient for me to shew tis not impossible, and no Man I think
can shew 'tis improbable, but much more might be offer'd to demonstrate
clearly that Men are in some Degree free Agents, and accountable for their
Actions; however, this I may possibly reserve for another Discourse hereafter if
I find Occasion.
Lastly If God does not sometimes interfere by his Providence tis either
because he cannot, or because he will not; which of these Positions will you
choose? There is a righteous Nation grievously oppress'd by a cruel Tyrant,
they earnestly intreat God to deliver them; If you say he cannot, you deny his
infinite Power, which at first acknowledg'd; if you say he will not, you must
directly deny his infinite Goodness. You are then of necessity oblig'd to allow,
that 'tis highly reasonable to believe a Providence because tis highly absurd to
believe otherwise.
Now if tis unreasonable to suppose it out of the Power of the Deity to help
and favour us particularly or that we are out of his Hearing or Notice or that
Good Actions do not procure more of his Favour than ill Ones. Then I conclude, that believing a Providence we have the Foundation of all true Religion;
for we should love and revere that Deity for his Goodness and thank him for
his Benefits; we should adore him for his Wisdom, fear him for his Power, and
pray to him for his Favour and Protection; and this Religion will be a Powerful
Regulator of our Actions, give us Peace and Tranquility within our own Minds,
and render us Benevolent, Useful and Beneficial to others.

Self-Denial Not the Essence of Virtue (1735)
This short piece ofFranklin 1s appeared anonymously in his Pennsylvania Gazette.
That the «correspondent11 is actually Franklin himselfis indicated by a passage in
his Autobiography in which he confesses that from time to time the Gazette ran
«tittle Pieces of my own which had been first compos 1d for Reading in our ]unto.,,
One of these journalistic squibs was «a Discourse on Self denial, showing that
Virtue was not secure, till its Practice became a Habitude, and was free from the
Opposition of contrary Inclination.»
Self-Denial Not the Essence of Vrrtue is vintage Franklin. In it we see him
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once again hammering away at what he takes to be irrational Christian
dogma-in this case, the ethical excellence of asceticism-and offering as a normative substitute a quite Aristotelian analysis of virtue as rational habituation
to good actions. What is of moral significance for Franklin is pragmatic consequence, not the puri-ty (or lack thereof) of intention. The assumption that ethical
actions are utility-laden and promotive of the commonweal is characteristic of
deism.
Franklin's publication of this piece on self-denial was probably intended as
much to raise hackles as to instruct and edify. Whether it succeeded in the latter
goal is unknown, but it certainly accomplished the former, prompting an indignant response in the 4 March issue of the American Weekly Mercury. We also
know that Franklin took to heart his definition of virtue as habituation to good
deeds. His self-imposed "program for arriving at moral peifection, » described in
the Autobiography, had its origins in precisely this analysis (see selections from the
Autobiography, below).

To the Printer of the Gazette.
That SELF-DENIAL is not the ESSENCE OF VIRTUE.
It is commonly asserted, that without Self-Denial there is no Virtue, and
that the greater the Self-Denial the greater the Virtue.
Ifit were said, that he who cannot deny himself in any Thing he inclines to,
tho' he knows it will be to his Hurt, has not the Virtue of Resolution or
Fortitude, it would be intelligible enough; but as it stands it seems obscure or
erroneous.
Let us consider some of the Virtues singly.
If a Man has no inclination to wrong People in his Dealings, if he feels no
Temptation to it, and therefore never does it; can it be said that he is not a just
Man? If he is a just Man, has he not the Virtue of Justice?
If to a certain Man, idle Diversions have nothing in them that is tempting,
and therefore he never relaxes his Application to Business for their Sake; is he
not an Industrious Man? Or has he not the Virtue of Industry?
I might in like manner instance in all the rest of the Virtues: But to make
the Thing short, As it is certain, that the more we strive against the Temptation
to any Vice, and practise the contrary Virtue, the weaker will that Temptation
be, and the stronger will be that Habit; 'till at length the Temptation has no
Force, or entirely vanishes: Does it follow from thence, that in our Endeavours
to overcome Vice, we grow continually less and less Virtuous; till at length we
have no Virtue at all?
If Self-Denial be the Essence ofVirtue, then it follows, that the Man who
is naturally temperate, just, &c. is not virtuous; but that in order to be virtuous,
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he must, in spite of his natural Inclinations, wrong his Neighbours, and eat and
drink, &c. to excess.
But perhaps it may be said, that by the Word Virtue in the above Assertion,
is meant, Merit-, and so it should stand thus; Without Self- Denial there is no
Merit; and the greater the Self-Denial the greater the Merit.
The Self-denial here meant, must be when our Inclinations are towards
Vice, or else it would still be Nonsense.
By Merit is understood, Desert; and when we say a Man merits, we mean
that he deserves Praise or Reward.
We do not pretend to merit any thing of God, for he is above our Services;
and the Benefits he confers on us, are the Effects of his Goodness and Bounty.
All our Merit then is with regard to one another, and from one to another.
Taking then the Assertion as it last stands,
If a Man does me a Service from a natural benevolent Inclination, does he
deserve less of me than another who does me the like Kindness against his
Inclination?
If I have two Journeymen, one naturally industrious, the other idle, but
both perform a Days Work equally good, ought I to give the latter the most
Wages?
Indeed, lazy Workmen are commonly observ'd to be more extravagant in
their Demands than the Industrious; for if they have not more for their Work,
they cannot live so well: But tho' it be true to a Proverb, That Lazy Folks take
the most Pains, does it follow that they deserve the most Money?
Ifyou were to employ Servants in Affairs of Trust, would you not bid more
for one you knew was naturally honest, than for one naturally roguish, but who
had lately acted honestly? For Currents whose natural Channel is damm'd up,
(till the new Course is by Time worn sufficiently deep and become natural,) are
apt to break their Banks. If one Servant is more valuable than another, has he
not more Merit than the other? And yet this is not on Account of Superior Selfdenial.
Is a Patriot not praise-worthy, if Publick Spirit is natural to him?
Is a Pacing-Horse less valuable for being a natural Pacer?
Nor in my Opinion has any Man less Merit for having in general natural
virtuous Inclinations.
The Truth is, that Temperance, Justice, Charity, &c. are Virtues, whether
practis'd with or against our Inclinations; and the Man who practises them,
merits our Love and Esteem: And Self-denial is neither good nor bad, but as
'tis apply'd: He that denies a Vicious Inclination is Virtuous in proportion to
his Resolution, but the most perfect Virtue is above all Temptation, such as the
Virtue of the Saints in Heaven: And he who does a foolish, indecent or wicked
Thing, merely because 'tis contrary to his Inclination, (like some mad Enthu-
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siasts I have read of, who ran about naked, under the Notion of taking up the
Cross) is not practising the reasonable Science of Virtue, but is lunatick.

Dialogue between Two Presbyterians ( 1735)
Franklin ran this composition in his Pennsylvania Gazette on 10 April 1735,
signing it simply "AB. C.D.,, There wasgood reason for the anonymity. This is one
of Franklin's strongest published denunciations of Calvinist doctrine and sectarian parochialism. Although militant deists such as Paine and Palmer later
penned criticisms of orthodoxy that make the Dialogue seem mild in comparison,
its publication was a bold move for the moderate Franklin. (At the risk ofsounding uncharitable, it was also a cunning business maneuver for a newspaperman
to sell more papers by fanning an already hot issue.)
There is no doubt, however, that Franklin was angry. The incident that
sparked the piece was the persecution (as Franklin saw it) ofthe Reverend Samuel
Hemphill (referred to as «Mr. H,, in the Dialogue). Hemphill was an Irish-born
Presbyterian clergyman who emigrated to Pennsylvania in 1734--partly, it
seems, because charges ofunorthodoxy hadgotten him into trouble in Ireland. But
his past followed him to the New World. Two early sermons in New Castle
prompted an official inquiry into his doctrinal purity. Acquitted by the presbytery, Hemphill left New Castle and moved to Philadelphia, where he became
assistant minister to the congregation Franklin earlier had left in disgust. While
serving in this capacity, so Franklin tells us, Hemphill regularly preached sermons
that had «tittle of the dogmatical kind, but inculcated strongly the Practice of
Virtue, or what in the religious Stile are called Good Works." The officiating
minister, one Jebediah Andrews, as well as some members of the congregation,
found these sermons theologically unacceptable. On 7 April 1735, Hemphill once
again was charged with unorthodoxy, and a synodical commission was called to
investigate.
Franklin was outraged by what he took to be the small-minded sectarianism
of the Presbyterian establishment and joined the controversy by de.fending Hemphill in the Dialogue. But the work is much more than merely a brieffor Hemphill.
It is significant as a deistic indictment ofone of the central tenets of Calvinismjustification by faith.
In the Dialogue, Franklin criticizes the precept that faith (as opposed to good
works) is the only road to salvation by turning the Christian establishment's primary weapon-scriptural authority-against it. He awues that a careful study
ofthe Gospels reveals that the main thrust ofJesus' teaching is moral in tenor, that
Jesus emphatically tells his followers that good works and not faith in his divinity
are the key to the Kingdom of Heaven, and that virtue is cca doctrine exactly
agreeable to Christianity.,, Franklin rhetorically concedes that faith is a necessary
condition for virtuous behavior, but he defines cfaith" as trust in the purity of
Jesus' moral teaching and example, not in his godhead.
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Moreover, Franklin castigates the Calvinist establishment for its assumption
that its basic doctrines are infallible. Protestantism, he argues, correctly criticizes
the Roman church for its endorsement ofpapal inerrancy. How then, he asks, «can
we modestly claim Infallibility for our selves or our Synods in our way ofInterpreting?)) Franklin's point is that humans are by nature fallible in their reasoning
and that consequently a rigid .fidelity to written-in-stone doctrine is always suspect. As he characteristically observes, <<Peace, Unity and Virtue in any Church
are more to be regarded than Orthodoxy. These two themes-the importance of
virtue and the soundness ofkeeping an open mind about religious matters--reappear time and again throughout Franklin's writings.
Franklin's defense of Hemphill was unsuccessful--it may, in fact, have exacerbated Hemphill's already precarious situation. At any rate, Hemphill was
unanimously censored by the members ofthe Commission ofthe Synod on 27 April
1735. Moreover, the commission suspended him from the ministry for doctrines
«unsound and Dangerous, contrary to the sacred Scriptures and our excellent
Confession and Catechisms.» Franklin followed up in the 17 July issue of the
Gazette with a harsh criticism of the commission's decision. Again, however, his
efforts were to no avail. The verdict against Hemphill remained, and the unhappy minister, as Franklin recalls in his Autobiography, «left us in search elsewhere of better fortune.»
)J

... S. Good Morrow! I am glad to find you well and abroad; for not having
seen you at Meeting lately, I concluded you were indispos'd.
T. Tis true I have not been much at Meeting lately, but that was not
occasion'd by any Indisposition. In short, I stay at home, or else go to Church,
because I do not like Mr. H. Your new-fangled Preacher.
S. I am sorry we should differ in Opinion upon any Account; but let us
reason the Point calmly; what Offense does Mr. H. give you?
T. Tis his Preaching disturbs me: He talks of nothing but the Duties of
Morality: I do not love to hear so much of Morality: I am sure it will carry no
Man to Heaven, and I do not think it fit to be preached in a Christian Congregation.
S. I suppose you think no Doctrine fit to be preached in a Christian congregation, but such as Christ and his Apostles used to preach.
T. To be sure I think so.
S. I do not conceive then how you can dislike the Preaching of Morality,
when you consider, that Morality made the principal Part of their Preaching as
well as of Mr. H's. What is Christ's Sermon on the Mount but an excellent
moral Discourse, towards the end of which, (as foreseeing that People might
in time come to depend more upon their Faith in him, than upon Good Works,
for their Salvation) he tells the Hearers plainly, that their saying to him, Lord,
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Lord, (that is, professing themselves his Disciples or Christians) should give
them no Title to Salvation, but their Doing the Will of his Father; and that tho'
they have prophesied in his Name, yet he will declare to them, as Neglecters
of Morality, that he never knew them.
T. But what do you understand by that Expression of Christ's, Doing the
Will of my Father?
S. I understand it to be the Will of God, that we should live virtuous,
upright, and good-doing Lives; as the Prophet understood it, when he said,
What doth the Lord require ofthee, 0 Man, but to do justly, love Mercy, and walk
humbly with the Lord thy God.
T. But is not Faith recommended in the New Testament as well as Morality?
S. Tis true, it is. Faith is recommended as a Means of producing Morality:
Our Saviour was a Teacher of Morality or Virtue, and they that were deficient
and desired to be taught, ought first to believe in him as an able and faithful
Teacher. Thus Faith would be a Means of producing Morality, and Morality of
Salvation. But that from such Faith alone Salvation may be expected, appears
to me to be neither a Christian Doctrine nor a reasonable one. And I should
as soon expect, that my bare Believing Mr. Grew* to be an excellent Teacher
of the Mathematicks, would make me a Mathematician, as that Believing in
Christ would of it self make a Man a Christian.
T. Perhaps you may think, that tho' Faith alone cannot save a Man, Morality or Virtue alone, may.
S. Morality or Virtue is the End, Faith only a Means to obtain that end: And
if the Epd be obtained, it is no matter by what Means. What think you of these
Sayings of Christ, when he was reproached for conversing chiefly with gross
Sinners, The whole, says he, need not a Physician, but they that are sick; and, I
come not to call the Righteous, but Sinners, to Repentance: Does not this imply,
that there were good Men, who, without Faith in him, were in a State of
Salvation? And moreover, did he not say of Nathanael, while he was yet an
Unbeliever in him, and thought no Good could possibly come out of
Nazareth, Behold an Israelite indeed, in whom there is no Guile! that is, behold
a virtuous upright Man. Faith in Christ, however, may be and is of great Use
to produce a good Life, but that it can conduce nothing towards Salvation
where it does not conduce to Virtue, is, I suppose, plain from the Instance of
the Devils, who are far from being Infidels, they believe, says the Scipture, and
tremble. There were some indeed, even in the Apostles' Days, that set a great
Value upon Faith, distinct from Good Works, they merely idolized it, and
*Ed.: The reference is to Theophilus Grew, a popular tutor of mathematics in the
Philadelphia area. Grew was appointed professor of mathematics in the Academy and
College of Philadelphia in 1751, a position he held until his death eight years later.
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thought that a Man ever so righteous could not be saved without it: But one
of the Apostles, to show his Dislike of such Notions, tells them, that not only
those heinous Sins of Theft, Murder, and Blasphemy, but even Idleness, or the
Neglect of a Man's Business, was more pernicious than mere harmless Infidelity, He that neglects to provide for them ofhis own House, says he, is WORSE than
an Infidel. St. James, in his second Chapter, is very zealous against these
Cryers-up ofFaith, and maintains that Faith without Virtue is useless, Wilt thou
know, 0 vain Man, says he, that Faith without Works is dead; and, shew me your
Faith without your Works, and I will shew you mine by my Works. Our Saviour,
when describing the Last Judgment, and declaring what shall give Admission
into Bliss, or exclude from it, says nothing of Faith but what he says against it,
that is, that those who cry Lord, Lord, and profess to have believed in his Name,
have no Favour to expect on that Account; but declares that 'tis the Practice,
or the omitting the Practice of the Duties of Morality, Feeding the Hungry,
cloathing the Naked, visiting the Sick, &c. in short, 'tis the Doing or not Doing
all the Good that lies in our Power, that will render us the Heirs of Happiness
or Misery.
T. But if Faith is of great Use to produce a good life, why does not Mr. H.
preach up Faith as well as Morality?
S. Perhaps it may [be] this, that as the good Physician suits his Physick to
the Disease he finds in the Patient, so Mr. H. may possibly think, that though
Faith in Christ be properly first preach'd to Heathens and such as are ignorant
of the Gospel, yet since he knows that we have been baptized in the Name of
Christ, and educated in his Religion, anii call'd after his Name, it may not be
so immediately necessary to preach Faith to us who abound in it, as Morality
in which we are evidently deficient: For our late Want of Charity to each other,
our Heart-burnings and Bickerings are notorious. St. James says, Where Envying and Strife is, there is Confusion and every evil Work: and where Confusion
and every evil Work is, Morality and Good-will to Men, can, I think, be no
unsuitable Doctrine. But surely Morality can do us no harm. Upon a Supposition that we all have Faith in Christ already, as I think we have, where can be
the Damage of being exhorted to Good Works? Is Virtue Heresy; and Universal Benevolence False Doctrine, that any of us should keep away from Meeting
because it is preached there?
T. Well, I do not like it, and I hope we shall not long be troubled with it.
A Commission of the Synod will sit in a short Time, and try this Sort of
Preaching.
S. I am glad to hear that the Synod are to take it into Consideration. There
are Men of unquestionable Good Sense as well as Piety among them, and I
doubt not but they will, by their Decision, deliver our Profession from the
satirical Reflection, which a few uneasy People of our Congregation have of
late given Occasion for, to wit, That the Presbyterians are going to persecute,
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silence and condemn a good Preacher, for exhorting them to be honest and
charitable to one another and the rest of Mankind.
T. IfMr. H. is a Presbyterian Teacher, he ought to preach as Presbyterians
used to preach; or else he may justly be condemn'd and silenc'd by our Church
Authority. We ought to abide by the Westminster Confession of Faith; and he
that does not, ought not to preach in our Meetings.
S. The Apostasy of the Church from the primitive Simplicity of the Gospel,
came on by Degrees; and do you think that the Reformation was of a sudden
perfect, and that the first Reformers knew at once all that was right or wrong
in Religion? Did not Luther at first preach only against selling of Pardons,
allowing all the other Practices of the Romish Church for good? He afterwards
went further, and Calvin, some think, yet further. The Church of England
made a Stop, and fi.x'd her Faith and Doctrine by 39 Articles; with which the
Presbyterians not satisfied, went yet farther; but being too self-confident to
think, that as their Fathers were mistaken in some Things, they also might be
in some others; and fancying themselves infallible in their Interpretations, they
also ty'd themselves down by the Westminster Confession. But has not a Synod
that meets in King George the Second's Reign, as much Right to interpret
Scripture, as one that met in Oliver's Time? And if any Doctrine then
maintain'd is, or shall hereafter be found not altogether orthodox, why must
we be for ever confin'd to that, or to any, Confession?
T. But if the Majority of the Synod be against any Innovation, they may
justly hinder the Innovator from Preaching.
S. That is as much as to say, if the Majority of the Preachers be in the wrong,
they may justly hinder any Man from setting the People right; for a Majority
may be in the wrong as well as the Minority, and frequently are. In the beginning of the Reformation, the Majority was vastly against the Reformers, and
continues so to this Day; and, if, according to your Opinion, they had a Right
to silence the Minority, I am sure the Minority ought to have been silent. But
tell me, if the Presbyterians in this Country, being charitably inclin'd, should
send a Missionary into Turkey, to propagate the Gospel, would it not be unreasonable in the Turks to prohibit his Preaching?
T. It would, to be sure, because he comes to them for their good.
S. And if the Turks, believing us in the wrong, as we think them, should out
of the same charitable Disposition, send a Missionary to preach Mahometanism to us, ought we not in the same manner to give him free Liberty of
preaching his Doctrine?
T. It may be so; but what would you infer from that?
S. I would only infer, that ifit would be thought reasonable to suffer a Turk
to preach among us a Doctrine diametrically opposite to Christianity, it cannot
be reasonable to silence one of our own Preachers, for preaching a Doctrine
exactly agreeable to Christianity, only because he does not perhaps zealously
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propagate all the Doctrines of an old Confession. And upon the whole, though
the Majority of the Synod should not in all respects approve of Mr. H's Doctrine, I do not however think they will find it proper to condemn him. We have
justly deny' d the Infallibility of the Pope and his Councils and Synods in their
Interpretations of Scripture, and can we modestly claim Infallibility for our
selves or our Synods in our way oflnterpreting? Peace, Unity and Virtue in any
Church are more to be regarded than Orthodoxy. In the present weak State of
human Nature, surrounded as we are on all sides with Ignorance and Error, it
little becomes poor fallible Man to be positive and dogmatical in his Opinions.
No Point of Faith is so plain, as that Morality is our Duty, for all Sides agree in
that. A virtuous Heretick shall be saved before a wicked Christian: for there is
no such Thing as voluntary Error. Therefore, since 'tis an Uncertainty till we
get to Heaven what true Orthodoxy in all points is, and since our Congregation is rather too small to be divided, I hope this Misunderstanding will soon
be got over, and that we shall as heretofore unite again in mutual Christian
Charity.
T. I wish we may. I'll consider of what you've said, and wish you well.
S. Farewell.

To Josiah and Abiah Franklin (13 April 1738)
This letter, written by Franklin to his parents, is probably in response to rumors of
his religious unorthodoxy. Compare this version with the one immediately following it-a draft ofa letter addressed by Franklin to his father only, which appears
to have never been sent.

Honour'd Father and Mother
I have your Favour of the 21st of March in which you both seem concem'd
lest I have imbib'd some erroneous Opinions. Doubtless I have my Share, and
when the natural Weakness and Imperfection of Human Understanding is
considered, with the unavoidable Influences ofEducation, Custom, Books and
Company, upon our Ways of thinking, I imagine a Man must have a good deal
of Vanity who believes, and a good deal of Boldness who affirms, that all the
Doctrines he holds, are true; and all he rejects, are false. And perhaps the same
may be justly said of every Sect, Church and Society of men when they assume
to themselves that Infallibility which they deny to the Popes and Councils. I
think Opinions should be judg'd of by their Influences and Effects; and if a
Man holds none that tend to make him less Virtuous or more vicious, it may
be concluded he holds none that are dangerous; which I hope is the Case with
me. I am sorry you should have any Uneasiness on my Account, and if it were
a thing possible for one to alter his Opinions in order to please others, I know
none whom I ought more willingly to oblige in that respect than your selves:
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But since it is no more in a Man's Power to think than to look like another,
methinks all that should be expected from me is to keep my Mind open to
Conviction, to hear patiently and examine attentively whatever is offered me
for that end; and if after all I continue in the same Errors, I believe your usual
Charity will induce you rather to pity and excuse than blame me. In the mean
time your Care and Concern for me is what I am very thankful for.
As to the Freemasons, unless she will believe me when I assure her that they
are in general a very harmless sort of People; and have no principles or Practices
that are inconsistent with Religion or good Manners, I know no Way of giving
my Mother a better Opinion of them than she seems to have at present, (since
it is not allow'd that Women should be admitted into that secret Society). She
has, I must confess, on that Account, some reason to be displeas'd with it; but
for any thing else, I must entreat her to suspend her Judgment till she is better
inform'd, and in the mean time exercise her Charity.
My Mother grieves that one of her Sons is an Arian, another an Arrninian.
What an Arminian or an Arian is, I cannot say that I very well know; the Truth
is, I make such Distinctions very little my Study; I think vital Religion has
always suffer'd, when Orthodoxy is more regarded than Virtue. And the Scripture assures me, that at the last Day, we shall not be examin'd what we thought,
but what we did; and our Recommendation will not be that we said Lord, Lord,
but that we did GOOD to our Fellow Creatures. . . .

Draft of a Letter to His Father (13 April 1738[?])
I have yours of the 21st March, with another from my Mother, in which you
both seem concern'd for my Orthodoxy. God only knows whether all the
Doctrines I hold for true, be so or not. For my part, I must confess, I believe
they are not, but I am not able to distinguish the good from the bad. And
Knowing my self, as I do, to be a weak ignorant Creature, full of natural
Imperfections, subject to be frequently misled by my own Reasonings, or the
wrong Arguments of others, to the Influence of Education, of Custom, of
Company, and the Books I read, It would be great Vanity in me to imagine that
I have been so happy, as out ofan infinite Number of Opinions of which a few
only can be true, to select those only for my own Use. No, I am doubtless in
Error as well as my Neighbours, and methinks a Man can not say, All the
Doctrines that I believe, are true; and all that I reject, are false, without arrogantly claiming to himself that Infallibility which he denies to the Pope, with
the greatest Indignation.
From such Considerations as these it follows, that I ought never to be
angry with any one for differing in Judgment from me. For how know I but
the Point in dispute between us, is one of those Errors that I have embrac' d as
Truth. Ifl am in the Wrong, I should not be displeas'd that another is in the
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right. If I am in the Right, 'tis my Happiness; and I should rather pity than
blame him who is unfortunately in the wrong.

The Lord's Prayer (1768[?])
Few other pieces so clearly reflect Franklin's basic conviction that religious belief
should be an expression ofrational inquiry conducive to utility than this sketch of
a reformulated Lord's Prayer. In it, he drops what he considers to be archaic forms
ofaddress held onto merely for tradition's sake, substituting expressions he considers more representative of rational religion. As with so many of his theological
musings, this selection illustrates his concern that belief in the deity be promotive
of virtue.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Old Version
Our Father which art in Heaven,
Hallowed be thy Name.
Thy Kingdom come.
Thy will be done on Earth as it is in Heaven.
Give us this Day our daily Bread.
Forgive us our Debts as we forgive our Debtors.
And lead us not into Temptation, but deliver us from Evil.

New Version by B. F.
1. Heavenly Father,
2. May all revere thee,
3. And become thy dutiful Children and faithful Subjects.
4. May thy Laws be obeyed on Earth as perfectly as they are in Heaven.
5. Provide for us this Day as thou hast hitherto daily done.
6. Forgive us our Trespasses and enable us likewise to forgive those that offend
us.
7. Keep us out of Temptation, and deliver us from Evil.
Reasons for the Change of Expression
Old Version. Our Father which art in Heaven.
New V.-Heavenly Father, is more concise, equally expressive, and better
modern English.Old V.-Hallowed be thy Name. This seems to relate to an Observance among
the Jews not to pronounce the proper or peculiar Name of God, they
deeming it a Profanation so to do. We have in our Language no proper
Name for God; the Word God being a common or general Name, expressing all chief Objects of Worship, true or false. The Word hallowed is almost
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obsolete. People now have but an imperfect Conception of the Meaning
of the Petition. It is therefore proposed to change the expression into
New V.-May all revere thee.
Old V.-Thy Kingdom come. This Petition seems suited to the then Condition
of the Jewish Nation. Originally their State was a Theocracy. God was their
King. Dissatisfied with that kind of Government, they desired a visible
earthly King in the same manner of the Nations around them. They had
such Kings accordingly; but their Offerings were due to God on many
Occasions by the Jewish Law, which when People could not pay, or had
forgotten as Debtors are apt to do, it was proper to pray that those Debts
might be forgiven . Our Liturgy uses neither the Debtors of Matthew, nor
the indebted of Luke, but instead of them speaks of those that trespass
against us. Perhaps the Considering it as a Christian Duty to forgive Debtors, was by the Compilers thought an inconvenient Idea in a trading Nation.-There seems however something presumptuous in this Mode of
Expression, which has the Air of proposing ourselves as an Example of
Goodness fit for God to imitate. We hope you will at least be as good as we
are-, you see we forgive one another, and therefore we pray that you would
forgive us. Some have considered it in another sense, For;give us as we forgive
others, i.e. Ifwe do not forgive others we pray that thou wouldst not forgive
us. But this being a kind of conditional Imprecation against ourselves,
seems improper in such a Prayer; and therefore it may be better to say
humbly & modestly
New V.-For;give us our Trespasses, and enable us likewise to for;give those that
offend us. This instead of assuming that we have already in & of ourselves
the Grace of Forgiveness, acknowledges our Dependance on God, the
Fountain of Mercy for any Share we may have in it, praying that he would
communicate of it to us.Old. V.-And lead us not into Temptation. The Jews had a Notion, that God
sometimes tempted, or directed or permitted the Tempting of People.
Thus it was said he tempted Pharaoh; directed Satan to tempt Job; and a
false Prophet to tempt Ahab, &c. Under this Persuasion it was natural for
them to pray that he would not put them to such severe Trials. We now
suppose that Temptation, so far as it is supernatural, comes from the Devil
only, and this Petition continued conveys a Suspicion which in our present
Conception seems unworthy of God, therefore might be altered to
New V.-Keep us out of Temptation. Happiness was not increas'd by the
Change, and they had reason to wish and pray for a Return of the Theocracy, or Government of God. Christians in these Times have other Ideas
when they speak of the Kingdom of God, such as are perhaps more adequately express'd by
New V.-And become thy Dutiful Children & faithful Subjects.
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Old V.-Thy Will be done on Earth as it is in Heaven.
New V.-May thy Laws be obeyed on Earth as perfectly as they are in Heaven.
Old V.-Give us this Day our daily Bread. Give us what is ours, seems to put us
in a Claim of Right, and to contain too little of the grateful Acknowledgment and Sense of Dependance that becomes Creatures who live on the
daily Bounty of their Creator. Therefore it is changed to
New V.-Provide far us this Day, as thou hast hitherto daily done.
Old V.-For:give us our Debts as we for:give our Debtors. Matthew.
For:give us our Sins, for we also for:give every one that is indebted to us.
Luke.

Selections from Franklin's
Autobiography (1771, 1784, 1788)
Few memoirs have achieved the lasting appeal ofFranklin's Autobiography. His
recollections provide an urbaneglimpse into a remarkable personality-although
it is an incomplete glimpse, since the Autobiography only covers the first five decades of Franklin's long life. More significantly, his reminiscences shed light upon
the character and temperament of an entire era. The Autobiography is an exercise in socia4 intellectual, and political history. It is also a document that attests
to Franklin's lifelong fidelity to sectarian tolerance, virtuous behavior, and deistic
religious sensibilities.
The fallowing excerpts from the Autobiography discuss Franklin's early retreat from the dogmatic materialism defended in his Dissertation; his conviction
that rational religion, unadorned with supernaturalist tenets, is most worthy of
both the deity and reflective humans; his disgust with doctrinal bigotry; his famous
«program of moral perfection,» by which he sought to test his Aristotelian belief
that virtue is a matter of habit; his memories and appraisal of the Reverend
Geor:ge Whitefield, one of the central figures in the Great Awakening revivalist
movement, which swept through the colonies between 1739 and 1742; and his
insistence that no particular religious sect has a monopoly on the divine but rather
that al4 to one degree or another, contain elements of truth.
Franklin wrote his memoirs on three separate occasions. Selection (1) here is
taken from the portion he wrote in 1771; selection (2) from that of 1784; and the
final three selections from the manuscript of 1788.
(1)

My parents had early given me religious impressions, and brought me through
my childhood piously in the Dissenting way. But I was scarce fifteen, when,
after doubting by turns of several points, as I found them disputed in the
different books I read, I began to doubt of Revelation itsel£ Some books
against Deism fell into my hands; they were said to be the substance of sermons
preached at Boyle's Lectures. It happened that they wrought an effect on me
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quite contrary to what was intended by them; for the arguments of the Deists,
which were quoted to be refuted, appeared to me much stronger than the
refutations; in short, I soon became a thorough Deist.... [But] I began to
suspect that this doctrine, though it might be true, was not very useful. My
London pamphlet, [Franklin's 1725 Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity,
Pleasure and Pain] which ... from the attributes of God, his infinite wisdom,
goodness and power, concluded that nothing could possibly be wrong in the
world, and that vice and virtue were empty distinctions, no such things existing, appeared now not so clever a performance as I once thought it; and I
doubted whether some error had not insinuated itself unperceived into my
argument, so as to infect all that followed, as is common in metaphysical reasoning.
I grew convinced that truth, sincerity and integrity in dealings between
man and man were of the utmost importance to the felicity of life; and I
formed written resolutions, which still remain in my journal book, to practice
them ever while I lived. Revelation had indeed no weight with me, as such; but
I entertained an opinion that, though certain actions might not be bad because
they were forbidden by it, or good because it commanded them, yet probably
these actions might be forbidden because they were bad for us, or commanded
because they were beneficial to us, in their own natures, all the circumstances
of things considered. And this persuasion, with the kind hand of Providence,
or some guardian angel, or accidental favorable circumstances and situations,
or all together, preserved me, through this dangerous time of youth, and the
hazardous situations I was sometimes in among strangers, remote from the eye
and advice of my father, without any willful gross immorality or injustice, that
might have been expected from my want of religion. I say willful, because the
instances I have mentioned had something of necessity in them, from my youth,
inexperience, and the knavery of others. I had therefore a tolerable character
to begin the world with; I valued it properly, and determined to preserve
it. . . .
(2)
I had been religiously educated as a Presbyterian; and though some of the
dogmas of that persuasion, such as the eternal decrees of God, election, reprobation, etc., appeared to me unintelligible, others doubtful, and I early absented
myself from the public assemblies of the sect, Sunday being my studying day,
I never was without some religious principles. I never doubted, for instance,
the existence of the Deity; that he made the world, and governed it by his
Providence; that the most acceptable service of God was the doing good to
man; that our souls are immortal; and that all crime will be punished, and virtue
rewarded, either here or hereafter. These I esteemed the essentials of every
religion; and, being found in all the religions we had in our country, I respected
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them all, though with different degrees of respect, as I found them more or less
mixed with other articles, which, without any tendency to inspire, promote, or
confirm morality, served principally to divide us, and make us unfriendly to one
another. This respect to all, with an opinion that the worst had some good
effects, induced me to avoid all discourse that might tend to lessen the good
opinion another might have of his own religion; and as our province increased
in people, and new places of worship were continually wanted, and generally
erected by voluntary contribution, my mite for such purpose, whatever might
be the sect, was never refused.
Though I seldom attended any public worship, I had still an opinion of
propriety, and of its utility when rightly conducted, and I regularly paid my
annual subscription for the support of the only Presbyterian minister* or meeting we had in Philadelphia. He used to visit me sometimes as a friend, and
admonish me to attend his administrations, and I was now and then prevailed
on to do so, once for five Sundays successively. Had he been in my opinion a
good preacher, perhaps I might have continued, notwithstanding the occasion
I had for the Sunday's leisure in my course of study; but his discourses were
chiefly either polemic arguments, or explications of the peculiar doctrines of
our sect, and were all to me very dry, uninteresting, and unedifying, since not
a single moral principle was inculcated or enforced, their aim seeming to be
rather to make us Presbyterians than good citizens.
At length he took for his text that verse of the fourth chapter of Philippians,
Finally, brethren, whatsoever things are true, honest, just, pure, lovely, or ofgood
report, if there be any virtue, or any praise, think on these things. And I imagined,
in a sermon on such a text, we could not miss of having some morality. But he
confined himself to five points only, as meant by the apostle, viz.: 1. Keeping
holy the Sabbath day. 2. Being diligent in reading the holy Scriptures. 3. Attending duly the public worship. 4. Partaking of the Sacrament. 5. Paying a
due respect to God's ministers. These might be all good things; but, as they
were not the kind of good things that I expected from that text, I despaired of
ever meeting with them from any other, was disgusted, and attended his
preaching no more. I had some years before composed a little Liturgy, or form
of prayer, for my own private use, entitled, Articles of Belief and Acts of Religion. I returned to the use of this, and went no more to the public assemblies.
My conduct might be blameable, but I leave it, without attempting further to
excuse it; my present purpose being to relate facts, and not to make apologies
for them.
It was about this time I conceived the bold and arduous project of arriving
at moral perfection. I wished to live without committing any fault at any time;
*Ed.: The Presbyterian minister referred to is Jebediah Andrews, who was also involved in the Hemphill affair; see introduction to Dialogue between Two Presbyterians.
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l would conquer all that either natural inclination, custom, or company might
lead me into. As I knew, or thought I knew, what was right and wrong, I did
not see why I might not always do the one and avoid the other. But I soon
found I had undertaken a task of more difficulty than I had imagined. While
my care was employed in guarding against one fault, I was often surprised by
another; habit took the advantage of inattention; inclination was sometimes
too strong for reason. I concluded, at length, that the mere speculative conviction that it was our interest to be completely virtuous, was not sufficient to
prevent our slipping; and that the contrary habits must be broken, and good
ones acquired and established, before we can have any dependence on a steady,
uniform rectitude of conduct. For this purpose I therefore contrived the following method.
In the various enumerations of the moral virtues I had met with in my
reading, I found the catalogue more or less numerous, as different writers
included more or fewer ideas under the same name. Temperance, for example,
was by some confined to eating and drinking, while by others it was extended
to mean the moderating every other pleasure, appetite, inclination, or passion,
bodily or mental, even to our avarice and ambition. I proposed to myself, for
the sake of clearness, to use rather more names, with fewer ideas annexed to
each, then a few names with more ideas; and I included under thirteen names
of virtues all that at that time occurred to me as necessary or desirable, and
annexed to each a short precept, which fully expressed the extent I gave to its
meaning.
These names of virtues, with their precepts, were:
1. TEMPERANCE.-Eat not to dullness; drink not to elevation.
2. SILENCE.-Speak not but what may benefit others or yourself; avoid
trifling conversation.
3. ORDER.-Let all your things have their places; let each part of your business have its time.
4. RESOLUTION.-Resolve to perform what you ought; perform without
fail what you resolve.
5. FRUGALITY.-Make no expense but to do good to others or yourself; i.e.,
waste nothing.
6. INDUSTRY.-Lose no time; be always employed in something useful; cut
off all unnecessary actions.
7. SINCERITI.-Use no hurtful deceit; think innocently and justly, and, if
you speak, speak accordingly.
8. JUSTICE.-Wrong none by doing injuries, or omitting the benefits that
are your duty.
9. MOnERATION.-Avoid extremes; forbear resenting injuries so much as
you think they deserve.
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10. CLEANLINESS.-Tolerate no uncleanliness in body, clothes, or habitation.
11. TRANQUILITY.-Be not disturbed at trifles, or at accidents common or
unavoidable.
12. CHASTIIY.-Rarely use venery but for health or offspring, never to dullness, weakness, or the injury of your own or another's peace or reputation.
13. HUMILITY.-Imitate Jesus and Socrates.
My intention being to acquire the habitude of all these virtues, I judged it
would be well not to distract my attention by attempting the whole at once,
but to fix it on one of them at a time; and, when I should be master of that,
then to proceed to another, and so on, till I should have gone through the
thirteen; and, as the previous acquisition of some might facilitate the acquisition of certain others, I arranged them with that view, as they stand above.
Temperance first, as it tends to procure that coolness and clearness of head,
which is so necessary where constant vigilance was to be kept up, and guard
maintained against the unremitting attraction of ancient habits, and the force
of perpetual temptations. This being acquired and established, Silence would
be more easy; and my desire being to gain knowledge at the same time that I
improved in virtue, and considering that in conversation it was obtained rather
by the use of the ears than of the tongue, and therefore wishing to break a habit
I was getting into of prattling, punning, and joking, which only made me
acceptable to trifling company, I gave Silence the second place. This and the
next, Order, I expected would allow me more time for attending to my project
and my studies. Resolution, once become habitual, would keep me firm in my
endeavors to obtain all the subsequent virtues. Frugality and Industry freeing
me from my remaining debt, and producing aflluence and independence,
would make more easy the practice of Sincerity and Justice, etc., etc ....
It will be remarked that, though my scheme was not wholly without religion, there was in it no mark of any of the distinguishing tenets of any particular sect. I had purposely avoided them; for, being fully persuaded of the utility
and excellency of my method, and that it might be serviceable to people in all
religions, and intending some time or other to publish it, I would not have any
thing in it that should prejudice any one, of any sect, against it. I purposed
writing a little comment on each virtue, in which I would have shown the
advantages of possessing it, and the mischiefs attending its opposite vice; and
I should have called my book THE ART OF VIRTUE, because it would have shown
the means and manner of obtaining virtue, which would have distinguished it
from the mere exhortation to be good, that does not instruct and indicate the
means, but is like the apostle's man of verbal charity, who only without showing to the naked and hungry how or where they might get clothes or victuals,
exhorted them to be fed and clothed.-James ii, 15, 16.
But it so happened that my intention of writing and publishing this com-
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ment was never fulfilled. I did, indeed, from time to time, put down short hints
of the sentiments, reasonings, etc., to be made use of in it, some of which I
have still by me; but the necessary close attention to private business in the
earlier part of my life, and my public business since, have occasioned my postponing it; for, it being connected in my mind with a great and extensive project,
that required the whole man to execute, and which an unforeseen succession
of employs prevented my attending to, it has hitherto remained unfinished.
In this piece it was my design to explain and enforce this doctrine, that
vicious actions are not hurtful because they are forbidden, but forbidden because they are hurtful, the nature of man alone considered; that it was therefore, every one's interest to be virtuous who wished to be happy even in this
world; and I should, from this circumstance ( there being always in the world
a number of rich merchants, nobility, states, and princes, who have need of
honest instruments for the management of their affairs, and such being so
rare), have endeavored to convince young persons that no qualities were so
likely to make a poor man's fortune as those of probity and integrity....
(3)

I put down, from time to time, on pieces of paper, such thoughts as occurred
to me .... Most of these are lost; but I find one purporting to be the substance
of an intended creed, containing, as I thought, the essentials of every known
religion, and being free of every thing that might shock the professors of any
religion. It is expressed in these words, viz.:
"That there is one God, who made all things.
"That he governs the world by his providence.
"That he ought to be worshiped by adoration, prayer, and thanksgiving.
"But that the most acceptable service to God is doing good to man.
"That the soul is immortal.
"And that God will certainly reward virtue and punish vice, either here or
hereafter."

(4)
In 1739 arrived among us from Ireland the Reverend Mr. Whitefield, who had
made himself remarkable there as an itinerant preacher. He was at first permitted to preach in some of our churches; but the clergy, taking a dislike to him,
soon refused him their pulpits, and he was obliged to preach in the fields. The
multitudes of all sects and denominations that attended his sermons were
enormous, and it was a matter of speculation to me, who was one of the
number, to observe the extraordinary influence of his oratory on his hearers,
and how much they admired and respected him, notwithstanding his common
abuse of them, by assuring them they were naturally halfbeasts and halfdevils.
It was wonderful to see the change soon made in the manners of our inhab-
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itants. From being thoughtless or indifferent about religion, it seemed as if all
the world were growing religious, so that one could not walk through the town
in an evening without hearing psahns sung in different families of every street.
And it being found inconvenient to assemble in the open air, subject to its
inclemencies, the building of a house to meet in was no sooner proposed, and
persons appointed to receive contributions, but sufficient sums were soon received to procure the ground and erect the building, which was one hundred
feet long and seventy broad, about the size of Westminster Hall; and the work
was carried on with such spirit as to be finished in a much shorter time than
could have been expected. Both house and ground were vested in trustees,
expressly for the use of any preacher of any religious persuasion who might
desire to say something to the people at Philadelphia; the design in building
not being to accommodate any particular sect, but the inhabitants in general;
so that even if the Mufti of Constantinople were to send a missionary to preach
Mohammedanism to us, he would find a pulpit at his service.
Mr. Whitefield, on leaving us, went preaching all the way through the
colonies to Georgia. The settlement of that province had lately been begun,
but, instead of being made with hardy, industrious husbandmen, accustomed
to labor, the only people fit for such an enterprise, it was with families of broken
shop-keepers and other insolvent debtors, many of indolent and idle habits,
taken out of the jails, who, being set down in the woods, unqualified for
clearing land, and unable to endure the hardships of a new settlement, perished
in numbers, leaving many helpless children unprovided for. The sight of their
miserable situation inspired the benevolent heart of Mr. Whitefield with the
idea of building an Orphan House there, in which they might be supported
and educated. Returning northward, he preached up this charity, and made
large collections, for his eloquence had a wonderful power over the hearts and
purses of his hearers, of which I myself was an instance.
I did not disapprove of the design, but, as Georgia was then destitute of
materials and workmen, and it was proposed to send them from Philadelphia
at a great expense, I thought it would have been better to have built the house
there, and brought the children to it. This I advised; but he was resolute in his
first project, rejected my counsel, and I therefore refused to contribute. I happened soon after to attend one of his sermons, in the course of which I perceived he intended to finish with a collection, and I silently resolved he should
get nothing from me. I had in my pocket a handful of copper money, three or
four silver dollars, and five pistoles in gold. As he proceeded I began to soften,
and concluded to give the coppers. Another stroke of his oratory made me
ashamed of that, and determined me to give the silver; and he finished so
admirably, that I emptied my pocket wholly into the collector's dish, gold and
all. At this sermon there was also one of our club, who being of my sentiments
respecting the building in Georgia, and suspecting a collection might be in-
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tended, had, by precaution, emptied his pockets before he came from home.
Towards the conclusion of the discourse, however, he felt a strong desire to
give, and applied to a neighbor, who stood near him, to borrow some money
for the purpose. The application was unfortunately made to perhaps the only
man in the company who had the firmness not to be affected by the preacher.
His answer was, At any other time, Friend Hopkinson, I would lend to thee freely;
but not now, for thee seems to be out of thy right senses. . . .
The following instance will show something of the terms on which we
stood. Upon one of his [Whitefield's] arrivals from England at Boston, he
wrote to me that he should come soon to Philadelphia, but knew not where
he could lodge when there, as he understood his old friend, and host, Mr.
Benezet [probably Anthony Benezet, a Quaker educator and reformer], was
removed to Germantown. My answer was, "You know my house; if you can
make shift with its scanty accommodations, you will be most heartily welcome." He replied, that ifl made that kind offer for Christ's sake, I should not
miss of a reward. And I returned, "Don't let me be mistaken; it was not for
Christ's sake, but for your sake." One of our common acquaintance jocosely
remarked, that, knowing it to be the custom of the saints, when they received
any favour, to shift the burden of the obligation from off their own shoulders,
and place it in heaven, I had contrived to fix it on earth ....
(5)

[The] embarrassments that the Quakers suffered from having established and
published it as one of their principles that no kind of war was lawful, and which
being once published, they could not afterwards, however they might change
their minds, easily get rid of, reminds me of what I think a more prudent
conduct in another sect among us, that of the Dunkers. I was acquainted with
one ofits founders, Michael Welfare, soon after it appeared. He complained to
me that they were grievously calumniated by the zealots of other persuasions,
and charged with abominable principles and practices to which they were utter
strangers. I told him this had always been the case with new sects and that to
put a stop to such abuse, I imagined it might be well to publish the articles of
their belief and the rules of their discipline. He said that it had been proposed
among them, but not agreed to for this reason: "When we were first drawn
together as a society," says he, "it had pleased God to enlighten our minds so
far as to see that some doctrines which we once esteemed truths were errors,
and that others which we had esteemed errors were real truths. From time to
time he has been pleased to afford us further light, and our principles have been
improving and our errors diminishing. Now we are not sure that we are arrived
at the end of this progression, and at the perfection of spiritual or theological
knowledge; and we fear that if we should once print our confession of faith, we
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should feel ourselves as if bound and confined by it, and perhaps be unwilling
to receive further improvement, and our successors still more so, as conceiving
what their elders and founders had done to be something sacred, never to be
departed from." This modesty in a sect is perhaps a singular instance in the
history of mankind, every other sect supposing itself in possession of all truth,
and that those who differ are so far in the wrong-like a man travelling in foggy
weather: Those at some distance before him on the road he sees wrapped up
in the fog, as well as those behind him, and also the people in the fields on each
side; but near him all appears clear, tho' in truth he is as much in the fog as any
of them. To avoid this kind of embarrassment, the Quakers have of late years
been gradually declining the public service in the Assembly and in the magistracy, choosing rather to quit their power than their principle.

The Levee (1779(?])
On its surface, this short piece conveys a political rather than a religious message.

Probably written in 1779, it is a rather transparent allegorical condemnation of
the monarchy of Geor;ge IIL Just as the biblical Job was unjustly brought low by a
divine monarch influenced by the rumor-mongering ofa courtier (Satan), so the
colonies have been unfairly treated by an earthly monarch's misguided harkening
to his «malicious courtiers." The political lesson is obvious: c'Trust not a single
person with the government ofyour state." Absolute power is capable ofcorrupting
even a celestial ruler.
But the very fact that Franklin couches his allegory in biblical terms reflects his
deistic dissatisfaction with Christian dogma and scriptural authority. In
Franklin's interpretation ofthe Book ofJob, Satan is not the only villain. God also
emerges with dirty hands, acting as he does, on Satan's prompting, in a manner
that Franklin obviously sees as condemnable. One of the motifs in American deism, defended by moderates and militants alike, was the claim that it was unworthy of the deity to perform actions that would be unethical if done by mortals.
Scriptural passages (such as those about Job's trials) that suggested God occasionally acts arbitrarily or unjustly supported the deistic contention that the Christian
notion of God was incorrect and even blasphemous. In writing The Levee, then,
Franklin may have had more in mind than simply blasting political monarchy.
He may also have been subtly taking a stab at a concept of God he considered to be
irrational and unconducive to moral rectitude.

In the first chapter of Job we have an account of a transaction said to have
arisen in the court, or at the levee, of the best of all possible princes, or of
governments by a single person, viz. that of God himsel£
At this levee, in which the sons of God were assembled, Satan also appeared.
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It is probable the writer of that ancient book took his idea of this levee from
those of the eastern monarchs of the age he lived in.
It is to this day usual at the levees of princes, to have persons assembled who
are enemies to each other, who seek to obtain favor by whispering calumny and
detraction, and thereby ruining those that distinguish themselves by their virtue and merit. And kings frequently ask a familiar question or two, of every one
in the circle, merely to show their benignity. These circumstances are particu larly exemplified in this relation.
If a modern king, for instance, finds a person in the circle who has not lately
been there, he namrally asks him how he has passed his time since he last had
the pleasure of seeing him? the gentleman perhaps replies that he has been in
the country to view his estates, and visit some friends. Thus Satan being asked
whence he cometh? answers, "From going to and fro in the earth, and walking
up and down in it." And being further asked, whether he had considered the
uprightness and fidelity of the prince's servant Job, he immediately displays all
the malignance of the designing courtier, by answering with another question:
"Doth Job serve God for naught? Hast thou not given him immense wealth,
and protected him in the possession of it? Deprive him of that, and he will curse
thee to thy face." In modern phrase, Take away his places and his pensions, and
your Majesty will soon find him in the opposition.
This whisper against Job had its effect. He was delivered into the power of
his adversary, who deprived him of his fortune, destroyed his family, and completely ruined him.
The book of Job is called by divines a sacred poem, and, with the rest of the
Holy Scripmres, is understood to be written for our instruction.
What then is the instruction to be gathered from this supposed transaction?
Trust not a single person with the government of your state. For if the
Deity himself, being the monarch may for a time give way to calumny, and
suffer it to operate the destruction of the best of subjects; what mischief may
you not expect from such power in a mere man, though the best of men, from
whom the truth is often industriously hidden, and to whom falsehood is often
presented in its place, by artful, interested, and malicious courtiers?
And be cautious in trusting him even with limited powers, lest sooner or
later he sap and destroy those limits, and render himself absolute.
For by the disposal of places, he attaches to himself all the placeholders,
with their numerous connexions, and also all the expecters and hopers of
places, which will form a strong party in promoting his views. By various political engagements for the interest of neighbouring states or princes, he procures their aid in establishing his own personal power. So that, through the
hopes of emolument in one part of his subjects, and the fear of his resentment
in the other, all opposition falls before him.
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To Joseph Priestley (8 February 1780)
American deism was a child ofthe Enlightenment and, like its progenitor, was an
ardent believer in the inevitable progress ofscience and the ultimate perfection of
humans and societies. Reason, as expressed through the natural sciences, would
eradicate the vestiges ofecclesial superstition, fear, and bigotry, thereby liberating
humanity from the traditional impediments to progress. Moral as well as technical improvement, the conquest ofpassions as well as nature, were certainties.
Franklin was probably more enamored of the promise of the physical sciences
than any other American deist (with the possible exception ofJefferson), and in
this letter to Joseph Priestley (1733-1804), the chemist and Unitarian, he asserts
his faith in the inevitable victory of Reason. His reflections not only illustrate his
deistic confidence in the ability of reason and science to improve the human condition but also strikingly anticipate twentieth-century scientific achievements.

Dear Sir,
Your kind Letter of September 27 came to hand but very lately, the Bearer
having stayed long in Holland. I always rejoice to hear of your being still
employ'd in experimental Researches into Nature, and of the Success you meet
with. The rapid Progress true Science now makes, occasions my regretting
sometimes that I was born so soon. It is impossible to imagine the Height to
which may be carried, in a thousand years, the Power of Man over Matter. We
may perhaps learn to deprive large Masses of their Gravity, and give them
absolute Levity, for the sake of easy Transport. Agriculture may diminish its
Labour and double its Produce; all Diseases may by sure means be prevented
or cured, not excepting even that of Old Age, and our Lives lengthened at
pleasure even beyond the antediluvian Standard. 0 that moral Science were in
as fair a way of Improvement, that Men would cease to be Wolves to one
another, and that human Beings would at length learn what they now improperly call Humanity! ...

T o - - - - ( ? ) (3 July 1786[?])
Franklin the deist was not cut from the same cloth as Paine, Palmer, or even
Jefferson. Except for one or two exceptions (such as his Dialogue between Two
Presbyterians), he studiously avoided publishing potentially offensive statements
of his religious sentiment.
There are probably several reasons for his discretion. First, he seemed temperamentally unsuited for theological shouting matches; as he tells us in his Autobiography, he considered one ofhis life's errata to have been his youthful indultJence in
<<disputatious" ar;guments over religious matters. Second, he appears to have taken
seriously his own ethical defenses of religious toleration and was willing to coexist
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peacefully with Christian sectarians so long as they reciprocated his live-and-letlive attitude. Third, as he makes clear in the Autobiography as well as his 1738
letter to his parents, he thought it reasonable to suspect that some of his religious
views were incorrect and that the only appropriate reaction to this likelihood was
a refusal to pontificate about them. Finally, it would have been characteristic of
Franklin, who was a preeminently practical man, to wish to avoid the social opprobrium that often befell more vocal deists of his day. Franklin, in short, was a
moderate deist, in doctrine as well as attitude.
But this letter to an unknown correspondent--possibly Tom Paine--suggests
yet another explanation for Franklin 1s moderation: his suspicion that orthodox
Christianity, even iffundamentally incorrect about the nature ofthe deity, might
promote morality in its adherents. Franklin was preoccupied his entire life with
ethics and early on had become convinced that virtue was dependent on an
individual's habituation to good acts, regardless of the intentions that motivate
them. Christianity, as he says in this letter, might be the catalyst for such habit
formation: The «Motives of Religion» might restrain otherwise rudderless persons
in the practice of virtue «till it becomes habitual, which is the great Point for its
Security.» To destroy that bearing is to risk opening the floodgates to moral anarchy.
To the later militant deists, such prudential caution would smack offrightened hypocrisy. But to the moderate Franklin, no doubt further mellowed by age,
the willingness to sacrifice public morality for the sake of deism was socially unsound as well as ethically reprehensible.

Dear Sir,
I have read your Manuscript with some Attention. By the Argument it
contains against the Doctrines of a particular Providence, tho' you allow a
general providence, you strike at the Foundation of all Religion. For without
the Belief of a Providence, that takes Cognizance of, guards, and guides, and
may favour particular Persons, there is no Motive to Worship a Deity, to fear
its Displeasure, or to pray for its Protection. I will not enter into any Discussion
of your Principles, tho' you seem to desire it. At present I shall only give you
my Opinion, that, though your Reasonings are subtile, and may prevail with
some Readers, you will not succeed so as to change the general Sentiments of
Mankind on that Subject, and the Consequence of printing this Piece will be,
a great deal of Odium drawn upon yourself, Mischief to you, and no Benefit
to others. He that spits against the Wind, spits in his own Face.
But, were you to succeed, do you imagine any Good would be done by it?
You yourself may find it easy to live a virtuous Life, without the Assistance
afforded by Religion; you having a clear perception of the Advantages of Virtue, and the Disadvantages of Vice, and possessing a Strength of Resolution
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sufficient to enable you to resist common Temptations. But think how great
a Proportion of Mankind consists of weak and ignorant Men and Women, and
ofinexperienc'd, and inconsiderate Youth of both Sexes, who have need of the
Motives of Religion to restrain them in the Practice of it till it becomes habitual, which is the great Point for its Security. And perhaps you are indebted
to her originally, that is, to your Religious Education, for the Habits ofVirtue
upon which you now justly value yoursel£ You might easily display your excellent Talents of reasoning upon a less hazardous subject, and thereby obtain a
Rank with our most distinguish' d Authors. For among us it is not necessary, as
among the Hottentots, that a Youth, to be receiv'd into the Company of men,
should prove his Manhood by beating his Mother.
I would advise you, therefore, not to attempt unchaining the Tyger, but to
burn this Piece before it is seen by any other Person; whereby you will save
yourself a great deal of Mortification from the Enemies it may raise against you,
and perhaps a good deal of Regret and Repentance. If men are so wicked as we
now see them with religion, what would they be if without it. I intend this
Letter itself as a Proof of my Friendship, and therefore add no Professions
to it....

Motion for Prayers in the Convention
(28 June 1787)
In 1787 Franklin, rich in years and honor, was once again called on to exercise
virtue in the public interest: He was elected a Pennsylvania delegate to the Constitutional Convention. After a month ofheated debate that sometimes degenerated into full-scale bickering, Franklin had had enough. He appealed to the delegates1 consciences by moving that the sessions be opened with prayer.
Franklin's motion (which was almost unanimously rejected) is itself rather
unremarkable. But when placed in context, it affirms that the old man still subscribed to the views on divine providence he had defended some fifty-five years
earlier (as in On the Providence of God in the Government of the World). It
also underscores his steadfast deistic faith in the benevolence of the deity, the necessity ofgovernment by human reason, and tolerance of all religious sects (as witnessed by its final suggestion that cle'flJy of all persuasions be invited to lead the
convention in prayer).

Mr. President,
The small Progress we have made, after 4 or 5 Weeks' close Attendance and
continual Reasonings with each other, our different Sentiments on almost
every Question, several of the last producing as many Noesas Ayes, is, methinks,
a melancholy Proof of the Imperfection of the Human Understanding. We
indeed seem to feel our own want of political Wisdom, since we have been
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running all about in Search of it. We have gone back to ancient History for
Models of Government, and examin'd the different Forms of those Republics,
which, having been originally form'd with the Seeds of their own Dissolution,
now no longer exist; and we have view'd modern States all round Europe, but
find none of their Constitutions suitable to our Circumstances.
In this Situation of this Assembly, groping, as it were, in the dark to find
Political Truth, and scarce able to distinguish it when presented to us, how has
it happened, Sir, that we have not hitherto once thought of humbly applying
to the Father of Lights to illuminate our Understandings? In the Beginning of
the Contest with Great Britain, when we were sensible of Danger, we had daily
Prayers in this Room for the Divine Protection. Our Prayers, Sir, were heard;and they were graciously answered. All of us, who were engag'd in the
Struggle, must have observed frequent Instances of a superintending Providence in our Favour. To that kind Providence we owe this happy Opportunity
of Consulting in Peace on the Means of establishing our future national Felicity. And have we now forgotten that powerful Friend? or do we imagine we no
longer need its assistance? I have lived, Sir, a long time; and the longer I live,
the more convincing proofs I see of this Truth, that GOD governs in the Affairs
of Men. And if a Sparrow cannot fall to the Ground without His Notice, is it
probable that an Empire can rise without His Aid? We have been assured, Sir,
in the Sacred Writings, that "except the Lord build the House, they labour in
vain that build it." I firmly believe this; and I also believe, that, without his
concurring Aid, we shall succeed in this political Building no better than the
Builders of Babel; we shall be divided by our little, partial, local Interests, our
Projects will be confounded, and we ourselves shall become a Reproach and a
Bye-word down to future Ages. And, what is worse, Mankind may hereafter,
from this unfortunate Instance, despair of establishing Government by human
Wisdom, and leave it to Chance, War, and Conquest.
I therefore beg leave to move,
That henceforth Prayers, imploring the Assistance of Heaven and its Blessing on our Deliberations, be held in this Assembly every morning before we
proceed to Business; and that one or more of the Clergy of this city be requested to officiate in that Service.

To Ezra Stiles (9 March 1790)
The following letter to Ezra Stiles, president of Yale College, was written five
weeks before Franklin's death. Although an orthodox Calvinist in his later years,
Stiles hadgone through a long period ofreligious confusion, turning first to deism
and then to Arminianism before his midlife «rebirth.» His own history of doubt
lends a certain poignancy to his request for an account of Franklin's religious
sentiments.
In his reply to Stiles, Franklin echoes the basic deistic catechism he had endorsed
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in his earlier credos of 1728, 1731, and 1784. The general themes of benevolent
providence, virtue, and religious tolerance, central to Franklin's lifelong religious
perspective, are reaffirmed, as is his dislike of theological speculation (or ((metaphysical reasoning, JJ as he would have said). Finally, and most interestingly,
Franklin's reply contains one ofhis few public confessions ofdoubt about the divin#y ofJesus-although, characteristically, he adds that if such a belief is promotive
ofpublic virtue, it serves a good purpose.

Reverend and Dear Sir,
... You desire to know something of my Religion. It is the first time I have
been questioned upon it. But I cannot take your Curiosity amiss, and shall
endeavour in a few Words to gratify it. Here is my Creed. I believe in one God,
Creator of the Universe. That he governs it by his Providence. That he ought
to be worshipped. That the most acceptable Service we render to him is doing
good to his other Children. That the soul of Man is immortal, and will be
treated with Justice in another Life respecting its Conduct in this. These I take
to be the fundamental Principles of all sound Religion, and I regard them as
you do in whatever Sect I meet with them.
As to Jesus of Nazareth, my Opinion of whom you particularly desire, I
think the System of Morals and his Religion, as he left them to us, the best the
World ever saw or is likely to see; but I apprehend it has received various
corrupting Changes, and I have, with most of the present Dissenters in England, some Doubts as to his Divinity; tho' it is a question I do not dogmatize
upon, having never studied it, and think it needless to busy myself with it now,
when I expect soon an Opportunity of knowing the Truth with less Trouble.
I see no harm, however, in its being believed, if that Belief has the good Consequence, as probably it has, of making his Doctrines more respected and
better observed; especially as I do not perceive, that the Supreme takes it amiss,
by distinguishing the Unbelievers in his Government of the World with any
peculiar Marks of his Displeasure.
I shall only add, respecting myself, that, having experienced the Goodness
of that Being in conducting me prosperously thro' a long life, I have no doubt
of its Continuance in the next, though without the smallest Conceit of meriting such Goodness ....
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Most of the American deists were regularly vilified from the pulpit and in the
popular press as godless apostates. All of them, with the possible exception of
Franklin, were favorite and predictable targets of both personal attacks and
public censure. But it is arguable that Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) suffered
the most from the calumny his deism prompted. He was an intensely-almost
obsessively-private man who rarely revealed himselfin either public or personal
communications, yet his political career and national prominence spotlighted
the unorthodoxy of his religious convictions. His political enemies gleefully
invoked this nonconformity to call his administrative ability into question.
Similarly, his Christian opponents self-righteously used it to attack his personal
integrity. During his tenure as president, almost a hundred pamphlets and scores
of newspaper articles denounced him as a "French infidel and atheist." The
clergy preached fire-and-brimstone sermons warning that his leadership would
destroy established religion and public morality, so frightening the members of
their congregations that many of them actually hid their Bibles when Jefferson
was elected president. Alexander Hamilton, Jefferson's political archrival, contemptuously (and publicly) dismissed him as an "atheist and fanatic." And as
late as 1830 the Philadelphia Public Library refused to catalogue his collected
works on the grounds that he had died an "infidel." In short, Jefferson's high
profile as a national figure made his religious heterodoxy easy prey for any group
disgruntled with his politics, personality, or philosophy. It is little wonder that
toward the end of his life, disgusted with public acrimony and besieged by
religious bigotry, he plaintively said, "I am of a sect by myself, as far as I know."
A voracious reader his entire life, Jefferson early on imbibed the heady brew
of the Enlightenment's New Learning. While a student at the College of
William and Mary, he fell under the influence of William Small, who occupied
the chair of mathematics and natural science. Prompted by Small, whom
Jefferson always remembered with affectionate respect, he devoured British
and French philosophy, soon switching allegiance from the Anglican tradition
into which he had been born to Enlightenment rationalism. He was particularly impressed by Locke's argument that tolerance in matters of conscience
and a political respect for the natural rights of equality and liberty were the twin
foundations of a just and felicitous society. Jefferson's absorption of Locke
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obviously echoed later in his drafting of the Declaration ofindependence, as
well as in his republican orientation while serving as secretary of state, vice
president, and eventually president. But his indebtedness to the principles of
rational liberalism is also apparent in his Notes on Virginia (1785) and the justly
acclaimed "Act for Establishing Religious Freedom" ( 1786).
Jefferson was too zealous a reader to be a systematic scribbler. As a result,
most of his corpus consists of correspondence, the sheer volume of which is
staggering even by the eighteenth century's epistle-loving standards. The
reader of Jefferson's letters, particularly the ones devoted to discussions of his
deism, is immediately struck by three things: the breadth of his learning, his
talent (like Paine's) for coining pithy phrases that eloquently express volumes,
and his unswerving fidelity to the standards of reason and tolerance. Contrary
to the accusations of his critics, Jefferson was no atheist. But he had little
patience for religious sentiment that slipped into "enthusiasm" by neglecting
the boundaries ofrational reflection and empirical investigation. For Jefferson,
theological speculation enjoyed no privileged position. It was subject to the
same standards of"reason and free inquiry ... the only effectual agents against
error" as all knowledge claims.
The selections here from Jefferson include excerpts from his Notes on Virginia, the "Act for Establishing Religious Freedom" in its entirety, and epistolary reflections on religion spanning the years 1787 to 1825 . They deal primarily with the three issues that most exercised Jefferson the deist: religious and
political liberty, textual and theological criticism, and morality.
Jefferson's conviction that matters of religious conscience are outside the
reach of either public or legal sanction is most strongly expressed in Query
XVII of his Notes on Vir;ginia. There Jefferson laments that religious intolerance, one of the original reasons for the colonial exodus to America, had entrenched itself in Virginia. True, the May 1776 national declaration of rights
had "declared it to be a truth, and a natural right, that the exercise of religion
should be free" and had reversed the existing statutory provisions regulating
many religious obligations. But the common law tradition still endorsed by
Virginia continued to allow the persecution of heresy, thereby in Jefferson's
mind inconsistently perpetuating "that religious slavery under which a people
have been willing to remain, who [otherwise] have lavished their lives and
fortunes for the establishment of their civil freedom."
In opposing common law's interdiction of heterodoxy, Jefferson argues
that "the rights of conscience" cannot be submitted to the law, that "we are
answerable for them [only] to our God." The law's purview extends solely to
those actions that inflict harm on others. "But," concludes Jefferson, "it does
me no injury for my neighbour to say there are twenty gods, or no God. It
neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg." Consequently, private religious
conviction is beyond the pale of civil jurisdiction.
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Moreover, the subordination of matters of conscience to legal or public
standards encourages a uniformity of action and thought that enervates both
the individual and society and encourages oppression: "Subject opinion to
coercion: whom will you make your inquisitors? Fallible men; men governed
by bad passions, by private as well as public reasons. And why subject it to
coercion? To produce uniformity. But is uniformity of opinion desirable? No
more than of face and stature." Religion in the truest sense of the word-a
reflective, ethical, and free self-determination in matters of conscience-will
flourish ifleft to individual discretion. Legal coercion of opinion only serves "to
make one half the world fools, and the other half hypocrites." Jefferson's eloquent defense of religious liberty achieved its purpose. One year after the
publication of Notes on Viwinia, he drafted and successfully pushed through
the Virginia assembly his "Act for Establishing Religious Freedom." It redressed the injustices he had described in his book and remained one of his
proudest accomplishments.
Jefferson felt so strongly about the necessity for universal tolerance in religious conviction because he believed that reason was the final arbiter in theological dispute and that its powers to discriminate between truth and error
could flourish only in a nonoppressive environment. Like the other American
deists, Jefferson was persuaded that sectarian doctrines based on supernaturalistic claims of revelation were fundamentally suspect. In his estimation, reason
can infer God's existence through observation of and reflection on the natural
world: "I hold (without appeal to revelation) that when we take a view of the
Universe, in its parts general or particular, it is impossible for the human mind
not to perceive and feel a conviction of design, consummate skill, and indefinite power in every atom of its composition," all of which points to a divine
First Cause (letter to John Adams, 11 April 1823). Moreover, the same data
necessarily leads to the conviction that the First Cause is also good and perfect
(letter to Ezra Stiles Ely, 25 June 1819). But beyond these two inferences
reason cannot go. Consequently, there is no justification for accepting the
dogmas of Christian faith. In fact, there are good grounds for rejecting them,
since they violate the standards of observable natural uniformity and logical
possibility. Even if they cannot be conclusively repudiated as false, they can be
dismissed as nonsensical. "Ideas," argues Jefferson, "must be distinct before
reason can act on them" (letter to F. A. Van der Kemp, 30 July 1816). But
theological claims about the incarnation, resurrection, revelation, the Trinity,
and miracles are indistinct if not downright murky.
Jefferson's rigorously empiricist criteria for the determination of truth and
meaning prompted pioneering work on his part in the textual criticism ot
Christian doctrine. Although it has been overlooked by commentators on his
religious perspective, Jefferson's hermeneutical analysis ofScripture anticipated
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the modern "demythologization" movement of Rudolph Bultmann by some
two hundred years.
Jefferson was convinced that Scripture-particularly the New Testamentwas a confused hybrid of rational ethical and religious sentiments and sheer
nonsense. The former, he felt, accurately reflects the actual beliefs of the mannot god-Jesus. Like so many (but not all) of his fellow deists, Jefferson saw
Jesus as an early proponent of rational religion whose teachings are reducible
to three propositions: that there is one perfect God, that a future state of
reward and punishment exists, and that "to love God with all thy heart, and thy
neighbour as thyself, is the sum of religion" (letter to Benjamin Waterhouse,
26 June 1822 ). As deists in the first decade of the nineteenth century would
later put it, the heart of Jesus' real message is "theophilanthropy": the love of
God and man. These three tenets Jefferson wholeheartedly endorses. It is the
"Platonic" absurdities with which later Christian theologians had embellished
Scripture that Jefferson deplores. As he wrote to Joseph Priestley on 9 April
1803, "To the corruption of Christianity I am indeed opposed; but not to the
genuine precepts of Jesus himsel£"
How, then, to distinguish between the original doctrine and its subsequent
adulteration? Through historical exegesis of the text, answers Jefferson, in
which the fantastical accounts and logical impossibilities are mercilessly excised
from the rationally plausible. As early as 1787, in a letter to his nephew Peter
Carr, Jefferson described his method of textual criticism:
Fix reason firmly in her seat, and call to her tribunal every fact, every
opinion .... Read the bible then, as you would read Livy or Tacitus.
The facts which are within the ordinary course of nature you will believe
on the authority of the writer, as you do those of the same kind in Livy
or Tacitus. The testimony of the writer weighs in their favor in one
scale, and their not being against the laws of nature does not weigh
against them. But those facts in the bible which contradict the laws of
nature, must be examined with more care .... Here you must recur to
the pretension of the writer.... Examine upon what evidence his pretensions are founded, and whether that evidence is so strong as that its
falsehood would be more improbable than a change of the laws of
nature in the case he relates.
Adherence to this rule of thumb, according to Jefferson, would enable the
careful reader to discriminate between scriptural truth and falsity. Just as the
rational person rejects stories in Livy or Tacitus about showers of blood or
talking statues because they violate the lessons of experience, so he or she
should dismiss scriptural accounts of miracles for the same reason. Similarly, just
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as those anecdotes by secular historians that are rationally plausible and do not
contradict contemporary science are reliable, so too are their analogues in sacred historical accounts. Jefferson's approach to the demystification of Christian Scripture, then, is in keeping with his fundamental conviction that "reason
and free inquiry are the only effectual agents against error."
Seeking to bring about a "euthanasia for Platonic Christianity," Jefferson
spent several years purging Scripture of its nondeistic elements. He rewrote the
Gospels, by disregarding their allusions to supernaturalist doctrine, snipping
out what he accepted as expressions of Jesus' original precepts, and pasting
those (in English, French, Latin, and Greek) into a copybook. Moreover, he
wrote several drafts of a "Synopsis" or "Summary" of the true Christian religion, complete with his reasons for rejecting orthodox adulterations of it ( see
the letters to Joseph Priestley, 9 April 1803; Benjamin Rush, 21 April 1803;
John Adams, 12 October 1813). Jefferson intended his synopsis to be an
outline of a more comprehensive study, but, as with so many other projected
works, he never undertook its composition.
In addition to his emphasis on freedom of conscience and scriptural demythologization, Jefferson the deist was also preoccupied with questions of
morality and the basis of ethics. True to his essentially naturalistic orientation,
Jefferson argued that moral awareness, like all knowledge, ultimately rests on
experience. The knowledge of moral truth stems from an innate moral faculty,
or what he sometimes referred to as "conscience" or "instinct." But the prescriptions of this faculty are not reflections of mere social convention, much less
subjective caprice. Instead, they mirror the objective natural laws of individual
felicity and social utility. "Nature hath implanted in our breasts ... a moral
instinct" that defines our duty (letter to Thomas Law, 13 June 1814). When
reason heeds that instinct, humans act in such a way as to promote their own
and others' welfare. True, certain individuals perform hurtful and therefore
wicked actions. But this is no more evidence against the existence of an innate
moral faculty than blindness is disproof of the human faculty of vision. Education, the tolerant interplay ofideas, and equal opportunity are necessary conditions for the activation of the moral faculty. Hence, that society is best that
promotes environmental conditions conducive to the conscious emergence of
the natural light of morality. It is against this background that Jefferson's comments on the distinction between natural and artificial aristocracy should be
read (letterto John Adams, 28 October 1813). True or natural aristocrats are
those who rationally heed the moral light, act accordingly, and justly earn the
acclaim and admiration of their fellows. Artificial or pseudo-aristocrats, on the
other hand, are those who, through mere accidents of birth such as physical
strength or social position, assume without deserving prestige and influence.
Although not a systematic philosopher, Jefferson, along with Elihu Palmer,
was the most sophisticated American proponent of the deistic worldview. One
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can argue with some of his conclusions-particularly his sometimes ambiguous
descriptions of the moral faculty-but it is difficult to doubt either his integrity
or the sincerity of his convictions. He once wrote that humans "are answerable
not for the rightness but the uprightness" of their beliefs. Judged by his own
standard, Jefferson passes the test.

On Freedom of Conscience
(From Notes on Vh;ginia, 1785)
The first settlers in this country were emigrants from England, of the English
Church, just at a point of time when it was flushed with complete victory over
the religious of all other persuasions. Possessed, as they became, of the powers
of making, administering, and executing the laws, they showed equal intolerance in this country with their Presbyterian brethren, who had emigrated to
the northern government. The poor Quakers were flying from persecution in
England. They cast their eyes on these new countries as asylums of civil and
religious freedom; but they found them free only for the reigning sect. Several
acts of the Virginia assembly of 1659, 1662, and 1693, had made it penal in
parents to refuse to have their children baptized; had prohibited the unlawful
assembling of Quakers; had made it penal for any master of a vessel to bring a
Quaker into the State; had ordered those already here, and such as should
come thereafter, to be imprisoned till they should abjure the country; provided
a milder punishment for their first and second return, but death for their third;
had inhibited all persons from suffering their meetings in or near their houses,
entertaining them individually, or disposing of books which supported their
tenets. If no execution took place here, as did in New England, it was not
owing to the moderation of the church, or spirit of the legislature, as may be
inferred from the law itself; but to historical circumstances which have not been
handed down to us. The Anglicans retained full possession of the country
about a century. Other opinions began then to creep in, and the great care of
the government to support their own church, having begotten an equal degree
of indolence in its clergy, two-thirds of the people had become dissenters at the
commencement of the present revolution. The laws, indeed, were still oppressive on them, but the spirit of the one party had subsided into moderation, and
of the other had risen to a degree of determination which commanded respect.
The present state of our laws on the subject of religion is this. The convention of May 1776, in their declaration of rights, declared it to be a truth, and
a natural right, that the exercise of religion should be free ; but when they
proceeded to form on that declaration the ordinance of government, instead
of taking up every principle declared in the bill of rights, and guarding it by
legislative sanction, they passed over that which asserted our religious rights,
leaving them as they found them. The same convention, however, when they
met as a member of the general assembly in October, 1776, repealed all acts of
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Parliament which had rendered criminal the maintaining any opinions in
matters of religion, the forbearing to repair to church, and the exercising any
mode of worship; and suspended the laws giving salaries to the clergy, which
suspension was made perpetual in October, 1779. Statutory oppressions in
religion being thus wiped away, we remain at present under those only imposed
by the common law, or by our own acts of assembly. At the common law, heresy
was a capital offence, punishable by burning. Its definition was left to the
ecclesiastical judges, before whom the conviction was, till the statute of the 1
EL c. 1 circumscribed it, by declaring, that nothing should be deemed heresy,
but what had been so determined by authority of the canonical scriptures, or
by one of the four first general councils, or by other council, having for the
grounds of their declaration the express and plain words of the scriptures.
Heresy, thus circumscribed, being an offence against the common law, our act
of assembly of October 1777, c. 17, gives cognizance ofit to the general court,
by declaring that the jurisdiction of that court shall be general in all matters at
the common law. The execution is by the writ De haeretico comburendo. By our
own act of assembly of 1705, c. 30, if a person brought up in the Christian
religion denies the being of a God, or the Trinity, or asserts there are more gods
than one, or denies the Christian religion to be true, or the scriptures to be of
divine authority, he is punishable on the first offence by incapacity to hold any
office or employment ecclesiastical, civil, or military; on the second by disability
to sue, to take any gift or legacy, to be guardian, executor, or administrator, and
by three years' imprisonment without bail. A father's right to the custody of his
own children being founded in law on his right of guardianship, this being
taken away, they may of course be severed from him, and put by the authority
of a court into more orthodox hands. This is a summary view of that religious
slavery under which a people have been willing to remain, who have lavished
their lives and fortunes for the establishment of their civil freedom. The error
seems not sufficiently eradicated, that the operations of the mind, as well as the
acts of the body, are subject to the coercion of the laws. But our rulers can have
no authority over such natural rights, only as we have submitted to them. The
rights of conscience we never submitted, we could not submit. We are answerable for them to our God. The legitimate powers of government extend to
such acts only as are injurious to others. But it does me no injury for my
neighbour to say there are twenty gods, or no God. It neither picks my pocket
nor breaks my leg. If it be said, his testimony in a court of justice cannot be
relied on, reject it then, and be the stigma on him. Constraint may make him
worse by making him a hypocrite, but it will never make him a truer man. It
may fix him obstinately in his errors, but will not cure them. Reason and free
inquiry are the only effectual agents against error. Give a loose to them, they
will support the true religion by bringing every false one to their tribunal, to
the test of their investigation. They are the natural enemies of error, and of
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error only. Had not the Roman government permitted free inquiry, Christianity could never have been introduced. Had not free inquiry been indulged at
the era of the reformation, the corruptions of Christianity could not have been
purged away. Ifit be restrained now, the present corruptions will be protected,
and new ones encouraged. Was the government to prescribe to us our medicine and diet, our bodies would be in such keeping as our souls are now. Thus
in France the emetic was once forbidden as a medicine, and the potato as an
article of food. Government is just as infallible, too, when it fixes systems in
physics. Galileo was sent to the Inquisition for affirming that the earth was a
sphere; the government had declared it to be as flat as a trencher, and Galileo
was obliged to abjure his error. This error, however, at length prevailed, the
earth became a globe, and Descartes declared it was whirled round its axis by
a vortex. The government in which he lived was wise enough to see that this
was no question of civil jurisdiction, or we should all have been involved by
authority in vortices. In fact, the vortices have been exploded, and the
Newtonian principle of gravitation is now more firmly established, on the basis
of reason, than it would be were the government to step in, and to make it an
article of necessary faith. Reason and experiment have been indulged, and error
has fled before them. It is error alone which needs the support of government.
Truth can stand by itself Subject opinion to coercion: whom will you make
your inquisitors? Fallible men; men governed by bad passions, by private as well
as public reasons. And why subject it to coercion? To produce uniformity. But
is uniformity of opinion desirable? No more than of face and stature. Introduce
the bed of Procrustes then, and as there is danger that the large men may beat
the small, make us all of a size, by lopping the former and stretching the latter.
Difference of opinion is advantageous in religion. The several sects perform the
office of a censor morum over each other. Is uniformity attainable? Millions of
innocent men, women, and children, since the introduction of Christianity,
have been burnt, tortured, fined, imprisoned; yet we have not advanced one
inch towards uniformity. What has been the effect of coercion? To make one
half the world fools, and the other half hypocrites. To support roguery and
error all over the earth. Let us reflect that it is inhabited by a thousand millions
of people. That these profess probably a thousand different systems of religion.
That ours is but one of that thousand. That if there be but one right, and ours
that one, we should wish to see the nine hundred and ninety-nine wandering
sects gathered into the fold of truth. But against such a majority we cannot
effect this by force. Reason and persuasion are the only practicable instruments.
To make way for these, free inquiry must be indulged; and how can we wish
others to indulge it while we refuse it ourselves. But every State, says an inquisitor, has established some religion. No two, say I, have established the same. Is
this a proof of the infallibility of establishments? Our sister States of Pennsylvania and New York, however, have long subsisted without any establishment
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at all. The experiment was new and doubtful when they made it. It has answered beyond conception. They flourish infinitely. Religion is well supported;
of various kinds, indeed, but all good enough; all sufficient to preserve peace
and order; or if a sect arises, whose tenets would subvert morals, good sense has
fair play, and reasons and laughs it our of doors, without suffering the State to
be troubled with it. They do not hang more malefactors than we do. They are
not more disturbed with religious dissensions. On the contrary, their harmony
is unparalleled, and can be ascribed to nothing but their unbounded tolerance,
because there is no other circumstance in which they differ from every nation
on earth. They have made the happy discovery, that the way to silence religious
disputes, is to take no notice of them. Let us too give this experiment fair play,
and get rid, while we may, of those tyrannical laws. It is true, we are as yet
secured against them by the spirit of the times. I doubt whether the people of
this country would suffer an execution for heresy, or a three years' imprisonment for not comprehending the mysteries of the Trinity. But is the spirit of the
people an infallible, a permanent reliance? Is it government? Is this the kind of
protection we receive in return for the rights we give up? Besides, the spirit of
the times may alter, will alter. Our rulers will become corrupt, our people
careless. A single zealot may commence persecutor, and better men be his
victims. It can never be too often repeated, that the time for fixing every
essential right on a legal basis is while our rulers are honest, and ourselves
united. From the conclusion of this war we shall be going down hill. It will not
then be necessary to resort every moment to the people for support. They will
be forgotten, therefore, and their rights disregarded. They will forget themselves, but in the sole faculty of making money, and will never think of uniting
to effect a due respect for their rights. The shackles, therefore, which shall not
be knocked off at the conclusion of this war, will remain on us long, will be
made heavier and heavier, till our rights shall revive or expire in a convulsion.

An Act for Establishing Religious Freedom,
Passed in the Assembly of Virginia
in the Beginning of the Year 1786
Well aware that Almighty God hath created the mind free; that all attempts to
influence it by temporal punishments or burdens, or by civil incapacitations,
tend only to beget habits of hypocrisy and meanness, and are a departure from
the plan of the Holy Author of our religion, who being Lord both of body and
mind, yet chose not to propagate it by coercions on either, as was in his Almighty power to do; that the impious presumption of legislators and rulers,
civil as well as ecclesiastical, who, being themselves but fallible and uninspired
men have assumed dominion over the faith of others, setting up their own
opinions and modes of thinking as the only true and infallible, and as such
endeavoring to impose them on others, hath established and maintained false
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religions over the greatest part of the world, and through all time; that to
compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical; that even the forcing him to
support this or that teacher of his own religious persuasion, is depriving him of
the comfortable liberty of giving his contributions to the particular pastor
whose morals he would make his pattern and whose powers he feels most
persuasive to righteousness, and is withdrawing from the ministry those temporal rewards, which proceeding from an approbation of their personal conduct, are an additional incitement to earnest and unremitting labors for the
instruction of mankind; that our civil rights have no dependence on our religious opinions, more than our opinions in physics or geometry; that, therefore,
the proscribing any citizen as unworthy the public confidence by laying upon
him an incapacity of being called to the offices of trust and emolument, unless
he profess or renounce this or that religious opinion, is depriving him injuriously of those privileges and advantages to which in common with his fellow
citizens he has a natural right; that it tends also to corrupt the principles of that
very religion it is meant to encourage, by bribing, with a monopoly of worldly
honors and emoluments, those who will externally profess and conform to it;
that though indeed these are criminal who do not withstand such temptation,
yet neither are those innocent who lay the bait in their way; that to suffer the
civil magistrate to intrude his powers into the field of opinion and to restrain
the profession or propagation of principles, on the supposition of their ill tendency, is a dangerous fallacy, which at once destroys all religious liberty, because
he being of course judge of that tendency, will make his opinions the rule of
judgment, and approve or condemn the sentiments of others only as they shall
square with or differ from his own; that it is time enough for the rightful
purposes of civil government, for its officers to interfere when principles break
out into overt acts against peace and good order; and finally, that truth is great
and will prevail if left to herself, that she is the proper and sufficient antagonist
to error, and has nothing to fear from the conflict, unless by human interposition disarmed of her natural weapons, free argument and debate, errors ceasing to be dangerous when it is permitted freely to contradict them.
Be it therefore enacted by the General Assembly, That no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his body or
goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or belief;
but that all men shall be free to profess, and by argument to maintain, their
opinions in matters of religion, and that the same shall in nowise diminish,
enlarge, or affect their civil capacities.
And though we well know this Assembly, elected by the people for the
ordinary purposes of legislation only, have no power to restrain the acts of
succeeding assemblies, constituted with the powers equal to our own, and that
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therefore to declare this act irrevocable, would be of no effect in law, yet we are
free to declare, and do declare, that the rights hereby asserted are of the natural
rights of mankind, and that if any act shall be hereafter passed to repeal the
present or to narrow its operation, such act will be an infringement of natural
right.

To Peter Carr (10 August 1787)
Jefferson was minister to France when he penned this letter of advice to his orphaned nephew Peter Carr. It is, as Jefferson says, ((a sketch of the sciences to which
I would wish you to apply.» Included in its various injunctions are Jeffersonys
ruminations on ethics and religion.

Dear Peter
... He who made us would have been a pitiful bungler if he had made the
rules of our moral conduct a matter of science. For one man of science, there
are thousands who are not. What would have become of them? Man was
destined for society. His morality therefore was to be formed to this object. He
was endowed with a sense of right and wrong merely relative to this. This sense
is as much a part of his nature as the sense of hearing, seeing, feeling; it is the
true foundation of morality, and not the TO K<XAOV ["the beautiful"] truth,
&c., as fanciful writers have imagined. The moral sense, or conscience, is as
much a part of man as his leg or arm. It is given to all human beings in a
stronger or weaker degree, as force of members is given them in a greater or
less degree. It may be strengthened by exercise, as may any particular limb of
the body. This sense is submitted indeed in some degree to the guidance of
reason; but it is a small stock which is required for this: even a less one than
what'we call Common sense. State a moral case to a ploughman and a professor. The former will decide it as well, and often better than the latter, because
he has not been led astray by artificial rules. In this branch therefore read good
books because they will encourage as well as direct your feelings. . . . Above
all things lose no occasion of exercising your dispositions to be grateful, to be
generous, to be charitable, to be humane, to be true, just, firm, orderly, courageous &c. Consider every act of this kind as an exercise which will strengthen
your moral faculties, and increase your worth.
4. Religion. Your reason is now mature enough to examine this object. In
the first place divest yourself of all bias in favour of novelty and singularity of
opinion. Indulge them in any other subject rather than that of religion. It is too
important, and the consequences of error may be too serious. On the other
hand shake off all the fears and servile prejudices under which weak minds are
servilely crouched. Fix reason firmly in her seat, and call to her tribunal every
fact, every opinion. Question with boldness even the existence of a god; be-
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cause, if there be one, he must more approve of the homage of reason, than
that of blindfolded fear. You will naturally examine first the religion of your
own country. Read the bible then, as you would read Livy or Tacitus. The facts
which are within the ordinary course of nature you will believe on the authority
of the writer, as you do those of the same kind in Llvy and Tacitus. The
testimony of the writer weighs in their favor in one scale, and their not being
against the laws of nature does not weigh against them. But those facts in the
bible which contradict the laws of nature, must be examined with more care,
and under a variety of faces. Here you must recur to the pretensions of the
writer to inspiration from god. Examine upon what evidence his pretensions
are founded, and whether that evidence is so strong as that its falsehood would
be more improbable than a change of the laws of nature in the case he relates.
For example in the book ofJoshua we are told the sun stood still several hours.
Were we to read that fact in Llvy or Tacitus we should class it with their showers
of blood, speaking of statues, beasts &c., but it is said that the writer of that
book was inspired. Examine therefore candidly what evidence there is of his
having been inspired. The pretension is entitled to your inquiry, because millions believe it. On the other hand you are Astronomer enough to know how
contrary it is to the law of nature that a body revolving on its axis, as the earth
does, should have stopped, should not by that sudden stoppage have prostrated animals, trees, buildings, and should after a certain time have resumed
its revolution, and that without a second general prostration. Is this arrest of
the earth's motion, or the evidence which affirms it, most within the law of
probabilities? You will next read the new testament. It is the history of a
personage called Jesus. Keep in your eye the opposite pretensions. 1. Of those
who say he was begotten by god, born of a virgin, suspended and reversed the
laws of nature at will, and ascended bodily into heaven; and 2. of those who say
he was a man, of illegitimate birth, of a benevolent heart, enthusiastic mind,
who set out without pretensions to divinity, ended in believing them, and was
punished capitally for sedition by being gibbeted according to the Roman law
which punished the first commission of that offence by whipping, and the
second by exile or death in furea . ... Do not be frightened from this inquiry
by any fear of its consequences. If it ends in a belief that there is no god, you
will find incitements to virtue in the comfort and pleasantness you feel in its
exercise, and the love of others which it will procure you. If you find reason to
believe there is a god, a consciousness that you are acting under his eye, and
that he approves you, will be a vast additional incitement. If that there be a
future state, the hope of a happy existence in that increases the appetite to
deserve it; if that Jesus was also a god, you will be comforted by a belief of his
aid and love. In fine, I repeat that you must lay aside all prejudice on both sides,
and neither believe nor reject any thing because any other persons, or description of persons have rejected or believed it. Your own reason is the only oracle
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given you by heaven, and you are answerable not for the rightness but uprightness of the decision ....

To the Rev. Isaac Story (5 December 1801)
Jefferson responds to a nine-page manuscript entitled "The Metempsychosis-doctrine, in a limited sense, defended,,, written by Story.

Sir
Your favor of Oct. 27 was received some time since, and read with pleasure.
It is not for me to pronounce on the hypothesis you present of a transmigration
of souls from one body to another in certain cases. The laws of nature have
withheld from us the means of physical knowledge of the country of spirits and
revelation has, for reasons unknown to us, chosen to leave us in the dark as we
were. When I was young I was fond of the speculations which seemed to
promise some insight into that hidden country, but observing at length that
they left me in the same ignorance in which they had found me, I have for very
many years ceased to read or to think concerning them, and have reposed my
head on that pillow of ignorance which a benevolent creator has made so soft
for us knowing how much we should be forced to use it. I have thought it
better by nourishing the good passions, and controlling the bad, to merit an
inheritance in a state of being of which I can know so little, and to trust for the
future to him who has been so good for the past. I perceive too that these
speculations have with you been only the amusement of leisure hours; while
your labours have been devoted to the education of your children, making
them good members of society, to the instructing men in their duties, and
performing the other offices of a large parish ....

To Joseph Priestley (9 April 1803)
Jefferson offers an early description of his planned but never written study of the
Christian religion. For his synopsis of the proposed treatise, see the 1803 letter to
Rush, next.

Dear Sir
While on a short visit lately to Monticello, I received from you a copy of
your comparative view of Socrates and Jesus, and I avail myself of the first
moment of leisure after my return to acknowledge the pleasure I had in the
perusal of it, and the desire it excited to see you take up the subject on a more
extensive scale. In consequence of some conversation with Dr. Rush in the
years 1798-99. I had promised some day to write him a letter giving him my
view of the Christian system. I have reflected often on it since, and even

Reason and Free Inquiry Are the Only Agents against Errors

sketched the outlines in my own mind. I should first take a general view of the
moral doctrines of the most remarkable of the antient philosophers, of whose
ethics we have sufficient information to make an estimate: say of Pythagoras,
Epicurus, Epictetus, Socrates, Cicero, Seneca, Antoninus. I should do justice
to the branches of morality they have treated well, but point out the importance of those in which they are deficient. I should then take a view of the
deism, and ethics of the Jews, and shew in what a degraded state they were, and
the necessity they presented of a reformation. I should proceed to a view of the
life, character, and doctrines ofJesus, who, sensible of the incorrectness of their
ideas of the deity, and of morality, endeavored to bring them to the principles
of a pure deism, and juster notions of the attributes of god, to reform their
moral doctrines to the standard of reason, justice, and philanthropy, and to
inculcate the belief of a future state. This view would purposely omit the question of his divinity and even of his inspiration. To do him justice it would be
necessary to remark the disadvantages his doctrines have to encounter, not
having been committed to writing by himself, but by the most unlettered of
men, by memory, long after they had heard them from him; when much was
forgotten, much misunderstood, and presented in very paradoxical shapes. Yet
such are the fragments remaining as to shew a master workman, and that his
system of morality was the most benevolent and sublime probably that has
been ever taught; and eminently more perfect than those of any of the antient
philosophers. His character and doctrines have received still greater injury from
those who pretend to be his special disciples, and who have disfigured and
sophisticated his actions and precepts, from views of personal interest, so as to
induce the unthinking part of mankind to throw off the whole system in disgust, and to pass sentence as an imposter on the most innocent, the most
benevolent the most eloquent and sublime character that ever has been exhibited to man.-This is the outline; but I have not the time, and still less the
information which the subject needs. It will therefore rest with me in contemplation only. You are the person who of all others would do it best, and most
promptly. You have all the materials at hand, and you put together with ease.
I wish you could be induced to extend your late work to the whole subject....

To Benjamin Rush (21 April 1803)
Dear Sir
In some of the delightful conversations with you, in the evenings of
1798-99, which served as an Anodyne to the afllictions of the crisis through
which the country was then labouring, the Christian religion was sometimes
our topic: and I then promised you that, one day or other, I would give you
my views of it. They are the result of a life of enquiry and reflection, and very
different from that Anti-Christian system, imputed to me by those who know
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nothing of my opinions. To the corruptions of Christianity, I am indeed opposed; but not to the genuine precepts ofJesus himself. I am a Christian, in the
only sense in which he wished any one to be; sincerely attached to his doctrines,
in preference to all others; ascribing to himself every human excellence, and
believing he never claimed any other. At the short intervals, since these conversations, when I could justifiably abstract my mind from public affairs, this subject has been under my contemplation. But the more I considered it, the more
it expanded beyond the measure of either my time or information. In the
moment of my late departure from Monticello, I received from Doctr. Priestley
his little treatise of"Socrates and Jesus compared." This being a section of the
general view I had taken of the field, it became a subject of reflection, while on
the road, and unoccupied otherwise. The result was, to arrange in my mind a
Syllabus, or Outline, of such an Estimate of the comparative merits of Christianity, as I wished to see executed, by some one of more leisure and information for the task than mysel£ This I now send you, as the only discharge of my
promise I can probably ever execute. And, in confiding it to you, I know it will
not be exposed to the malignant perversions of those who make every word
from me a text for new misrepresentations and calumnies. I am 1noreover
averse to the communication of my religious tenets to the public; because it
would countenance the presumption of those who have endeavored to draw
them before that tribunal, and to seduce public opinion to erect itself into that
Inquisition over the rights of conscience, which the laws have so justly proscribed. It behooves every man, who values liberty of conscience for himself,
to resist invasions of it in the case of others; or their case may, by change of
circumstances, become his own. It behooves him too, in his own case, to give
no example of concession, betraying the common right of independent opinion, by answering questions of faith, which the laws have left between god and
himself Accept my affectionate salutations.

Syllabus of an Estimate of the Merit of the Doctrines
ofJesus, compared with those of others.
In a comparative view of the Ethics of the enlightened nations of antiquity,
of the Jews, and of Jesus, no notice should be taken of the corruptions of
reason, among the antients, to wit, the idolatry and superstition of the vulgar,
Nor of the corruptions of Christianity by the learned among its professors.
Let a just view be taken of the moral principles inculcated by the most
esteemed of the sects of antt. philosophy, or of their individuals; particularly
Pythagoras, Socrates, Epicurus, Cicero, Epictetus, Seneca, Antoninus.
I. Philosophers.
1. Their precepts related chiefly to ourselves, and the government of those
passions which, unrestrained, would disturb our tranquility of mind. In this
branch of Philosophy they were really great.
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2. In developing our duties to others, they were short and defective. They
embraced indeed the circles of kindred and friends: and inculcated patriotism,
or the love of our country in the aggregate, as a primary obligation: towards
our neighbors and countrymen, they taught justice, but scarcely viewed them
as within the circle of benevolence. Still less have they inculcated peace, charity,
and love to our fellow men, or embraced with benevolence, the whole family
of mankind.
IL Jews.
1. Their system was Deism, that is, the belief in one only god. But their
ideas of him, and of his attributes, were degrading and injurious.
2. Their Ethics were not only imperfect, but often irreconcilable with the
sound dictates of reason and morality, as they respect intercourse with those
around us: and repulsive, and anti-social, as respecting other nations. They
needed reformation therefore in an eminent degree.
III. Jesus.
In this state of things among the Jews, Jesus appeared. His parentage was
obscure, his condition poor, his education null, his natural endowments great,
his life correct and innocent; he was meek, benevolent, patient, firm, disinterested, and of the sublimist eloquence.
The disadvantages under which his doctrines appear are remarkable.
1. Like Socrates and Epictetus, he wrote nothing himself.
2. But he had not, like them, a Xenophon or an Arrian to write for
him. . . . On the contrary, all the learned of his country, entrenched in its
power and riches, were opposed to him lest his labours should undermine their
advantages: and the committing to writing his life and doctrines, fell on unlettered and ignorant men: who wrote too from memory, and not till long after
the transactions had passed.
3. According to the ordinary fate of those who attempt to enlighten and
reform mankind, he fell an early victim to the jealousy and combination of the
altar and the throne; at about 33 years of age, his reason having not yet attained
the maximum of its energy, nor the course of his preaching, which was but of
about 3 years at most, presented occasions for developing a compleat system
of morals.
4. Hence the doctrines which he really delivered were defective as a whole,
And fragments only of what he did deliver have come to us, mutilated,
mistated, and often unintelligible.
5. They have been still more disfigured by the corruptions of schismatising
followers, who have found an interest in sophisticating and perverting the
simple doctrines he taught, by engrafting on them the mysticisms of a Graecian
Sophist, frittering them into subtleties, and obscuring them with jargon, until
they have caused good men to reject the whole in disgust, and to view Jesus
himself as an impostor.
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Nothwithstanding these disadvantages, a system of morals is presented to
us, which, if filled up in the true style and spirit of the rich fragments he left us,
would be the most perfect and sublime that has ever been taught by man.
The question of his being a member of the god-head, or in direct communication with it, claimed for him by some of his followers, and denied by others,
is foreign to the present view, which is merely an estimate of the intrinsic merits
of his doctrines.
1. He corrected the Deism of the Jews, confirming them in their belief of
one only god, and giving them juster notions of his attributes and government.
2. His moral doctrines relating to kindred and friends were more pure and
perfect, than those of the most correct of the philosophers, and greatly more
so than those of the Jews. And they went far beyond both in inculcating universal philanthropy, not only to kindred and friends, to neighbors and countrymen, but to all mankind, gathering all into one family, under the bonds oflove,
charity, peace, common wants, and common aids. A development of this head
will evince the peculiar superiority of the system of Jesus over all others.
3. The precepts of Philosophy, and of the Hebrew code, laid hold of actions
only. He pushed his scrutinies into the heart of man; erected his tribunal in the
region of his thoughts, and purified the waters at the fountain head.
4. He taught, emphatically, the doctrine of a future state; which was either
doubted or disbelieved by the Jews: and wielded it with efficacy, as an important incentive, supplementary to the other motives to moral conduct.

To John Adams (12 October 1813)
Jefferson reflects on the «corruption)) of Christianity and refers to his edited cPhilosophy of Jesus of Nazareth/) a compilation of New Testament synoptic texts
stripped of their supernaturalist doctrine.

Dear Sir
... To compare the morals of the old, with those of the new testament,
would require an attentive study of the former, a search thro' all its books for
its precepts, and through all its history for its practices, and the principles they
prove. As commentaries too on these, the philosophy of the Hebrews must be
enquired into, their Mishna, their Gemara, Cabbala, Jezirah, Sohar, Cosri, and
their Talmud must be examined and understood, in order to do them full
justice. Brucker, it would seem, has gone deeply into these Repositories of their
ethics, and Enfield, his epitomiser, concludes in these words . "Ethics were so
little understood among the Jews, that, in their whole compilation called the
Talmud, there is only one treatise on moral subjects. Their books of Morals
chiefly consisted in a minute enumeration of duties . From the law of Moses
were deduced 613 precepts, which were divided into two classes, affirmative
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and negative, 248 in the former, and 365 in the latter. It may serve to give the
reader some idea of the low state of moral philosophy among the Jews in the
Middle age, to add, that of the 248 affirmative precepts, only 3 were considered as obligatory upon women; and that, in order to obtain salvation, it was
judged sufficient to fulfill any one single law in the hour of death; the observance of the rest being deemed necessary, only to increase the felicity of the
future life. What a wretched depravity of sentiment and manners must have
prevailed before such corrupt maxims could have obtained credit! It is impossible to collect from these writings a consistent series of moral Doctrine."
Enfield, B. 4 chap. 3. It was the reformation ofthis "wretched depravity" of
morals which Jesus undertook. In extracting the pure principles which he
taught, we should have to strip off the artificial vestments in which they have
been muffled by priests, who have travestied them into various forms, as instruments of riches and power to themselves. We must dismiss the Platonists and
Plotinists, the Stagyrites and Gamalielites, the Eclectics the Gnostics and Scholastics, their essences and emanations, their Logos and Demi-urgos, Aeons and
Daemons male and female, with a long train Etc. Etc. Etc. or, shall I say at
once, of Nonsense. We must reduce our volume to the simple evangelists,
select, even from them, the very words only of Jesus, paring off the Amphibologisms into which they have been led by forgetting often, or not understanding, what had fallen from him, by giving their own misconceptions as his dicta,
and expressing unintelligbly for others what they had not understood themselves. There will be found remaining the most sublime and benevolent code
of morals which has ever been offered to man. I have performed this operation
for my own use, by cutting verse by verse out of the printed book, and arranging the matter which is evidently his, and which is as easily distinguishable as
diamonds in a dunghill. The result is an octavo of 46 pages of pure and unsophisticated doctrines, such as were professed and acted on by the unlettered
apostles, the Apostolic fathers, and the Christians of the 1st century. Their
Platonising successors indeed, in after times, in order to legitimate the corruptions which they had incorporated into the doctrines of Jesus, found it necessary to disavow the primitive Christians, who had taken their principles from
the mouth of Jesus himself, of his Apostles, and the Fathers contemporary with
them. They excommunicated their followers as heretics, branding them with
the opprobrious name of Ebionites or Beggars.
For a comparison of the Graecian philosophy with that of Jesus, materials
might be largely drawn from the same source. Enfield gives a history, and
detailed account of the opinions and principles of the different sects. These
relate to the gods, their natures, grades, places and powers; the demi-gods and
daemons, and their agency with man; the Universe, its structure, extent, production and duration; the origin of things from the elements of fire, water, air,
and earth; the human soul, its essence and derivation; the summum bonum

123

Thomas Jefferson

124

and finis bonorum; with a thousand idle dreams and fancies on these and other
subjects the knowledge of which is withheld from man, leaving but a short
chapter for his moral duties, and the principal section of that given to what he
owes himself, to precepts for rendering him impassible, and unassailable by the
evils of life, and for preserving his mind in a state of constant serenity.
Such a canvas is too broad for the age of seventy, and especially of one
whose chief occupations have been in the practical business of life. We must
leave therefore to others, younger and more learned than we are, to prepare
this euthanasia for Platonic Christianity, and its restoration to the primitive
simplicity of its founder. I think you give a just outline of the theism of the
three religions when you say that the principle of the Hebrew was the fear, of
the Gentile the honor, and of the Christian the love of God.
An expression in your letter of Sep. 14 that "the human understanding is
a revelation from its maker" gives the best solution, that I believe can be given,
of the question, What did Socrates mean by his Daemon? He was too wise to
believe, and too honest to pretend that he had real and familiar converse with
a superior and invisible being. He probably considered the suggestions of his
conscience, or reason, as revelations, or inspirations from the Supreme mind,
bestowed, on important occasions, by a special superintending providence ...

To John Adams (28 October 1813)
Jefferson expresses his views about the <<natural aristocracy» promoted by freedom of conscience and opportunity, as well as the «progressive)) nature of «science.»

Dear Sir
... Experience proves that the moral and physical qualities of man, whether
good or evil, are transmissible in a certain degree from father to son. But I
suspect that the equal rights of men will rise up against this privileged Solomon,
and oblige us to continue acquiescence under the ~a.upc.o01~y£v£0~ <XOTWV
[ degeneration of the race of men] which Theognis complains of, and to
content ourselves with the accidental aristoi produced by the fortuitous concourse of breeders. For I agree with you that there is a natural aristocracy
among men. The grounds of this are virtue and talents. Formerly bodily powers gave place among the aristoi. But since the invention of gunpowder has
armed the weak as well as the strong with missile death, bodily strength, like
beauty, good humor, politeness and other accomplishments, has become but
an auxiliary ground of distinction. There is also an artificial aristocracy founded
on wealth and birth, without either virtue or talents; for with these it would
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belong to the first class. The natural aristocracy I consider as the most precious
gift of nature for the instruction, the trusts, and government of society. And
indeed it would have been inconsistent in creation to have formed man for the
social state, and not to have provided virtue and wisdom enough to manage
the concerns of the society. May we not even say that that form of government
is the best which provides the most effectually for a pure selection of these
natural aristoi into the offices of government? The artificial aristocracy is a
mischievous ingredient in government, and provision should be made to prevent its ascendancy. On the question, What is the best provision, you and I
differ; but we differ as rational friends, using the free exercise of our own
reason, and mutually indulging its errors. You think it best to put the Pseudoaristoi into a separate chamber oflegislation where they may be hindered from
doing mischief by their coordinate branches, and where also they may be a
protection to wealth against the Agrarian and plundering enterprises of the
Majority of the people. I think that to give them power in order to prevent
them from doing mischief, is arming them for it, and increasing instead of
remedying the evil. For if the coordinate branches can arrest their action, so
may they that of the coordinates. Mischief may be done negatively as well as
positively. Of this a cabal in the Senate of the U.S. has furnished many proofs.
Nor do I believe them necessary to protect the wealthy; because enough of
these will find their way into every branch of the legislature to protect themselves. From 15 to 20 legislatures of our own, in action for 30 years past, have
proved that no fears of an equalisation of property are to be apprehended from
them.
I think: the best remedy is exactly that provided by all our constitutions, to
leave to the citizens the free election and separation of the aristoi from the
pseudo-aristoi, of the wheat from the chaff. In general they will elect the real
good and wise. In some instances, wealth may corrupt, and birth blind them;
but not in sufficient degree to endanger society. . . .
At the first session of our legislature after the Declaration oflndependence,
we passed a law abolishing entails. And this was followed by one abolishing the
privilege of Primogeniture, and dividing the lands of intestates equally among
all their children, or other representatives. These laws, drawn by myself, laid the
axe to the root of Pseudo-aristocracy. And had another which I prepared been
adopted by the legislature, our work would have been compleat. It was a Bill
for the more general diffusion of learning. This proposed to divide every
county into wards of 5 or 6 miles square, like your townships; to establish in
each ward a free school for reading, writing and common arithmetic; to provide for the annual selection of the best subjects from these schools who might
receive at the public expence a higher degree of education at a district school;
and from these district schools to select a certain number of the most promising
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subjects to be compleated at an University, where all the useful sciences should
be taught. Worth and genius would thus have been sought out from every
condition oflife, and compleatly prepared by education for defeating the competition of wealth and birth for public trusts ....
With respect to Aristocracy, we should further consider that, before the
establishment of the American states, nothing was known to History but the
Man of the old world, crowded within limits either small or overcharged, and
steeped in the vices which that situation generates. A government adapted to
such men would be one thing; but a very different one, that for the Man of
these states. Here every one may have land to labor for himself if he chooses;
or, preferring the exercise of any other industry, may exact for it such compen sation as not only to afford a comfortable subsistence, but wherewith to provide for a cessation from labor in old age. Every one, by his property, or by his
satisfactory situation, is interested in the support of law and order. And such
men may safely and advantageously reserve to themselves a wholesome control
over the public affairs and a degree of freedom, which in the hands of the
Canaille of the cities of Europe, would be instantly perverted to the demolition
and destruction of every thing public and private. The history of the last 25
years of France, and of the last 40 years in America, nay of its last 200 years,
proves the truth of both parts of this observation.
But even in Europe a change has sensibly taken place in the mind of Man.
Science had liberated the ideas of those who read and reflect, and the American
example had kindled feelings of right in the people. An insurrection has consequently begun, of science, talents and courage against rank and birth, which
have fallen into contempt. It has failed in its first effort, because the mobs of
the cities, the instrument used for its accomplishment, debased by ignorance,
poverty and vice, could not be restrained to rational action. But the world will
recover from the panic of this first catastrophe. Science is progressive, and
talents and enterprise on the alert. Resort may be had to the people of the
country, a more governable power from their principles and subordination;
and rank, and birth, and tinsel-aristocracy will finally shrink into insignificance,
even there. This however we have no right to meddle with. It suffices for us,
if the moral and physical condition of our own citizens qualifies them to select
the able and good for the direction of their government, with a recurrence of
elections at such short periods as will enable them to displace an unfaithful
servant before the mischief he meditates may be irremediable. . ..

To Thomas Law (13 June 1814)
Jefferson replies to Law)s Second Thoughts on Instinctive Impulses (Philadelphia, 1813), which defended an ethical system purporting to be a «regular science,
founded on primordia4 universal, invariable principles.»
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Dear Sir
The copy of your Second thoughts on Instinctive impulses with the letter
accompanying it, was received just as I was setting out on a journey to this place
[Poplar Forest], two or three days distant from Monticello. I brought it with
me, and read it with great satisfaction; and with the more, as it contained
exactly my own creed on the foundation of morality in man. It is really curious
that, on a question so fundamental, such a variety of opinions should' have
prevailed among men; and those too of the most exemplary virtue and first
order of understanding. It shews how necessary was the care of the Creator in
making the moral principle so much a part of our constitution as that no errors
of reasoning or of speculation might lead us astray from its observance in
practice. Of all the theories on this question, the most whimsical seems to have
been that ofWollaston, who considers truth as the foundation of morality. The
thief who steals your guinea does wrong only inasmuch as he acts a lie, in using
your guinea as if it were his own. Truth is certainly a branch of morality, and
a very important one to society. But, presented as its foundation, it is as if a tree,
taken up by the roots, had its stem reversed in the air, and one of its branches
planted in the ground.-Some have made the love ofgod the foundation of
morality. This too is but a branch of our moral duties, which are generally
divided into duties to god, and duties to man. If we did a good act merely from
the love of god and a belief that it is pleasing to him, whence arises the morality
of the Atheist? It is idle to say as some do, that no such being exists. We have
the same evidence of the fact as of most of those we act on, to wit, their own
affirmations, and their reasonings in support of them. I have observed indeed
generally that, while in protestant countries the defections from the Platonic
Christianity of the priests is to Deism, in Catholic countries they are to Atheism. Diderot, D'Alembert, D'Holbach, Condorcet, are known to have been
among the most virtuous of men. Their virtue then must have had some other
foundation than the love of god.
The TO K:<XAOV of others is founded in a different faculty, that of taste,
which is not even a branch of morality. We have indeed an innate sense of what
we call beautiful: but that is exercised chiefly on subjects addressed to the fancy,
whether thro' the eye, in visible forms, as landscape, animal figure, dress, drapery, architecture, the composition of colours &c. or to the imagination directly,
as imagery, style, or measure in prose or poetry, or whatever else constitutes the
domain of criticism, or taste, a faculty entirely distinct from the moral one. Selfinterest, or rather Self love, or Egoism, has been more plausibly substituted as
the basis of morality. But I consider our relations with others as constituting the
boundaries of morality. With ourselves we stand on the ground of identity, not
of relation; which last, requiring two subjects, excludes self-love confined to a
single one. To ourselves, in strict language, we can owe no duties, obligation

127

Thomas Jefferson

128

requiring also two parties. Self-love therefore is no part of morality. Indeed it
is exactly its counterpart. It is the sole antagonist of virtue, leading us constantly by our propensities to self-gratification in violation of our moral duties
to others. Accordingly it is against this enemy that are erected the batteries of
moralists and religionists, as the only obstacle to the practice of morality. Take
from man his selfish propensities, and he can have nothing to seduce him from
the practice of virtue. Or subdue those propensities by education, instruction,
or restraint, and virtue remains without a competitor. Egoism, in a broader
sense, has been thus presented as the source of moral action. It has been said
that we feed the hungry, clothe the naked, bind up the wounds of the man
beaten by thieves, pour oil and wine into them, set him on our own beast, and
bring him to the inn, because we receive ourselves pleasure from these acts. So
Helvetius, one of the best men on earth, and the most ingenious advocate of
this principle, after defining "interest" to mean, not merely that which is pecu niary, but whatever may procure us pleasure or withdraw us from pain ( de
l'Esprit, 2.1) says (ib. 2.2) "the humane man is he to whom the sight of misfortune is insupportable and who, to rescue himself from this spectacle, is
forced to succour the unfortunate object." This indeed is true. But it is one
step short of the ultimate question. These good acts give us pleasure: but how
happens it that they give us pleasure? Because nature hath implanted in our
breasts a love of others, a sense of duty to them, a moral instinct in short, which
prompts us irresistibly to feel and to succour their distresses; and protests
against the language ofHelvetius (ib. 2.5) "what other motive than self interest
could determine a man to generous actions? It is as impossible for him to love
what is good for the sake of good, as to love evil for the sake of evil." The
creator would indeed have been a bungling artist, had he intended man for a
social animal, without planting in him social dispositions. It is true they are not
planted in every man; because there is no rule without exceptions; but it is false
reasoning which converts exceptions into the general rule. Some men are born
without the organs of sight, or of hearing, or without hands. Yet it would be
wrong to say that man is born without these faculties; and sight, hearing and
hands may with truth enter into the general definition of Man.
The want or imperfection of the moral sense in some men, like the want or
imperfection of the senses of sight and hearing in others, is no proof that it is
a general characteristic of the species. When it is wanting we endeavor to supply
the defect by education, by appeals to reason and calculation, by presenting to
the being so unhappily conformed other motives to do good, and to eschew
evil; such as the love, or the hatred or rejection of those among whom he lives
and whose society is necessary to his happiness, and even existence; demonstrations by sound calculation that honesty promotes interest in the long run; the
rewards and penalties established by the laws; and ultimately the prospects of
a future state of retribution for the evil as well as the good done while here.
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These are the correctives which are supplied by education, and which exercise
the functions of the moralist, the preacher and legislator: and they lead into a
course of correct action all those whose depravity is not too profound to be
eradicated. Some have argued against the existence of a moral sense, by saying
that if nature had given us such a sense, impelling us to virtuous actions, and
warning us against those which are vicious, then nature would also have designated, by some particular earmarks, the two sets of actions which are, in
themselves, the one virtuous, and the other vicious: whereas we find in fact,
that the same actions are deemed virtuous in one country, and vicious in another. The answer is that nature has constituted utility to man the standard and
test of virtue. Men living in different countries, under different circumstances,
different habits, and regimens, may have different utilities. The same act therefore may be useful, and consequently virtuous, in one country, which is injurious and vicious in another differently circumstanced. I sincerely then believe
with you in the general existence of a moral instinct. I think it the brightest
gem with which the human character is studded; and the want of it as more
degrading than the most hideous of the bodily deformities. I am happy in
reviewing the roll of associates in this principle which you present in your 2d
letter, some of which I had not before met with. To these might be added Lord
Kaims, one of the ablest of our advocates, who goes so far as to say, in his
Principles of Natural Religion, that a man owes no duty to which he is not
urged by some impulsive feeling. This is correct if referred to the standard of
general feeling in the given case, and not to the feeling of a single individual.
Perhaps I may misquote him, it being fifty years since I read his book ....

To Charles Thomson (9 January 1816)
Jefferson acknowledges receipt of Thomson's A Synopsis of the Four Evangelists;
or, A Regular History of the Conception, Birth, Doctrine, Miracles, Death,
Resurrection, and Ascension ofJesus, in the Words of the Evangelists (Philadelphia, 1815).

My Dear and Antient Friend
... I too have made a wee little book, from the same materials, which I call
the Philosophy ofJesus. It is a paradigma of his doctrines, made by cutting the
texts out of the book, and arranging them on the pages of a blank book, in a
certain order of time or subject. A more beautiful or precious morsel of ethics
I have never seen. It is a document in proof that I am a real Christian, that is
to say, a disciple of the doctrines of Jesus, very different from the Platonists,
who call me infidel, and themselves Christians and preachers of the gospel, while
they draw all their characteristic dogmas from what its Author never said nor
saw. They have compounded from the heathen mysteries a system beyond the
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comprehension of man, of which the great reformer of the vicious ethics and
deism of the Jews, were he to return on earth, would not recognise one feature ....

To Francis Adrian Van der Kemp (30 July 1816)
Van der Kemp was a New York Unitarian to whom Jefferson had earlier sent a
copy of his syllabus on Christian doctrine.

Dear Sir
Your favor of July 14 is received, and I am entirely satisfied with the disposition you made of the Syllabus, keeping my name unconnected with it, as I am
sure you have done. I should really be gratified to see a full and fair examination
of the ground it takes. I believe it to be the only ground on which reason and
truth can take their stand, and that only against which we are told that the gates
of hell shall not finally prevail. Yet I have little expectation that the affirmative
can be freely maintained in England. We know it could not here. For altho' we
have freedom of religious opinion by law, we are yet under the inquisition of
public opinion: and in England it would have both law and public opinion to
encounter. The love of peace, and a want of either time or taste for these
disquisitions, induce silence on my part as to the contents of this paper, and all
explanations and discussions which might arise out of it; and this must be my
apology for observing the same silence on the questions of your letter. I leave
the thing to the evidence of the books on which it claims to be founded, and
with which I am persuaded you are more familiar than mysel£-Altho' I rarely
waste time in reading on theological subjects, as mangled by our PseudoChristians, yet I can readily suppose Basanistos may be amusing. Ridicule is the
only weapon which can be used against unintelligible propositions. Ideas must
be distinct before reason can act upon them; and no man ever had a distinct
idea of the trinity. It is the mere Abracadabra of the mountebanks calling
themselves the priests of Jesus. Ifit could be understood it would not answer
their purpose. Their security is in their faculty of shedding darkness, like the
scuttle fish, thro' the element in which they move, and making it impenetrable
to the eye of a pursuing enemy. And there they will skulk, until some rational
creed can occupy the void which the obliteration of their duperies would leave
in the minds of our honest and unsuspecting brethren. Whenever this shall take
place, I believe that Christianism may be universal and eternal. I salute you with
great esteem and respect.

To Margaret Bayard Smith (6 August 1816)
Smith had inquired if a recent rumor was true-that Jefferson had professed belief in Christianity.
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I have received, dear Madam, your very friendly letter of July 21 and Assure
you that I feel with deep sensibility its kind expressions towards my self, and the
more as from a person than whom no others could be more in sympathy with
my own affections. I often call to mind the occasions of knowing your worth,
which the societies of Washington furnished; and none more than those derived from your much valued visit to Monticello. I recognise the same motives
of goodness in the solicitude you express on the rumor supposed to proceed
from a letter of mine to Charles Thomson on the subject of the Christian
religion. It is true that, in writing to the translator of the Bible and Testament,
that subject was mentioned: but equally so that no adherence to any particular
mode of Christianity was there expressed; nor any change of opinions suggested. A change from what? The priests indeed have heretofore thought
proper to ascribe to me religious, or rather antireligious sentiments, of their
own fabric, but such as soothed their resentments against the Act of Virginia
for establishing religious freedom. They wished him to be thought Atheist,
Deist, or Devil, who could advocate freedom from their religious dictations.
But I have ever thought religion a concern purely between our god and our
consciences, for which we were accountable to him, and not to the priests. I
never told my own religion, nor scrutinised that of another. I never attempted
to make a convert, nor wished to change another's creed. I have ever judged
of the religion of others by their lives: and by this test, my dear Madam, I have
been satisfied yours must be an excellent one, to have produced a life of such
exemplary virtue and correctness. For it is in our lives, and not from our words,
that our religion must be read. By the same test the world must judge me. But
this does not satisfy the priesthood. They must have a positive, a declared assent
to all their interested absurdities. My opinion is that there would never have
been an infidel, if there had never been a priest. The artificial structures they
have built on the purest of all moral systems, for the purpose of deriving from
it pence and power, revolts those who think for themselves, and who read in
that system only what is really there. These therefore they brand with such
nicknames as their enmity chooses gratuitously to impute. I have left the world,
in silence, to judge of causes from their effects: and I am consoled in this
course, my dear friend, when I perceive the candor with which I am judged by
your justice and discernment; and that, notwithstanding the slanders of the
Saints, my fellow-citizens have thought me worthy of trusts. The imputations
ofirreligion having spent their force, they think an imputation of change might
now be turned to account as a bolster for their duperies. I shall leave them, as
heretofore to grope on in the dark .. ..

To Ezra Stiles Ely (25 June 1819)
Jefferson comments on ElyYs Conversation on the Science of the Human Mind
(Philadelphia, 1819).
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Your favor Sir, of the 14th has been duly received, and with it the book you
were so kind as to forward to me. For this mark of attention be pleased to
accept my thanks. The science of the human mind is curious, but it is one on
which I have not indulged myself in much speculation. The times in which I
have lived, and the scenes in which I have been engaged, have required me to
keep the mind too much in action to have leisure to study minutely its laws of
action. I am therefore little qualified to give an opinion on the comparative
worth ofbooks on that subject, and little disposed to do it on any book. Yours
has brought the science within a small compass and that is a merit of the 1st
order; and especially with one to whom the drudgery of letter writing often
denies the leisure of reading a single page in a week. On looking over the
summary of the contents of your book, it does not seem likely to bring into
collision any of those sectarian differences which you suppose may exist between us. In that branch of religion which regards the moralities of life, and the
duties of a social being, which teaches us to love our neighbors as ourselves, and
to do good to all men, I am sure that you and I do not differ. We probably
differ on that which relates to the dogmas of theology, the foundation of all
sectarianism, and on which no two sects dream alike; for if they did they would
then be of the same. You say you are a Calvinist. I am not. I am of a sect by
myself, as far as I know. I am not a Jew: and therefore do not adopt their
theology, which supposes the god of infinite justice to punish the sins of the
fathers upon their children, unto the 3d and 4th generation: and the benevolent and sublime reformer of that religion has told us only that god is good and
perfect, but has not defined him. I am therefore of his theology, believing that
we have neither words nor ideas adequate to that definition. And if could all,
after his example, leave the subject as undefinable, we should all be of one sect,
doers of good and eschewers of evil. No doctrines of his lead to schism. It is the
speculations of crazy theologists which have made a Babel of a religion the
most moral and sublime ever preached to man, and calculated to heal, and not
to create differences. These religious animosities I impute to those who call
themselves his ministers, and who engraft their casuistries on the stock of his
simple precepts. I am sometimes more angry with them than is authorised by
the blessed charities which he preached. . . .

To William Short (4 August 1820)
Dear Sir
I owe a letter for your favor ofJune 29 which was received in due time, and
there being no subject of the day of particular interest I will make this a supplement to mine of Apr. 13. My aim in that was to justify the character of Jesus
against the fictions of his pseudo-followers which have exposed him to the
inference of being an imposter. For if we could believe that he really countenanced the follies, the falsehoods and the Charlatanisms which his biographers
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father on him, and admit the misconstructions, interpolations and theorisations of the fathers of the early, and fanatics of the latter ages, the conclusion
would be irresistible by every sound mind, that he was an imposter. I give no
credit to their falsifications of his actions and doctrines; and, to rescue his
character, the postulate in my letter asked only what is granted in reading every
other historian. When Livy or Siculus, for example, tell us things which coincide with our experience of the order of nature, we credit them on their word,
and place their narrations among the records of credible history. But when they
tell us of calves speaking, of statues sweating blood, and other things against
the course of nature, we reject these as fables, not belonging to history. In like
manner, when an historian, speaking of a character well known and established
on satisfactory testimony imputes to it things incompatible with that character,
we reject them without hesitation, and assent to that only for which we have
better evidence. Had Plutarch informed us that Caeser and Cicero passed their
whole lives in religious exercises, and abstinence from the affairs of the world,
we should reject what was so inconsistent with their established characters, still
crediting what he relates in conformity with our ideas of them. So again, the
superlative wisdom of Socrates is testified by all antiquity, and placed on
ground not to be questioned. When therefore Plato puts into his mouth such
fancies, such paralogisms and sophisms as a schoolboy would be ashamed of,
we conclude they were the whimsies of Plato's own foggy brain, and acquit
Socrates of puerilities so unlike his character. (Speaking of Plato I will add that
no writer antient or modern has bewildered the world with more ignes fatui
than this renowned philosopher, in Ethics, in Politics and Physics. In the latter,
to specify a single example, compare his views of the animal economy, in his
Timaeus, with those of Mrs. Bryan in her Conversations on chemistry, and
weigh the science of the canonised philosopher against the good sense of the
unassuming lady. But Plato's visions have furnished a basis for endless systems
of mystical theology, and he is therefore all but adopted as a Christian saint.It is surely time for men to think for themselves, and to throw off the authority
of names so artificially magnified. But to return from this parenthesis, I say
that) this free exercise of reason is all I ask for the vindication of the character
of Jesus. We find in the writings of his biographers matter of two distinct
descriptions. First a ground work of vulgar ignorance, of things impossible, of
superstitions, fanaticisms, and fabrications. Intermixed with these again are
sublime ideas of the supreme being, aphorisms and precepts of the purest
morality and benevolence, sanctioned by a life of humility, innocence, and
simplicity of manners, neglect of riches, absence of worldly ambition and honors, with an eloquence and persuasiveness which have not been surpassed.
These could not be inventions of the grovelling authors who relate them. They
are far beyond the powers of their feeble minds. They shew that there was a
character, the subject of their history, whose splendid conceptions were above
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all suspicion of being interpolations from their hands. Can we be at a loss in
separating such materials, and ascribing each to its genuine author? The difference is obvious to the eye and to the understanding, and we may read, as we
run, to each his part; and I will venture to affirm that he who, as I have done,
will undertake to winnow this grain from its chaff, will find it not to require a
moment's consideration. The parts fell asunder of themselves as would those
of an image of metal and clay.
There are, I acknowledge, passages not free from objection, which we may
with probability ascribe to Jesus himself; but claiming indulgence from the
circumstances under which he acted. His object was the reformation of some
articles in the religion of the Jews, as taught by Moses. That Seer had presented, for the object of their worship, a being of terrific character, cruel,
vindictive, capricious and unjust. Jesus, taking for his type the best qualities of
the human head and heart, wisdom, justice, goodness, and adding to them
power, ascribed all of these but in infinite perfection, to the supreme being, and
formed him really worthy of their adoration. Moses had either not believed in
a future state of existence, or had not thought it essential to be explicitly taught
to his people. Jesus inculcated that doctrine with emphasis and precision.
Moses had bound the Jews to many idle ceremonies, mummeries and observances of no effect towards producing the social utilities which constitute the
essence of virtue. Jesus exposed their futility and insignificance. The one instilled into his people the most anti-social spirit towards other nations; the
other preached philanthropy and universal charity and benevolence.-The
office of reformer of the superstitions of a nation is ever dangerous. Jesus had
to walk on the perilous confines of reason and religion: and a step to right or
left might place him within the grip of the priests of the superstition, a bloodthirsty race, as cruel and remorseless as the being whom they represented as the
family god of Abraham, oflsaac and of Jacob, and the local god oflsrael. They
were constantly laying snares too to entangle him in the web of the law. He was
justifiable therefore in avoiding these by evasions, by sophisms, by misconstructions and misapplications of scraps of the prophets, and in defending himself
with these their own weapons as sufficient, ad hominems, at least. That Jesus
did not mean to impose himself on mankind as the son of god physically
speaking I have been convinced by the writings of men more learned than
myself in that lore. But that he might conscientiously believe himself inspired
from above, is very possible. The whole religion of the Jews, inculcated on him
from his infancy, was founded in the belief of divine inspiration. The fumes of
the most disordered imaginations were recorded in their religious code, as
special communications of the deity; and as it could not but happen that, in the
course of ages, events would now and then turn up to which some of these
vague rhapsodies might be accommodated by the aid of allegories, figures,
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types, and other tricks upon words, they have not only preserved their credit
with the Jews of all subsequent times, but are the foundation of much of the
religions of those who have schismatised from them. Elevated by the enthusiasm of a warm and pure heart, conscious of the high strains of an eloquence
which had not been taught him, he might readily mistake the coruscations of
his own fine genius for inspirations of an higher order. This belief carried therefore no more personal imputation, than the belief of Socrates that himself was
under the care and admonitions of a guardian daemon. And how many of our
wisest men still believe in the reality of these inspirations, while perfectly sane
on all other subjects. Excusing therefore, on these considerations, those passages in the gospels which seem to bear marks of weakness in Jesus, ascribing
to him what alone is consistent with the great and pure character of which the
same writings furnish proofs, and to their proper authors their own trivialities
and imbecilities, I think myself authorised to conclude the purity and distinction of his character in opposition to the impostures which those authors
would fix upon him: and that the postulate of my former letter is no more than
is granted in all other historical works ....

To Jared Sparks (4 November 1820)
Jefferson acknowledges Spar/ifs Letters on the Ministry, Ritual, and Doctrines of
the Protestant Episcopal Church (Baltimore, 1820).

Sir
Your favor of Sep. 18 is just received, with the book accompanying it. Its
delay was owing to that of the box of books from Mr. Guegan, in which it was
packed. Being just setting out on a journey I have time only to look over the
summary of contents. In this I see nothing in which I am likely to differ materially from you. I hold the precepts ofJesus, as delivered by himself, to be the
most pure, benevolent, and sublime which have ever been preached to man. I
adhere to the principles of the first age; and consider all subsequent innovations
as corruptions of his religion, having no foundation in what came from him.
The metaphysical insanities of Athanasius, of Loyola, and of Calvin, are to my
understanding, mere relapses into polytheism, differing from paganism only by
being more unintelligible. The religion of Jesus is founded on the Unity of
God, and this principle chiefly, gave it triumph over the rabble of heathen gods
then acknowledged. Thinking men of all nations rallied readily to the doctrine
of one only god, and embraced it with the pure morals which Jesus inculcated.
If the freedom of religion, guaranteed to us by law in theory, can ever rise in
practice under the overbearing inquisition of public opinion, truth will prevail
over fanaticism, and the genuine doctrines of Jesus, so long perverted by his
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pseudo-priests, will again be restored to their original purity. This reformation
will advance with the other improvements of the human mind but too late for
me to witness it. . . .

To Benjamin Waterhouse (26 June 1822)
Dear Sir
... The doctrines ofJesus are simple, and tend all to the happiness of man.
1. that there is one God, and he all-perfect:
2. that there is a future state of rewards and punishment:
3. that to love God with all thy heart, and they neighbor as thyself, is the
sum of religion.
These are the great points on which he endeavored to reform the religion
of the Jews. But compare with these the demoralising dogmas of Calvin.
1. that there are three Gods:
2. that good works, or the love of our neighbor are nothing:
3. that Faith is every thing: and the more incomprehensible the proposition, the more merit in its faith:
4. that Reason in religion is of unlawful use:
5. that God, from the beginning, elected certain individuals to be saved,
and certain others to be damned; and that no crimes of the former can damn
them, no virtues of the latter save.
Now which of these is the true and charitable Christian? he who believes
and acts on the simple doctrines of Jesus? or the impious dogmatists of
Athanasius and Calvin? Verily, I say that these are the false shepherds, foretold
as to enter, not by the door into the sheep-fold, but to climb up some other
way. They are mere Usurpers of the Christian name, teaching a Counter-religion, made up of the deliria of crazy imaginations, as foreign from Christianity
as is that of Mahomet. Their blasphemies have driven thinking men into infidelity, who have too hastily rejected the supposed Author himself, with the
horrors so fal~ely imputed to him. Had the doctrines of Jesus been preached
always as purely as they came from his lips, the whole civilised world would now
have been Christian. I rejoice that in this blessed country of free enquiry and
belief, which has surrendered its creed and conscience to neither kings nor
priests, the genuine doctrine of one only God is reviving, and I trust that there
is not a young man now living in the US. who will not die an Unitarian.
But much I fear that when this great truth shall be re-established, its Votaries will fall into the fatal error of fabricating formulas of creed, and Confessions of faith, the engines which so soon destroyed the religion of Jesus, and
made of Christendom a mere Aceldama: that they will give up morals for
mysteries, and Jesus for Plato. How much wiser are the Quakers, who, agreeing
in the fundamental doctrine of the gospel, schismatize about no mysteries, and
keeping within the pale of Common sense, suffer no speculative differences of
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opinion, any more than offeature, to impair the love of their brethren. Be this
the wisdom of Unitarians; this the holy mantle which shall cover within its
charitable circumference all who believe in one God, and who love their neighbor.-! conclude my sermon with sincere assurances of my friendly esteem and
respect.

To John Adams (11 April 1823)
Dear Sir
The wishes expressed, in your last favor, that I may continue in life and
health until I become a Calvinist, at least in his exclamation of "mon Dieu!
jusque aquand!" [Lord, how long!] would make me immortal. I can never join
Calvin in addressing his god. He was indeed an Atheist, which I can never be;
or rather his religion was Daemonism. If ever man worshipped a false god, he
did. The being described in his 5 points is not the God whom you and I
acknowledge and adore, the Creator and benevolent governor of the world;
but a daemon of malignant spirit. It would be more pardonable to believe in
no god at all, than to blaspheme him by the atrocious attributes of Calvin.
Indeed I think that every Christian sect gives a great handle to Atheism by their
general dogma that, without a revelation, there would not be sufficient proof
of the being of a god. Now one sixth of mankind only are supposed to be
Christians: the other five sixths then, who do not believe in the Jewish and
Christian revelation, are without a knowledge of the existence of a god! This
gives completely a gain de cause to the disciples of Ocellus, Timaeus, Spinoza,
Diderot and D'Holbach. The argument which they rest on as triumphant and
unanswerable is that, in every hypothesis of Cosmogony you must admit an
eternal pre-existence of something; and according to the rule of sound philosophy, you are never to employ two principles to solve a difficulty when one will
suffice. They say then that it is more simple to believe at once in the eternal preexistence of the world, as it is now going on, and may for ever go on by the
principle of reproduction which we see and witness, than to believe in the
eternal pre-existence of an ulterior cause, or Creator of the world, a being
whom we see not, and know not, of whose form substance and mode or place
of existence, or of action no sense informs us, no power of the mind enables
us to delineate or comprehend. On the contrary I hold (without appeal to
revelation) that when we take a view of the Universe, in its parts general or
particular, it is impossible for the human mind not to perceive and feel a conviction of design, consummate skill, and indefinite power in every atom of its
composition. The movements of the heavenly bodies, so exactly held in their
course by the balance of centrifugal and centripetal forces, the structure of our
earth itself, with its distribution of lands, waters and atmosphere, animal and
vegetable bodies, examined in all their minutest particles, insects mere atoms
of life, yet as perfectly organised as man or mammoth, the mineral substances,
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their generation and uses, it is impossible, I say, for the human mind not to
believe that there is, in all this, design, cause and effect, up to an ultimate cause,
a fabricator of all things from matter and motion, their preserver and regulator
while permitted to exist in their present forms, and their regenerator into new
and other forms. We see, too, evident proofs of the necessity of a superintending power to maintain the Universe in its course and order. Stars, well known,
have disappeared, new ones have come into view, comets, in their incalculable
courses, may run foul of suns and planets and require renovation under other
laws; certain races of animals are become extinct; and, were there no restoring
power, all existences might extinguish successively, one by one, until all should
be reduced to a shapeless chaos. So irresistible are these evidences of an intelligent and powerful Agent that, of the infinite numbers of men who have
existed thro' all time, they have believed, in the proportion of a million at least
to Unit, in the hypothesis of an eternal pre-existence of a creator, rather than
in that of a self-existent Universe. Surely this unanimous sentiment renders this
more probable than that of the few in the other hypothesis. Some early Christians indeed have believed in the coeternal pre-existence of both the Creator
and the world, without changing their relation of cause and effect. That this
was the opinion of St. Thomas, we are informed by Cardinal Toleto, in these
words "Deus ab aeterno fuit jam omnipotens, sicut cum produxit mundum.
Ab aeterno potuit producere mundum.--Si sol ab aeterno esset, lumen ab
aeterno esset; et si pes, similiter vestigium. At lumen et vestigium effectus sunt
efficientis solis et pedis; potuit ergo cum causa aeterno effectus coaeterna esse.
Cujus sententiae est S. Thomas Theologorum primus" [God has been omnipotent forever, just as when he made the world. He has had the power to
make the world forever. If the sun were in existence forever, light would have
been in existence forever; and if a foot, then likewise a footprint. But light and
footprint are the effects of an efficient sun and foot; therefore the effect has had
the power to be co-eternal with the eternal cause. Of this opinion is St. Thomas, the first of the theologians].
Of the nature of this being we know nothing. Jesus tells us that "God is a
spirit." 4 John 24, but without defining what a spirit is 'nvrnµa. 6 01::0~' [God
is spirit]. Down to the 3d century we know that it was still deemed material;
but of a lighter subtler matter than our gross bodies. So says Origen. "Deus
igitur, cui anima similis est, juxta Originem, reapte corporalis est; sed graviorum
tantum ratione corporum incorporeus" [God, therefore, to whom the soul is
similar, in consequences ofits origin, is in reality corporeal; but He is incorporeal in comparison with so much heavier bodies]. These are the words ofHuet
in his commentary on Origen. Origen himself says "appellatio acrroµa.Tov
apud nostros scriptores est inusitata et incognita" [The word 'unembodied,'
among our writers, is not used or known]. So also Tertullian "quis autem
negabit Deum esse Corpus, etsi deu~ spiritus? Spiritum etiam corporis sui

Reason and Free Inquiry Are the Only Agents against Errors

generis, in sua effigie." ["Yet who will deny that God is body, although God
is spirit? Indeed He is spirit of His own type of body, in His own image."]
Tertullian. These two fathers were of the 3d century. Calvin's character of this
supreme being seems chiefly copied from that of the Jews. But the reformation
of these blasphemous attributes, and substitution of those more worthy, pure
and sublime, seems to have been the chief object of Jesus in his discourses to
the Jews: and his doctrine of the Cosmogony of the world is very clearly laid
down in the 3 first verses of the 1st chapter of John, in these words,
EV apxTJ riv o 'A&yo(, Kal o Myo(, riv 1rpo(, Tov 8E6v, ml riv o
'A&yo(,. Otrro(, T\V EV <lPXTJ TTpo(, TOV &ov. ITaVTa fa' UVTOU
EYEVETO. Kal Kwpl(, aUTou EYEVETO oi& EV, o yEyovEv.

Which truly translated means "in the beginning God existed, and reason (or
mind) was with God, and that mind was God. This was in the beginning with
God. All things were created by it, and without it was made not one thing
which was made." Yet this text, so plainly declaring the doctrine of Jesus that
the world was created by the supreme, intelligent being, has been perverted by
modern Christians to build up a second person of their tritheism by a
mistranslation of the word Aoyo~. One of its legitimate meanings indeed is "a
word." But, in that sense, it makes an unmeaning jargon: while the other
meaning "reason," equally legitimate, explains rationally the eternal pre-existence of God, and his creation of the world. Knowing how incomprehensible
it was that "a word," the mere action or articulation of the voice and organs
of speech could create a world, they undertake to make of this articulation a
second pre-existing being, and ascribe to him, and not to God, the creation of
the universe. The Atheist here plumes himself on the uselessness of such a God,
and the simpler hypothesis of a self-existent universe. The truth is that the
greatest enemies to the doctrines of Jesus are those calling themselves the
expositors of them, who have perverted them for the structure of a system of
fancy absolutely incomprehensible, and without any foundation in his genuine
words. And the day will come when the mystical generation of Jesus, by the
supreme being as his father in the womb of a virgin will be classed with the fable
of the generation of Minerva in the brain of Jupiter. But we may hope that the
dawn of reason and freedom of thought in these United States will do away all
this artificial scaffolding, and restore to us the primitive and genuine doctrines
of this the most venerated reformer of human errors.
So much for your quotation of Calvin's "man <lieu! jusque a quand" in
which, when addressed to the God of Jesus, and our God, I join you cordially,
and await his time and will with more readiness than reluctance. May we meet
there again, in Congress, with our antient Colleagues, and receive with them
the seal of approbation "Well done, good and faithful servants."
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To Alexander Smyth (17 January 1825)
Smyth had sentJefferson his Explanation of the Apocalypse, or Revelation of St.
John (Washington, D.C., 1825).

Dear Sir
I have duly received 4 proof sheets of your explanation of the Apocalypse,
with your letters of Dec. 29 and Jan. 8 in the last of which you request that,
so soon as I shall be of opinion that the explanation you have given is correct,
I would express it in a letter to you. From this you must be so good as to excuse
me, because I make it an invariable rule to decline ever giving opinions on new
publications in any case whatever. No man on earth has less taste or talent for
criticism than myself, and least and last of all should I undertake to criticise
works on the Apocalypse. It is between 50 and 60 years since I read it, and I
then considered it as merely the ravings of a Maniac, no more worthy, nor
capable of explanation than the incoherences of our own nightly dreams. I was
therefore well pleased to see, in your first proof-sheet, that it was said to be not
the production of St. John, but ofCerinthus, a century after the death of that
Apostle. Yet the change of the Author's name does not lessen the extravagances of the composition, and come they from whomsoever they may, I cannot so far respect them as to consider them as an allegorical narrative of events,
past or subsequent. There is not coherence enough in them to countenance
any suite of rational ideas. You will judge therefore from this how impossible
I think it that either your explanation, or that of any man in the heavens above,
or on the earth beneath, can be a correct one. What has no meaning admits no
explanation. And pardon me if I say, with the candor of friendship, that I think
your time too valuable, and your understanding of too high an order, to be
wasted on these paralogisms. You will perceive, I hope, also that I do not
consider them as revelations of the supreme being, whom I would not so far
blaspheme as to impute to him a pretension of revelation, couched at the same
time in terms which, he would know, were never to be understood by those to
whom they were addressed. In the candor of these observations, I hope you
will see proofs of the confidence, esteem and respect which I truly entertain for
you.

Ethan Allen
Nature Is God/s Revelation

Ethan Allen (1737-89) is primarily remembered today as the romantically
flamboyant leader of the "Green Mountain Boys." But during his lifetime he
was also notorious for his authorship of what is America's first systematic treatise on deism: Reason the Only Oracle of Man (or, in some editions, Oracles of
Reason). This work, first published in 1784, quickly earned Allen the dubious
reputation, as Yale's Ezra Stiles put it, of a "profane & impious Deist." Allen
himself pretended not to be so sure. As he says in the preface to his book, "I
am generally denominated a Deist, the reality of which I never disputed, being
conscious I am no Christian, except mere infant baptism makes me one; and
as to being a Deist, I know not strictly speaking, whether I am one or not, for
I have never read their writings." There is little reason, however, to take this
disclaimer at face value. Allen's rejection of Christianity is clearly based on
deistic principles. Moreover, many of his central arguments in support of rational religion are reminiscent of those employed by such British deists as Toland
and Charles Blount (1654--93), who in the final year of his life published an
anti-Christian tract entitled Oracles of Reason.
The future "profane & impious Deist" was born 10 January 1737 in
Litchfield, Connecticut, but spent his formative years on the southwestern
frontier, to which his family had moved shortly after his birth. Although echoes
of the Great Awakening's religious fundamentalism must have reached those
settlements during his childhood, Allen appears not to have been overly influenced by them. By the time his father died in 1755, he seems to have already
lost whatever fidelity to orthodoxy he might at one time have possessed.
His father's death left Allen the sole support of his mother and seven siblings, thus ending his chances for a college education. But after working a
couple of years on the family farm, he enlisted in the army and served in the
French and Indian War. He afterward relocated to Vermont, where by 1769
he had become "colonel commandant" of the Green Mountain Boys, a local
militia called up in response to a boundary dispute between New York, New
Hampshire, and Vermont. His leadership of the militia was so successful that
by 1771 the governor ofNew York had offered a twenty-pound reward for his
capture; in 1774 it was increased to a full hundred. Past sins appear to have
been forgiven if not entirely forgotten with the outbreak of war between the
colonies and England, and Allen was quickly catapulted to the status of a hero
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after his capture of Fort Ticonderoga in 1775. Six months later he was a prisoner of war in Canada, captured during a rather foolhardy assault on Montreal,
and sat out much of the remaining hostilities in a cell. After the war, he devoted
himself to local Vermont politics and farming until his death from apoplexy,
reportedly after a night of heavy drinking, in 1789.
Allen was the author of several pamphlets and numerous articles, but the
only one of his works to stand the test of time is his Reason the Only Oracle of
Man. Ironically, however, it is also the most poorly written one. It is too long,
redundant, and sometimes impenetrably convoluted. Allen himself seems to
have been aware of its cumbersome style, as indicated in the following confession with which he prefaced the treatise:

In my youth I was much disposed to contemplation, and at my commencement in manhood, I committed to manuscript such sentiments
or arguments as appeared most consonant to reason, lest through the
debility of memory my improvement should have been less gradual:
This method of scribbling I practised for many years, from which I
experienced great advantages in the progression of learning and knowledge, the more so as I was deficient in education, and had to acquire the
knowledge of grammar and language, as well as the art of reasoning,
principally from a studious application to it, which after all I am sensible,
lays me under disadvantages, particularly in matters of composition.
Although Allen was straightforward about his lack of expertise in composition (a confession of no great sacrifice, since its truth was apparent in the
book), he may have been less candid about a much more significant issue: the
true authorship of Reason the Only Oracle. There is some debate about
whether he or a friend, Thomas Young, actually wrote it. Young was a freethinking physician whom Allen had known in his youth, and it seems evident
that Young, a relatively well-educated man, introduced Allen to the British
deistic tradition. Reason the Only Oracle was published after Young's death,
and his widow maintained that Allen had plagiarized from her husband's
manuscripts. Allen's defenders responded that at worst the manuscript had
been coauthored by the two men with the understanding that the one who
outlived the other would publish it. Allen himself chose to remain silent and
carried the truth about the treatise's authorship to his grave.
Regardless of who wrote the book, however, it became the young
Republic's first sustained defense of deism. Moreover, it exerted an immense
influence on American free thought---despite the fact that the Bennington,
Vermont, printer who typeset the manuscript refused to release it for two years
and that when he did a possibly arsonous fire in his warehouse destroyed all but
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thirty copies. But the few issues that survived circulated widely and were soon
pirated at an alarming rate. In fact, the book was reprinted (in conservative
Boston, no less) as late as 1854. It seems certain, then, that for every Ezra Stiles
who dismissed the book as a pack of "scurrillous Reflexions," for every Timothy Dwight who insisted that its author "In Satan's cause ... bustled, bruised
and swore," there were hundreds of people in the Early Republic who read,
pondered, and applauded Allen's homespun defense of rational religion.
The selections here from Allen's Reason the Only Oracle revolve, in typical
deistic fashion, around the ideas of God, reason, and morality.
In writing about the deity, Allen argues that its existence is demonstrated
a posteriori. Experience teaches that all events are causally dependent on preceding ones, so it follows that the "vast system of causes and effects are [likewise] necessarily connected." This points to a First Cause of the entire set of
perceptible events. The First Cause maintains providential regularity in reality-indeed, Allen goes so far as to identify the natural harmony with God. Of
course, the perceived dependency of individual events does not entail an analogous causal dependency of reality in general, but this is a logical point that
escaped Allen as well as many other American deists. For him and them, the
causal argument remained a sufficient demonstration of divine existence. In
Allen's words, "The display of God's providence is that by which the evidence
of his being is evinced to us."
But the rational investigation of nature does not merely establish God's
existence. It also provides insight into divine and human nature. Experience
shows that physical reality exhibits constancy, uniformity, regularity; it is, in
short, rational. If God is the First Cause of reality, God must possess the attributes characteristic ofit, since the effect of a cause always reveals the cause's
essence. Consequently, God is likewise rational, constant, and perfectly wise
and benevolent. Similarly, since humans themselves are effects of divine causation, they must also reflect, albeit imperfectly, its nature. The human species,
then, possesses reason, eternal although finite, which enables it to read and
understand the laws of nature that constitute God's revelation of himself.
Like so many of the later American deists, Allen goes to great pains to
defend human reason against orthodox Christianity's charge of depravity and
insufficiency as an epistemological criterion. For Allen, since natural law is "coextensive and co-existent with reason, and binding on all intelligent beings in
the universe," there is a direct symmetry between the mental faculty of reason
and the rational nature of the universe. Hence, when humans think and act
rationally, they comprehend reality and at the same time reflect divine wisdom
and goodness. It follows for Allen, then, that the moral and physical sciences
are promoted by the exercise of reason and corrupted by a denial of it. True,
the book of nature can be misread if humans allow their prejudices and
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unexamined opinions to sully their judgments. But nature, not supernaturalistic doctrine, nonetheless remains the sole reliable guide for the promotion of
science, morality, and happiness.
In keeping with his Enlightenment-based panrationalism, Allen denounces
scriptural revelation as "beyond human understanding" and thus as an illegitimate form of knowledge; the doctrine of the Trinity as a logical absurdity, since
its postulation of three separate but undivided substances in the deity violates
the law of identity; and miraculous interventions, because they "imply mutability in the wisdom of God" and offer no cogent explanation for the phenomena they claim to describe. Moreover, in a reformulation that set the stage for
later deistic apologies, he denies that faith is mystical or that the person of faith
is ethically superior to others. In a very empiricist move indeed, Allen redefines
faith as "the last result of the understanding, or the same which we call the
conclusion, it is the consequence of a greater or less deduction of reasoning
from certain premises previously laid down." As such, faith in the correct sense
of the word denotes the last claim in a chain of inferential reasoning. It is only
the proponents of revealed religion who accept a corrupted version of faith as
a mysterious and logically gratuitous illumination. Since, however, the word
properly refers to logical deduction, and since humans are incapable of assenting to propositions "contrary to their [rational] judgments," there is no special
merit in acquiescing to faith-based propositions. Such assent is only to be expected of rational individuals.
Just as reason is the sole arbiter in the investigation of natural philosophy
and theological speculation, so it is also the necessary condition for ethical
behavior and human happiness. Morality, says Allen, "does not derive its nature
from [holy] books, but from the fitness of things." It is "acquired from reason
and experience." The latter tells us which actions are conducive and which
detrimental to our well-being; the former enables us to prescribe ethical codes
and principles reflecting that knowledge. An ethical system grounded in religion, on the other hand, "subjects mankind to sacerdotal empire; which is
erected on . .. imbecility." Allen concedes that traditional religious creeds have
sometimes defended admirable ethical principles, but such instances represent
a rational reaction to the light of nature rather than a mysteriously revealed
inspiration. Since genuine religious sensibility is in essence the knowledge of
virtue and the desire to pursue it and avoid wickedness, religion should be
based on rational contemplation of physical and human nature, not on "arbitrary ceremonies, or mere positive institutions, abstractly considered from the
moral rectitude of things." Although Allen failed to elaborate on the precise
principles that support ethical behavior-a task left to the more able Elihu
Palmer-his naturalistic orientation was to resound in later deistic theories of
morality.
A good portion ofAllen's treatise is concerned with arguments denying the
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divinity of Jesus. He attacks this central Christian doctrine from two fronts.
First, and less convincingly, he insists that Jesus' own words as recorded in
Scripture reveal that he never claimed to be divine. Second, and more substantially, Allen argues that insofar as God by definition is essentially one and possesses unlimited attributes such as infinitude, eternality, and omnipotence, it is
logically impossible that "God should become a man ... and that man should
become a God." There is an "infinite disproportion" between two such entities
that precludes the possibility- much less likelihood-of that contradictory
union. Such a being would have to simultaneously exhibit limited and unlimited attributes-a situation repugnant to reason.
Allen is not content simply to gainsay the divinity of Jesus. He also assails
the God of Scripture as being an arbitrary and immoral deity who violates every
norm of distributive justice known to humans. The Christian God, for example, unwarrantedly sentences humans to eternal punishment for what must
necessarily be finite crimes. In addition, he countenances and performs actions
in both the Old and New Testaments that transgress the moral "fitness of
things." Such an incongruity is not possible for the Grand Architect, because
"the same reasons cannot fail to hold good in the divine mind as in that of the
human, for the rules of justice are essentially the same whether applied to the
one or to the other, having their uniformity in the eternal truth and reason of
things."
In the final analysis, cumbersome and long-winded as it is, Allen's Reason
the Only Oracle of Man is an able synthesis of the central tenets of Enlightenment deism. He was probably the least acute of all the American deists, yet the
issues he raised and the arguments he presented served as prototypes for later
and more sophisticated defenses of rational religion.

Reason the Only Oracle of Man,
or a Compenduous System of Natural Religion
LL The Duty of Reforming Mankind from Superstition
and Error and the Good Consequences of It. *
The desire of knowledge has engaged the attention of the wise and curious
among mankind in all ages, which has been productive of extending the arts
and sciences far and wide in the several quarters of the globe, and excited the
contemplative to explore nature's laws in a gradual series of improvement, 'till
philosophy, astronomy, geography and history, with many other branches of
science, have arrived to a great degree of perfection.
It is nevertheless to be regretted, that the bulk of mankind, even in those
*Ed.: The numbers indicate locations in Allen's original text- here, for example,
chapter I, section 1.

145

Ethan Allen

146

nations which are most celebrated for learning and wisdom, are still carried
down the torrent of superstition, and entertain very unworthy apprehensions
of the BEING, PERFECTIONS, CREATION and PROVIDENCE of GOD, and their duty
to him, which lays an indispensable obligation on the philosophic friends of
human nature, unanimously to exert themselves in every lawful, wise and prudent method, to endeavour to reclaim mankind from their ignorance and
delusion, by enlightening their minds in those great and sublime truths concerning God and his providence, and their obligations to moral rectitude,
which in this world, and that which is to come, cannot fail greatly to affect their
happiness and well being.
Though "None by searching can find out God, or the Almighty to perfection"; YET I am persuaded, that if mankind would dare to exercise their reason
as freely on those divine topics, as they do in the common concerns of life, they
would, in a great measure rid themselves of their blindness and superstition,
gain more exalted ideas of God and their obligations to him and one another,
and be proportionably delighted and blessed with the views of his moral government, make better members of society, and acquire many powerful incentives to the practice of morality, which is the last and greatest perfection that
human nature is capable of.
I.2. Of the Being of a God
The Laws of Nature having subjected mankind to a state of absolute dependence on something out of, and manifestly beyond themselves, or the compound exertion of their natural powers, gave them the first conception of a
superior principle existing; otherwise they could have had no possible conception of a superintending power. But this sense of dependency, which results
from experience and reasoning on the facts, which every day cannot fail to
produce, has uniformly established the knowledge of our dependence to every
of the species who are rational, which necessarily involves or contains in it the
idea of a ruling power, or that there is a GOD, which ideas are synonymous.
This is the first glimpse of a Deity, and powerfully attracts the rational mind
to make farther discoveries, which, through the weakness of human reasonings
opens a door for errors and mistakes respecting the divine essense, though
there is no possibility of our being deceived in our first conceptions of a superintending power. Of which more will be observed in its order.
The globe with its productions, the planets in their motions, and the starry
heavens in their magnitudes, surprise our senses, and confound our reason, in
their munificent lessons of instruction concerning GOD, by means whereof we
are apt to be more or less lost in our ideas of the object of divine adoration,
though at the same time every one is truly sensible that their being and preservation is from GOD. We are too apt to confound our ideas of GOD with his
works, and take the latter for the former. Thus barbarous and unlearned na-

Nature Is God's Revelation

tions have imagined, that inasmuch as the sun in its influence is beneficial to
them in bringing forward the spring of the year, causing the production of
vegetation, and food for their subsistence, that therefore it is their GOD: while
others have located other parts of creation, and ascribe to them the prerogatives of God; and mere creatures and images have been substituted to be Gods
by the wickedness or weakness of man, or both together. It seems that mankind in most ages and parts of the world have been fond of corporeal Deities
with whom their outward senses might be gratified, or as fantastically diverted
from the just apprehension of the true God, by a supposed supernatural intercourse with invisible and mere spiritual beings, to whom they ascribe divinity,
so that through one means or other, the character of the true God has been
much neglected, to the great detriment of truth, justice, and morality in the
world; nor is it possible, that mankind can be uniform in their religious opinions, or worship God according to knowledge, except they can form a consistent arrangement of ideas of the Divine character. This therefore shall be the
great object of the following pages, to which all others are only subordinate;
for the superstructure of our religion will be proportionate to the notions we
entertain of the divinity whom we adore. A sensibility of mere dependence
includes an idea of something, on which we depend ( call it by what name we
will) which has a real existence, in as much as a dependency on nonentity is
inadmissible, for that the absence or non-existence of all being could not have
caused an existence to be. But should we attempt to trace the succession of the
causes of our dependence, they would exceed our comprehension though
every of them, which we could understand, would be so many evidences ( of
the displays) of a God. Although a sense of dependency discloses to our minds
the certainty of a Supreme Being, yet it does not point out to us the object,
nature or perfections of that being; this belongs to the province of reason, and
in our course of ratiocination on the succession of causes and events. Although
we extend our ideas retrospectively ever so far upon the succession, yet no
cause in the extended order of succession, which depends upon another prior
to itself, can be in the independent cause of all things: nor is it possible to trace
the order of the succession of causes back to that self-existent cause, inasmuch
as it is eternal and infinite, and therefore cannot be traced out by succession,
which operates according to the order of time, consequently can bear no more
proportion to the eternity of God, than time itself may be supposed to do,
which has no proportion at all; as the succeeding arguments respecting the
eternity and infinity of God will evince. But notwithstanding the series of the
succession of causes cannot be followed in a retrospective succession up the
self-existent or eternal cause, it is nevertheless a perpetual and conclusive evidence of a God. For a succession of causes, considered collectively, can be
nothing more than effects of the independent cause, and as much dependent
on it, as those dependent causes are upon one another; so that we may with
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certainty conclude that the system of nature, which we call by the name of
natural causes, is as much dependent on a self-existent cause, as an individual
of the species in the order of generation is dependent on its progenitors for
existence. Such part of the series of nature's operations, which we understand,
has a regular and necessary connection with, and dependence on its parts,
which we denominate by the names of cause and effect. From hence we are
authorised from reason to conclude, that the vast system of causes and effects
are thus necessarily connected, (speaking of the natural world only) and the
whole regularly and necessarily dependent on a self-existent cause; so that we
are obliged to admit an independent cause, and ascribe self-existence to it,
otherwise it could not be independent, and consequently not a God. But the
eternity or manner of the existence of a self-existent and independent being is
to all finite capacities utterly incomprehensible; yet this is so far from an objection against the reality of such a being, that it is essentially necessary to support
the evidence of it; for if we could comprehend that being, whom we call God,
he would not be God, but must have been finite, and that in the same degree
as those may be supposed to be, who could comprehend him; therefore so
certain as God is, we cannot comprehend his essence, eternity or manner of
existence. This should always be premised, when we assay to reason on the
being, perfection, eternity and infinity of God, or of his creation and providence. As far as we understand nature, we are become acquainted with the
character of God; for the knowledge of nature is the revelation of God. If we
form in our imagination a compenduous idea of the harmony of the universe,
it is the same as calling God by the name of harmony, for there could be no
harmony without regulation, and no regulation without a regulator, which is
expressive of the idea of a God. Nor could it be possible, that there could be
order or disorder, except we admit of such a thing as creation, and creation
contains in it the idea of a creator, which is another appellation for the Divine
Being, distinguishing God from his creation. Furthermore there could be no
proportion, figure or motion without wisdom and power; wisdom to plan, and
power to execute, and these are perfections, when applied to the works of
nature, which signify the agency or superintendency of God. If we consider
nature to be matter, figure and motion, we include the idea of God in that of
motion; for motion implies a mover, as much as creation does a creator. Iffrom
the composition, texture, and tendency of the universe in general, we form a
complex idea of general good resulting therefrom to mankind, we implicitly
admit a God by the name of good, including the idea of his providence to man.
And from hence arises our obligation to love and adore God, because he provides for, and is beneficent to us: abstract the idea of goodness from the character of God, and it would cancel all our obligations to him, and excite us to
hate and detest him as a tyrant; hence it is, that ignorant people are superstitiously misled into a conceit that they hate God, when at the same time it is
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only the idol of their own imagination, which they truly ought to hate and be
ashamed of; but were such persons to connect the ideas of power, wisdom,
goodness and all possible perfection in the character of God, their hatred toward him would be turned into love and adoration.
For mankind to hate truth as it may bring their evil deeds to light and
punishment, is very easy and common; but to hate truth as truth, or God as
God, which is the same as to hate goodness for its own sake, unconnected with
any other consequences, is impossible even to a (premised) diabolical nature
itself If we advert to the series of the causes of our being and preservation in
the world, we shall commence a retrospective examination from son to father,
grand-father and great-grandson, and so on to the supreme and self-existent
father of all: and as to the means of our preservation or succeeding causes of
it, we may begin with parental kindness in nourishing, succouring and providing for us in our helpless age, always remembering it to have originated from
our eternal father, who implanted that powerful and sympathetic paternal affection in them.
By t>xtending our ideas in a larger circle, we shall perceive our dependence
on the earth and waters of the globe, which we inhabit, and from which we are
bountifully fed and gorgeously arrayed, and nextly extend our ideas to the sun,
whose fiery mass darts its brilliant rays of light to our terraqueous ball with
amazing velocity, and whose region of inexhaustible fire supplies it with fervent
heat, which causes vegetation and gilds the various seasons of the year with ten
thousand charms: this is not the achievement of man, but the workmanship
and providence of God. But how the sun is supplied with materials thus to
perpetuate its kind influences, we know not. But will any one deny the reality
of those beneficial influences, because we do not understand the manner of the
perpetuality of that fiery world, or how it became such a body of fire; or will
any one deny the reality of nutrition by food, because we do not understand
the secret operation of the digesting powers of animal nature, or the minute
particulars ofits cherishing influence, none will be so stupid as to do it. Equally
absurd would it be for us to deny the providence of God, by "whom we live,
move, and have our being," because we cannot comprehend it.
We know that earth, water, fire and air in their various compositions
subserve us, and we also know that these elements are devoid of reflection,
reason or design; from whence we may easily infer, that a wise, understanding,
and designing being has ordained them to be thus subservient. Could blind
chance constitute order and decorum, and consequently a providence? That
wisdom, order, and design should be the production of non-entity, or of chaos,
confusion and old night, is too absmd to deserve a serious confutation, for it
supposeth that there may be effects without a cause, viz: produced by nonentity, or that chaos and confusion could produce the effects of power, wisdom
and goodness; such absurdities as these we must assent to, or subscribe to the
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doctrine of a self-existent and providential being. Chaos itselfwould necessarily
include the idea of a creator, inasmuch as it supposes a positive existence,
though it precludes the idea of a Providence, which cannot exist without order,
tendericy and design.
But Chaos could no more exist independent of a Creator than the present
aptly disposed system of nature. For there could be no fortuitous jumble, or
chaos of original atoms, independent of or previous to creation, as nonentity
could not produce the materials. Nothing from nothing and there remains nothing, but something from nothing is contradictory and impossible. The evidence
of the being and providence of a God, is so full and compleat, that we cannot
miss of discerning it, if we but open our eyes and reflect on the visible creation.
The display of God's providence is that by which the evidence of his being is
evinced to us, for though mere Chaos would evince the certainty of a Creator,
yet that abstracted method of argument could not have been conceived of, or
known by us, was it not for the exercise of God's Providence, (by whom we
have our being;) though that argument in itself would have been true whether
it had been used by us or not: for the reason of propositions and just inferences
in themselves, are in truth the same, independent of our conceptions of them,
abstractedly considered from our existence.
The benefit accruing to us from reasoning and argument, as it respects our
knowledge and practice, is to explore the truth of things, as they are in their
own nature, this is our wisdom. All other conceptions of things are false and
imaginary. We cannot exercise a thought on any thing whatever, that has a
positive existence, but if we trace it thoroughly it will center in an independent
cause, and be evidential of a God. Thus it is from the works of nature that we
explore its great author; but all inquisitive minds are lost in their searches and
researches into the immensity of the divine fullness, from whence our beings
and all our blessings flow.

IILl. The Doctrine of the Infinite
Evil of Sin Considered
That God is infinitely good in the eternal displays of his providence has been
argued in the seventh section of the second chapter, from which we infer, that
there cannot be an infinite evil in the universe, inasmuch as it would be incompatible with infinite good; yet there are many who imbibe the doctrine of the
infinite evil of sin, and the maxim on which they predicate their arguments in
its support, are, that the greatness of sin, or adequateness of its punishment, is
not to be measured, or its viciousness ascertained by the capacity and circum stances of the offender, but by the capacity and dignity of the being against
whom the offence is committed; and as every transgression is against the au thority and law of God, it is therefore against God; and as God is infinite,
therefore sin is an infinite evil; and from hence infer the infinite and vindictive
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wrath of God against sinners, and of his justice in dooming them, as some say,
to infinite, and as others say, to eternal misery; the one without degree or
measure, and the other without end of duration.
Admitting this maxim for truth, that the transgressions or sins of mankind
are to be estimated, as to their heinousness, by the dignity and infinity of the
divine nature, then it will follow, that all sins would be equal; which would
confound all our notions of the degrees or aggravations of sin; so that the sin
would be the same to kill my neighbour as it would be to kill his horse: For the
divine nature, by this maxim, being the rule by which man's sin is to be estimated, and always the same, there could therefore be no degrees in sin or guilt,
any more than there are degrees of perfection in God, whom we all admit to
be infinite, and who for that reason only cannot admit of any degrees of enlargement. Therefore as certain as there are degrees in sin, the infinity of the
divine nature cannot be the standard whereby it is to be ascertained; which
single consideration is a sufficient confutation of the doctrine of the infinite evil
of sin, as predicated on that maxim; inasmuch as none are so stupid as not to
discern that there are degrees and aggravations in sin.
I recollect a discourse ofa learned Ecclesiastic, who was labouring in support
of this doctrine, his first proposition was: "That moral rectitude was infinitely
pleasing to God." From which he deduced this inference, viz; "That a contrariety to moral rectitude was consequently infinitely displeasing to God and infinitely evil." That the absolute moral rectitude of the divine nature is infinitely well
pleasing to God, will not be disputed; for this is none other but perfect and
infinite rectitude; but there cannot in nature be an infinite contrariety thereto,
or any being infinitely evil, or infinite in any respect whatever; except we admit
a self-existent and infinite diabolical nature, which is too absurd to deserve
argumentative confutation. Therefore, as all possible moral evil must result
from the agency of finite beings, consisting in their sinful deviations from the
rules of eternal unerring order and reason, which is moral rectitude in the
abstract; we infer, that, provided alt finite beings in the universe, had not done
any thing else but sin and rebel against God, reason and moral rectitude in
general; all possible moral evil would fall as much short of being infinite, as all
finite capacities, complexly considered, would fail of being infinite; which
would bear no proportion at all. For tho' finite minds, as has been before
argued, bear a resemblance to God, yet they bear no proportion to his infinity;
and therefore there is not and cannot be any being, beings, or agency of being
or beings, complexly considered or otherwise, which are infinite in capacity, or
which are infinitely evil and detestable in the sight of God, in that unlimited
sense; for the actions or agency of limited beings are also limited, which is the
same as finite-. so that both the virtues and vices of man are finite; they are not
virtuous or vicious but in degree; therefore moral evil is finite and bounded.
Though there is one and but one infinite good, which is God, and there can
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be no dispute, but that God judges, and approves or disapproves of all things
and beings, and agencies of beings, as in truth they are, or in other words
judges of every thing as being what it is; but to judge a finite evil to be infinite,
would be infinitely erroneous and disproportionable: for so certain as there is a
distinction between infinity and finitude, so certain finite sinful agency cannot
be infinitely evil: or in other words finite offences cannot be infinite. Nor is it
possible that the greatest of sinners should in justice deserve infinite punishment, or their nature sustain it; finite beings may as well be supposed to be
capable of infinite happiness as of infinite misery, but the rank which they hold
in the universe exempts them from either: it nevertheless admits them to a state
of agency, probation or trial, consequently to interchangeable progressions in
moral good and evil, and of course to alternate happiness or misery. We will
dismiss the doctrine of the infinite evil of sin with this observation, that as no
mere creature can suffer an infinitude of misery or of punishment, it is therefore
incompatible with the wisdom of God, so far to capacitate creatures to sin, as
in his constitution of things to foreclose himself from adequately punishing
them for it.

III.2. The Moral Government of God
Incompatible with Eternal Punishment
Having considered the doctrine of the infinite evil of sin, we proceed to the
consideration of that of eternal damnation. Though it is in the nature of things
impossible, that an infinite weight of punishment should be inflicted on the
wicked, nevertheless, admitting a never ending punishment on them to be just
and consistent with the moral government of God, it would be in itself possible. Therefore in order to determine the question concerning eternal punishment, (which cannot be eternal with respect to the preceding eternity, though
it may be possible with respect to that which succeeds the aera of the existence
of the wicked,) we must advert to the providence of God, as it respects the
moral world particularly. That God in his creation and providence ultimately
designed the good of being in general, has been clearly evinced in the preceding pages; nor can this doctrine of the divine munificence be objected to,
except it is disputed whether God be a good and gracious being or not, which
to do would be highly criminal: for a good being would have good purposes
the ultimate end of its conduct, though it be supposed to be a mere creature,
but perfectly so as applicable to the economy of God, who must be supposed
to have had the good and happiness of his creation, the ultimate end and
design of his providence.
The wisest and best of men may not succeed in their benevolent purposes
to serve mankind, for want of wisdom, opportunity or power; but this is no
ways applicable to God, who can and will effect the ultimate purposes of his
providence. Such expressions as these may be thought to militate against the
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agency of man; but it ought to be considered, that though God has implanted
a principle of liberty in our minds, it is in some respects limited; he has not put
it in our power eternally to ruin ourselves, for our agency is as eternal as our
existence; so that the agency of this life cannot constitute an eternal happiness
or misery for us in this world or worlds to come, but our agency in its particular
periods is temporary, and so are its rewards and punishments. For as our minds
cannot comprehend eternity, so neither can the consequences of our agency,
which is happiness or misery[,] extend to it; for we are limited beings and act
in certain circumstances in all and every respect, except as to existence without
end; and this it is which renders our agency eternal as it respects the succeeding
eternity: God's government of the natural and moral worlds is the same as his
providence, so that when we speak of the moral government of God, we mean
that display of his providence which respects moral beings: The former is governed by fate, but the latter by rewards and punishment.
It is from the knowledge of right and wrong, good and evil that we are
capable of moral government; and it is from the deficiency of this principle of
knowledge, in the natural world, that it is subjected to mechanical laws, so that
the natural world includes every part of the creation, which is below the dignity
of a rational nature, which cannot be subject to mechanical operations, but is
in the order of things more exalted than gross creation, consisting of elements
or matter variously compounded, tempered and modified, with its cohesion,
attraction and all other of its qualities, properties, proportions, motions and
harmony of the whole. And as the natural world is made subservient to the
moral, the government of it may therefore be truly and properly said to belong
to the providence of God, which it otherwise could not, inasmuch as rational
beings are benefited thereby; but the government of mere material, inanimate
and unintelligent beings, abstractly considered from moral beings, could not
have been an object of divine providence, nor would such a supposed government constitute a providence; inasmuch as it would be void of sensibility, happiness and goodness. This being premised, we proceed more particularly to the
consideration of the moral government of God, in the exercise whereof it is not
to be supposed, that he would counteract his eternal plan of doing good to,
and happifying being in general; and inasmuch as eternal punishment is incompatible with this great and fundamental principle of wisdom and goodness, we
may for certain conclude, that such a punishment will never have the divine
approbation, or be inflicted on any intelligent being or beings in the infinitude
of the government of God. For an endless punishment defeats the very end of
its institution, which in all wise and good governments is as well to reclaim
offenders, as to be examples to others; but a government, which does not
admit of reformation and repentance, must unavoidably involve its subjects in
misery; for the weakness of creatures will always be a source of error and inconstancy, and a wise governor, as we must admit God to be, would suit his
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government to the capacity and all other circumstances of the governed; and
instead of inflicting eternal damnation on his offending children, would rather
interchangeably extend his beneficence with his vindictive punishments, so as
to alienate them from sin and wickedness, and incline them to morality; convincing them from experimental suffering, that sin and vanity are their greatest
enemies, and that in GOD and moral rectitude their dependence and true happiness consists, and by reclaiming them from wickedness and error, to the truth,
and to the love and practice ofvirtue, give them occasion to glorify GOD for the
wisdom and goodness of his government, and to be ultimately happy under it.
But we are told that the eternal damnation of a part of mankind greatly augments the happiness of the elect, who are represented as being vastly the less
numerous, (a diabolical temper of mind in the elect:) Besides, how narrow and
contracted must such notions of infinite justice and goodness be? Who would
imagine that the Deity conducts his providence similar to the detestable despots of this world. 0 horrible most horrible impeachmentofm.vrNE GOODNESS!
rather let us exaltedly suppose that God eternally had the ultimate best good
of being, generally and individually in his view, with the reward of the virtuous
and the punishment of the vicious, and that no other punishment will ever be
inflicted, merely by the divine administration, but what will .finally terminate in
the BEST GOOD of the PUNISHED, and thereby subserve the great and important
ends of the divine government, and be productive of the restoration and felicity
of all .finite rational nature.
Mankind in general seems to be evidently impressed with a sense and
strong expectation of judgment to come, after animal life is ended; wherein the
disorders, injustice and wickedness, which have been acted by rational agents,
shall be fully and righteously adjusted, and the delinquents punished; and that
such, who obey the laws of reason, or moral rectitude, may be rewarded according to their works: this apprehension is so general with all denominations
and secretaries of men, that it is rather the intuition of nature than mere tra dition. It is nevertheless to be considered, that this notion of accow1tability,
and judgment to come, has not gone so fur as to determine, whether the
incorrigible sinner, from the dose of human life, shall be everlastingly debarred
from reformation and repentance, and precluded from the favour of God or
not; but having taught a just and righteous judgment, left it as the prerogative
of God to proportion the rewards of the virtuous and the punishments of the
wicked, with their respective durations, which we find by reasoning cannot be
eternal, and consequently must be temporary; but in what degrees, manner or
proportions of intenseness, or of duration, we cannot comprehend, but must
wait the decision of the righteous judge, whose omniscience takes cognizance
of the thoughts, designs and actions of his creatures; and whose impartial justice will hold the balance and extend interchangeable happiness or misery to
them, according to their respective merits or demerits, or the virtues or vices

Nature Is God's Revelation

of their minds, in certain temporary periods coextensive with our immortality:
and though the judgments of God may be vastly more severe and terrible to
incorrigible sinners beyond the grave, than such as can be inflicted, or conceived of in this life, yet we may by reasoning from the wisdom and goodness
of God and the nature and capacity of the human mind determine, that its
happiness or misery cannot be perpetual and eternal.
The most weighty arguments deducible from the divine nature have been
already offered, to wit, the ultimate end of God, in creation and providence, to
do the greatest possible good and benignity to being in general, and consequently, that the great end and design of punishment, in the divine government, must be to reclaim, restore, and bring revolters from moral rectitude
back to embrace it, and to be ultimately happy; as also, that an eternal punishment, would defeat the very end and design of punishment itself; and that no
good consequences to the punished could arise out of a never ending destruction; but that a total, everlasting, and irreparable evil would take place on such
part of the moral creation, as may be thus sentenced to eternal and remediless
perdition; which would argue imperfection either in the creation, or moral
government of God, or in both.
Furthermore, provided there was, in the nature of things, a liability of
eternal destruction to any one intelligent being, there must consequently have
been the same liability in all, or the justice and goodness of God would not be
equal or uniform. But if there could have been, in the nature and fitness of
things, a possibility of perpetually and eternally happifying the moral world,
without agency, probation or trial, there can be no dispute, but that the God
of nature would have adopted such a measure, and have made it needless and
impossible for us to have speculated on the causes of our misery: and inasmuch
as such a plan has not taken place, we may infer, that it was not possible, in the
reason and fitness of things, that it should; and as imperfection opened the
door to error and wickedness, or to a deviation from moral rectitude; which has
actually taken place in the system of rational beings, and punishment also as a
necessary consequence of it, it therefore follows, that if eternal punishment was
possible, to any one of the rational creation, it must hold equally so to the
whole, or the divine system of fitness would be unequal. From which we infer,
that though God in his creation and providence, designed the ultimate best
good and felicity of the moral world, he had nevertheless so far departed from
his eternal plan, or intention, that it was liable to be frustrated, and that universal misery and eternal damnation was possible to overspread the whole; all
this necessarily follows on the position, that any rational natures are liable to
eternal destruction; and therefore the doctrine of the possibility, or liability, of
eternal punishment, is inadmissible.
Furthermore, accountability, probation or trial, are in nature inseparably
connected with the existence of moral beings, and must eternally remain so to
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be, for weakness and imperfection is that which subjects all finite rational beings to trial and is the only ground of the possibility of it. All intelligent agents
therefore, except the most high God, are probationers. A state of improvement
is necessarily connected with that of trial and proficiency. What reason can be
given to make it appear, that the immortal souls of mankind, in their succeeding state of existence, may not err, and more or less deviate from the rules of
eternal unerring order and reason; they must be admitted to be capable of
moral action, for it is essential to their existence; and though the next state of
being may be ever so much dissimilar from this, in the mode or manner of it,
yet we shall be but creatures in that state, and why not liable to error, transgression and blame, and also to punishment for the same; for as finiteness or imperfection are the grounds of the liability of our present offences, that liability
will eternally continue, and that in proportion to our future imperfection.
Could God have established any creature, or race of creatures, in a confirmed
and perpetual happiness, by a sovereign act of omnipotence, consistent with his
moral perfections, and the nature of intelligent agents themselves, we should
have experienced such a confirmation in this life. But a confirmed and perpetual state of blessedness, will agree to no character short of God's: this is
therefore his prerogative, and it is the absolute perfection of his nature, which
confirms him in that state. But as to finite cogitative beings, they cannot in the
nature of things, be any more confirmed in happiness, than they can in moral
rectitude, which is the ground and source of it; nor is it possible for an imperfect nature to attain to perfection, though they may be eternally improving;
nor can they be perpetually morally good, for perpetual uniformity is perfection itself; but they are always liable to change, to error and sin, and consequently to misery, which is inseparably connected with it, as the only certain
means of repentance, reformation and restoration.
Moral good is the only source from whence a rational mind can be supplied
with a happiness agreeable to the dignity of its nature. It would be impossible
for omnipotence itself to make a vicious mind taste the ecstatic felicity of a
moral happiness, so long as it may be supposed to be vicious, inasmuch as
morality, in the nature of the thing itself, is prerequisite to such a happiness,
without the possession and actual enjoyment of which the mind cannot be
mentally happy, or enjoy itself agreeable to its discerning, conscious and sentimental nature; but must disapprove of the erroneous departure (or its vicious
pursuits) from the amiable rules of moral fitness, and feel proportionably guilty
and miserable. Nor could pardon or atonement alter the condition of a vicious
mind, for miserable it must be, as long as it remains vicious, whether God be
supposed to forgive the wickedness of it or not; for it is the conscious exercise
of moral goodness only, which is capable of happifying the rational mind;
therefore such reflections, pursuits and habits, which are comprised in our
agency, as will in their own nature admit of a rational happiness, make us happy;
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and such agency of man as is inadequate and improper to constitute such
happiness, and which naturally tends to misery will involve us therein; and
miserable we must be, until the bias and disposition of the mind is turned from
moral evil to moral good, which is the same as repentance and restoration. This
is the eternal law of nature, respecting the agency and the happiness or misery
ofimperfect rational nature, throughout its never ending agency and trial; and
consequently, our eternity, will be as much diversified with happiness and misery, as our agency may be supposed to alternately partake of moral good and
evil. So certain as we retain our rational nature, in our succeeding state of
existence, we shall be capable of moral actions, which admit of proficiency,
agency and trial; and not only so, but subjects us to agency and accountability,
as much as in this life, or in any condition of finite reason whatever; and every
improvement of a rational mind, alters the consciousness of it, and consequently the happiness or the misery of it. Absolute power may inflict physical
evils, but is utterly incapable of inflicting those of a moral nature; nor can mere
positive injunction by law affect the conscience~ of rational beings, who must
be either happy or miserable on the basis of their own agency, and consciousness of merit or demerit.
It has been owing to improvement that we have progressively advanced
from the knowledge and capacity of childhood to that of manhood, and to our
improvement, which is the same as agency, in moral good and evil, that has
alternately made us happy or unhappy in a mental sense; from hence we infer,
that if rational nature, in the world to come, is essentially analogous to what it
is in this life, agency and probation will be continued with the immortality of
the soul, be the manner of its existence, or of its communicating or receiving
ideas as it will.
Furthermore, the doctrine of a future improvement, or agency, may be
argued from the death of infants and children. None will pretend that they
have an opportunity of proficiency in this life, therefore we infer, that if such
a state be requisite to fit and improve their feeble minds for the enjoyment of
a rational happiness, agency must be continued to the future state; and admitting that they are immortal, and that agency is precluded from the world to
come, they would remain children in knowledge eternally; nor could any departed soul, on such a position, expand its rational functions beyond its size of
understanding at the time of departing this life which would make immortality
to man a cypher, except as to the perpetuation of their powers of cogitation in
a limited circumference; the reflection whereof would be more or less rude and
incoherent; which at best would be but a small fund for an eternal contemplation.
But if it be admitted, that the souls of mankind, of every age and denomination, will in their futurity be progressive in knowledge, (which must be the
case with cogitative beings) then it necessarily follows, that agency and trial

157

Ethan Allen

158

proceed hand in hand with it. Therefore it is impossible, that there should be
a particular day of judgment, in which mankind, or any, or either of them, shall
receive their eternal sentence of happiness or misery; for such a sentence is
inconsistent with any further trial or agency, and therefore is inadmissible.
Furthermore, proficiency or agency, is inconsistent with a confirmed state
of happiness or of misery; for in the same proportion as our ideas, pursuits,
intentions and habits vary, so does our happiness or misery.
Finite minds cannot be confirmedly happy or miserable, any more than
they can be absolutely identical which is the prerogative of the divine mind:
finite intelligences gain ideas by a succession of thinking, and are happy or
miserable in proportion as the succession of ideas will admit; and every succession in the multiplicity of thinking, is incompatible with a proper identity of
mind, (except as to the principle of thinking itself) was it to be perfectly iden tical, it could not admit of a succession of ideas, which is the same as addition,
nor of a diminution of them, but would be confined to one perception only,
and in this case, the happiness or misery, resulting from it, would be as identical
as the perception itself may be supposed to be, and incapable of enlargement
or diminution; which might be denominated a confirmed state. But a confirmed state is utterly incompatible with a state of improvement, and is applicable to the divine perfection only. Inasmuch as succession of thinking cannot
be ascribed to God, he is therefore identically the same, but progressive agents,
are always capable of additional knowledge, which lays them under additional
obligations to moral government, and thus duty is always co-extensive with the
improvement of rational agents; and inasmuch as agency, proficiency and accountability, are in nature co-existent, or concomitant with intelligent finite
beings, we infer, that the doctrine of eternal damnation is without foundation,
for that it would, if true, put a final end to any further agency, trial or accountability, therefore, so certain as our agency is eternal our condemnation cannot
be so.

V.1. Speculations on the Doctrine of the
Deprav#y of Human Reason
In the course of our speculations on divine providence we proceed next to the
consideration of the doctrine of the depravity of human reason; a doctrine
derogatory to the nature of man, and the rank and character of being which
he holds in the universe, and which, if admitted to be true overturns knowledge and science and renders learning, instruction and books useless and impertinent; inasmuch as reason, depraved or spoiled, would cease to be reason;
as much as the mind of a raving madman would of course cease to be rational:
admitting the depravity of reason, the consequence would unavoidably follow,
that as far as it may be supposed to have taken place in the minds of mankind,
they could be no judges of it, in consequence of their supposed depravity; for
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without the exercise of reason, we could not understand what reason is, which
would be necessary for us previously to understand, in order to understand
what it is not; or to distinguish it from that which is its reverse. But for us to
have the knowledge of what reason is, and the ability to distinguish it from that
which is depraved, or is irrational, is incompatible with the doctrine of the
depravity of our reason. Inasmuch as to understand what reason is, and to
distinguish it from that which is marred or spoiled, is the same to all intents and
purposes, as to have, exercise and enjoy, the principle of reason itself, which
precludes its supposed depravity: so that it is impossible for us to understand
what reason is, and at the same time determine that our reason is depraved; for
this would be the same as when we know that we are in possession and exercise
of reason, to determine that we are not in possession or exercise of it.
It may be, that some, who embrace the doctrine of the depravity of human
reason, will not admit, that it is wholly and totally depraved, but that it is in a
great measure marred or spoiled. But the foregoing arguments are equally
applicable to a supposed depravity in part, as in the whole. For in order to judge
whether reason be depraved in part, or not, it would be requisite to have an
understanding, of what reason may be supposed to have been, previous to its
premised depravity; and to have such a knowledge of it, would be the same as
to exercise and enjoy it in its lustre and purity; which would preclude the
notion of a depravity in part, as well as in the whole; for it would be utterly
impossible for us to judge of reason undepraved and depraved, but by comparing them together. But for depraved reason to make such a comparison, is
contradictory and impossible; so that, if our reason had been depraved, we
could not have had any conception of it any more than a beast. Men of small
faculties in reasoning cannot comprehend the extensive reasonings of their
superiors, how then can a supposed depraved reason, comprehend that reason
which is uncorrupted and pure? To suppose that it could, is the same as to
suppose that depraved and undepraved reason is alike, and if so there needs no
further dispute about it.
There is a manifest contradiction in applying the term depraved, to that of
reason, the ideas contained in their respective definitions will not admit of their
association together, as the terms convey heterogeneous ideas; for reason
spoiled, marred, or robbed of its perfection, ceaseth to be rational, and should
not be called reason; inasmuch as it is premised to be depraved, or degenerated
from a rational nature; and in consequence of the deprivation of its nature,
should also be deprived of its name, and called subterfuge, or some such like
name, which might better define its real character.
Those who invalidate reason, ought seriously to consider, <<whether they
at;gue against reason with or without reason; if with reason, then they establish
the principle, that they are labouring to dethrone:'' but if they argue without
reason, (which, in order to be consistent with themselves, they must do) they
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are out of the reach of rational conviction, nor do they deserve a rational
argument.
We are told that the knowledge of the depravity of reason, was first communicated to mankind by the immediate inspiration of God. But inasmuch as
reason is supposed to be depraved, what principle could there be in the human
irrational soul, which could receive or understand the inspiration, e>r on which
it could operate, so as to represent, to those whom it may be supposed were
inspired, the knowledge of the depravity of(their own and mankind's) reason
(in general:) For a rational inspiration must consist of rational ideas; which
presupposes, that the minds of those who were inspired, were rational, previous
to such their inspiration; which would be a downright contradiction to the
inspiration itself; the import of which was to teach the knowledge of the depravity of human research, which without reason could not be understood, and
with reason it would be understood, that the inspiration was false .
Will any advocates for the depravity of reason suppose, that inspiration
ingrafts or superadds the essence of reason itself, to the human mind? Admitting it to be so, yet such inspired persons could not understand any thing of
reason, before the reception of such supposed inspiration; nor would such a
premised inspiration, prove to its possessors, or receivers, that their reason had
ever been depraved. All that such premised inspired persons could understand,
or be conscious of, respecting reason, would be after the inspiration may be
supposed to have taken effect, and made them rational beings, and then instead of being taught by inspiration, that their reason had been previously
depraved, they could have had no manner of consciousness of the existence or
exercise of it, 'till the imparting the principle of it by the supposed energy of
inspiration; nor could such supposed inspired persons communicate the knowledge of such a premised revelation to others of the species, who for want of a
rational nature, could not be supposed, on this position, to be able to receive the
impressions of reason.
That there are degrees in the knowledge of rational beings, and also in their
capacities to acquire it, cannot be disputed, as it is so very obvious among
mankind. But in all the retrospect gradations from the exalted reasonings of a
Locke or a Newton, down to the lowest exercise of it among the species, still
it is reason, and not depraved; for a less degree of reason by no means implies
a depravity of it, nor does the impairing of reason argue its depravity, for what
remains of reason, or rather of the exercise of it, is reason still. But there is not,
and cannot be such a thing, as depraved reason, for that which is rational is so,
and for that reason cannot be depraved, whatever its degree of exercise may be
supposed to be.
A blow on the head, or fracture of the perecranium, as also palsies and many
other casualties that await our sensorium; retard, and in some cases wholly
prevent the exercise of reason, for a longer, or shorter period; and sometimes
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through the stage of human life; but in such instances as these, reason is not
depraved, but ceases in a greater or less degree, or perhaps wholly ceases its
rational exertions or operations; by reason of the breaches, or disorders of the
organs of sense, but in such instances, wherein the organs become rectified,
and the senses recover their usefulness, the exercise of reason returns; free from
any blemish or depravity. For the cessation of the exercise of reason, by no
means depraves it.
There is in God's infinite plenitude of creation and providence, such an
infinite display of reason, that the most exalted finite rational beings, fall infinitely short of the comprehension thereof For though the most inconsiderable
rational beings, who can discern any truth at all, bear a resemblance or likeness
to God, as well as every rational nature of whatever degree in the scale of being,
yet neither the greatest or least of them can bear any manner of proportion to
God; inasmuch as no possible degree of reason or knowledge, can bear any
proportion to that reason and knowledge, which is eternal and infinite, as has
been before argued. And though human reason cannot understand every
thing, yet in such things, which it does understand, its knowledge which is
acquired by reasoning, is as true and certain, as the divine knowledge may be
supposed to be: for to more than understand a thing, speaking of that particular, is impossible even to omniscience itself. For knowledge is but knowledge,
and that only whether it is in the divine mind, or ours, or in any other intelligences; therefore knowledge is not imperfect; for a knowledge of any thing is
the same as to have right ideas of it, or ideas according to truth, and as all
knowledge of things in general must be predicated on truth, it will agree in the
divine or human mind.
From what has been argued on this subject, in this and the preceding
chapters, it appears, that reason is not, and cannot be depraved, but that it bears
a likeness to divine reason, is of the same kind, and in its own nature as uniform
as truth, which is the test of it; though in the divine essence, it is eternal and
infinite, but in man it is eternal only, as it respects their immortality, and finite,
as it respects capaciousness. Such people as can be prevailed upon to believe,
that their reason is depraved, may easily be led by the nose, and duped into
superstition at the pleasure of those, in whom they confide, and there remain
from generation to generation: for when they throw by the law of reason, the
only one which God gave them to direct them in their speculations and duty,
they are exposed to ignorant or insidious teachers, and also to their own irregular passions, and to the folly and enthusiasm of those about them, which nothing but reason can prevent or restrain: Nor is it a rational supposition that the
commonality of mankind would ever have mistrusted, that their reason was
depraved, had they not been told so, and it is whispered about, that the first
insinuation of it was from the Priests; (though the Arminian Clergymen in the
circle of my acquaintance have exploded the doctrine.) Should we admit the
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depravity of reason, it would equally affect the priesthood, or any other teachers of that doctrine, with the rest of mankind; but for depraved creatures to
receive and give credit to a depraved doctrine, started and taught by depraved
creatures, is the greatest weakness and folly imaginable, and comes nearer a
proof of the doctrine of a total depravity, than any arguments which have ever
been advanced in support of it.

V.2. Containing a Disquisition of the Law of Nature,
as it Respects the Moral System, Interspersed
with Observations on Subsequent Religions
That mankind are by nature endowed with sensation and reflection, from
which results the powers of reason and understanding, will not be disputed.
The senses are well calculated to make discoveries of external objects, and to
communicate those notices, or simple images of things to the mind, with all
the magnificent simplicity of nature, which opens an extensive field of contemplation to the understanding, enabling the mind to examine into the natural
causes and consequences of things, and to investigate the knowledge of moral
good and evil, from which, together with the power of agency, results the
human conscience. This is the original of moral obligations and accountability,
which is called natural religion; for without the understanding of truth from
falsehood, and right from wrong, which is the same as justice from injustice,
and a liberty of agency, which is the same as a power of proficiency in either
moral good or evil; mankind would not be rational or accountable creatures.
Undoubtedly it was the ultimate design of our creator, in giving us being, and
furnishing us with those noble compositions of mental powers and sensitive
aptitudes, that we should, in, by, and with that nature, serve and honor him:
and with those united capacities search out and understand our duty to him,
and to one another, with the ability of practising the same, as far as may be
necessary for us, in this life. To object against the sufficiency of natural religion,
to effect the ultimate best good of mankind, would be derogating from the
wisdom, justice and goodness of God, who in the course of his providence to
us has adopted it: besides, if natural religion may be supposed to be deficient,
what security can we have that any subsequent revealed religion should not be
so also? For why might not a second religion from God, be as insufficient or
defective as a first religion from him may be supposed to be? From hence we
infer, that if natural religion is insufficient to dictate mankind in the way of their
duty, and make them ultimately happy, there is an end to religion in general.
But as certain as God is perfect, in wisdom and goodness, natural religion is
sufficient and complete; and having had the divine approbation, and naturally
resulting from a rational nature, is as universally promulgated to mankind as
reason itsel£ But to the disadvantage of the claim of all subsequent religions,
called revelations, whether denominated inspired, external, supernatural, or
what not, they came too late into the world to be essential to the well being of
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mankind, or to point out to them the only way to heaven and everlasting
blessedness: Inasmuch as far the greatest part of mankind, who have ever lived
in this world, had departed this life previous to the aeras and promulgations of
such revelations. Besides, those subsequent revelations to the law of nature,
began the same as human traditions have ever done, in very small circumferences, in the respective parts of the world where they have been inculcated, and
made their progress as time, chance and opportunity presented. Does this look
like the contrivance of heaven and the only way of salvation? or is it not more
like this world and the device of man? Undoubtedly the great parent of mankind laid a just and sufficient foundation of salvation for every of them, for
otherwise such of them, who may be supposed not to be thus provided for,
would not have whereof to glorify God for their being, but on the contrary
would have just matter of complaint against his providence or moral government, for involuntarily necessitating them into a wretched and miserable existence, and that without end or remedy; which would be ascribing to God a
more extensive injustice than is possible to be charged on the most barbarous
despots that ever were among mankind.
But to return to our speculations upon the law of nature. That this divine
law surpasses all positive institutions, that have been ushered into the world
since its creation, as much as the wisdom and goodness of God exceeds that of
man, is beautifully illustrated in the following quotation; "But it may be said,
what is virtue? it is the faithful discharge of those obligations which reason
dictates. And what is wisdom itself? but a portion of intelligence" with which
the creator has furnished us, in order to direct us in our duty. It may be further
asked, what is this duty? whence does it result? and by what law is it prescribed?
I answer, that the law which prescribed it is the immutable will of God; to
which right reason obliges us to conform ourselves, and in this conformity
virtue consists. No law which has commenced since the creation, or which may
ever cease to be in force, can constitute virtue; for before the existence of such
a law, mankind could not be bound to observe it, but they were certainly under
an obligation to be virtuous from the beginning. Princes may make laws and
repeal them, but they can neither make nor destroy virtue, and how indeed
should they be able to do what is impossible to the Deity himself: virtue being
as immutable in its nature as the divine will, which is the ground ofit. * A Prince
may command his subjects to pay certain taxes or subsidies, may forbid them
*Virtue, did not derive its nature merely from the omnipotent will of God, but also
from the eternal truth and moral fitness of things; which was the eternal reason, why
they were eternally approved by God, and immutably established by him, to be what
they are; and so far as our duty is connected with those eternal measures of moral
fitness, or we are able to act upon them, we give such actions, or habits, the name of
virtue or morality. But when we in writing or conversation say, that virtue is grounded
on the divine will, we should at the same time include in the complex idea ofit, that the
divine will, which constituted virtue, was eternally and infinitely reasonable.
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to export certain commodities, or to introduce those of a foreign country. The
faithful observance of these laws makes obedient subjects, but does not make
virtuous men: and would any one seriously think himself possessed of a virtue
the more for not having dealt in painted calicoe; or if the prince should by his
authority abrogate these laws, would any one say he had abrogated virtue. It
is thus with all positive laws: they all had a beginning, are all liable to exceptions, and may be dispensed with, and even abolished. That law alone, which
is ingraven on our hearts by the hand of the creator, is unchangeable and of
universal and eternal obligation. That law, says Cicero, is not a human invention, nor an arbitrary political institution, it is in its nature eternal and of universal obligation. The violence Tarquin offered to Lucretia, was breach of that
eternal law, and though the Romans at that time might have no written law
which condemned such kind of crimes, his offence was not the less heinous; for
this law of reason did not then begin, when it was first committed to writing:
its original is as antient as the divine mind. For the true, primitive and supreme
law, is no other than the unerring reason of the great Jupiter. And in another
place he says; this law is founded in nature, it is universal, immutable and
eternal, it is subject to no change from any difference of place, or time, it
extends invariably to all ages and nations, like the sovereign dominion of that
being, who is the author of it.
The promulgation of this supreme law to creatures, is co-extensive and coexistent with reason, and binding on all intelligent beings in the universe; and
is that eternal rule of fitness, as applicable to God, by which the creator of all
things conducts his infinitude of providence, and by which he governs the
moral system of being, according to the absolute perfection of his nature. From
hence we infer, that admitting those subsequent revelations, which have more
or less obtained credit in the world, as the inspired laws of God, to be consonant to the laws of nature, yet they could be considered as none other but mere
transcripts therefrom, promulgated to certain favorite nations, when at the
same time all mankind was favoured with the original. The moral precepts
contained in Moses's decalogue to the people oflsrael, were previously known
to every nation under heaven, and in all probability by them as much practised
as by the tribes of Israel. Their keeping the seventh day of the week as a
sabbath, was an arbitrary imposition of Moses ( as many other of his edicts
were) and not included in the law of nature. But as to such laws of his, or those
of any other legislator, which are morally fit, agree with, and are a part of the
natural law, as for instance; "Thou shalt not covet," or "Kill." These positive
injunctions cannot add any thing to the law of nature, inasmuch as it contains
an entire and perfect system of morality; nor can any positive injunctions or
commands enforce the authority of it, or confer any additional moral obligation on those to whom they are given to obey; the previous obligation of
natural religion, having either been as binding as reason can possibly conceive
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of, or the order and constitution of the moral rectitude of things, as resulting
from God, can make it to be.
To illustrate the argument of the obligatory nature of the natural law, let
us revise the commandments of the decalogue, by premising that Moses had
said thou shalt covet, thou shalt steal and murder; would any one conclude,
that the injunctions would have been obligatory, surely they would not, for a
positive command to violate the law of nature could not be binding on any
rational being, how then came the injunctions of Moses, or any others, to be
binding in such cases, in which they coincide with the law of nature? We answer, merely in consequence of the obligatory sanctions of the natural law,
which does not at all depend on the authority of Moses or of any other Legislator, short of him who is eternal and infinite: nor is it possible that the Jews,
who adhere to the law of Moses, should be under greater obligation to the
moral law, than the Japanese; or the Christians than the Chinese; for the same
God extends the same moral government over universal rational nature, independent of Popes, Priests and Levites. But with respect to all mere positive
institutions, injunctions, rites and ceremonies, that do not come within the
jurisdiction of the law of nature, they are political matters, and may be expected, perpetuated, dispensed with, abolished, reenacted, compounded or
diversified, as conveniency, power, opportunity, inclination, or interest, or all
together may dictate; inasmuch as they are not founded on any stable or universal principle of reason, but change with the customs, fashions, traditions and
revolutions of the world; having no centre of attraction, but interest, power
and advantages of a temporary nature.
When we reflect on the state and circumstances of mankind in this world,
their various languages and interchangeable methods of communicating intelligence to each other, (which are subject to perpetual alterations and refinements) the insuperable difficulties in translating antient writings, with any
considerable degree of perfection; as also our being exposed to the villainous
practices of impostors, with a variety of other deceptions, blunders and inaccuracies, which unavoidably attend written and diverse or variously translated
revelations; we cannot too much admire the wisdom and goodness of God in
imparting his law to us in the constitution of our rational nature, to point out
our duty in all circumstances and vicissitudes of human life; which a written
revelation would not be able to do, admitting, that it had sustained no serious
alterations from its first composure, which we will premise to have been perfect: for human affairs are so constantly changing and varying, that the same
action, or conduct, would, under different circumstances, be alternately good
and evil; and to have our duty in every of the multiplicity of incidental circumstances and changes of life, pointed out to us by a written revelation, would
compose a Bible of a monstrous size. Furthermore, as every individual of the
human race is attended with more or less diversity of circumstances of action
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in life, therefore in order for us to be taught our duty by a written revelation,
it would be requisite, that each individual of mankind should have their particular, and diverse revelation; in which their particular duty might be known
in all cases: so that we should suspend our actions, until we may be supposed
to have turned to the particular paragraph of our respective revelations, and
consulted them, in order to conduct our agency thereby (in which case printing would be in great demand.) Still there would be a difficulty in understanding an external printed revelation, or which paragraph of the bulky volume
would be applicable to the various parts of the conduct of human agency; so
that we should be obliged finally to make use of (depraved) reason, to understand it, or, in other words, should be obliged to make use of the deistical Bible
to explain and understand our own, which brings us back again to the religion
of nature or reason. Was it not that we were rational creatures, it would have
been as ridiculous to have pretended to have given us a Bible, for our instruction in matters ofreligion or morality, as it would to a stable of horses. And on
the other hand, admitting that we naturally understand moral good and evil,
it renders such a book no ways essential to us, though if it be admitted to be
argumentative and instructive, it might, like other sensible writings, subserve
mankind; but ifit is supposed to be in part defective in reason, and interspersed
with superstition, it would, under the sanction of divine authority, be vastly
more prejudicial to mankind, than as though it was stamped merely by the
authority of man; for an error in that which is received as infallible, can never
be confuted or rectified; inasmuch as it usurps the authority of human reason.
Furthermore, admitting that the copies of written revelation, which are now
extant in the world, perfectly accord with their several original manuscripts
(which is impossible to be true) yet they could not be equally instructive to
mankind with the productions of a variety of modern authors, who have written since their epocha, inasmuch as the world has ever since been improving in
learning and science; and as those written revelations must necessarily have
been (as to their subject matter and all and every other particular) accommodated to the state, circumstances and degrees of learning and knowledge, of
those, to whom the revelations were first supposed to have been communicated, and also to those to whom it was afterwards taught, and it would reduce
it below the understanding of this age. For it appears from the scripture accounts, that shepherds, fishermen, and the illiterate of those early ages of the
world, were principally made use of as the promulgators thereof to the rest of
mankind, and that "Not many wise or noble," were "Called," or embraced
their revelations in the early times, "But the weak things of this world" were
"Chosen," for which reason they were called "Babes:" Though after such religion became popular, princes and politicians of several parts of the world
promoted it as an instrument of state-policy. Be this as it will, the first promulgators of written revelations could not reveal to the world more than they
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knew themselves; nor could they be made to know any more than their capacity (under their then circumstances) was capable of receiving: any external
written revelation is therefore utterly incompatible with a progressive or increasing state of knowledge. We will premise, that the world's dissolution will
be postponed one hundred thousand million of years from this epocha, or that
it will eternally remain, what an idle conceit would it be for us to suppose, that
the succeeding generations of mankind, in their religious knowledge, will be
chained down to the theology of those positive written revelations, which were
introduced into the world, in its early, illiterate, and superstitious age; this
would be utterly subversive of a state of proficiency, much the same as for a
man to consult his nonage for rules of knowledge, and instruction to govern
his manhood.
Was the creator and Governor of the universe to erect a particular academy
of arts and sciences in this world, under his immediate inspection, with tutors
rightly organized, and intellectually qualified to carry on the business of teaching, it might like other colleges (and possibly in a superior manner,) instruct its
scholars. But that God should have given a revelation of his will to mankind,
as, his law, and to be continued to the latest posterity as such, which is premised
to be above the capacity of their understanding; is contradictory and in its own
nature impossible. Nor could a revelation to mankind, which comes within the
circle of their knowledge, be edifying or instructive to them, for it is a contra diction to call that which is above my comprehension, or that which I already,
(from natural sagacity) understand, a revelation to me: to tell me, or inspire me,
with the knowledge of that which I knew before, would reveal nothing to me
and to reveal that to me which is supernatural or above my comprehension, is
contradictory and impossible. But the truth of the matter is, that mankind are
restricted by the law of nature to acquire knowledge or science progressively,
as before argued. From which we infer the impropriety, and consequently the
impossibility, of God's having ever given us any manuscript copy of his eternal
law: for that to reveal it as first would bring it on a level with the infancy of
knowledge then in the world, or (fishermen, shepherds, and illiterate people
could not have understood it) which would have brought it so low, that it
could not be instructive or beneficial to after generations in their progressive
advances in science and wisdom.

VII.S. Miracles Could Not Be Instructive to Mankind
Should we admit the intervention of Miracles, yet they could not enlarge our
ideas of the power of God. For that to unmake nature universally, and to
impress it with new and opposite laws from those of its eternal establishment,
could require no greater exertion of power, than that which is Omnipotent,
and which must have been exerted in the eternal creation, regulation and
support of the universe. But any supposed miraculous alteration of nature,
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must imply mutability in the wisdom of God; and therefore is inadmissible.
Should God miraculously raise a dead person to life again, would the restoring
life argue a greater exertion of power in God than in first giving existence to
that life? surely it could not: From all which we infer, that miracles cannot
enlarge our ideas of the power of God. We proceed next to enquire, what
advantages could accrue to mankind by them in the way of teaching and instruction? For this must be the great end proposed by them. That they cannot
teach us any thing relative to the omnipotence of God, has been evinced; but
that they militate against his wisdom : and furthermore, that they cannot prove
the divine authority of written revelation, or the mission of its respective teachers to any country, people or nation, any farther or longer than the miraculous
works are actually continued, has been sufficiently argued in the preceding
section. It remains farther to be considered, that they are incapable of instructing us in the subject-matter, doctrine, proposition or inference of any premised
written revelation; or of giving us any insight into the precepts or injunctions
thereof, or to communicate any sort ofintelligence or knowledge respecting its
contents. The premised, sudden and miraculous alterations of the common
course of nature might astonish us; but such alterations or changes, do not
evince that they have any thing to do with us, or we with them in the way of
teaching and instruction; for truth and falsehood, right and wrong, justice and
injustice, virtue and vice, or moral good and evil are in their distinct natures
diametrically opposite to each other, and necessarily and eternally will remain
so to be, and that, independent of miracles or revealed religion. It is by reason
we investigate the knowledge of moral good and evil, it is that which lays us
under a moral obligation, and it is not a miracle or revelation that can alter the
moral rectitude of things, or prove that to be truth, which in its nature is not
so. Therefore admitting ever so many miracles, and revelations, we should still
have to recur to reason and argument, the old and only way of exploring truth
and distinguishing it from falsehood, or understanding true religion from
imposture or error. For though miracles might evince the divine mission of the
clergy, and the divinity of the christian revelation, to us, were they in fact
wrought in this enlightened age for that purpose, yet they are not calculated
to expound or explain it, but would perplex and confound us, in our logical
and doctrinal speculations, nature and reason being opposed to them as before
argued. Such supposed miraculous changes in nature, would to us be mysterious, and altogether unintelligible, and consequently could not come within
our deliberation on the right understanding, or comments on a supposed
written revelation; the understanding of which, after all the bustle about
miracles, must be investigated by reason: and revelation itself be either approved or disapproved by it. From the foregoing reasonings we infer, that
miracles cannot be edifying or instructive to us; and though they are strenuously urged as a proof of the divine legation of the first promulgators of rev-
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elation, and their successors; nevertheless, where the premised miracles became
extinct, their divine authority and the evidence of the infallibility of revelation,
became extinct also.
IX.I. Of the Nature of Faith and Wherein It Consists
Faith in Jesus Christ and in his Gospel throughout the New-Testament, is
represented to be an essential condition of the eternal salvation of mankind.
<<Knowing that a man is not justified by the works of the law, but by the faith of
Jesus Christ, even we have believed in Jesus Christ, that we might be justified by the
faith of Christ, and not by the works of the law, for by the works of the law shall no
flesh be justified.» Again, «If thou shalt confess the Lord Jesus Christ, and believe
in thine heart that God hath raised him from the dead, thou mayest be saved.,,
And again, «He that believeth and is baptised shall be saved, but he that believeth
not shall be damned.,, Faith is the last result of the understanding, or the same
which we call the conclusion, it is the consequence of a greater or less deduction of reasoning from certain premises previously laid down; it is the same as
believing or judging of any matter of fact, or assenting to or dissenting from the
truth of any doctrine, system or position; so that to form a judgment, or come
to a determination in one's own mind, or to believe, or to have faith, is in
reality the same thing, and is synonymously applied both in writing and speaking; for example, «Abraham believed in God.» Again, «]'or he,» speaking of
Abraham, «judged him faithful who had promised» and again, <?Jis faith was
counted unto him for righteoumess. ,, It is not only in scripture that we meet with
examples of the three words, to wit, belief, judgment and faith, to stand for the
marks of our ideas for the same thing, but also all intelligible writers and speakers, apply these phrases synonymously, and it would be good grammar and
sense for us to say that we have faith in a universal providence, or that we
believe in a universal providence, or that we judge that there is a universal
providence. These three different phrases, in communicating our ideas of
providence, do every of them exhibit the same idea, to all persons of common
understanding, who are acquainted with the English Language. In fine every
one's experience may convince them, that they cannot assent to, or dissent
from the truth of any matter of fact, doctrine or proposition whatever, contrary
to their judgment; for the act of the mind in assenting to, or dissenting from
any position, or in having faith or belief in favor of, or against any doctrine,
system or proposition, could not amount to any thing more or less, than the
act of the judgment, or last dictate of the understanding, whether the understanding be supposed to be rightly informed or not; so that our faith in all cases
is as liable to err, as our reason is to misjudge of the truth; and our minds act
faith in disbelieving any doctrine or system of religion to be true, as much as
in believing it to be so. From hence it appears, that the mind cannot act faith
in opposition to its judgment, but that it is the resolution of the understanding
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itself committed to memory or writing, and can never be considered distinct
from it. And inasmuch as faith necessarily results from reasoning, forcing itself
upon our minds by the evidence of truth, or the mistaken apprehension of it,
without any act of choice of ours, there cannot be any thing, which pertains to,
or partakes of the nature of moral good or evil in it. For us to believe such
doctrines or systems of religion, as appear to be credibly recommended to our
reason, can no more partake of the nature of goodness or morality, than our
natural eyes may be supposed to partake ofit in their perception of colours; for
the faith of the mind, and the sight of the eye are both of them necessary
consequences, the one results from the reasonings of the mind, and the other
from the perception of the eye. To suppose a rational mind without the exercise of faith, would be as absurd as to suppose a proper and compleat eye
without sight, or the perception of the common objects of that sense. The
short of the matter is this, that without reason we could not have faith, and
without the eye or eyes we could not see. But once admitting that we are
rational, faith follows of course, naturally resulting from the dictates of reason.
Furthermore, it is observable, that in all cases wherein reason makes an
erroneous conclusion, faith is likewise erroneous, and that in the same proportion as the conclusion may be supposed to be faulty and irregular: for it is the
established order of human nature, that faith should always conform to the
decrees of the judgment, whether it be right or wrong, or partly both. From
hence it follows, that errors in faith, and consequently in practice, are more or
less unavoidable. We are therefore obliged to substitute sincerity in the room
of knowledge, in all cases wherein knowledge is not attainable, for we cannot
look into the eternal order of unerring reason and perfect rectitude, so as in all
cases to regulate our minds and consciences from thence. We must therefore
adopt the principle of sincerity, since it is always supposed to aim at perfection,
and to come as near it as the informities of our nature will admit, (for otherwise
it could not be sincerity) which is the highest pretension to goodness, that we
can lawfully aspire to. There are therefore good or bad designs and intentions,
which crown all our actions, and denominate them to be either good or bad,
virtuous or vicious. Those who are vicious and abandoned to wickedness, may,
and often do, possess more knowledge, and consequently a more extensive
faith than those who are ignorant and virtuous: their sin does not consist in the
want of understanding or faith, but in their omission of cultivating in their own
minds the love and practice of virtue, or in not bringing their designs, intentions, dispositions and habits to a conformity thereto. A good conscience,
predicated on knowledge as far as that is attainable, and on sincerity for the rest
of our conduct, always was and will be essential to a rational happiness, which
results from a consciousness of moral rectitude, and thus it is that mankind, by
seeking after the truth, and conforming ( as far as human frailty will permit) to
moral rectitude, may attain to the enjoyment of a good conscience, although
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in doctrinal or speculative points of religion, or in creeds, they may be supposed
to be ever so erroneous.

X.3. The Imperfection of Knowledge in the Person ofJesus Christ,
Incompatible with His Divinity, with Observations
on the Hypostatical Union of the Divine and Human Nature
That Jesus Christ was not God is evident from his own words, where, speaking
of the day of judgment, he says, "Of that day and hour knoweth no man, no not
the angels which are in Heaven, neither the Son, but the Father." This is giving
up all pretension to divinity, and acknowledging in the most explicit manner,
that he did not know all things, but compares his understanding to that of man
and of angels; "of that day and hour knoweth no man, no not the angels which
are in heaven, neither the son." Thus he ranks himself with finite beings, and
with them acknowledges, that he did not know the day and hour of judgment,
and at the same time ascribes a superiority of knowledge to the father, for that
he knew the day and hour of judgment.
That he was a mere creature is further evident from his prayer to the father,
saying, "Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me, nevertheless, not my will
but thine be done." These expressions speak forth the most humble submission
to his father's will, authority and government, and however becoming so submissive a disposition to the divine government would be, in a creature, it is
utterly inconsistent and unworthy of a God, or of the person of Jesus Christ,
admitting him to have been a divine person, or of the essence of God.
What notions can we entertain that the divine essence should be divided,
and one part assume an authority over the other; or that the other should wield
obedience; this is a contradiction, inasmuch as essence cannot be divided, but
is the same, without distinction, either in its nature, authority or government.
To suppose one part of the divine nature to exercise authority over another,
is the same as to suppose, that part of the essence of God was weak and imperfect, and not capable of holding a share in the divine government, which would
reduce it to the state and condition of a creature, and divest it of its divinity.
Nor would the consequences of such a supposed imperfection in the essence
of God end here, but would necessarily involve the divine nature, in weakness,
misery and imperfection; and extinguish every idea of the existence of a God:
This is the necessary consequence of deifying Christ. But if Jesus Christ was not
of the essence of God, he must have been a mere creature: as there cannot be
any being but who is either finite or infinite, as has been before argued.
But we are told of a hypostatical union of the divine and human nature. But
wherein does it consist? Does it unite the two natures so as to include the
human nature in the essence of God? If it does not it does not deify the person
of Christ; for the essence of God is that which makes him to be what he is; but
if the hypostatical union includes human nature in the divine, then there would
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be an addition of the human nature to the essence of God, in which case the
divine nature would be no longer perfectly simple, but compounded, and
would be diverse from what it may be supposed to have been the eternity
preceding such premised union; in which connection the divine nature must
have changed from its eternal identity. He could not be the same God he was
previous to his union with humanity; for if the union of natures is supposed to
have made no alteration in the divine essence, it is a contradiction to call it a
union; for the hypostatical union must be supposed to be something or nothing, if it be nothing, then there is no such union, but if it is any thing real, it
necessarily produces mutability in the divine nature. Now, if the divine nature
was eternally perfect and compleat, it could not receive the addition of the
nature of man, but if it was not perfect in the eternity preceding the premised
hypostatical union, it could not have been perfected by the addition of another
imperfection.
The doctrine of the incarnation itself, and the vi,;gin mother, does not
merit a serious confutation and therefore is passed in silence, except the mere
mention of it.

XII.6. Ihe Person of Jesus Christ, Considered in a Variety of Different
Characters, Each of Which Are Incompatible with a Participation of
the Divine Nature. Ihat a Redemption, Wrought Out by Inflicting
the Demerits of Sin upon the Innocent, Would Be Unjust, and
Ihat It Could Contain No Mercy or Goodness to the Universality
of Being, Considered Inclusively
It is impossible that God should suffer or change, or the person of Jesus Christ,
as far as he may be supposed to be of the essence of God; for the absolute
perfection of the divine nature exempts it from suffering, weakness, or any
manner of imperfection. Therefore Jesus Christ, in the nature in which he is
premised to have suffered, could not be God.
But on the position that Christ was a mere creature, as the Arians believe,
though ever so exalted, all the obedience or righteousness he could have acquired or attained to, would have been necessary for the discharge of his own
duty as an accountable creature. Admitting that he had imputed it to others,
he must have been miserable himself for the deficiency thereof, except his
righteousness had been acquired by works of supererogation, or except he is
supposed to be capable of a moral happiness without righteousness or goodness, and if he may be supposed to have been capable of such a happiness
without those moral qualifications requisite thereto, why might not mankind
in general have been capable ofit upon the same footing of deficiency, without
his imputed righteousness? however it is no way probable admitting it to be
possible, that any exalted, wise and understanding being would part with the
essentials of his own happiness; viz. his morality to others; and for them, and
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in their stead, actually suffer a great and dreadful weight of misery, and thus at
an equal expence of his own happiness and goodness, redeem a race of sinful
and guilty creatures; for there could not on this thesis, be any advantage to the
system of finite beings, considered collectively, or any mercy or goodness displayed to being in general. What mercy would there be in reprieving or restoring a race of condemned creatures from misery, by inflicting an equal condemnation or punishment on a premised innocent and exalted finite being, which
should have been inflicted on the guilty? Humanity obliges us to be kind and
benevolent, but never obliges us to suffer for criminals (nor could sueh a suffering excuse them from their just demerits) but justice and self-preservation
forbids it; for all finite beings are under greater obligations to themselves than
to any other creature or race of creatures whatever; so that there could be no
justice or goodness in one being's suffering for another, nor is it at all compatible with reason to suppose, that God was the contriver of such a propitiation.
The practice of imputing one person's crime to another, in capital offences
among men, so that the innocent should suffer for the guilty, has never yet
been introduced into any court of judicature in the world, or so much as
practised in any civilised country; And the manifest reason in this, as in all other
cases of imputation, is the same, viz. it confounds personal merit and demerit.
The murderer ought to die for the demerit of his crime, but if the court
exclude the idea of personal demerit (guilt being always the inherent property
of the guilty and of them only) they might as well sentence one person to death
for the murder of another: for justice would be wholly blind was it not predicated on the idea of the fact of a personal demerit, on the identical person who
was guilty of the murder: nor is it possible to reward merit abstractly considered
from its personal agents. These are facts that universally hold good in human
governments. The same reasons cannot fail to hold good in the divine mind as
in that of the human, for the rules of justice are essentially the same whether
applied to the one or to the other, having their uniformity in the eternal truth
and reason of things.
But it is frequently objected, that inasmuch as one person can pay, satisfy
and discharge a cash debt for another, redeem him from prison and set him at
liberty, therefore Jesus Christ might become responsible for the sins of mankind, or of the elect, and by suffering their punishment atone for them, and
free them from their condemnation. But it should be considered, that comparisons darken or reflect light upon an argument according as they are either
pertinent or impertinent thereto; we will therefore examine the comparison,
and see if it will with propriety apply to the atonement.
Upon the Christian scheme, Christ the son was God, and equal with God
the father, or with God the Holy Ghost, and therefore original sin must be
considered to be an offence equally against each of the persons of the premised
Trinity, and being of a criminal nature could not be discharged or satisfied by
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cash or produce, as debts of a civil contract are, but by suffering; and it has
already been proved to be inconsistent with the divine or human government,
to inflict the punishment of the guilty upon the innocent, though one man
may discharge another's debt in cases where lands, chattels or cash are adequate
to it; but what capital offender was ever discharged by such commodities?
Still there remains a difficulty on the part of Christianity, in accounting for
one of the persons in the premised trinity's satisfying a debt due to the impartial
justice of the unity of the three persons. For God the son to suffer the condemnation of guilt in behalf of man, would not only be unjust in itself, but incompatible with his divinity, and the retribution of the justice of the premised
trinity of persons in the godhead (of whom God the son must be admitted to
be one) toward mankind; for this would be the same as to suppose God to be
judge, criminal and executioner, which is inadmissible.
But should we admit for argument's sake, that God suffered for original sin,
yet taking into one complex idea the whole mental system of being, universally,
both finite and infinite, there could have been no display of grace, mercy, or
goodness to being in general, in such a supposed redemption of mankind;
inasmuch as the same quantity or degree of evil is supposed to have taken place
upon being, universally considered, as would have taken place, had finite individuals, or the race of Adam, suffered according to their respective demerits.
Should we admit that there is a trinity of persons in the divine essence, yet
the one could not suffer without the other, for essence cannot be divided in
suffering, any more than in enjoyment. The essence of God is that which
includes the divine nature, and the same identical nature must necessarily partake of the same glory, honor, power, wisdom, goodness and absolute
uncreated and unlimited perfection, and is equally exempted from weakness
and suffering. Therefore, as certain as Christ suffered he was not God, but
whether he is supposed to be God or man, or both, he could not in justice have
suffered for original sin, which must have been the demerit of its perpetrators
as before argued.
Supposing Christ to have been both God and man, he must have existed
in two different essences, Piz. the essence of God and the essence of man. And
if he existed in two distinct and separate essences, there could be no union
between the divine and human natures. But if there is any such thing as an
hypostatical union between the divine and human natures, it must unite both
natures in one essence, which is impossible: for the divine nature being infinite,
could admit of no addition or enlargement, and consequently cannot allow of
a union with any nature whatever. Was such an union possible in itself, yet, for
a superior nature to unite with an inferior one in the same essence, would be
degrading to the former, as it would put both natures on a level by constituting
an identity of nature: the consequences whereof would either deify man, or
divest God of his divinity, and reduce him to the rank and condition of a
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creature; inasmuch as the united essence must be denominated either divine or
human.
That God should become a man, is impossible, and that man should become a God, is equally impossible and absurd. But if the divine nature retains
its absolute perfection, and the nature of man its infirmity, then a premised
hypostatical union between them would imply a union of weakness and imperfection to the nature and essence of God; for so certain as human nature is
imperfect and united with the divine, so certain perfection must be supposed
to unite with imperfection, but it is contradictory and unworthy of the divine
nature to form such a hypostatical junction. Furthermore to suppose that two
essences are contained in one, is as great a contradiction, as to suppose, that
two units are one, and one unit is two: for if two essences have a positive
existence, they must exist in two distinct and separate natures, for that, which
constitutes but one nature, is and necessarily must be contained in but one
essence, so vice versa, that which constitutes two essences, at the same time
gives existence to two natures, for a nature cannot exist without an essence, nor
an essence without a nature; for essence is identity itself. But that there should
be two identities in the same nature or essence, is impossible and contradictory,
therefore Jesus Christ could not be both God and man, for this plain reason,
that if he was one of them, he could not be the other; for God and man are
not and cannot be one and the same, for that there is an infinite disproportion
between them; for which reason they cannot be hypostatically united in one
nature or essence. The divine mind comprehends all possible knowledge, with
one entire and infinite reflection without a succession of thinking. Nor is it
compatible with the omnipresence of God to ascribe motion to him, for it
would imply absence in him from place, and be a downright contradiction to
his being every where present; therefore that mind, which intuitively understands all things, and is every where present, is exalted above our narrow conceptions or traditions of uniting with the animal or cogitative nature of man,
any more than with the universe in general. Our intelligence would contribute
nothing to his mind, and the body of man would be but a circumscribed and
inconsistent vehicle to enwrap, or indose that mind, which is eternal and infinite. A man is finite and cannot be in but one place at the same time, his
motion from one place to another as regularly and necessarily excludes him
from one place, as it introduces him into another; he thinks by succession and
by parts, and is liable to errors and mistakes in theory and practice; and ignorance, vanity and infirmity are more or less the lot of humanity. How arrogant
is it then in man to pretend a union with the divine nature, who is infinitely
above our praises or adoration? But we are told, that the hypostatical union is
a mysterious one. Nevertheless it is a union or not a union, if it is a union of
the divine and human natures, they must be comprised in one and the selfsame essence, or otherwise it is such a mysterious union, that it is not a union,
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which is no mystery at all, but a barefaced absurdity. For that which we can
comprehend to be unreasonable and contradictory, is by no means mysterious.
That only is mysterious, which we cannot understand to be reasonable or
unreasonable, true or false, right or wrong, which is not the case respecting the
hypostatical union: for admitting it to be true, the human mind must reflect,
reason and judge of things in and with the divine mind. But as the divine mind
does not think or reflect by succession, and the human mind cannot exert its
thinking faculty any otherwise than by succession, it could not think or reflect
in or with the divine mind at all; for the divine omniscience, comprehending
all things, would also comprehend the thoughts and reasonings of the human
mind, whether they are supposed to be right or wrong. But the finite mind
would be lost and swallowed up in the divine, without adding any thing to it,
except it be imperfection. Nor is it possible in itself, that an intelligent finite
being, who thinks by succession, should be united in one essence with that
mind, which is infinite, and does not think by succession: For infinity of intelligence cannot admit of addition, nor could the infinite and finite mind think
together in one and the same mind, as the manner of their perceptions, as well
as the extent of them, would be infinitely different, and consequently there
could be no union between them. But the human mind, by a progressive and
finite mode of reflection, would act and judge of things, not only distinctly
from, but opposite to the eternal mind, which naturally obstructs or precludes
the union. Besides, if the human mind acts separately and individually from the
divine mind, it acts in the same manner as our minds do, and like them would
be liable not only to imperfection, but to sin and misery; a union too wretched
to be ascribed to the divine nature. But admitting the union between the
infinite and finite minds, they would be but one mind, and conscious of the
same.consciousness, for otherwise they could not be the same, or pertain to the
same essence. But that a finite mind could be conscious of an infinite or all
comprehending consciousness, or compose any part of it, is absurd; as a consciousness is not compounded of parts, as parts cannot comprise infinity. And
as to moral and physical evil, the infinite mind is at as great a remove therefrom
as from finiteness itself, and consequently could not jointly suffer with the
person of a supposed mediator.
But it may be objected that Jesus Christ was not possessed of a human
mind, and that the hypostatical union consisted in the uniting of the divinity
with the animal part of the nature of man only. But such a union would of
consequence subject the divine nature to a state of suffering, and obnoxiously
expose it to physical evils. To suppose that it did not, is the same as to suppose,
that there was no such union, for ifit be really a union, it must be attended with
the necessary consequences of a union of the divine nature with the animal part
of the nature of man, or otherwise it is a contradiction to call it a union. But
if the divine nature did not suffer in the person of Christ, and he was by nature
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void of a human mind, then it follows, that it was the mere animal body of
Christ that suffered for original sin, in which, intelligent nature, either divine
or human, did not bear a part. But ifit be supposed, that the hypostatical union
united the divine nature with that of the human, consisting of cogitation and
sensation, then the previous arguments stand fairly opposed to the doctrine of
the hypostatical union, which is submitted to the reader.

XIV:2. MoraHty Derived from Natural
Fitness, and Not from Tradition
Such parts or passages of the scriptures as inculcate morality, have a tendency
to subserve mankind, the same as all other public investigations or teachings of
it, may be supposed to have; but are neither better or worse for having a place
in the volume of those writings denominated canonical; for morality does not
derive its nature from books, but from the fitness of things; and though it may
be more or less, interspersed through the pages of the Alkoran, its purity and
rectitude would remain the same; for that it is founded in eternal right; and
whatever writings, books or oral speculations, best illustrate or teach this moral
science, should have the preference. The knowledge of this as well as all other
sciences, is acquired from reason and experience, and ( as it is progressively
obtained) may with propriety be called, the revelation of God, which he has
revealed to us in the constitution of our rational natures: and as it is congenial
with reason and truth cannot (like other revelations) partake of imposture. This
is natural religion, and could be derived from none other but God. I have
endeavoured, in this treatise, to prune this religion from those excrescences,
with which Craft on the one hand, and Ignorance on the other, have loaded
it; and to hold it up to view in its native simplicity, free from alloy; and have
throughout the contents of the volume, addressed the reason of mankind, and
not their passions, traditions or prejudices; for which cause, it is no wise probable that it will meet with any considerable approbation.
Most of the human race, by one means or other are prepossessed with
principles opposed to the religion of reason. In these parts of America, they are
most generally taught, that they are born into the world in a state of enmity to
God and moral good, and are under his wrath and curse, that the way to
Heaven and future blessedness is out of their power to pursue, and that it is
incumbered with mysteries which none but the Priests can unfold, that we
must "be born again," have a special kind of faith, and be regenerated; or in
fine, that human nature, which they call "the old man," must be destroyed,
perverted, or changed by them, and by them new modeled, before it can be
admitted into the Heavenly kingdom. Such a plan of superstition, as far as it
obtains credit in the world, subjects mankind to sacerdotal empire; which is
erected on the imbecility of human nature. Such of mankind, as break the
fetters of their education, remove such other obstacles as are in their way, and
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have the confidence publicly to talk rational, exalt reason to its just supremacy,
and vindicate truth and the ways of God's providence to men; are sure to be
stamped with the epithet of irreligious, infidel, profane, and the like. But it is
often observed of such a man, that he is morally honest, and as often replied,
what of that? Morality will carry no man to heaven. So that all the satisfaction
the honest man can have while the superstitious are squibbing hell fire at him,
is to retort back upon them that they are priest ridden.
Most people place religion in arbitrary ceremonies, or mere positive institutions, abstractly considered from the moral rectitude of things, and in which
religion does not and cannot consist, and thus delude themselves with an
empty notion of religion, which, in reality is made up of tradition and superstition, and in which moral obligation is not concerned; not considering that
a conformity to moral rectitude, which is morality in the abstract, is the sum
of all religion, that ever was or can be in the universe; as there can be no religion
in that in which there is no moral obligation; except we make religion to be
void of reason, and if so, all argument about it is at an end.
The manner of the existence, and intercourse of human souls, after the
dissolution of their bodies by death, being inconceivable to us in this life, and
all manner of intelligence between us and departed souls impracticable, the
priests have it in their power to amuse us, with a great variety of visionary
apprehensions of things in the world to come, which, while in this life, we
cannot contradict from experience, the test of great part of our certainty ( especially to those of ordinary understandings) and having introduced mysteries
into their religion, make it as incomprehensible to us, (in this natural state) as
the manner of our future existence; and from scripture authority, having invalidated reason as being carnal and depraved, they proceed further to teach us
from the same authority, that "the natural man knoweth not the things of the
spirit, for they are foolishness unto him, neither can he know them for they are
spiritually discerned." A spiritualizing teacher is nearly as well acquainted with
the kingdom ofHeaven, as a man can be with his home lot. He knows the road
to heaven and eternal blessedness, to which happy regions, with the greatest
assurance, he presumes to pilot his dear disciples, and unfold to them the
mysteries of the canonical writings, and of the world to come; they catch the
enthusiasm and see with the same sort of spiritual eyes, with which they can
pierce religion through and through, and understand the spiritual meaning of
the scriptures, which before had been "a dead letter" to them, particularly the
revelations of St. John the Divine, and the allusion of the horns therein mentioned. The most obscure and unintelligible passages of the Bible, come within
the compass of their spiritual discerning, as apparently as figures do to a mathematician: Then they can sing songs out of the Canticles, saying, "I am my
beloved's and my beloved is mine;" and being at a loose from the government
of reason, please themselves with any fanaticisms they like best, as that of their
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being "snatched as brands out of the burning, to enjoy the special and eternal
favour of God, not from any worthiness or merit in them, but merely from the
sovereign will and pleasure of God, while millions of millions, as good by nature
and practice as they, were left to welter eternally, under the scalding drops of divine vengeance;" not considering, that if it was consistent with the perfections
of God to save them, his salvation could not fail to have been uniformly extended to all others, whose circumstances may be supposed to be similar to, or
more deserving than theirs, for equal justice cannot fail to apply in all cases in
which equal justice demands it. But these deluded people resolve the divine
government altogether into sovereignty; "even so Father,for so it seemedgood in
thy sight." And as they exclude reason and justice from their imaginary notions
of religion, they also exclude it from the providence or moral government of
God. Nothing is more common, in the part of the country where I was educated, than to hear those infatuated people, in their public and private addresses, acknowledge to their creator, from the desk and elsewhere, "hadst
thou, 0 Lord, laid judgment to the line and righteousness to the plummet, we had
been in the grave with the dead and in hell with the damned, long before this
time." Such expressions from the creature to the creator are profane, and utterly incompatible with the divine character. Undoubtedly, (all things complexly considered) the providence of God to man is just, inasmuch as it has the
divine approbation.
The superstitious thus let up a spiritual discerning, independent of, and in
opposition to reason, and their mere imaginations pass with each other, and with
themselves, for infallible truth. Hence it is, that they despise the progressive and
wearisome reasonings of philosophers (which must be admitted to be a painful
method of arriving at truth) but as it is the only way in which we can acquire
it, I have pursued the old natural road of ratiocination, concluding, that as this
spiritual discerning is altogether inadequate to the management of any of the
concerns of life, or of contributing any assistance or knowledge towards the
perfecting of the arts and sciences, it is equally unintelligible and insignificant
in matters of religion: and therefore conclude, that if the human race in general,
could be prevailed upon to exercise common sense in religious concerns, those
spiritual fictions would cease, and be succeeded by reason and truth.

XIV3. Of the Importance of the Exercise of Reason, and Practice
of Morality, in Order to the Happiness of Mankind
The period of life is very uncertain, and at the longest is but short: a few years
bring us from infancy to manhood, a few more to a dissolution; pain, sickness
and death are the necessary consequences of animal life. Through life we
struggle with physical evils, which eventually are certain to destroy our earthly
composition; and well would it be for us did evils end here; but alas! moral evil
has been more or less predominant in our agency, and though natural evil is
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unavoidable, yet moral evil may be prevented or remedied by the exercise of
virtue. Morality is therefore of more importance to us than any or all other
attainments; as it is a habit of mind, which, from a retrospective consciousness
of our agency in this life, we should carry with us into our succeeding state of
existence, as an acquired appendage of our rational nature, and as the necessary
means of our mental happiness. Virtue and vice are the only things in this
world, which, with our souls, are capable of surviving death; the former is the
rational and only procuring cause of all intellectual happiness, and the latter of
conscious guilt and misery; and therefore, our indispensable duty and ultimate
interest is, to love, cultivate and improve the one, as the means of our greatest
good, and to hate and abstain from the other, as productive of our greatest evil.
And in order thereto, we should so far divest ourselves of the incumbrances of
this world, (which are too apt to engross our attention) as to enquire a consistent system of the knowledge of religious duty, and make it our constant
endeavour in life to act conformably to it. The knowledge of the being, perfections, creation and providence of GOD, and of the immortality of our souls,
is the foundation of religion . . . . And as the Pagan, Jewish, Christian and
Mahometan countries of the world have been overwhelmed with a multiplicity
of revelations diverse from each other, and which, by their respective promulgators, are said to have been immediately communicated to them by the intervening agency of angels ( as in the instance of the invisible Gabriel to Mahomet)
and as those revelations have been received and credited, by far the greater part
of the inhabitants of the several countries of the world (on whom they have
been obtruded) as supernaturally revealed by God or Angels, and which, in
doctrine and discipline, are in most respects repugnant to each other, it fully
evinces their imposture, and authorizes us, without a lengthy course of arguing, to determine with certainty, that not more than one if any of them, had
their original from God; as they clash with each other; which is ground of high
probability against the authenticity of each of them.
A revelation, that may be supposed to be really of the institution of God,
must also be supposed to be perfectly consistent or uniform, and to be able to
stand the test of truth; therefore such pretended revelations, as are tendered to
us as the contrivance of heaven, which do not bear that test, we may be morally
certain, was either originally a deception, or has since, by adulteration become
spurious. Furthermore, should we admit, that among the numerous revelations on which the respective priests have given the stamp of divinity, some one
of them was in reality of divine authority, yet we could no otherwise, as rational
beings, distinguish it from others, but by reason.
Reason therefore must be the standard, by which we determine the respective claims of revelation; for otherwise we may as well subscribe to the divinity
of the one as of the other, or to the whole of them, or to none at all. So likewise
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on this thesis, if reason rejects the whole of those revelations, we ought to
return to the religion of nature and reason.
Undoubtedly it is our duty, and for our best good, that we occupy and
improve the faculties, with which our Creator has endowed us, but so far as
prejudice, or prepossession of opinion prevails over our minds, in the same
proportion, reason is excluded from our theory or practice. Therefore if we
would acquire useful knowledge, we must first divest ourselves of those impediments; and sincerely endeavour to search out the truth; and draw our
conclusions from reason and just argument, which will never conform to our
inclination, interest or fancy; but we must conform to that if we would judge
rightly. As certain as we determine contrary to reason, we make a wrong conclusion; therefore, our wisdom is, to conform to the nature and reason of
things, as well in religious matters, as in other sciences. Preposterously absurd
would it be, to negative the exercise of reason in religious concerns, and yet,
be actuated by it in all other and less occurrences of life. All our knowledge of
things is derived from God, in and by the order of nature, out of which we
cannot perceive, reflect or understand any thing whatsoever; our external
senses are natural and so are our souls; by the instrumentality of the former we
perceive the objects of sense, and with the latter we reflect on them. And those
objects are also natural; so that ourselves, and all things about us, and our
knowledge collected therefrom, is natural, and not supernatural. . . .
We may and often do, connect or arrange our ideas together, in a wrong
or improper manner, for the want of skill or judgment, or through mistake or
the want of application, or through the influence of prejudice; but in all such
cases, the error does not originate from the ideas themselves, but from the
composer; for a system, or an arrangement of ideas justly composed; always
contain the truth; but an unjust composition never fails to contain error and
falsehood. Therefore an unjust connection of ideas is not derived from nature,
but from the imperfect composition of man. Misconnection of ideas is the
same as misjudging, and has no positive existence, being merely a creature of
the imagination; but nature and truth are real and uniform; and the rational
mind by reasoning, discerns the uniformity, and is thereby enabled to make a
just composition of ideas, which will stand the test of truth. But the fantastical
illuminations of the credulous and superstitious part of mankind, proceed from
weakness, and as far as they take place in the world, subvert the religion of
REASON and TRUTH.
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The Comte de Volney (1757-1820) was American neither by birth nor adoption; indeed, he resided in the United States only three short years. But he is
included here because no other continental contemporary of the American
deists exerted a greater influence on them. His major work, Ruins; or, Meditations on the Revolutions ofEmpires ( 1791), was required reading for deists on
this side of the Atlantic. Its deistic rejection of revealed religion, and its defense
of naturalistic religion and morality, impressed Freneau, Paine, Palmer, and
other American advocates of deism. Thomas Jefferson was so struck by the
book that he began a translation, which was eventually completed by Joel
Barlow, another admirer ofVolney. As late as the mid-nineteenth century, the
Ruins was still being castigated by orthodox theologians who claimed that it
had served "to unchristianize" thousands of American readers. It is, of course,
true that other French freethinkers were studied and endorsed by American
deists: Voltaire, d'Holbach, and Claude Helvetius spring readily to mind. But
Volney was clearly the favorite and molded the temperament of American
deism to a far greater degree than did his better-remembered fellow savants.
Volney was born in Craon, France, the son of a well-to-do member of the
landed gentry. In his youth he roamed extensively throughout the Middle
East, studying its customs, languages, and religions, and subsequently published two popular accounts of his travels ( Voyage en Egypte et en Syrie, 1787;
and Considerations sur laguerre des Tures et de la Russie, 1788). Ruins appeared three years later and was clearly influenced by his exposure to nonEuropean cultures. Imprisoned during the French Terror, he later regained
favor and was sent to the United States in 1795 as an agent of the French
government. While in America, he became a close associate of Jefferson's, who
subsequently suffered no little political embarrassment when Volney was accused of planning the French reoccupation of Louisiana and sent packing back
to Europe in 1798. But Volney seems to have possessed a remarkable talent for
surviving political intrigues and crises, and his failure as an agent provocateur
did not overly damage his career. Although no admirer ofNapoleon, he served
under him and was rewarded with the title of comte. After the Restoration, he
equally well served the House of Bourbon, which gratefully elevated him to
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the peerage. Despite his flexibility in cooperating with a variety of political
regimes, Volney remained a moderate liberal, faithful to Enlightenment ideals,
to the end of his life. At his death in 1820, he was one of France's most
respected intellectuals.
The Ruins is a curious work. Its praise of reason and natural religion places
it squarely in the Enlightenment tradition, but its fanciful style and mode of
presentation are startlingly romantic in flavor. The book is best described as a
study in what would today be designated as comparative religion. Volney
guides the reader, with the aid of a mythical "legislator" or "Genius," through
a survey of the various creeds and doctrines of the world's religions. The book's
central thesis is that all sectarian religions are expressions of geographical locale,
environment, and tradition and as such are contingent on not only historical
contexts but temporal ones as well. In arguing along these lines, Volney concludes that no particular creed-including Christianity-has a monopoly on
universal and immutable religious truth. Instead, each is relative to its own time
and place, even if all do share a common and hence trustworthy core of belief
The purpose of Ruins is to point out precisely what that core is and to establish
around it a religion worthy of human rationality and divine dignity. What
Montesquieu's Spirit of the Laws did for theories of human nature, then,
Volney's Ruins did for religious belief. It is not surprising that the book was
detested by orthodox Christians and applauded by heterodox deists.
The selections here from Volney's Ruins open on a fanciful assembly of
representatives from each of the world's revealed religions. The gathering is
presided over by the mysterious "legislator," who seems to be a personification
of the spirit of Reason. Each sect is invited to explain why it is superior to all
others. The ultimate purpose of the debate is to ascertain why there exists
conflict and disagreements between adherents of different religions and
whether or not they can be reconciled. As the legislator tells the assembly,
"Truth is one, your persuasions are various; many of you therefore are in error."
In the debate that follows, each of the devotees offers a brief for the universal truth of one tradition. All, for example, insist that the foundations of
their faiths rest on unquestionable divine revelation, as recorded in their various
sacred scriptures. But the legislator reminds them that their respective revelations contradict one another and that there are no living witnesses to attest to
the truth of the original putative communication. Each religious spokesperson
then insists that the truth of his tradition is attested to by the willingness of
individuals to suffer martyrdom in its defense. The legislator's response is quite
Lockean in tenor: Sincerity and fervor of belief do not guarantee the truth of
that which is believed. The clergy parry by pointing to accounts of miracles
demonstrating divine favor. The legislator replies that since each tradition appeals to a different set of conflicting miraculous interventions, it is impossible
to decide which to trust. A similar criticism is made when the sectarians turn
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to their separate doctrinal beliefs. The conclusion is that the contradictions
between the varieties of revealed religion cannot be resolved so long as the
devotees of those traditions "prejudicially" insist that their path is the only
correct one. Sectarian opinions are accidents of birth, reflections of historical
context erroneously transmitted from one generation to the next as absolute
truth. "How is it," asks the legislator, "that such a hazard should be a ground
of conviction, an argument of truth?"
How is the puzzle of religious contradiction to be solved? By accepting,
answers the legislator, only those beliefs that are "capable of verification"
through either experience or reason, and by suspending judgment-and especially conviction-about the rest. Dispute arises between sectarians about tenets they can in no way verify but cling to out of fear and attachment to
tradition. As such, affectations, prejudices, and vanity blind them to the contingency of their doctrinal beliefs and foment mutual charges of heresy and
savage persecution. There is, however, a way out of the impasse: the recognition that nature provides a more reliable guide to both the divine and morality
than supernaturalist ( and nonverifiable) mysteries. As Volney puts it, "The only
means of establishing harmony is to return to nature, and take for a guide and
regulator the order of things which she has founded." In order to steer the
various sectarians out of their morass of superstition and prejudice, the legislator then drills them in a catechism of natural religion-"The Law of Nature."
The law of nature, the legislator tells the assembly, "is the constant and
regular order of facts, by which God governs the universe; an order which his
wisdom presents to the senses and to the reason of men, as an equal and
common rule for their actions, to guide them, without distinction of country
or of sect, towards perfection and happiness." A close study, then, of natural
philosophy reveals the nonhistorical universal principles that serve as the foun clarion for the different varieties of justified belief-theological, scientific, ethical, political. It improves the felicity of individuals and the utility of society and
does not sully the worship of God, as do supernaturalist doctrines, "with the
foul ingredients of all the weaknesses and passions entailed on humanity."
Especially interesting within the context of American deism is the naturalistic ethics Volney derives from his law of nature. It clearly influenced Elihu
Palmer's later systematic analysis of moral principle; along with Palmer's,
Volney's is the only serious attempt to elaborate a uniquely deistic ethic. According to Volney, the law of nature points to one human imperative: selfpreservation. To act in conformity to the natural order of things is to ensure
survival; to rebel against it leads to disaster. Sensation, or the capacity for pleasure and pain, serves as the physical barometer for determining whether one's
actions are compatible with the natural order. Violations of that order bring
pain to oneself and others and are accordingly evil. But conformity to it enhances pleasure for all and is thereby virtuous. Vice and virtue, then, originate
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with human behavior and need not be reduced to supernatural explanations.
Humans thus are absolute masters of their fates, artisans of their own destinies.
A judiciously rational compliance with nature furthers human progress and
happiness. But a prejudicial retreat from reason into superstition and bigotry
will ultimately collapse the fruits of human labor into pitiful and ghostly ruins.

Ruins; or, Meditations
on the Revolutions of Empires
Problem of Religious Contradiction
The various groups having taken their places, an unbounded silence succeeded
to the murmurs of the multitude, and the legislator said: "Chiefs and doctors
of mankind! you remark how the nations, living apart, have hitherto followed
different paths, each believing its own to be that of truth. If however, truth is
one, and opinions are various, it is evident that some are in error. If then such
vast numbers of us are in the wrong, who shall dare to say, I am in the right?
Begin therefore by being indulgent in your dissensions. Let us all seek truth as
if no one possessed it. The opinions which to this day have governed the world,
originating from chance, propagated in obscurity, admitted without discussion, accredited by a love of novelty and imitation, have usurped their empire
in a clandestine manner. It is time, if they are well founded, to give a solemn
stamp to their certainty, and legitimate their existence. Let us summon them
this day to a general scrutiny, let each propound his creed, let the whole assembly be the judge, and let that alone be acknowledged true which is so for the
whole human race."
Then, by order of position, the first standard on the left was allowed to
speak: "You are not permitted to doubt," said their chiefs, "that our doctrine
is the only true and infallible one. First it is revealed by God himself-"
"So is ours," cried all the other standards, "and you are not permitted to
doubt it."
"But at least," said the legislator, ''you must propose it; for we cannot
believe what we do not know."
"Our doctrine is proved," replied the first standard, "by numerous facts; by
a multitude of miracles, by resurrections of the dead, by rivers dried up, by
mountains removed, etc."
"And we also," cried all the others, "we have numberless miracles:" and
each began to recount the most incredible things.
"Their miracles," said the first standard, "are imaginary; or the fictions of
the evil spirit, who has deluded them."
"They are yours," said the others, "that are imaginary;" and each group,
speaking of itself, cried out: "None but ours are true; all the others are false."
The legislator asked: "Have you living witnesses?"
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"No," replied they all: "the facts are ancient, the witnesses are dead, but
their writings remain."
"Be it so," replied the legislator; "but if they contradict each other, who
shall reconcile them?"
"Just judge!" cried one of the standards, "the proof that our witnesses have
seen the truth is that they died to confirm it, and our faith is sealed with the
blood of martyrs."
"And ours too," said the other standards: ''we have thousands of martyrs
who died in the most excruciating torments, without every denying the truth."
Then the Christians of every sect, the Mussulmen, the Indians, the Japaneses,
recited endless legends of confessors, martyrs, penitents, etc.
And one of these parties having denied the martyrology of the others:
"Well," said they, "we will then die ourselves to prove the truth of our belief"
And instantly a crowd of men of every religion and every sect, presented
themselves to suffer the torments of death. Many even began to tear their
arms, and to beat their heads and breasts, without discovering any symptom of
pain.
But the legislator preventing them: "Omen!" said he, "hear my words with
patience: if you die to prove that two and two make four, will your death
render this truth more evident?"
"No," answered all.
"And if you die to prove that they make five, will that make them five?
Again they all answered, "No."
"What then is your persuasion to prove, if it changes not the existence of
things? Truth is one, your persuasions are various; many of you therefore are in
error. Now, if man, as is evident, can persuade himself of error, what does his
persuasion prove?
"If error has its martyrs, what is the criterion of truth?
"If the evil spirit works miracles, what is the distinctive character of God?
"Besides, why resort forever to incomplete and insufficient miracles? Instead of changing the course of nature, why not rather change opinions? Why
murder and terrify men, instead of instructing and correcting them?
"0 credulous, but opinionated mortals! none ofus know what was done
yesterday, what is even doing today under our eyes, and we swear to what was
done two thousand years ago!
"Oh, the weakness, and yet the pride of men! the laws of nature are immutable and profound, our minds are full of illusion and frivolity, and yet we
would comprehend everything, determine everything! Verily, it is easier for the
whole human race to be in an error, than to change the nature of an atom."
"Well then," said one of the doctors, "let us lay aside the evidence of fact,
since it is uncertain; let us come to argument, the proofs inherent in the doctrine."
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Then came forward, with a look of confidence, an Imam of the law of
Mahomet; and, having advanced into the circle, turned towards Mecca and
recited with great fervor his confession offaith: "Praised be God," said he, with
a solemn and imposing voice! "The light shineth with full evidence, and truth
has no need of examination:" then showing the Coran: "Here," said he, "is the
light of truth in its proper essence. There is no doubt in this book; it conducts
with safety him who walks in darkness, and who receives without discussion the
divine word which descended on the prophet to save the simple, and confound
the wise. God has established Mahomet his minister on earth; he has given him
the world, that he may subdue with the sword whoever shall refuse to receive
his law: infidels dispute and will not believe; their obduracy comes from God,
who has hardened their hearts to deliver them to dreadful punishments-"
At these words, a violent murmur arose on all sides, and silenced the
speaker. "Who is this man," cried all the groups, "who thus gratuitously insults
us? What right has he to impose his creed on us as conqueror and tyrant? Has
not God endowed us, as well as him, with eyes, understanding, and reason?
And have we not an equal right to use them, in choosing what to believe and
what to reject? If he attacks us, shall we not defend ourselves? If he likes to
believe without examination, must we therefore not examine before we believe?
"And what is this luminous doctrine that fears the light? What is this apostle
of a God of clemency, who preaches nothing but murder and carnage? What
is this God of justice, who punishes blindness which he himself has made? If
violence and persecution are the arguments of truth, must gentleness and
charity be looked on as signs of falsehood?"
A man then advancing from a neighbouring group, said to the Imam:
"Admitting that Mahomet is the apostle of the best doctrine, the prophet of
the true religion; have the goodness at least to tell us, in the practice of his
doctrine, whether we are to follow his son-in-law Ali, or his vicars Omar and
Aboubekre?"
At the sound of these names a terrible schism arose among the Mussulmen
themselves: the partisans of Omar and ofAli, calling out heretics and blasphemers, loaded each other with execrations. The quarrel became so violent, that the
neighbouring groups were obliged to interfere to prevent their coming to
blows.
At length, tranquillity being somewhat restored, the legislator said to the
Imams: "See the consequences of your principles! If you yourselves were to
carry them into practice, you would destroy each other to the last man; is it not
the first law of God that man should live?" Then addressing himself to the
other groups: "Doubtless," said he, "this intolerant and exclusive spirit shocks
every idea of justice, and overturns the whole foundation of morals and society;
but before we totally reject this code of doctrine, is it not proper to hear some
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of its dogmas, in order not to pronounce on the forms, without having some
knowledge of the substance?"
The groups having consented, the Imam began to expound how God,
after having sent to the nations, lost in idolatry, twenty-four thousand prophets, had finally sent the last, the seal and perfection of all, Mahomet, on whom
be the salvation of peace: how, to prevent the divine word from being any
longer perverted by infidels, the supreme bounty had itself written the pages
of the Coran: then explaining the particular dogmas of Islamism, the Imam
unfolded how the Coran, partaking of the divine nature, was increate and
eternal, like its author: how it had been sent leaf by leaf in twenty-four thousand nocturnal apparitions of the angel Gabriel: How the angel announced
himself by a gentle knocking, which threw the prophet into a cold sweat; how,
in the vision of one night, he had travelled over ninety heavens, riding on the
animal Boraq, half a horse and half a woman: how, endowed with the gift of
miracles, he walked in the sunshine without a shadow, turned dry trees to
green, filled wells and cisterns with water, and split in two the body of the
moon: how, by divine command, Mahomet had propagated, sword in hand,
the religion the most worthy of god by its sublimity, and the best adapted for
man by the simplicity of its practice, since it consisted in only eight or ten
points: to profess the unity of God; to acknowledge Mahomet as his only
prophet; to pray five times a day; to fast one month in the year; to go to Mecca
once in our life; to pay the tenth of all we possess; to drink no wine; to eat no
pork; and to make war upon the infidels; he taught that by these means every
Mussulman, becoming himself an apostle and a martyr, should enjoy in this
world many blessings; and at his death, his soul weighed in the balance of
works, and absolved by the two black angels, should pass the infernal pit on the
bridge as narrow as a hair and as sharp as the edge of a sword, and should finally
be received to a region of delight, watered with rivers of milk and honey, and
embalmed in all the perfumes of India and Arabia; and where the celestial
houris, virgins always chaste, are eternally crowning with repeated favors the
elect of God, who preserve an eternal youth.
At these words, an involuntary smile was seen on every countenance; and
the various groups, reasoning on these articles of faith, exclaimed with one
voice: "Is it possible that reasonable beings can admit such reveries? would not
you think it a chapter from the Arabian nights?"
A Samoyed advanced into the circle: "The paradise of Mahomet," said he,
"appears very desirable; but one of the means of gaining it is embarrassing: for
if we must neither eat nor drink between the rising and setting sun, as he has
ordered, how are we to practice that fast in my country, where the sun continues above the horizon four months without setting?"
"That is impossible," cried all the Mussulman doctors, to support the
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honor of the prophet; but a hundred nations having attested the fact, the
infallibility of Mahomet could not but receive a severe shock.
"Itis singular," said an European, "that God should be constantly revealing
what takes place in heaven, without ever instructing us what is doing on the
earth!"
"For my part," says an American, "I find a great difficulty in the pilgrimage;
for suppose twenty-five years to a generation and only a hundred millions of
males on the globe: each being obliged to go to Mecca once in his life, there
must be four millions a year on the journey; and as it would be impracticable
for them to return the same year, the numbers would be doubled, that is, eight
millions: where would you find provisions, lodging, water, vessels for this universal procession? Here must be miracles indeed!"
"The proof," said a Catholic doctor, "that the religion of Mahomet is not
revealed, is that the greater part of the ideas which serve for its basis existed a
long time before, and that it is only a confused mixture of truths disfigured and
taken from our holy religion and from that of the Jews; which an ambitious
man has made to serve his projects of domination, and his wordly views. Peruse
his book, you will see nothing there but the histories of the Bible and the
Gospel, travestied into absurd fables; a tissue of vague and contradictory declamations, and ridiculous or dangerous precepts. Analyze the spirit of these
precepts, and the conduct of their apostle, you will find there an artful and
audacious character; which to obtain its end, works ably, it is true, on the
passions of the people it had to govern. Speaking to simple and credulous men,
it entertains them with miracles; they are ignorant and jealous, and it flatters
their vanity by despising science; they are poor and rapacious, and it excites
their cupidity by the hope of pillage; having nothing at first to give them on
earth, it tells them of treasures in heaven; it teaches them to desire death as the
supreme good; it threatens cowards with hell; it rewards the brave with paradise; it sustains the weak with the opinon of fatality; in short, it produces the
attachment it wants by all the allurements of sense and all the power of the
passions.
"How different is the character of our religion! and how completely does
its empire, founded on the counteraction of our natural inclinations, and the
mortification of all our passions, prove its divine origin! how forcibly does its
mild and compassionate morality, its affections altogether spiritual, attest its
emanation from the divinity? Many of its doctrines, it is true, soar above the
reach of the understanding, and impose on reason a respectful silence; but this
more fully demonstrates its revelation, since the human mind could never have
imagined such mysteries." Then, holding the Bible in one hand and the four
Gospels in the other, the doctor began to relate, that in the beginning, God
(after having passed an eternity in inaction) took the resolution, without any

189

Comte de Volney

190

known cause, of making the world out of nothing; that having created the
whole universe in six days, he found himself fatigued on the seventh; that
having placed the first human pair in a garden of delight, to make them completely happy, he forbade their tasting a particular fruit which he left within
their reach; that these first parents, having yielded to the temptation, all their
race (yet unborn) had been condemned to bear the penalty of a fault which
they had not committed; that, after having left the human race to damn themselves for four or five thousand years, this God of mercy ordered a dearly
beloved son, whom he had engendered without a mother, and who was as old
as himself, to go and be put to death on the earth; and this, for the salvation
of mankind, of whom much the greater portion, nevertheless, have ever since
continued in the way of perdition; that to remedy this new difficulty, this same
God, born of a virgin, having died and risen from the dead, assumes a new
existence every day, and in the form of a piece of bread, multiplies himself by
millions at the voice of one of the vilest of men; then passing on to the doctrine
of the sacraments, he was going to treat at large of the power of absolution and
reprobation, of the means of purging all sins by a little water and a few words,
when, uttering the words indulgence, power of the pope, sufficient or efficacious grace, he was interrupted by a thousand cries. "It is a horrible abuse,"
exclaimed the Lutherans, "to pretend to remit sins for money." "The notion
of the real presence," cried the Calvinists, "is contrary to the text of the gospel." "The pope has no right to decide anything of himself," cried the
Jansenists; and thirty other sects, rising up and accusing each other of heresy
and error, it was no longer possible to hear anything distinctly.
Silence being at last restored, the Mussulmen observed to the legislator:
"since you have rejected our doctrine as containing things incredible, can you
admit that of the Christians? is not theirs still more contrary to common sense
and justice? a God, immaterial and infinite, to become a man? to have a son as
old as himself1 this god-man to become bread, to be eaten and digested! have
we anything equal to that? Have the Christians an exclusive right to exact
implicit faith? and will you grant them privileges of belief to our detriment?"
Some savage tribes then advanced: "What!" said they, "because a man and
woman ate an apple six thousand years ago, all the human race are damned?
and you call God just! What tyrant ever rendered children responsible for the
faults of their fathers! What man can answer for another's actions: Is not this
subversive of every idea of justice and of reason?"
Others exclaimed: "Where are the proofs, the witnesses of these pretended
facts? Can we receive them without examining the evidence? The least action
in a court of justice requires two witnesses; and we are ordered to believe all this
on mere tradition and hearsay!"
A Jewish rabbin then addressing the assembly, said; "As to the fundamental
facts we are sureties; but with regard to their form and application, the case is

Let Man Study Nature's Laws!

different, and the Christians are here condemned by their own arguments; for
they cannot deny that we are the original source from which they are derived,
the primitive stock on which they are grafted; and hence the reasoning is very
short: either our law is from God, and then theirs is a heresy, since it differs from
ours; or our law is not from God, and then theirs falls at the same time."
"But you must make this distinction," replied the Christian: "your law is
from God, as typical and preparative, but not as final and absolute; you are the
image of which we are the substance."
"We know," replied the rabbin, "that such are your pretensions; but they
are absolutely gratuitous and false. Your system turns altogether on mystical
meanings, on visionary and allegorical interpretations: with violent distortions
on the letter of our books, you substitute the most chimerical ideas to the true
ones, and find in them whatever pleases you, as a wild imagination will find
figures in the clouds. Thus you have made a spiritual Messiah of that which, in
the spirit of our prophets, is only a temporal king: you have made a redemption
of the human race out of the simple reestablishment of our nation; your conception of the virgin is founded on a single phrase, which you have misunderstood. Thus you make from our scriptures whatever your fancy dictates, you
even find there your trinity, though there is not the most distant allusion to it,
and it is an invention of profane writers, admitted into your system with a host
of other opinions of every religion and of every sect, during the anarchy of the
three first centuries of your era."
At these words, the Christian doctors crying sacrilege and blasphemy,
sprang forward in a transport offury to fall upon the Jew. And a troop of monks
in motley dresses of black and white, advanced with a standard, on which were
painted pincers, gridirons, lighted fagots and the words justice, charity, mercy:
"We must," said they, "make an example of these impious wretches, and burn
them for the glory of God." They began even to prepare the pile, when a
Mussulman answered in a strain of irony: "This then is your religion of peace,
that meek and beneficent system which you so much extol! This is that evangelical charity which combats infidelity with persuasive mildness, and repays
injuries with patience! Ye hypocrites! it is thus that you deceive mankind; thus
that you propagate your accursed errors! When you were weak, you preached
liberty, toleration, peace; when you arc strong, you practise persecution and
violence." -And he was going to begin the history of the wars and slaughters
of Christianity, when the legislator demanding silence, suspended this scene of
discord.
The monks, affecting a tone of meekness and humility, exclaimed, "It is not
ourselves that we avenge, it is the cause of God, it is his glory that we defend."
"And what right have you, more than we," said the Imams, "to constitute
yourselves the representatives of God? Have you privileges that we have not?
Are you not men like us?"
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"To defend God," said another group, "to pretend to avenge him, is to
insult his wisdom and his power. Does he not know better than men what
befits his dignity?"
"Yes," replied the monks, "but his ways are secret."
... Then the legislator having commanded silence and recalled the dispute
to its true object, said, "Chiefs and instructors of the people, you came together in search of truth; at first, every one of you, thin.king he possessed it,
demanded of the others an implicit faith; but receiving the contrariety of your
opinions, you found it necessary to submit them to a common rule of evidence, and to bring them to one general term of comparison; and you agreed
that each should exhibit the proofs of his doctrine. You began by alleging facts;
but each religion and every sect, being equally furnished with miracles and
martyrs, each producing an equal cloud of witnesses, and offering to support
them by a voluntary death, the balance on this first point, by right of parity,
remained equal.
"You then passed to the trial of reasoning; but the same arguments applying equally to contrary positions; the same assertions, equally gratuitous, being
advanced and repelled with equal force, and all having an equal right to refuse
assent, nothing was demonstrated. What is more, the confrontation of your
systems has brought up new and extraordinary difficulties; for amidst the apparent or adventitious diversities, you have discovered a fundamental resemblance, a common groundwork; and each of you pretending to be the inventor, and first depositary, you have taxed each other with adulterations and
plagiariams; and thence arises a difficult question concerning the transmission
of religious ideas from people to people.
"Finally to repeat the embarrassment, when you endeavoured to explain
your doctrines to each other, they appeared confused and foreign, even to their
adherents; they were founded on ideas inaccessible to your senses; of consequence you had no means of judging of them, and you confessed yourselves
in this respect to be only the echoes of your fathers; hence follows this other
question, how came they to the knowledge of your fathers, who themselves
had no other means than you to conceive them: so that, on the one hand, the
succession of these ideas being unknown, and on the other, their origin and
existence being a mystery, all the edifice of your religious opinions becomes a
complicated problem of metaphysics and history. . .. "

Solution of the Problem of Contradictions
The legislator then resumed his discourse. "O nations!" said he, "we have
heard the discussion of your opinions; and the different sentiments which divide you have given rise to many reflections, and furnished several questions
which we shall propose to you to solve.
"First, considering the diversity and opposition of the creeds to which you
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are attached, we ask on what motives you found your persuasion; is it from a
deliberate choice that you follow the standard of one prophet rather than
another? Before adopting this doctrine rather than that, did you first compare?
did you maturely examine them? Or have you received them only from the
chance of birth, from the empire of education and habit? Are you not born
Christians on the banks of the Tiber, Mussulmen on those of the Euphrates,
Idolaters on the Indus, just as you are born fair in cold climates and sable under
the scorching sun of Africa? And if your opinions are the effect of your fortuitous position on the earth, of consanguinity, of imitation, how is it that such
a hazard should be a ground of conviction, an argument of truth?
"Secondly, when we reflect on the mutual proscriptions and arbitrary intolerance of your pretensions, we are frightened at the consequences that flow
from your own principles. Nations! who reciprocally devote each other to the
bolts of heavenly wrath, suppose that the universal Being whom you revere,
should this moment descend from heaven on this multitude and, clothed with
all his power, should sit on this throne to judge you, suppose he should say to
you: 'Mortals! it is your own justice that I am going to exercise upon you. Yes,
of all the religious systems that divide you, one alone shall this day be preferred;
all the others, all this multitude of standards, of nations, of prophets shall be
condemned to eternal destruction; this is not enough-among the particular
sects of the chosen system, one only can be favored, and all the others must be
condemned; neither is this enough: from this little remnant of a group, I must
exclude all those who have not fulfilled the conditions enjoined by its precepts:
0 men! to what a small number of elect have you limited your race! to what
a penury of beneficence do you reduce the immensity of my goodness! to what
a solitude of admirers do you condemn my greatness and my glory?'
"But," said the legislator rising: "no matter; you have willed it so; Nations!
here is an urn in which all your names are placed: one only is a prize-approach
and draw this tremendous lottery-" And the nations, seized with terror, cried:
"No, no; we are all brothers, all equal; we cannot condemn each other."
Then said the legislator, resuming his seat: "0 men! who dispute on so
many subjects, lend an attentive ear to one problem which you exhibit, and
which you ought to decide yourselves." And the people giving great attention,
he lifted an arm towards heaven; and pointing to the sun, said, "Nations, does
that sun which enlightens you appear square or triangular?" "No," answered
they with one voice, "it is round."
Then taking the golden balance that was on the altar: "This gold that you
handle every day, is it heavier than the same volume of copper?" "Yes," answered all the people, "gold is heavier than copper."
Then taking the sword: "Is this iron," said the legislator, "softer than lead?"
"No," said the people.
"Is sugar sweet, and gall bitter?"-"Yes."
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"Do you love pleasure, and hate pain?"-"Yes."
"Thus then you are agreed in these points and many others of the same
nature.
"Now, tell us, is there a cavern in the centre of the earth, or inhabitants in
the moon?"
This question occasioned an universal murmur; every one answered differently, some yes, others no; one said it was probable; another said it was an idle,
ridiculous question; some, that it was worth knowing; and the discord was
universal.
After sometime, the legislator having obtained silence, said: "Explain to us,
0 nations, this problem. We have put to you several questions which you have
answered with one voice, without distinction of race or of sect; white men,
black men, followers of Mahomet and of Moses, worshippers of Boudda and
of Jesus, all have returned the same answer. We then proposed another question, and you are all at variance! Why this unanimity in one case, and this
discordance in the other?"
And the group of simple men and savages answered and said: "The reason
of this is evident: in the first case we see and feel the objects; and we speak from
sensation: in the second, they are beyond the reach of our senses; we speak of
them only from conjecture."
"You have resolved the problem," said the legislator: "and your own consent has established this first truth:
"That whenever objects can be examined and judged ofby your senses, you
are agreed in opinion;
"And that you only differ when the objects are absent and beyond your
reach.
"From this first truth flows another equally clear and worthy of notice.
Since you agree on things which you know with certainty, it follows that you
disagree only on those which you know not with certainty, and about which
you are not sure; that is to say, you dispute, you quarrel, you fight for that
which is uncertain, that of which you doubt. 0 men! is not this folly?
"Is it not then demonstrated that Truth is not the object of your contests?
that it is not her cause which you defend, but that of your affections, and of
your prejudices? that it is not the object, as it really is in itself, that you would
verify, but the object as you would have it; that is to say, it is not the evidence
of the thing that you would enforce, but your own personal opinion, your
particular manner of seeing and judging. It is a power that you wish to exercise,
an interest that you wish to satisfy, a prerogative that you arrogate to yourselves; it is a contest of vanity. Now, as each of you, on comparing himself to
every other, finds himself his equal and his fellow, he resists by a feeling of the
same right. And your disputes, your combats, your intolerance, are the effect
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of this right which you deny each other, and of the intimate conviction of your
equality.
"Now, the only means of establishing harmony is to return to nature, and
take for a guide and regulator the order of things which she has founded; and
then your accord will prove this other truth:
"That real beings have in themselves an identical, constant and uniform
mode of existence; and that there is in your organs a like mode of being affected by them.
"But at the same time, by reason of the mobility of these organs as subject
to your will, you may conceive different affections, and find yourselves in different relations with the same objects; so that you are to them like a mirror,
capable of reflecting them truly as they are, or of distorting and disfiguring
them.
"Hence it follows that, whenever you perceive objects as they are, you
agree among yourselves and with the objects; and the similitude between your
sensations and their manner of existence, is what constitutes their truth with
respect to you;
"And on the contrary, whenever you differ in your opinion, your disagreement is a proof that you do not represent them such as they are, that you
change them.
"Hence also it follows, that the causes of your disagreement exist not in the
objects themselves, but in your minds, in your manner of perceiving or judging.
"To establish therefore an uniformity of opinion, it is necessary first to
establish the certainty, completely verified, that the portraits which the mind
forms are perfectly like the originals; that it reflects the objects correctly as they
exist. Now, this result cannot be obtained but in those cases where the objects
can be brought to the test, and submitted to the examination of the senses.
Everything which cannot be brought to this trial is for that reason alone, impossible to be determined; there exists no rule, no term of comparison, no
means of certainty, respecting it.
"From this we conclude, that, to live in harmony and peace, we must agree
never to decide on such subjects, and to attach to them no importance; in a
word, we must trace a line of distinction between those that are capable of
verification, and those that are not, and separate by an inviolable barrier, the
world of fantastical beings from the world of realities; that is to say, all civil
effect must be taken away from theological and religious opinions.
"This, 0 people! is the object proposed by a great nation freed from her
fetters and her prejudices; this is the work which, under her eye, and by her
orders, we had undertaken when your kings and your priests came to interrupt
it. --0 kings and priests! you may suspend, yet for awhile, the solemn publi-
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cation of the laws of nature: but it is no longer in your power to annihilate or
to subvert them."
A general shout then arose from every part of the assembly; and the nations
universally, and with one voice, testified their assent to the proposals of the
legislator: "Resume," said they, "your holy and sublime labors, and bring them
to perfection! Investigate the laws which nature, for our guidance, has implanted in our breasts, and collect from them an authentic and immutable
code; nor let this code be any longer for one family only, but for us all without
exception! Be the legislator of the whole human race, as you shall be the
interpreter of nature herself; show us the line of partition between the world
of chimeras and that of realities: and teach us, after so many religions of error
and delusion, the religion of evidence and truth!"
Then the legislator, having resumed his inquiry into the physical and constituent attributes of man, and examined the motives and affections which
govern him in his individual and social state, unfolded in these words the laws
on which nature herself has founded his happiness.

The Law of Nature
(I)

Q. What is the law of nature?
A. It is the constant and regular order of facts, by which God governs the
universe; an order which his wisdom presents to the senses and to the reason
of men, as an equal and common rule for their actions, to guide them, without
distinction of country or of sect, towards perfection and happiness . . ..
Q. Do such orders exist in nature?
A. Yes.
Q. What does the word nature signify?
A. The word nature bears three different senses. 1st. It signifies the universe,
the material world: in this first sense we say the beauty of nature, the richness
of nature, that is to say, the objects in the heavens and on the earth exposed
to our sight; 2dly. It signifies the power that animates, that moves the universe,
considering it as a distinct being, such as the soul is to the body: in this second
sense we say, "The intentions of nature, the incomprehensible secrets of nature." 3rdly. It signifies the partial operations of that power on each being, or
on each class of beings; and in this third sense we say, "The nature of man is
an enigma; every being acts according to its nature." Wherefore, as the actions
of each being, or of each species of beings, are subjected to constant and
general rules, which cannot be infringed without interrupting and troubling
the general or particular order, those rules of action and of motion are called
natural laws, or laws of nature.
Q . Give me examples of those laws.
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A. It is a law of nature, that the sun illuminates successively the surface of the
terrestrial globe;-that its presence causes both light and heat;-that heat acting upon water, produces vapors;-that those vapors rising in clouds into the
regions of the air, dissolve into rain or snow, and renew incessantly the waters
of fountains and of rivers.
It is a law of nature, that water flows downwards; that it endeavours to find
its level; that it is heavier than air; that all bodies tend towards the earth; that
flame ascends towards the heaven;-that it disorganizes vegetables and animals; that air is necessary to the life of certain animals; that, in certain circumstances, water suffocates and kills them; that certain juices of plants, certain
minerals attack their organs, and destroy their life, and so on in a multitude of
other instances.
Wherefore, as all those and similar facts are immutable, constant, and regular, so many real orders result from them for man to conform himself to, with
the express clause ofpunishment attending the infraction of them, or of welfare
attending their observance. So that if man pretends to see clear in darkness, if
he goes in contradiction to the course of the seasons, or the action of the
elements; if he pretends to remain under water without being drowned, to
touch fire without burning himself, to deprive himself of air without being
suffocated, to swallow poison without destroying himself, he receives from
each of those infractions of the laws of nature a corporeal punishment proportionate to his fault; but if on the contrary, he observes and practises each of
those laws according to the regular and exact relations they have to him, he
preserves his existence, and renders it as happy as it can be: and as the only and
common end of all those laws, considered relatively to mankind, is to preserve,
and render them happy, it has been agreed upon to reduce the idea to one
simple expression, and to call them collectively the law of nature.

(II)

Q. What are the characters of the law of nature?
A. There can be assigned ten principal ones.
Q. Which is the first?
A. To be inherent to the existence of things, and, consequently, primitive and
anterior to every other law: so that all those which man has received, are only
imitations of it, and their perfection is ascertained by the resemblance they bear
to this primordial model.
Q . What is the second?
A. To be derived immediately from God, and presented by him to each man,
whereas all other laws are presented to us by men, who may be either deceived
or deceivers.
Q. Which is the third?
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A. To be common to all times, and to all countries, that is to say, one and
universal.
Q. Is no other law universal?
A. No: for no other is agreeable or applicable to all the people of the earth; they
are all local and accidental, originating from circumstances of places and of
persons; so that if such a man had not existed, or such an event happened, such
a law would never have been enacted.
Q. Which is the fourth character?
A. To be uniform and invariable.
Q. Is no other law uniform and invariable?
A. No: for what is good and virtue according to one, is evil and vice according
to another; and what one and the same law approves of at one time, it often
condemns at another.
Q. Which is the fifth character?
A. To be evident and palpable, because it consists entirely of facts incessantly
present to the senses, and to demonstration.
Q. Are not other laws evident?
A. No: for they are founded on past and doubtful facts, on equivocal and
suspicious testimonies, and on proofs inaccessible to the senses.
Q. Which is the sixth character?
A. To be reasonable, because its precepts and entire doctrine are conformable
to reason, and to the human understanding.
Q. Is no other law reasonable?
A. No: for all are in contradiction to the reason and the understanding of men,
and tyrannically impose on him a blind and impracticable belief.
Q. Which is the seventh character?
A. To be just, because in that law, the penalties are proportionate to the infractions.
Q. Are not other laws just?
A. No: for they often exceed bounds, either in rewarding deserts, or in punishing delinquencies, and consider as meritorious or criminal, null or indifferent
actions.
Q. Which is the eighth character?
A. To be pacific and tolerant, because in the law of nature, all men being
brothers and equal in rights, it recommends to them only peace and toleration,
even for errors.
Q. Are not other laws pacific?
A. No: for all preach dissension, discord, and war, and divide mankind by
exclusive pretensions of truth and domination.
Q. Which is the ninth character?
A. To be equally beneficent to all men, in teaching them the true means of
becoming better and happier.
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Q. Are not other laws beneficient likewise?
A. No: for none of them teach the real means of attaining happiness; all are
confined to pernicious or futile practices; and this is evident from facts, since
after so many laws, so many religions, so many legislators and prophets, men
are still as unhappy and as ignorant, as they were six thousand years ago.
Q. Which is the last character of the law of nature?
A. That it is alone sufficient to render men happier and better, because it
comprises all that is good and useful in other laws, either civil or religious, that
is to say, it constitutes essentially the moral part of them; so that if other laws
were divested of it, they would be reduced to chimerical and imaginary opinions devoid of any practical utility....
And such is the power of all these attributes of perfection and truth, that
when in their disputes the theologians can agree upon no article of belief, they
recur to the law of nature, the neglect of which, say they, forced God to send
from time to time prophets to proclaim new laws; as if God enacted laws for
particular circumstances, as men do, especially when the first subsists in such
force, that we may assert it to have been at all times and in all countries the rule
of conscience for every man of sense or understanding.
Q. If, as you say, it emanates immediately from God, does it teach his existence?
A. Yes, most positively: for, to any man whatsoever, who observes with reflection the astonishing spectacle of the universe, the more he meditates on the
properties and attributes of each being, on the admirable order and harmony
of their motions, the more it is demonstrated that there exists a supreme agent,
an universal and identical mover, designated by the appellation of God; and so
true it is that the law of nature suffices to elevate him to the knowledge of God,
that all which men have pretended to know by supernatural means, has constantly turned out ridiculous and absurd, and that they have ever been obliged
to recur to the immutable conceptions of natural reason.
Q. Then it is not true that the followers of the law of nature are atheists?
A. No, it is not true; on the contrary, they entertain stronger and nobler ideas
of the Divinity than most other men; for they do not sully him with the foul
ingredients of all the weaknesses and passions entailed on humanity.
Q. What worship do they pay him?
A. A worship wholly of action; the practice and observance of all the rules
which the supreme wisdom has imposed on the motion of each being; eternal
and unalterable rules, by which it maintains the order and harmony of the
universe, and which, in their relations to man, constitute the law of nature.
Q. Was the law of nature known before this period?
A. It has been at all times spoken of: most legislators pretend to adopt it as the
basis of their laws; but they only quote some ofits precepts, and have had only
vague ideas of its totality.
Q. Why?
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A. Because, though simple in its basis, it forms in its developments and consequences, a complicated whole which requires an extensive knowledge of facts,
joined to all the sagacity of reasoning.
Q. Does not instinct alone teach the law of nature?
A. No; for by instinct is meant nGthing more than that blind sentiment by
which we are actuated indiscriminately towards everything that flatters the
senses.
Q . Why then is it said that the law of nature is engraved in the hearts of all?
A. It is said for two reasons: 1st, because it has been remarked, that there are
acts and sentiments common to all men, and this proceeds from their common
organization; 2dly, because the first philosophers believed that men were born
with ideas already formed, which is now demonstrated to be erroneous.
Q. Philosophers then are fallible?
A. Yes, sometimes.
Q. Why so?
A. 1st, Because they are men; 2dly, because the ignorant call all those who
reason, right or wrong, philosophers; 3dly, because those who reason on many
subjects, and who are the first to reason on them, are liable to be deceived.
Q. If the law of nature be not written, must it not become arbitrary and ideal?
A. No; because it consists entirely in facts, the demonstration of which can be
incessantly renewed to the senses, and constitutes a science as accurate and as
precise as geometry and mathematics; and it is because the law of nature forms
an exact science, that men, born ignorant and living inattentive and heedless,
have had hitherto only a superficial knowledge of it.

(III)
Q. Explain the principles of the law of nature with relations to man.
A. They are simple; all of them are comprised in one fundamental and single
precept.
Q. What is that precept?
A. It is self-preservation.
Q. Is not happiness also a precept of the law of nature?
A. Yes: but as happiness is an accidental state, resulting only from the development of man's faculties and his social system, it is not the immediate and direct
object of nature; it is, in some measure, a superfluity annexed to the necessary
and fundamental object of preservation.
Q. How does nature order man to preserve himself?
A. By two powerful and involuntary sensations, which it has attached, as two
guides, two guardian Geniuses to all his actions: the one, a sensation of pain,
by which it admonishes him of, and deters him from, everything that tends to
destroy him; the other, a sensation of pleasure, by which it attracts and carries
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him towards everything that tends to his preservation and the development of
his existence.
Q. Pleasure therefore is not an evil, a sin, as casuists pretend?
A. No, only in as much as it tends to destroy life, and health, which, by the
avowal of those same casuists, we derive from God himsel£
Q. Is pleasure the principal object of our existence, as some philosophers have
asserted?
A. No; not more than pain; pleasure is an incitement to live, as pain is a repulsion from death.
Q. How do you prove this assertion?
A. By two palpable facts; one, that pleasure when taken immoderately, leads to
destruction; for instance, a man who abuses the pleasure of eating or drinking,
attacks his health, and injuries his life. The other, that pain sometimes leads to
self-preservation: for instance, a man who suffers a mortified member to be cut
off, endures pain in order not to perish totally.
Q. But does not even this prove that our sensations can deceive us respecting
the end of our preservation?
A. Yes; they can momentarily.
Q. How do our sensations deceive us?
A. In two ways; by ignorance, and by passion.
Q. When do they deceive us by ignorance?
A. When we act without knowing the action and effect of objects on our senses:
for example, when a man touches nettles without knowing their stinging quality, or when he swallows opium without knowing its soporiferous effects.
Q. When do they deceive us by passion?
A. When, conscious of the pernicious action of objects, we abandon ourselves,
nevertheless, to the impetuosity of our desires and appetites: for example, when
a man who knows that wine intoxicates, does nevertheless drink it to excess.
Q. What is the result?
A. It results that the ignorance in which we are born, and the unbridled appetites to which we abandon ourselves, are contrary to our preservation; that
consequently the instruction of our minds and the moderation of our passions
are two obligations, two laws which derive immediately from the first law of
preservation.
Q. But ifwe are born ignorant, is not ignorance a law of nature?
A. No more than to remain in the naked and feeble state of infancy. Far from
being a law of nature, ignorance is an obstacle to the practice of all its laws. It
is the real original sin.
Q. Why then have there been moralists who have looked upon it as a virtue and
a perfection?
A. Because, from a whimsical or misanthropical disposition they have con-
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founded the abuse of knowledge with knowledge itself: as if, because men
abuse the power of speech, their tongues should be cut out: as ifperfection and
virtue consisted in the nullity, and not in the development and proper employ
of our faculties.
Q. Instruction is therefore indispensably necessary to man's existence?
A. Yes, so indispensable, that without it he is every instant assailed and
wounded by all that surrounds him; for if he does not know the effects of fire,
he burns himself; those of water, he drowns himself; those of opium, he poisons himself; if, in the savage state, he does not know the wiles of animals, and
the art of seizing game, he perishes through hunger; if, in the social state, he
does not know the course of the seasons, he can neither cultivate the ground,
nor procure nourishment; and so on, of all his actions, respecting all the wants
of his preservation.
Q. But can man separately by himself acquire all this knowledge necessary to
his existence, and to the development of his faculties?
A. No, not without the assistance of his fellow men, and by living in society.
Q. But is not society to man a state against nature?
A. No: it is on the contrary a necessity, a law that nature imposed on him by
the very act of his organization: for 1st, nature has so constituted man, that he
cannot see his species of another sex without feeling emotions and an attraction, the consequences of which induce him to live in a family, which is already
a state of society; 2nd, by endowing him with sensibility, she organized him so
that the sensations of others reflect within him, and excite reciprocal sentiments of pleasure and of grief, which are attractions, and indissoluble ties of
society; 3rd, and finally, the state of society, founded on the wants of man, is
only a further means of fulfilling the law of preservation; and to pretend that
this state is out of nature, because it is more perfect, is the same as to say, that
a bitter and wild fruit of the forest, is no longer the production of nature, when
rendered sweet and delicious by cultivation in our gardens.
Q. Why then have philosophers called the savage state, the state of perfection?
A. Because, as I have told you, the vulgar have often given the name of philosophers to whimsical geniuses, who, from moroseness, from wounded vanity, or from a disgust to the vices of society, have conceived chimerical ideas of
the savage state, in contradiction with their own system of a perfect man.
Q. What is the true meaning of the word philosopher?
A. The word philosopher signifies a lover of wisdom: wherefore, as wisdom
consists in the practice of the laws of nature, the true philosopher is he who
knows those laws extensively and accurately, and who conforms the whole
tenor of his conduct to them.
Q. What is man in the savage state?
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A. A brutal, ignorant animal, a wicked and ferocious beast, like bears and
Ou.rang-outangs.
Q. Is he happy in that state?
A. No: for he only feels momentary sensations; and those sensations are habitually of violent wants which he cannot satisfy, since he is ignorant by nature and
weak by being insulated from his species.
Q. Is he free?
A. No: he is the most abject slave that exists; for his life depends on everything
that surrounds him; he is not free to eat when hungry, to rest when tired, to
warm himself when cold; he is every instant in danger of perishing; wherefore
nature offers but fortuitous examples of such beings; and we see that all the
efforts of the human species, since its origin, solely tend to emerge from that
violent state, by the pressing necessity of self-preservation.
Q. But does not this necessity of preservation engender in individuals egotism,
that is to say self-love? and is not egotism contrary to the social state?
A. No: for, ifby egotism you understand a propensity to hurt our neighbour,
it is no longer self-love, but the hatred of others. Self-love, taken in its true
sense, not only is not contrary to society, but is its firmest support by the
necessity we lie under of not injuring others, lest in return they should injure
us.
Thus man's preservation and the unfolding of his faculties, directed towards this end, are the true law of nature in the production of the human
being: and it is from this simple and fruitful principle that are derived, are
referred, and in its scale are weighed, all ideas of good and evil, of vice and
virtue, of just and unjust, of truth or error, oflawful or forbidden, on which is
founded the morality of individual, or of social man.
(IV)

Q. What is good, according to the law of nature?
A. It is everything that tends to preserve and perfect man.
Q. What is evil?
A. It is everything that tends to man's destruction or deterioration.
Q. What is meant by physical good and evil, and by moral good and evil?
A. By the word physical is understood, whatever acts immediately on the body.
Health is a physical good; and sickness a physical evil. By moral, is meant what
acts by consequences more or less remote. Calumny is a moral evil; a fair
reputation is a moral good, because both one and the other occasion towards
us, on the part of other men, dispositions and habitudes, which are useful or
hurtful to our preservation, and which attack or favor our means of existence.
Q. Everything that tends to preserve or to produce is therefore a good?
A. Yes; and it is for that reason that certain legislators have classed amongst the
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works agreeable to the divinity, the cultivation of a field and the fecundity of
a woman.
Q. Whatever tends to give death is therefore an evil?
A. Yes: and it is for that reason some legislators have extended the idea of evil
and of sin even to the murdering of animals.
Q. The murdering of a man is therefore a crime in the law of nature?
A. Yes: and the greatest that can be committed: for every other evil can be
repaired, but murder alone is irreparable.
Q . What is a sin in the law of nature?
A. It is whatever tends to trouble the order established by nature, for the
preservation and perfection of man and of society.
Q. Can intention be a merit or a crime?
A. No: for it is only an idea void of reality; but it is a commencement of sin and
evil, by the tendency it gives towards action.
Q. What is virtue according to the law of nature?
A. It is the practice of actions useful to the individual and to society.
Q. What is meant by the word individual?
A. It means a man considered separately from every other.
Q. What is vice according to the law of nature?
A. It is the practice of actions prejudicial to the individual and to society.
Q. Have not virtue and vice an object purely spiritual and abstracted from the
senses?
A. No: it is always to a physical end that they finally relate, and that end is
always to destroy or preserve the body.
Q. Have vice and virtue degrees of strength and intenseness?
A. Yes: according to the importance of the faculties which they attack or which
they favor; and according to the number of individuals in whom those faculties
are favored or injured.
Q. Give me some examples.
A. The action of saving a man's life is more virtuous than that of saving his
property; the action of saving the life of ten men, than that of saving only the
life of one, and an action useful to the whole human race is more virtuous than
an action that is only useful to one single nation.
Q. How does the law of nature prescribe the practice of good and virtue, and
forbid that of evil and vice?
A. By the very advantages resulting from the practice of good and virtue for the
preservation of our body, and by the losses which result, to our existence, from
the practice of evil and vice.
Q. Its precepts are then in action?
A. Yes: they are action itself considered in its present effect and in its future
consequences .. . .
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(V)

Q. What is society?
A. It is every reunion of men living together under the clauses of an expressed
or tacit contract, which has for its end their common preservation.
Q. Are the social virtues numerous?
A. Yes: they are in as great number as the kinds of actions useful to society; but
all may be reduced to one only principle.
Q. What is that fundamental principle?
A. It is justice, which alone comprises all the virtues of society.
Q. Why do you say that justice is the fundamental and almost only virtue of
society?
A. Because it alone embraces the practice of all the actions useful to it; and
because all the other virtues, under the denominations of charity, humanity,
probity, love of one's country, sincerity, generosity, simplicity of manners and
modesty, are only varied forms and diversified applications of the axiom, Do
not to another what you would not wish to be done to yourself; which is the
definition of justice.
Q. How does the law of nature prescribe justice?
A. By three physical attributes inherent in the organization of man.
Q. What are those attributes?
A. They are equality, liberty, and property.
Q. How is equality a physical attribute of man?
A. Because all men having equally eyes, hands, mouths, ears, and the necessity
of making use of them in order to live, have, by this reason alone, an equal right
to life, and to the use of the aliments which maintain it; they are all equal before
God.
Q. Do you suppose that all men hear equally, see equally, feel equally, have
equal wants and passions?
A. No; for it is evident and daily demonstrated, that one is short and another
long sighted; that one eats much, another little; that one has mild, another
violent passions; in a word, that one is weak in body and mind, whilst another
is strong in both.
Q. They are therefore really unequal.
A. Yes, in the development of their means, but not in the nature and essence
of those means; they are made of the same stuff, but not in the same dimensions; nor are the weight and value equal. Our language possesses no one word
capable of expressing the identity of nature, and the diversity of its form and
employment. It is a proportional equality; and it is for this reason I have said,
equal before God, and in the order of nature.
Q. How is liberty a physical attribute of man?
A. Because all men having senses sufficient for their preservation, no one want-
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ing the eye of another to see, his ear to hear, his mouth to eat, his feet to walk,
they are all, by this very reason, constituted naturally independent and free; no
man is necessarily subjected to another, nor has he a right to domineer over
him.
Q. But if a man is born strong, has he not a natural right to master the weak
man?
A. No; for it is neither a necessity for him, nor a convention between them. It
is an abusive extension of his strength; and here an abuse is made of the word
right, which in its true meaning implies, justice or reciprocal faculty.
Q. How is property a physical attribute of man?
A. In as much as all men being constituted equal or similar to one another, and
consequently independent and free, each is the absolute master, the full proprietor of his body and of the produce of his labor.
Q. How is justice derived from these three attributes?
A. In this, that men being equal and free, owing nothing to each other, have
no right to require anything from one another, only in as much as they return
an equal value for it; or in as much as the balance of what is given is in equilibrium with what is returned: and it is this equality, this equilibrium which is
called justice, equity; that is to say that equality and justice are but one and the
same word, the same law of nature, of which the social virtues are only applications and derivatives . . . .
(VI)

Q. What do you conclude from all this?
A. I conclude from it that all the social virtues are only the habitude of actions
and useful to society and to the individual who practises them; That they all
refer to the physical object of man's preservation; That nature having implanted in us the want of that preservation, has made a law to us of all its
consequences, and a crime of everything that deviates from it; That we carry
in us the seed of every virtue and of every perfection; That it only requires to
be developed; That we are only happy in as much as we observe the rules
established by nature for the end of our preservation; And that, all wisdom, all
perfection, all law, all virtue, all philosophy, consist in the practice of these
axioms founded on our own organization:
Preserve-thyself; Instruct-thyself; Moderate-thyself;
Live for thy fellow citizens, that they may live for thee.
Condition of Man in the Universe
After a short silence, the Genius resumed in these words:
I have told you already, 0 friend of truth, that man vainly ascribes his
misfortunes to obscure and imaginary agents; in vain he seeks for mysterious
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and remote causes of his ills .. . . In the general order of the universe, his
condition is doubtless subject to inconveniences, and his existence overruled
by superior powers: but those powers are neither the decrees of a blind fatality,
nor the caprices of whimsical and fantastic beings; like the world of which he
forms a part, man is governed by natural laws, regular in their course, consistent
in their effects, immutable in their essence; and those laws, the common source
of good and evil, are not written among the distant stars, or hidden in mysterious codes: inherent in the nature of terrestrial beings, interwoven with their
existence, they are at all times and in all places present to man, they act upon
his senses, they warn his understanding, and dispense to every action its reward
or punishment. Let man then study these laws! let him comprehend his own
nature, and the nature of the beings that surround him, and he will know the
regulators of his destiny; the causes of his evils, and the remedies he ought to
apply.
When the secret power, which animates the universe, formed the globe of
the earth, he implanted in the beings by whom it is inhabited, essential properties which became the law of their individual motion, the bound of their
reciprocal relations, the cause of the harmony of the whole; he thereby established a regular order of causes and effects, of principles and consequences,
which, under an appearance of chance, governs the universe, and maintains the
equilibrium of the world: thus, he gave to fire motion and activity; to air,
elasticity; weight and density to matter; he made air lighter than water, metal
heavier than earth, wood less cohesive than steel; he ordered the flame to
ascend, stones to fall, plants to vegetate; man, who was to be exposed to the
action of so many different beings, and whose frail life was nevertheless to be
preserved, was endowed with the faculty of sensation. By this faculty, all action
hurtful to his existence gives him a feeling of pain and evil; and every favorable
action an impression of pleasure and happiness. By these sensations, man,
sometimes averted from that which wounds his senses, sometimes allured towards that which soothes them, has been obliged to cherish and preserve his
own life. Thus, self-love, the desire of happiness, aversion to pain, are the
essential and primary laws imposed on man by NATURE herself; the laws which
the directing power, whatever it be, has established for his government, and
which, like those of motion in the physical world, are the simple and fruitful
principle of whatever happens in the moral world.
Such then is the condition of man: on one side exposed t<> the action of the
elements which surround him, he is subject to many inevitable evils: and if in
this decree Nature has been severe, on the other hand, just and even indulgent,
she has not only tempered the evils with equivalent good, she has even enabled
him to augment the good and alleviate the evil: she seems to say: "Feeble work
of my hands, I owe you nothing, and I give you life; the world wherein I placed
you was not made for you, yet I grant you the use of it; you will find in it a
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mixture of good and evil; it is for you to distinguish them, and to direct your
footsteps in the paths of flowers and thorns. Be the arbiter of your own lot; I
put your destiny into your hands." -Yes, man is made the artisan of his own
destiny; it is he who has alternately created the successes or reverses of his
fortune: and if, on a review of all the pains with which he has tormented his life,
he finds reason to weep over his own weakness or imprudence, yet, considering
the beginnings from which he set out, and the height attained, perhaps he has
more reason to presume on his strength, and to pride himself on his genius.

Thomas Paine
My Own Mind Is My Own Church

There is scarcely a figure in American letters more vilified, idolized, and ultimately tragic than Thomas Paine (1737-1809). As long as he contented himself with polemical defenses of American independence and the right to political self-determination, he was the darling of the young Republic. But the
moment he stepped over the line of orthodox respectability in religious matters, the same people who earlier had applauded him as a noble patriot excoriated him as a "lilly-livered sinical rogue," "a drunken atheist," a "detested
reptile." The book that prompted these and other attacks was, of course, Ihe
Age of Reason (1794-95), probably the best-known treatise in the history of
American deism. It is ironic, given the hostile reaction to the book's appearance, that Paine intended it as a response to the dogmatic atheism of the
French Revolution. Paine, like his fellow deists on both sides of the Atlantic,
was no atheist. But in the eyes of his Christian contemporaries, apostasy from
scriptural faith was tantamount to godlessness.
Born in Norfolk, England, Paine was plagued with personal and professional embarrassment for the first half of his life. He tried being a corset maker,
a merchant, and a customs official but failed miserably at each. One of the
reasons for his lack of success was no doubt his affinity for the bottle, although
it is doubtful that he was ever quite the hopeless drunkard his enemies later
made him out to be. But another reason was his restlessness, partly temperamental, partly the result of his informal but at one time wide reading, which
served to incapacitate him for steady and rather humdrum employment.
When he was almost forty, Paine left England and immigrated to the
American colonies. There his luck swiftly and dramatically changed. His Common Sense (1776), the first public call for American independence, won him
instant fame. His Crisis papers, written throughout the war, as well as Ihe
Rights of Man (1791-92), a defense of the French Revolution, cemented his
reputation as America's leading political polemicist. Nor was his fame confined
to the new Republic's shores. On the basis of his Rights of Man, Paine was
made an honorary citizen of France and elected in 1792 to its National Convention. But his appeals for moderation during the high point of the Terror,
combined with his pleas for clemency for Louis XVI, soon rankled the militant
leaders of the convention, and Paine eventually found himself incarcerated in
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the Luxembourg prison. If we take seriously his own account of what happened, he barely escaped the usual fate of "enemies" of the Republic.
While in France, Paine wrote parts I and II of The Age of Reason and was
one of the founders of the Society of Theophilanthropy, a Parisian deistical
fraternity. He returned to the United States in 1802, to be greeted by an
almost unimaginable campaign of defamation by opponents of his deistic beliefs. The last seven years of his life were spent in barely tolerable poverty and
increasing bitterness. At his death in 1809, he was in the unenviable position
of having lived long enough to see the American deist movement, which his
Age ofReason had done so much to spark, in its last convulsions. Most of the
influential deists-such as Elihu Palmer, Paine's close friend-had been spared
that final indignity.
Paine's deistic writings qualitatively fall somewhere between the cumbersome and at times incomprehensible ruminations of Ethan Allen and the often
brilliant reflections of Elihu Palmer. He was no intellectual, although he fancied himself so. Nor was his reading especially deep, which he often freely
admitted. Instead, he was an amazingly effective pamphleteer, able to capture
the public imagination with a finely tuned and memorable phrase. In retrospect, his role in the history of American deism is best seen as that ofideologue.
He inflamed emotions and sparked debate with his incendiary locutions, but
he failed to provide enough raw material in the way of solid argumentation for
the fire to catch hold. That task was performed, as we will see in the next
chapter, by Paine's young colleague Elihu Palmer.
The first selections from Paine are taken from The Age of Reason (Part I,
1794). In them, Paine divides his energy between an attack on revealed religion in general and Christianity in particular, and a defense of his deistic religion of nature.
Revelation, Paine correctly argues, is the foundation on which the three
major Western religious traditions are based. This revelation, or the direct
communication of God to humans, is recorded in sacred scripture, and
unswerving belief in its literal truth is mandated. But according to Paine, such
a mandate is unwarranted. Recorded revelation--even allowing that it actually
occurred-is nothing more than hearsay, and often second- or thirdhand at
that. No rational person can or ought to be expected to accept on authority
what is essentially rumor, in either the secular or theological realms. Consequently, the revelatory origins of Christian dogma are evidentially suspect.
After all, "a thing which everybody is required to believe, requires that the
proof and evidence of it should be equal to all, and universal." But revelatory
communications are by definition personal and private.
Similarly, Christianity's endorsement of miracles is a weakness rather than
a strength. Miracles, asserts Paine, are such egregious violations of perceived
regularity in nature that belief in them degrades the Almighty into "the char-
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acter of a show-man, playing tricks to amuse and make the people stare and
wonder." Moreover, acceptance of them is based on anecdotes that are centuries removed from the present day-hardly a firm evidential basis. Given, then,
that stories of miracles violate everything known about the uniformity of creation, and that there is no direct or consensual experience of them, it is more
rational to disbelieve than to believe in their truth. In a rather Humean-sounding passage, Paine rhetorically asks: "Is it more probable that nature should go
out of her course, or that a man should tell a lie?" The answer, for Paine, is
obvious.
In typical deistic style, Paine also rejects Christianity because of what he
perceives as its immorality. Paine is not at his best with this line of reasoning,
however; his analysis is clearly less thoughtful than, for instance, Elihu Palmer's.
Paine supports his point largely by reminding his readers of the historical atrocities committed in the name of Christianity. Palmer, on the other hand, bases
his indictment on a reflective examination of Christian dogma's normative
implications. Nor does Paine, again unlike Palmer, attempt to spell out systematically a theory of morality superior to Christianity's. He simply stipulates,
somewhat mysteriously, that "the knowledge of [morality] exists in every
man's conscience" and that this knowledge includes "doing justice, loving
mercy, and endeavouring to make our fellow-creatures happy."
Paine's charge that the Christian system is immoral does not extend, however, to the person of Jesus. Jesus, in Paine's estimation, advocated a morality
of a "most benevolent kind." He founded no system but "called men to the
practice of moral virtues, and the belief of one God." He was, in short, a good
deist. But his simple religion of virtue and nature was later corrupted by the
irrational metaphysics of his followers-especially, in Paine's opinion, St. Paul,
"that manufacturer of quibbles."
In place of Christian theology, Paine advocates what he calls "true" theology-that is, natural philosophy, "the study of the works of God." The deity
does reveal himself, but not through the nonsensical and immoral pages of
Scripture. Instead, "the word of God is the creation we behold." This is the
true revelation, which not only discloses God's existence but also gives rise to
the physical and moral sciences.
Paine argues that an examination of the book of nature shows that creation
is lawlike in its operations. This uniformity points to the existence of scientific
principles that are immutable and universal and that serve as the necessary basis
of all human knowledge. But the existence of such principles in turn points to
the presence of a First Cause, which established them and shares their characteristics. Thus "true" theology reveals the existence of a rational deity, of an
"Almighty [who] is the great mechanic of the creation, the first philosopher,
and original teacher of all science." This is clearly not much of an argument.
There is no obvious justification for inferring the existence of a divine First
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Cause merely on the basis of perceived regularity in nature. But Paine, ever the
polemicist, was not interested in encumbering the gripping eloquence of The
Age of Reason with philosophical subtleties.
Fortunately, Paine elsewhere attempted to be more circumspect in his reflections on this point. The selection entitled "The Existence of God" is such
an example. The essay was originally delivered at the first public meeting of the
Parisian Society ofTheophilanthropy on 16 January 1797. In it, Paine reiterates The Age ofReason's conviction that the proper source of knowledge about
God is nature rather than Scripture, but he also fleshes out his earlier truncated
argument for the existence of the deity as First Cause. Ifwe examine creation,
he claims, we discover that matter has certain predictable properties. Many of
these properties can be explained in terms of the nature of matter itself But
one attribute associated with matter points beyond it-motion. "The natural
state of matter ... is a state of rest. Motion, or change of place, is the effect of
an external cause acting upon matter." Moreover, motion ( or Newton's gravitation) can be either directly experienced or deduced as an attribute of all
matter, both on earth and throughout the solar system. It holds reality together and allows for the lawlike interactions of its constituents. Since motion
is not a property of material bodies themselves, and since it permeates all of
reality and thus maintains its integrity, it must have originated with and is kept
in existence by an external cause: "and that cause man calls GOD."
The final selection from Paine, "My Private Thoughts on a Future State,"
was written, appropriately enough, toward the end of his life. For Paine, the
Christian insistence that humans can be divided into righteous and wicked (or
sheep and goats) is too harsh. The race may be numerically divisible, but not
morally so. A more rational- and just- alternative is to suppose that some
individuals are clearly virtuous, some clearly wicked, while others-possibly the
majority-are "neither good nor bad." If future existence after physical death
is a possibility, Paine speculates, it follows that the first group will be rewarded,
the second punished, and the third, "too insignificant for notice, will be
dropped entirely." Such a conjecture, Paine concludes, is more "consistent
with my idea of God's justice" than the Christian dichotomy of eternal punishment or reward. From first to last, then, Paine remained loyal to the credo
expressed in the opening pages of The Age of Reason: "My own mind is my
own church."

The Age of Reason
The Author)s Profession of Faith
... I believe in one God, and no more; and I hope for happiness beyond this
life.
I believe in the equality of man, and I believe that religious duties consist
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in doing justice, loving mercy, and endeavouring to make our fellow-creatures
happy.
. . . I do not believe in the creed professed by the Jewish church, by the
Roman church, by the Greek church, by the Turkish church, by the Protestant
church, nor by any church that I know of. My own mind is my own church.
All national institutions of churches, whether Jewish, Christian, or Turkish,
appear to me no other than human inventions set up to terrify and enslave
mankind, and monopolize power and profit.
I do not mean by this declaration to condemn those who believe otherwise;
they have the same right to their belief as I have to mine. But it is necessary to
the happiness of man, that he be mentally faithful to himself. Infidelity does not
consist in believing, or in disbelieving; it consists in professing to believe what
he does not believe.
It is impossible to calculate the moral mischief, if I may so express it, that
mental lying has produced in society. When a man has so far corrupted and
prostituted the chastity of his mind, as to subscribe his professional belief to
things he does not believe, he has prepared himself for the commission of every
other crime. He takes up the trade of a priest for the sake of gain, and, in order
to qualify himself for that trade, he begins with a perjury. Can we conceive
anything more destructive to morality than this?

Of Missions and Revelations
Every national church or religion has established itself by pretending some
special mission from God, communicated to certain individuals. The Jews have
their Moses; the Christians their Jesus Christ, their apostles and saints; and
the Turks their Mahomet; as if the way to God was not open to every man
alike.
Each of those churches shows certain books, which they call revelation, or
the Word of God. The Jews say that their Word of God was given by God to
Moses face to face; the Christians say, that their Word of God came by divine
inspiration; and the Turks say, that their Word of God ( the Koran) was brought
by an angel from heaven. Each of those churches accuses the other of unbelief;
and, for my own part, I disbelieve them all.
As it is necessary to affix right ideas to words, I will, before I proceed further
into the subject, offer some observations on the word revelation. Revelation
when applied to religion, means something communicated immediately from
God to man.
No one will deny or dispute the power of the Almighty to make such a
communication ifhe pleases. But admitting, for the sake of a case, that something has been revealed to a certain person, and not revealed to any other
person, it is revelation to that person only. When he tells it to a second person,
a second to a third, a third to a fourth, and so on, it ceases to be a revelation
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to all those persons. It is revelation to the first person only, and hearsay to every
other, and, consequently, they are not obliged to believe it.
It is a contradiction in terms and ideas to call anything a revelation that
comes to us at second hand, either verbally or in writing. Revelation is necessarily limited to the first communication. After this, it is only an account of
something which that person says was a revelation made to him; and though
he may find himself obliged to believe it, it cannot be incumbent on me to
believe it in the same manner, for it was not a revelation made to me, and I have
only his word for it that it was made to him.
When Moses told the children of Israel that he received the two tables of
the commandments from the hand of God, they were not obliged to believe
him, because they had no other authority for it than his telling them so; and
I have no other authority for it than some historian telling me so, the commandments carrying no internal evidence of divinity with them. They contain
some good moral precepts such as any man qualified to be a lawgiver or a
legislator could produce himself, without having recourse to supernatural intervention. (It is, however, necessary to except the declaration which says that
God visits the sins of the fathers upon the children. This is contrary to every
principle of moral justice.)
When I am told that the Koran was written in Heaven, and brought to
Mahomet by an angel, the account comes to near the same kind of hearsay
evidence and second hand authority as the former. I did not see the angel
myself, and therefore I have a right not to believe it.
When also I am told that a woman, called the Virgin Mary, said, or gave
out, that she was with child without any cohabitation with a man, and that her
betrothed husband, Joseph, said that an angel told him so, I have a right to
believe them or not: such a circumstance required a much stronger evidence
than their bare word for it: but we have not even this; for neither Joseph nor
Mary wrote any such matter themselves. It is only reported by others that they
said so. It is hearsay upon hearsay, and I do not choose to rest my belief upon
such evidence.
It is, however, not difficult to account for the credit that was given to the
story of Jesus Christ being the Son of God. He was born when the heathen
mythology had still some fashion and repute in the world, and that mythology
had prepared the people for the belief of such a story. Almost all the extraordinary men that lived under the heathen mythology were reputed to be the
sons of some of their Gods. It was not a new thing at that time to believe a man
to have been celestially begotten; the intercourse of gods with women was
then a matter of familiar opinion. Their Jupiter, according to their accounts,
had cohabited with hundreds; the story had therefore nothing in it either new,
wonderful, or obscene; it was conformable to the opinions that then prevailed
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among the people called Gentiles, or mythologists, and it was those people
only that believed it. The Jews, who had kept strictly to the belief of one God,
and no more, and who had always rejected the heathen mythology, never
credited the story.
. . . That many good men have believed this strange fable, and lived very
good lives under that belief (for credulity is not a crime) is what I have no
doubt of. In the first place, they were educated to believe it, and they would
have believed anything else in the same manner. There are also many who have
been so enthusiastically enraptured by what they conceived to be the infinite
love of God to man, in making a sacrifice ofhimself, that the vehemence of the
idea has forbidden and deterred them from examining into the absurdity and
profaneness of the story. The more unnatural anything is, the more is it capable
of becoming the object of dismal admiration .
. . . But if objects for gratitude and admiration are our desire, do they not
present themselves every hour to our eyes? Do we not see a fair creation prepared to receive us the instant we are born-a world furnished to our hands,
that cost us nothing? Is it we that light up the sun; that pour down the rain;
and fill the earth with abundance? Whether we sleep or wake, the vast machinery of the universe still goes on. Are these things, and the blessings they indicate in future, nothing to us? Can our gross feelings be excited by no other
subjects than tragedy and suicide? or is the gloomy pride of man become so
intolerable, that nothing can flatter it but a sacrifice of the Creator?

OfJesus Christ
Nothing that is here said can apply, even with the most distant disrespect, to
the real character ofJesus Christ. He was a virtuous and an amiable man. The
morality that he preached and practised was of the most benevolent kind; and
though similar systems of morality had been preached by Confucius, and by
some of the Greek philosophers, many years before, by the Quakers since, and
by many good men in all ages, it has not been exceeded by any.
Jesus Christ wrote no account of himself, of his birth, parentage, or anything else. Not a line of what is called the New Testament is of his writing. The
history of him is altogether the work of other people; and as to the account
given of his resurrection and ascension, it was the necessary counterpart to the
story of his birth. His historians, having brought him into the world in a supernatural manner, were obliged to take him out again in the same manner, or the
first part of the story must have fallen to the ground.
The wretched contrivance with which this latter part is told, exceeds everything that went before it. The first part, that of the miraculous conception, was
not a thing that admitted of publicity; and therefore the tellers of this part of
the story had this advantage, that though they might not be credited, they
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could not be detected. They could not be expected to prove it, because it was
not one of those things that admitted of proof, and it was impossible that the
person of whom it was told could prove it himself.
But the resurrection of a dead person from the grave, and his ascension
through the air, is a thing very different, as to the evidence it admits of, to the
invisible conception of a child in the womb. The resurrection and ascension,
supposing them to have taken place, admitted of public and ocular demonstration, like that of the ascension of a balloon, or the sun at noon day, to all
Jerusalem at least. A thing which everybody is required to believe, requires that
the proof and evidence of it should be equal to all, and universal; and as the
public visibility of this last related act was the only evidence that could give
sanction to the former part, the whole of it falls to the ground, because that
evidence never was given. Instead of this, a small number of persons, not more
than eight or nine, are introduced as proxies for the whole world, to say they
saw it, and all the rest of the world are called upon to believe it. But it appears
that Thomas did not believe the resurrection; and, as they say, would not
believe without having ocular and manual demonstration himself So neither
will I; and the reason is equally as good for me, and for every other person, as
for Thomas ....

Of Scripture
... I now go on to the book called the New Testament. The new Testament!
that is, the new Will, as if there could be two wills of the Creator.
Had it been the object or the intention of Jesus Christ to establish a new
religion, he would undoubtedly have written the system himself, or procured it
to be written in his life time. But there is no publication extant authenticated with his name. All the books called the New Testament were written
after his death. He was a Jew by birth and by profession; and he was the son
of God in like manner that every other person is; for the Creator is the Father
of All.
The first four books, called Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, do not give
a history of the life of Jesus Christ, but only detached anecdotes of him. It
appears from these books, that the whole time of his being a preacher was not
more than eighteen months; and it was only during this short time that those
men became acquainted with him. They make mention of him at the age of
twelve years, sitting, they say, among the Jewish doctors, asking and answering
them questions. As this was several years before their acquaintance with him
began, it is most probable they had this anecdote from his parents. From this
time there is no account of him for about sixteen years. Where he lived, or how
he employed himself during this interval, is not known. Most probably he was
working at his father's trade, which was that of a carpenter. It does not appear
that he had any school education, and the probability is, that he could not
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write, for his parents were extremely poor, as appears from their not being able
to pay for a bed when he was born.
It is somewhat curious that the three persons whose names are the most
universally recorded were of very obscure parentage. Moses was a foundling;
Jesus Christ was born in a stable; and Mahomet was a mule driver. The first and
the last of these men were founders of different systems of religion; but Jesus
Christ founded no new system. He called men to the practice of moral virtues;
and the belief of one God. The great trait in his character is philanthropy.
The manner in which he was apprehended shews that he was not much
known at that time; and it shews also that the meetings he then held with his
followers were in secret; and that he had given over or suspended preaching
publicly. Judas could no otherways betray him than by giving information
where he was, and pointing him out to the officers that went to arrest him; and
the reason for employing and paying Judas to do this could arise only from the
causes already mentioned, that of his not being much known, and living concealed.
The idea of his concealment, not only agrees very ill with his reputed divinity, but associates with it something of pusillanimity; and his being betrayed, or
in other words, his being apprehended, on the information of one of his followers, shews that he did not intend to be apprehended, and consequently that
he did not intend to be crucified.
The Christian mythologists tell us that Christ died for the sins of the world,
and that he came on purpose to die. Would it not then have been the same if
he had died of a fever or of the small pox, of old age, or of anything else?
The declaratory sentence which, they say, was passed upon Adam, in case
he ate of the apple, was not, that thou shalt surely be crucified, but, thou shalt
surely die. The sentence was death, and not the manner of dying. Crucifixion,
therefore, or any other particular manner of dying, made no part of the sentence that Adam was to suffer, and consequently, even upon their own tactic,
it could make no part of the sentence that Christ was to suffer in the room of
Adam. A fever would have done as well as a cross, if there was any occasion for
either.
This sentence of death, which, they tell us, was thus passed upon Adam,
must either have meant dying naturally, that is, ceasing to live, or have meant
what these mythologists call damnation; and consequently, the act of dying on
the part of Jesus Christ, must, according to their system, apply as a prevention
to one or other of these two things happening to Adam and to us.
That it does not prevent our dying is evident, because we all die; and if their
accounts oflongevity be true, men die faster since the crucifixion than before:
and with respect to the second explanation, (including with it the natural
death of Jesus Christ as a substitute for the eternal death or damnation of all
mankind), it is impertinently representing the Creator as coming off, or revok-
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ing the sentence, by a pun or a quibble upon the word death. That manufacturer of quibbles, St. Paul, ifhe wrote the books that bear his name, has helped
this quibble on by making another quibble upon the word Adam. He makes
there to be two Adams; the one who sins in fact, and suffers by proxy; the other
who sins by proxy, and suffers in fact. A religion thus interlarded with quibble,
subterfuge, and pun, has a tendency to instruct its professors in the practice of
these arts. They acquire the habit without being aware of the cause.
If Jesus Christ was the being which those mythologists tell us he was, and
that he came into this world to suffer, which is a word they sometimes use
instead of to die, the only real suffering he could have endured would have been
to live. His existence here was a state of exilement or transportation from
heaven, and the way back to his original country was to die. -In fine, everything in this strange system is the reverse of what it pretends to be. It is the
reverse of truth, and I become so tired of examining into its inconsistencies and
absurdities, that I hasten to the conclusion of it, in order to proceed to something better.
How much, or what parts of the books called the New Testament, were
written by the persons whose names they bear, is what we can know nothing
of, neither are we certain in what language they were originally written. The
matters they now contain may be classed under two heads: anecdote, and
epistolary correspondence.
The four books already mentioned, Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, are
altogether anecdotal. They relate events after they had taken place. They tell
w);iat Jesus Christ did and said, and what others did and said to him; and in
several instances they relate the same event differently. Revelation is necessarily
out of the question with respect to those books; not only because of the disagreement of the writers, but because revelation cannot be applied to the
relating of facts by the persons who saw them done, not to the relating or
recording of any discourse or conversation by those who heard it. The book
called the Acts of the Apostles (an anonymous work) belongs also to the anecdotal part.
All the other parts of the New Testament, except the book of enigmas,
called the Revelations, are a collection ofletters under the name of epistles; and
the forgery of letters has been such a common practice in the world, that the
probability is at least equal, whether they are genuine or forged. . . .

Of Redemption
. The church has set up a system of religion very contradictory to the
character of the person whose name it bears. It has set up a religion of pomp
and revenue in pretended imitation of a person whose life was humility and
poverty.
The invention of a purgatory, and of the releasing of souls therefrom, by
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prayers, bought of the church with money; the selling of pardons, dispensa tions, and indulgences, are revenue laws, without bearing that name or carrying that appearance. But the case nevertheless is, that those things derive their
origin from the proxysm of the crucifixion, and the theory deduced therefrom,
which was, that one person could stand in the place of another, and could
perform meritorious services for him. The probability, therefore, is that the
whole theory or doctrine ofwhat is called the redemption (which is said to have
been accomplished by the act of one person in the room of another) was
originally fabricated on putpose to bring forward and build all those secondary
and pecuniary redemptions upon; and that the passages in the books upon
which the idea or theory of redemption is built, have been manufactured and
fabricated for that purpose. Why are we to give this church credit, when she
tells us that those books are genuine in every part, any more than we give her
credit for everything else she has told us; or for the miracles she says she has
performed? That she could fabricate writings is certain, because she could write;
and the composition of the writings in question, is of that kind that anybody
might do it; and that she did fabricate them is not more inconsistent with
probability, than that she should tell us, as she has done, that she could and did
work miracles.
Since, then, no external evidence can, at this long distance of time, be
produced to prove whether the church fabricated the doctrine called redemption or not, (for such evidence, whether for or against, would be subject to the
same suspicion ofbeing fabricated), the case can only be referred to the internal
evidence which the thing carries of itself; and this affords a very strong presumption ofits being a fabrication. For the internal evidence is, that the theory
or doctrine of redemption has for its basis an idea of pecuniary justice, and not
that of moral justice.
Ifl owe a person money, and cannot pay him, and he threatens to put me
in prison, another person can take the debt upon himself, and pay it for me. But
if I have committed a crime, every circumstance of the case is changed. Moral
justice cannot take the innocent for the guilty even if the innocent would offer
itsel£ To suppose justice to do this, is to destroy the principle of its existence,
which is the thing itself. It is then no longer justice. It is indiscriminate revenge.
This single reflection will shew that the doctrine of redemption is founded
on a mere pecuniary idea corresponding to that of a debt which another person
might pay; and as this pecuniary idea corresponds again with the system of
second redemptions, obtained through the means of money given to the
church for pardons, the probability is that the same persons fabricated both the
one and the other of those theories; and that, in truth, there is no such thing
as redemption; that it is fabulous; and that man stands in the same relative
condition with his Maker he ever did stand, since man existed; and that it is his
greatest consolation to think so.
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Let him believe this, and he will live more consistently and morally, than by
any other system. It is by his being taught to contemplate himself as an out-law,
as an out-cast, as a beggar, as a mumper, as one thrown as it were on a dunghill,
at an immense distance from his Creator, and who must make his approaches
by creeping, and cringing to intermediate beings, that he conceives either a
contemptuous disregard for everything under the name of religion, or becomes indifferent, or turns what he calls devout. In the latter case, he consumes
his life in grief, or the affectation ofit. His prayers are reproaches. His humility
is ingratitude. He calls himself a worm, and the fertile earth a dunghill; and all
the blessings of life by the thankless name of vanities. He despises the choicest
gift of God to man, the GIFT OF REASON; and having endeavoured to force
upon himself the belief of a system against which reason revolts, he ungratefully
calls it human reason, as if man could give reason to himsel£ . . .

Of Miracles
Mankind have conceived to themselves certain laws, by which what
they call nature is supposed to act; and that a miracle is something contrary to
the operation and effect of those laws. But unless we know the whole extent
of those laws, and of what are commonly called the powers of nature, we are
not able to judge whether any thing that may appear to us wonderful or miraculous, be within, or be beyond, or be contrary to, her natural power of
acting . . ..
Of all the modes of evidence that ever were invented to obtain belief to any
system or opinion to which the name of religion has been given, that of
miracle, however successful the imposition may have been, is the most inconsistent. For, in the first place, whenever recourse is had to show, for the purpose
of procuring that belief(for a miracle, under any idea of the word, is a show)
it implies a lameness or weakness in the doctrine that is preached. And, in the
second place, it is degrading the Almighty into the character of a show-man,
playing tricks to amuse and make the people stare and wonder. It is also the
most equivocal sort of evidence that can be set up; for the belief is not to
depend upon the thing called a miracle, but upon the credit of the reporter,
who says that he saw it; and, therefore, the thing, were it true, would have no
better chance of being believed than if it were a lie.
Suppose I were to say, that when I sat down to write this book, a hand
presented itself in the air, took up the pen and wrote every word that is herein
written; would any body believe me? Certainly they would not. Would they
believe me a whit the more if the thing had been a fact? Certainly they would
not. Since then a real miracle, were it to happen, would be subject to the same
fate as the falsehood, the inconsistency becomes the greater of supposing the
Almighty would make use of means that would not answer the purpose for
which they were intended, even if they were real.
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Ifwe are to suppose a miracle to be something so entirely out of the course
of what is called nature, that she must go out of that course to accomplish it,
and we see an account given of such a miracle by the person who said he saw
it, it raises a question in the mind very easily decided, which is, -Is it more
probable that nature should go out of her course, or that a man should tell a
lie? We have never seen, in our time, nature go out of her course; but we have
good reason to believe that millions of lies have been told in the same time;
it is, therefore, at least millions to one, that the reporter of a miracle tells a
lie ....
In every point of view in which those things called miracles can be placed
and considered, the reality of them is improbable, and their existence unnecessary. They would not, as before observed, answer any useful purpose, even if
they were true; for it is more difficult to obtain belief to a miracle, than to a
principle evidently moral, without any miracle. Moral principle speaks universally for itsel£ Miracle could be but a thing of the moment, and seen but by a
few; after this it requires a transfer offaith from God to man to believe a miracle
upon man's report. Instead, therefore, of admitting the recitals of miracles as
evidence of any system of religion being true, they ought to be considered as
symptoms ofits being fabulous. It is necessary to the full and upright character
of truth that it rejects the crutch; and it is consistent with the character of fable
to seek the aid that truth rejects. Thus much for Mystery and Miracle . ...

Of the Immorality of Christianity
The most detestable wickedness, the most horrid cruelties, and the greatest
miseries, that have affiicted the human race, have had their origin in this thing
called revelation, or revealed religion. It has been the most dishonourable belief
against the character of the divinity, the most destructive to morality, and the
peace and happiness of man, that ever was propagated since man began to
exist. It is better, far better, that we admitted, if it were possible, a thousand
devils to roam at large, and to preach publicly the doctrine of devils, if there
were any such, than that we permitted one such imposter and monster as
Moses, Josh.ua, Samuel, and the Bible prophets, to come with the pretended
word of God in his mouth, and have credit among us.
Whence arose all the horrid assassinations of whole nations of men,
women, and infants, with which the Bible is filled; and the bloody persecutions,
and tortures unto death and religious wars, that since that time have laid Europe in blood and ashes; whence arose they, but from this impious thing called
revealed religion, and this monstrous belief that God has spoken to man? The
lies of the Bible have been the cause of the one, and the lies of the Testament
of the other.
Some Christians pretend that Christianity was not established by the sword;
but of what period of time do they speak? It was impossible that twelve men
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could begin with the sword: they had not the power; but no sooner were the
professors of Christianity sufficiently powerful to employ the sword than they
did so, and the stake and faggot too; and Mahomet could not do it sooner. By
the same spirit that Peter cut off the ear of the high priest's servant (if the story
be true) he would cut off his head, and the head of his master, had he been
able. Besides this, Christianity grounds itself originally upon the Hebrew Bible,
and the Bible was established altogether by the sword, and that in the worst use
ofit--not to terrify, but to extirpate. The Jews made no converts; they butchered all. The Bible is the sire of the Testament, and both are called the word of
God. The Christians read both books; the ministers preach from both books;
and this thing called Christianity is made up of both. It is then false to say that
Christianity was not established by the sword.
The only sect that has not persecuted are the Quakers; and the only reason
that can be given for it is, that they are rather Deists than Christians. They do
not believe much about Jesus Christ, and they call the scriptures a dead letter.
Had they called them by a worse name, they had been nearer the truth.
It is incumbent on every man who reverences the character of the Creator,
and who wishes to lessen the catalogue of artificial miseries, and remove the
cause that has sown persecutions thick among mankind, to expel all ideas of a
revealed religion as a dangerous heresy, and an impious fraud. What is it that
we have learned from this pretended thing called revealed religion? Nothing
that is useful to man, and every thing that is dishonourable to his Maker. What
is it the Bible teaches us?-rapine, cruelty, and murder. What is it the Testament teaches us?-to believe that the Almighty committed debauchery with a
woman engaged to be married; and the belief of this debauchery is called faith.
As to the fragments of morality that are irregularly and thinly scattered in
those books, they make no part of this pretended thing, revealed religion. They
are the natural dictates of conscience, and the bonds by which society is held
together, and without which it cannot exist; and are nearly the same in all
religions, and in all societies. The Testament teaches nothing new upon this
subject, and where it attempts to exceed, it becomes mean and ridiculous. The
doctrine of not retaliating injuries is much better expressed in Proverbs, which
is a collection as well from the Gentiles as the Jews, than it is in the Testament.
It is there said, (XXV. 21) "If thine enemy be hungry,give him bread to eat; and
ifhe be thirsty,give him water to drink:" but when it is said, as in the Testament,
"If a man smite thee on the right cheek, turn to him the other also," it is assassinating the dignity of forbearance, and sinking man into a spaniel.
Loving ofenemies is another dogma of feigned morality, and has besides no
meaning. It is incumbent on man, as a moralist, that he does not revenge an
injury; and it is equally as good in a political sense, for there is no end to
retaliation; each retaliates on the other, and calls it justice: but to love in proportion to the injury, if it could be done, would be to offer a premium for a
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crime. Besides, the word enemies is too vague and general to be used in a moral
maxim, which ought always to be clear and defined, like a proverb. If a man be
the enemy of another from mistake and prejudice, as in the case of religious
opinions, and sometimes in politics, that man is different to an enemy at heart
with a criminal intention; and it is incumbent upon us, and it contributes also
to our own tranquillity, that we put the best construction upon a thing that it
will bear. But even this erroneous motive in him makes no motive for love on
the other part; and to say that we can love voluntarily, and without a motive,
is morally and physically impossible.
Morality is injured by prescribing to it duties that, in the first place, are
impossible to be performed, and if they could be would be productive of evil;
or, as before said, be premiums for crime. The maxim of doing as we would be
done unto does not include this strange doctrine ofloving enemies; for no man
expects to be loved himself for his crime or for his enmity.
Those who preach this doctrine of loving their enemies, are in general the
greatest persecutors, and they act consistently by so doing; for the doctrine is
hypocritical, and it is natural that hypocrisy should act the reverse of what it
preaches. For my own part, I disown the doctrine, and consider it as a feigned
or fabulous morality; yet the man does not exist that can say I have persecuted
him, or any man, or any set of men, either in the American Revolution, or in
the French Revolution; or that I have, in any case, returned evil for evil. But
it is not incumbent on man to reward a bad action with a good one, or to
return good for evil; and wherever it is done, it is a voluntary act, and not a
duty. It is also absurd to suppose that such doctrine can make any part of a
revealed religion. We imitate the moral character of the Creator by forbearing
with each other, for he forbears with all; but this doctrine would imply that he
loved man, not in proportion as he was good, but as he was bad.
If we consider the nature of our condition here, we must see there is no
occasion for such a thing as revealed religion. What is it we want to know? Does
not the creation, the universe we behold, preach to us the existence of an
Almighty power, that governs and regulates the whole? And is not the evidence
that this creation holds out to our senses infinitely stronger than any thing we
can read in a book, that any imposter might make and call the word of God?
As for morality, the knowledge of it exists in every man's conscience.

Of Christian Theology and True Theology
As to the Christian system of faith, it appears to me as a species of atheism; a
sort of religious denial of God. It professes to believe in a man rather than in
God. It is a compound made up chiefly of man-ism with but little deism, and
is as near to atheism as twilight is to darkness. It introduces between man and
his Maker an opaque body, which it calls a redeemer, as the moon introduces
her opaque self between the earth and the sun, and it produces by this means
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a religious or an irreligious eclipse of light. It has put the whole orbit ofreason
into shade.
The effect of this obscurity has been that of turning everything upside
down, and representing it in reverse; and among the revolutions it has thus
magically produced, it has made a revolution in Theology.
That which is now called natural philosophy, embracing the whole circle of
science, of which astronomy occupies the chief place, is the study of the works
of God, and of the power and wisdom of God in his works, and is the true
theology.
As to the theology that is now studied in its place, it is the study of human
opinions and of human fancies concerning God. It is not the study of God
himself in the works that he has made, but in the works or writings that man
has made; and it is not among the least of the mischiefs that the Christian
system has done to the world, that it has abandoned the original and beautiful
system of theology, like a beautiful innocent, to distress and reproach, to make
room for the hag of superstition ....
It is a fraud of the Christian system to call the sciences human inventions,
it is only the application of them that is human. Every science has for its basis
a system of principles as fixed and unalterable as those by which the universe
is regulated and governed. Man cannot make principles, he can only discover
them.
For example: Every person who looks at an almanack sees an account when
an eclipse will take place, and he sees also that it never fails to take place
according to the account there given. This shews that man is acquainted with
the laws by which the heavenly bodies move. But it would be something worse
than ignorance, were any church on earth to say that those laws are an human
invention.
It would also be ignorance, or something worse, to say that the scientific
principles, by the aid of which man is enabled to calculate and foreknow when
an eclipse will take place, are an human invention. Man cannot invent any thing
that is eternal and immutable; and the scientific principles he employs for this
purpose must be, and are, of necessity, as eternal and immutable as the laws by
which the heavenly bodies move, or they could not be used as they are to
ascertain the time when, and the manner how, an eclipse will take place.
The scientific principles that man employs to obtain the foreknowledge of
an eclipse, or of any thing else relating to the motion of the heavenly bodies,
are contained chiefly in that part of science that is called trigonometry, or the
properties of a triangle, which, when applied to the study of the heavenly
bodies, is called astronomy; when applied to direct the course of a ship on the
ocean, it is called navigation; when applied to the construction of figures drawn
by a rule and compass, it is called geometry; when applied to the construction
of plans of edifices, it is called architecture; when applied to the measurement
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of any portion of the surface of the earth, it is called land-surveying. In fine, it
is the soul of science. It is an eternal truth: it contains the mathematical demonstration of which man speaks, and the extent of its uses are unknown.
It may be said, that man can make or draw a triangle, and therefore a
triangle is an human invention.
But the triangle, when drawn, is no other than the image of the principle:
it is a delineation to the eye, and from thence to the mind, of a principle that
would otherwise be imperceptible. The triangle does not make the principle,
any more than a candle taken into a room that was dark, makes the chairs and
tables that before were invisible. All the properties of a triangle exist independently of the figure, and existed before any triangle was drawn or thought
of by man. Man had no more to do in the formation of those properties or
principles, than he had to do in making the laws by which the heavenly
bodies move; and therefore the one must have the same divine origin as the
other.
In the same manner as, it may be said, that man can make a triangle, so also,
may it be said, he can make the mechanical instrument called a lever. But the
principle by which the lever acts, is a thing distinct from the instrument, and
would exist if the instrument did not; it attaches itself to the instrument after
it is made; the instrument, therefore, can act no otherwise than it does act;
neither can all the efforts of human invention make it act otherwise. That
which, in all such cases, man calls the effect, is no other than the principle itself
rendered perceptible to the senses.
Since, then, man cannot make principles, from whence did he gain a
knowledge of them, so as to be able to apply them, not only to things on earth,
but to ascertain the motion of bodies so immensely distant from him as all the
heavenly bodies are? From whence, I ask, could he gain that knowledge, but
from the study of the true theology?
It is the structure of the universe that has taught this knowledge to man.
That structure is an ever-existing exhibition of every principle upon which
every part of mathematical science is founded. The offspring of this science is
mechanics; for mechanics is no other than the principles of science applied
practically. The man who proportions the several parts of a mill uses the same
scientific principles as if had the power of constructing an universe, but as he
cannot give to matter that invisible agency by which all the component parts
of the immense machine of the universe have influence upon each other, and
act in motional unison together, without any apparent contact, and to which
man has given the name of attraction, gravitation, and repulsion, he supplies
the place of that agency by the humble imitation of teeth and cogs. All the
parts of man's microcosm must visibly touch. But could he gain a knowledge
of that agency, so as to be able to apply it in practice, we might then say that
another canonical book of the word of God had been discovered. . . .
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It is from the study of the true theology that all our knowledge of science
is derived; and it is from that knowledge that all the arts have originated.
The Almighty lecturer, by displaying the principles of science in the structure of the universe, has invited man to study and to imitation. It is as ifhe had
said to the inhabitants of this globe that we call ours, "I have made an earth for
man to dwell upon, and I have rendered the starry heavens visible, to teach him
science and the arts. He can now provide for his own comfort, AND LEARN
FROM MY MUNIFICENCE TO ALL, TO BE KIND TO EACH OTHER."

Of what use is it, unless it be to teach man something, that his eye is
endowed with the power of beholding, to an incomprehensible distance, an
immensity of worlds revolving in the ocean of space? Or of what use is it that
this immensity of worlds is visible to man? What has man to do with the
Pleiades, with Orion, with Sirius, with the star he calls the north star, with the
moving orbs he has named Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Venus, and Mercury, if no
uses are to follow from their being visible? A less power of vision would have
been sufficient for man, if the immensity he now possesses were given only to
waste itself, as it were, on an immense desert of space glittering with shows.
It is only by contemplating what he calls the starry heavens, as the book and
school of science, that he discovers any use in their being visible to him, or any
advantage resulting from his immensity of vision. But when he contemplates
the subject in this light, he sees an additional motive for saying, that nothing
was made in vain; for in vain would be this power of vision if it taught man
nothing.

Qf True Revelation; and of God
But some perhaps will say-Are we to have no word of God-no revelation?
I answer yes. There is a Word of God; there is a revelation.
THE WORD OF GOD IS THE CREATION WE BEHOLD: And it is in this word,
which no human invention can counterfeit or alter, that God speaketh universally to man. . . .
It is always necessary that the means that are to accomplish any end be
equal to the accomplishment of that end, or the end cannot be accomplished.
It is in this that the difference between finite and infinite power and wisdom
discovers itself. Man frequently fails in accomplishing his end, from a natural
inability of the power to the purpose; and frequently from the want of wisdom
to apply power properly. But it is impossible for infinite power and wisdom to
fail as man faileth. The means it useth are always equal to the end: but human
language, more especially as there is not an universal language, is incapable of
being used as an universal means of unchangeable and uniform information;
and therefore it is not the means that God useth in manifesting himself universally to man.
It is only in the CREATION that all our ideas and conceptions of a word ofGod

My Own Mind Is My Own Church

can unite. The Creation speaketh an universal language, independently of
human speech or human language, multiplied and various as they be. It is an
ever existing original, which every man can read. It cannot be forged; it cannot
be counterfeited; it cannot be lost; it cannot be altered; it cannot be suppressed. It does not depend upon the will of man whether it shall be published
or not; it publishes itself from one end of the earth to the other. It preaches to
all nations and to all worlds; and this word of God reveals to man all that is
necessary for man to know of God.
Do we want to contemplate his power? We see it in the immensity of the
creation. Do we want to contemplate his wisdom? We see it in the unchangeable order by which the incomprehensible Whole is governed. Do we want to
contemplate his munificence? We see it in the abundance with which he fills the
earth. Do we want to contemplate his mercy? We see it in his not withholding
that abundance even from the unthankful. In fine, do we want to know what
God is? Search not the book called the scripture, which any human hand might
make, but the scripture called the Creation.

The only idea man can affix to the name of God, is that of a first cause, the
cause of all things. And, incomprehensibly difficult as it is for a man to conceive
what a first cause is, he arrives at the belief of it, from the tenfold greater
difficulty of disbelieving it. It is difficult beyond description to conceive that
space can have no end; but it is more difficult to conceive an end. It is difficult
beyond the power of man to conceive an eternal duration of what we call time;
but it is more impossible to conceive a time when there shall be no time.
In like manner of reasoning, everything we behold carries in itself the internal evidence that it did not make itself. Every man is an evidence to himself,
that he did not make himself; neither could his father make himself, nor his
grandfather, nor any of his race; neither could any tree, plant, or animal make
itself; and it is the conviction arising from this evidence, that carries us on, as
it were, by necessity, to the belief of a first cause eternally existing, of a nature
totally different to any material existence we know of, and by the power of
which all things exist; and this first cause, man calls God.
It is only by the exercise of reason, that man can discover God. Take away
that reason, and he would be incapable of understanding anything; and in this
case it would be just as consistent to read even the book called the Bible to a
horse as to a man. How then is it that those people pretend to reject reason?
Almost the only parts in the book called the Bible, that convey to us any
idea of God, are some chapters in Job, and the 19th Psalm; I recollect no other.
Those parts are true deistical compositions; for they treat of the Deity through
his works. They take the book of Creation as the word of God; they refer to
no other book; and all the inferences they make are drawn from that volume.
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I insert in this place the 19th Psahn, as paraphrased into English verse by
Addison. I recollect not the prose, and where I write this I have not the opportunity of seeing it:
The spacious firmament on high,
With all the blue ethereal sky,
And spangled heavens, a shining frame,
Their great original proclaim.
The unwearied sun, from day to day,
Does his Creator's power display,
And publishes to every land
The work of an Almighty hand.
Soon as the evening shades prevail,
The moon takes up the wondrous tale,
And nightly to the list'ning earth
Repeats the story of her birth;
Whilst all the stars that round her burn,
And all the planets, in their turn,
Confirm the tidings as they roll,
And spread the truth from pole to pole.
What though in solemn silence all
Move round this dark terrestrial ball;
What though no real voice, nor sound,
Amidst their radiant orbs be found,
In reason's ear they all rejoice,
And utter forth a glorious voice,
Forever singing as they shine,
THE HAND THAT MADE US IS DIVINE.

What more does man want to know, than that the hand or power that
made these things is divine, is omnipotent? Let him believe this, with the force
it is impossible to repel ifhe permits his reason to act, and his rule of moral life
will follow of course.
The allusions in Job have all of them the same tendency with this Psalm;
that of deducing or proving a truth that would be otherwise unknown, from
truths already known.
I recollect not enough of the passages in Job to insert them correctly; but
there is one that occurs to me that is applicable to the subject I am speaking
upon. "Canst thou by searching find out God; canst thou find out the Almighty to perfection?"
I know not how the printers have pointed this passage, for I keep no Bible;
but it contains two distinct questions that admit of distinct answers. First,
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Canst thou by searching find out God? Yes. Because, in the first place, I know
I did not make myself, and yet I have existence; and by searching into the
nature of other things, I find that no other thing could make itself; and yet
millions of other things exist; therefore it is, that I know, by positive conclusion
resulting from this search, that there is a power superior to all those things, and
that power is God.
Secondly, Canst thou find out the Almighty to perfection? No. Not only
because the power and wisdom He has manifested in the structure of the
Creation that I behold is to me incomprehensible; but because even this manifestation, great as it is, is probably but a small display of that immensity of
power and wisdom, by which millions of other worlds, to me invisible by their
distance, were created and continue to exist ....

Conclusion
Here we are. The existence of an Almighty power is sufficiently demonstrated
to us, though we cannot conceive, as it is impossible we should, the nature and
manner ofits existence. We cannot conceive how we came here ourselves, and
yet we know for a fact that we are here. We must know also, that the power
that called us into being, can if he please, and when he pleases, call us to
account for the manner in which we have lived here; and therefore, without
seeking any other motive for the belief, it is rational to believe that he will, for
we know beforehand that he can. The probability or even possibility of the
thing is all that we ought to know; for if we knew it as a fact, we should be the
mere slaves of terror; our belief would have no merit, and our best actions no
virtue.
Deism then teaches us, without the possibility of being deceived, all that is
necessary or proper to be known. The creation is the Bible of the deist. He
there reads, in the hand-writing of the Creator himself, the certainty of his
existence, and the immutability of his power; and all other Bibles and Testaments are to him forgeries. The probability that we may be called to account
hereafter, will, to reflecting minds, have the influence of belief; for it is not our
belief or disbelief that can make or unmake the fact. As this is the state we are
in, and which it is proper we should be in, as free agents, it is the fool only, and
not the philosopher, nor even the prudent man, that will live as if there were
no God.
But the belief of a God is so weakened by being mixed with the strange
fable of the Christian creed, and with the wild adventures related in the Bible,
and the obscurity and obscene nonsense of the Testament, that the mind of
man is bewildered as in a fog. Viewing all these things in a confused mass, he
confounds fact with fable; and as he cannot believe all, he feels a disposition to
reject all. But the belief of a God is a belief distinct from all other things, and
ought not to be confounded with any. The notion of a Trinity of Gods has
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enfeebled the belief of one God. A multiplication of beliefs acts as a division of
belief; and in proportion as anything is divided, it is weakened.
Religion, by such means, becomes a thing of form instead of fact; of notion
instead of principle: morality is banished to make room for an imaginary thing
called faith, and this faith has its origin in a supposed debauchery; a man is
preached instead of a God; an execution is an object for gratitude; the preachers daub themselves with the blood, like a troop of assassins, and pretend to
admire the brilliancy it gives them; they preach a humdrum sermon on the
merits of the execution; then praise Jesus Christ for being executed, and condemn the Jews for doing it.
A man, by hearing all this nonsense lumped and preached together, confounds the God of the Creation with the imagined God of the Christians, and
lives as if there were none.
Of all the systems of religion that ever were invented, there is none more
derogatory to the Almighty, more unedifying to man, more repugnant to
reason, and more contradictory in itself, than this thing called Christianity. Too
absurd for belief, too impossible to convince, and too inconsistent for practice,
it renders the heart torpid, or produces only atheists and fanatics. As an engine
of power, it serves the purpose of despotism; and as a means of wealth, the
avarice of priests; but so far as respects the good of man in general, it leads to
nothing here or hereafter.
The only religion that has not been invented, and that has in it every
evidence of divine originality, is pure and simple deism. It must have been the
first and will probably be the last that man believes. But pure and simple deism
does not answer the purpose of despotic governments. They cannot lay hold
of religion as an engine but by mixing it with human inventions, and making
their own authority a part; neither does it answer the avarice of priests, but by
incorporating themselves and their functions with it, and becoming, like the
government, a party in the system. It is this that forms the otherwise mysterious connection of church and state; the church human, and the state tyrannic.
Were a man impressed as fully and strongly as he ought to be with the belief
of a God, his moral life would be regulated by the force of belief; he would
stand in awe of God, and of himself, and would not do the thing that could
not be concealed from either. To give this belief the full opportunity of force,
it is necessary that it acts alone. This is deism.
But when, according to the Christian Trinitarian scheme, one part of God
is represented by a dying man, and another part, called the Holy Ghost, by a
flying pigeon, it is impossible that belief can attach itself to such wild conceits.
It has been the scheme of the Christian church, and of all the other invented systems of religion, to hold man in ignorance of the Creator, as it is of
government to hold him in ignorance of his rights. The systems of the one are
as false as those of the other, and are calculated for mutual support. The study
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of theology as it stands in Christian churches, is the study of nothing; it is
founded on nothing; it rests on no principles; it proceeds by no authorities; it
has no data; it can demonstrate nothing; and admits of no conclusion. Not any
thing can be studied as a science without our being in possession of the principles upon which it is founded; and as this is not the case with Christian
theology, it is therefore the study of nothing.
Instead then of studying theology, as is now done, out of the Bible and
Testament, the meanings of which books are always controverted, and the
authenticity of which is disproved, it is necessary that we refer to the Bible of
the creation. The principles we discover there are eternal, and of divine origin:
they are the foundation of all the science that exists in the world, and must be
the foundation of theology.
We can know God only through his works. We cannot have a conception
of any one attribute, but by following some principle that leads to it. We have
only a confused idea of his power, if we have not the means of comprehending
something ofits immensity. vVe can have no idea of his wisdom, but by knowing the order and manner in which it acts. The principles of science lead to this
knowledge; for the Creator of man is the Creator of science, and it is through
that medium that man can see God, as it were, face to face .
Could a man be placed in a situation, and endowed with power of vision
to behold at one view, and to contemplate deliberately, the structure of the
universe, to mark the movements of the several planets, the cause of their
varying appearances, the unerring order in which they revolve, even to the
remotest comet, their connection and dependence on each other, and to know
the system of laws established by the Creator, that governs and regulates the
whole; he would then conceive, far beyond what any church theology can
teach him, the power, the wisdom, the vastness, the munificence of the Creator. He would then see that all the knowledge man has of science, and that
all the mechanical arts by which he renders his situation comfortable here, are
derived from that source: his mind, exalted by the scene, and convinced by the
fact, would increase in gratitude as it increased in knowledge: his religion or his
worship would become united with his improvement as a man: any employment he followed that had connection with the principles of the creation,-as
everything of agriculture, of science, and of the mechanical arts, has,-would
teach him more of God, and of the gratitude he owes to him, than any theological Christian sermon he now hears. Great objects inspire great thoughts;
great munificence excites great gratitude; but the grovelling tales and doctrines
of the Bible and the Testament are fit only to excite contempt.
Though man cannot arrive, at least in this life, at the actual scene I have
described, he can demonstrate it, because he has knowledge of the principles
upon which the creation is constructed. We know that the greatest works can
be represented in model, and that the universe can be represented by the same
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means. The same principles by which we measure an inch or an acre of ground
will measure to millions in extent. A circle of an inch diameter has the same
geometrical properties as a circle that would circumscribe the wuverse. The
same properties of a triangle that will demonstrate upon paper the course of a
ship, will do it on the ocean; and, when applied to what are called the heavenly
bodies, will ascertain to a minute the time of an eclipse, though those bodies
are millions of miles distant from us. This knowledge is of divine origin; and it
is from the Bible of the creation that man has learned it, and not from the
stupid Bible of the church, that teaches man nothing.
All the knowledge man has of science and of machinery, by the aid of which
his existence is rendered comfortable upon earth, and without which he would
be scarcely distinguishable in appearance and condition from a common animal, comes from the great machine and structure of the universe. The constant
and unwearied observations of our ancestors upon the movements and revolutions of the heavenly bodies, in what are supposed to have been the early ages
of the world, have brought this knowledge upon earth. It is not Moses and the
prophets, nor Jesus Christ, nor his apostles, that have done it. The Alnughty is
the great mechanic of the creation, the first philosopher, and original teacher
of all science. Let us then learn to reverence our master, and not forget the
labours of our ancestors ... .

The Existence of God
Religion has two principal enenues, fanaticism and in.fidelity, or that which is
called atheism. The first requires to be combated by reason and morality, the
other by natural philosophy.
The existence of a God is the first dogma of the Theophilanthropists. It is
upon this subject that I solicit your attention; for though it has been often
treated of, and that most sublimely, the subject is inexhaustible; and there will
always remain something to be said that has not been before advanced. I go
therefore to open the subject, and to crave your attention to the end.
The universe is the bible of a true Theophilanthropist. It is there that he
reads of God. It is there that the proofs of His existence are to be sought and
to be found. As to written or printed books, by whatever name they are called,
they are the works of man's hands, and carry no evidence in themselves that
god is the Author of any of them. It must be in something that man could not
make that we must seek evidence for our belief, and that something is the
wuverse, the true Bible- the ininutable work of god.
Contemplating the universe, the whole system of Creation, in this point of
light, we shall discover, that all that which is called natural philosophy is properly a divine study. It is the study of God through His works. It is the best study,
by which we can arrive at a knowledge of His existence, and the only one by
which we can gain a glimpse of His perfection.
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Do we want to contemplate His power? We see it in the immensity of the
creation. Do we want to contemplate His wisdom? We see it in the unchangeable order by which the incomprehensible WHOLE is governed. Do we want to
contemplate His munificence? We see it in the abundance with which he fills
the earth. Do we want to contemplate His mercy? We see it in His not withholding that abundance even from the unthankful. In fine, do we want to
know what GOD is? Search not written or printed books, but the Scripture
called the creation.
It has been the error of the schools to teach astronomy and all the other
sciences and subjects of natural philosophy as accomplishments only; whereas
they should be taught theologically, or with reference to the Being who is the
Author of them: for all the principles of science are of divine origin. Man
cannot make, or invent, or contrive principles; he can only discover them, and
he ought to look through the discovery to the Author.
When we examine an extraordinary piece of machinery, an astonishing pile
of architecture, a well executed statue, or a highly finished painting where life
and action are imitated, and habit only prevents our mistaking a surface oflight
and shade for cubical solidity, our ideas are naturally led to think of the exten sive genius and talents of the artist.
When we study the elements of geometry, we think of Euclid. When we
speak of gravitation, we think of Newton. How then is it that when we study
the works of God in the creation we stop short, and do not think of GOD? It
is from the error of the schools in having taught those subjects as accomplishments only, and thereby separated the study of them from the Beingwho is the
Author of them.
The schools have made the study of theology to consist in the study of
opinions in written or printed books; whereas theology should be studied in
the works or books of the Creation. The study of theology in books of opinions
has often produced fanaticism, rancor and cruelty of temper; and from hence
have proceeded the numerous persecutions, the fanatical quarrels, the religious
burnings and massacres, that have desolated Europe.
But the study of theology in the works of the creation produces a direct
contrary effect. The mind becomes at once enlightened and serene, a copy of
the scene it beholds: information and adoration go hand in hand; and all the
social faculties become enlarged.
The evil that has resulted from the error of the schools in teaching natural
philosophy as an accomplishment only has been that of generating in the pupils
a species of atheism. Instead of looking through the works of creation to the
Creator himself, they stop short and employ the knowledge they acquire to
create doubts of His existence. They labor with studied ingenuity to ascribe
everything they behold to innate properties of matter, and jump over all the
rest by saying that matter is eternal.
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Let us examine this subject; it is worth examining; for if we examine it
through all its cases, the result will be that the existence of a SUPERIOR CAUSE,
or that which man calls GOD, will be discoverable by philosophical principles.
In the first place, admitting matter to have properties, as we see it has, the
question still remains, how came matter by those properties? To this they will
answer that matter possessed those properties eternally. This is not solution,
but assertion; and to deny it is equally as impossible of proof as to assert it. It
is then necessary to go further; and therefore I say-if there exist a circumstance that is not a property of matter, and without which the universe, or to
speak in a limited degree, the solar system composed of planets and a sun,
could not exist a moment, all the arguments of atheism, drawn from properties
of matter, and applied to account for the universe, will be overthrown, and the
existence of a superior cause, or that which man calls God, becomes discoverable, as is before said, by natural philosophy.
I go now to show that such a circumstance exists, and what it is.
The universe is composed of matter, and, as a system, is sustained by motion. Motion is not a property of matter, and without this motion, the solar
system could not exist. Were motion a property of matter, that undiscovered
and undiscoverable thing called perpetual motion would establish itself. It is
because motion is not a property of matter, that perpetual motion is an impossibility in the hand of every being but that of the Creator of motion. When the
pretenders to atheism can produce perpetual motion, and not till then, they
may expect to be credited.
The natural state of matter, as to place, is a state of rest. Motion, or change
of place, is the effect of an external cause acting upon matter. As to that faculty
of matter that is called gravitation, it is the influence which two or more bodies
have reciprocally on each other to unite and be at rest. Everything which has
hitherto been discovered, with respect to the motion of the planets in the
system, relates only to the laws by which motion acts, and not to the cause of
motion. Gravitation, so far from being the cause of motion to the planets that
compose the solar system, would be the destruction of the solar system were
revolutionary motion to cease; for as the action of spinning upholds a top, the
revolutionary motion upholds the planets in their orbits, and prevents them
from gravitating and forming one mass with the sun. In one sense of the word,
philosophy knows, and atheism says, that matter is in perpetual motion. But
the motion here meant refers to the state of matter, and that only on the
surface of the earth. It is either decomposition, which is continually destroying
the form of bodies of matter, or recomposition, which renews that matter in
the same or another form, as the decomposition of animal or vegetable substances enters into the composition of other bodies. But the motion that upholds the solar system is of an entire different kind, and is not a property of

My Own Mind Is My Own Church

matter. It operates also to an entire different effect. It operates to perpetual
preservation, and to prevent any change in the state of the system.
Giving then to matter all the properties which philosophy knows it has, or
all that atheism ascribes to it, and can prove, and even supposing matter to be
eternal, it will not account for the system of the universe, or of the solar system,
because it will not account for motion, and it is motion that preserves it. When,
therefore, we discover a circumstance of such immense importance that without it the universe could not exist, and for which neither matter, nor any nor
all the properties can account, we are by necessity forced into the rational
conformable belief of the existence of a cause superior to matter, and that cause
man calls GOD .
As to that which is called nanire, it is no other than the laws by which
motion and action of every kind, with respect to unintelligible matter, are
regulated. And when we speak oflooking through nature up to nature's God,
we speak philosophically the same rational language as when we speak oflooking through human laws up to the Power that ordained them.
God is the power of the first cause, nature is the law, and matter is the
subject acted upon.
But infidelity, by ascribing every phenomenon to properties of matter,
conceives a system for which it cannot account, and yet it pretends to demonstration. It reasons from what it sees on the surface of the earth, but it does not
carry itself on the solar system existing by motion. It sees upon the surface a
perpetual decomposition and recomposition of matter. It sees that an oak produces an acorn, an acorn an oak, a bird an egg, an egg a bird, and so on. In
things of this kind it sees something which it calls a natural cause, but none of
the causes it sees is the cause of that motion which preserves the solar system.
Let us contemplate this wonderful and stupendous system consisting of
matter, and existing by motion. It is not matter in a state of rest, nor in a state
of decomposition or recomposition. It is matter systematized in perpetual orbicular or circular motion. As a system that motion is the life ofit: as animation
is life to an animal body, deprive the system of motion and, as a system, it must
expire. Who then breathed into the system the life of motion? What power
impelled the planets to move, since motion is not a property of the matter of
which they are composed? If we contemplate the immense velocity of this
motion, our wonder becomes increased, and our adoration enlarges itselfin the
same proportion. To instance only one of the planets, that of the earth we
inhabit, its distance from the sun, the center of the orbits of all the planets, is,
according to observations of the transit of the planet Venus, about one hundred million miles; consequently, the diameter of the orbit, or circle in which
the earth moves round the sun, is double that distance; and the measure of the
circumference of the orbit, taken as three times its diameter, is six hundred
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million miles. The earth performs this voyage in three hundred and sixty-five
days and some hours, and consequently moves at the rate of more than one
million six hundred thousand miles every twenty-four hours.
Where will infidelity, where will atheism, find cause for this astonishing
velocity of motion, never ceasing, never varying, and which is the preservation
of the earth in its orbit? It is not by reasoning from an acorn to an oak, from
an egg to a bird, or from any change in the state of matter on the surface of
the earth, that this can be accounted for. Its cause is not to be found in matter,
nor in anything we call nature. The atheist who affects to reason, and the
fanatic who rejects reason, plunge themselves alike into inextricable difficulties.
The one perverts the sublime and enlightening study of natural philosophy
into a deformity of absurdities by not reasoning to the end. The other loses
himself in the obscurity of metaphysical theories, and dishonors the Creator by
treating the study of His works with contempt. The one is a half-rational of
whom there is some hope, the other a visionary to whom we must be charitable.
When at first thought we think of a Creator, our ideas appear to us undefined and confused; but ifwe reason philosophically, those ideas can be easily
arranged and simplified. It is a Being whose power is equal to His will.
Observe the nature of the will of man. It is of an infinite quality. We cannot
conceive the possibility of limits to the will. Observe, on the other hand, how
exceedingly limited is his power of acting compared with the nature of his will.
Suppose the power equal to the will, and man would be a God. He would will
a creation, and could make it. In this progressive reasoning, we see in the
nature of the will of man half of that which we conceive in thinking of God;
add the other half, and we have the whole idea of a Being who could make the
universe, and sustain it by perpetual motion; because He could create that
motion.
We know nothing of the capacity of the will of animals, but we know a
great deal of the difference of their powers. For example, how numerous are
the degrees, and how immense is the difference of power, from a mite to a
man. Since then everything we see below us shows a progression of power,
where is the difficulty in supposing that there is, at the summit of all things, a
Being in whom an infinity of power unites with the infinity of the will? When
this simple idea presents itself to our mind, we have the idea of a perfect Being
that man calls God.
It is comfortable to live under the belief of the existence of an infinite
protecting power; and it is an addition to that comfort to know that such a
beliefis not a mere conceit of the imagination, as many of the theories that are
called religious are; nor a belief founded only on tradition or received opinion;
but is a belief deducible by the action of reason upon the things that compose
the system of the universe; a belief arising out of visible facts. So demonstrable
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is the truth of this belief that if no such belief had existed, the persons who now
controvert it would have been the persons who would have produced and
propagated it; because by beginning to reason they would have been led to
reason progressively to the end, and thereby have discovered that matter and
the properties it has will not account for the system of the universe, and that
there must necessarily be a superior cause.
It was the excess to which imaginary systems of religion had been carried,
and the intolerance, persecutions, burnings and massacres they occasioned,
that first induced certain persons to propagate infidelity; thinking, that upon
the whole it was better not to believe at all than to believe a multitude of things
and complicated creeds that occasioned so much mischief in the world. But
those days are past, persecution has ceased, and the antidote then set up against
it has no longer even the shadow of apology. We profess, and we proclaim in
peace, the pure, unmixed, comfortable and rational belief of a God as manifested to us in the universe. We do this without any apprehension of that belief
being made a cause of persecution as other beliefs have been, or of suffering
persecution ourselves. To God, and not to man, are all men to account for their
belief.
It has been well observed, at the first institution of this Society, that the
dogmas it professes to believe are from the commencement of the world; that
they are not novelties, but are confessedly the basis of all systems of religion,
however numerous and contradictory they may be. All men in the outset of the
religion they profess are Theophilanthropists. It is impossible to form any system of religion without building upon those principles, and therefore they are
not sectarian principles, unless we suppose a sect composed of all the world.
I have said in the course of this discourse that the study of natural philosophy is a divine study, because it is the study of the works of God in the creation.
If we consider theology upon this ground, what an extensive field of improvement in things both divine and human opens itself before us! All the principles
of science are of divine origin. It was not man that invented the principles on
which astronomy, and every branch of mathematics, are founded and studied.
It was not man that gave properties to the circle and the triangle. Those principles are eternal and immutable. We see in them the unchangeable nature of
the Divinity. We see in them immortality, an immortality existing after the
material figures that express those properties are dissolved in dust.
The Society is at present in its infancy, and its means are small; but I wish
to hold in view the subject I allude to, and instead of teaching the philosophical
branches of learning as ornamental accomplishments only, as they have hitherto been taught, to teach them in a manner that shall combine theological
knowledge with scientific instruction. To do this to the best advantage some
instruments will be necessary, for the pwpose of explanation, of which the
Society is not yet possessed. But as the views of this Society extend to public
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good as well as to that of the individual, and as its principles can have no
enemies, means may be devised to procure them.
If we unite to the present instruction a series o( lectures on the ground I
have mentioned, we shall, in the first place, render theology the most delightful
and entertaining of all studies. In the next place we shall give scientific instruction to those who could not otherwise obtain it. The mechanic of every profession will there be taught the mathematical principles necessary to render him
a proficient in his art; the cultivator will there see developed the principles of
vegetation; while, at the same time, they will be led to see the hand of God in
all these things.

My Private Thoughts on a Future State
I have said in the first part of The Age ofReason, that "I hape for happiness after
this life." This hope is comfortable to me, and I presume not to go beyond the
comfortable idea of hope, with respect to a future state.
I consider myself in the hands of my Creator, and that He will dispose of
me after this life consistently with His justice and goodness. I leave all these
matters to Him, as my Creator and friend, and I hold it to be presumption in
man to make an article of faith as to what the Creator will do with us hereafter.
I do not believe because a man and a woman make a child that it imposes on
the Creator the unavoidable obligation of keeping the being so made in eternal
existence hereafter. It is in His power to do so, or not to do so, and it is not
in our power to decide which He will do.
The book called the New Testament, which I hold to be fabulous and have
shown to be false, gives an account in Matthew XXV of what is there called the
last day, or the day of judgment.
The whole world, according to that account, is divided into two parts, the
righteous and the unrighteous, figuratively called the sheep and the goats.
They are then to receive their sentence. To the one, figuratively called the
sheep, it says, "Come ye blessed ofmy Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you
from the foundation of the world." To the other, figuratively called the goats, it
says, "Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and
his angels."
Now the case is, the world cannot be thus divided: the moral world, like the
physical world, is composed of numerous degrees of character, running imperceptibly one into the other, in such a manner that no fixed point of division can
be found in either. That point is nowhere, or is everywhere.
The whole world might be divided into two parts numerically, but not as
to moral character; and therefore the metaphor of dividing them, as sheep and
goats can be divided, whose difference is marked by their external figure, is
absurd. All sheep are still sheep; all goats are still goats; it is their physical nature
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to be so. But one part of the world are not all good alike, nor the other part
all wicked alike. There are some exceedingly good; others exceedingly wicked.
There is another description of men who cannot be ranked with either the
one or the other-they belong neither to the sheep nor the goats; and there
is still another description of them who are so very insignificant, both in character and conduct, as not to be worth the trouble of damning or saving, or of
raising from the dead.
My own opinion is, that those whose lives have been spent in doing good,
and endeavoring to make their fellow-mortals happy, for this is the only way in
which we can serve God, will be happy hereafter; and that the very wicked will
meet with some punishment. But those who are neither good nor bad, or are
too insignificant for notice, will be dropped entirely.
That is my opinion. It is consistent with my idea of God's justice, and with
the reason that God has given me, and I gratefully know that He has given me
a large share of that divine gift.
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Although nearly forgotten today, Elihu Palmer (1764-1806) is unquestionably the chief of American deists. Almost single-handedly, Palmer metamorphosed Enlightenment deism into a popular movement that rocked the Early
Republic's religious and moral sensibilities in the opening years of the nineteenth century. He imbued it with a strident militancy it hitherto had lacked
by extending its standard criticisms of ecclesial hegemony to denunciations of
political and social oppression, arguing that the "double despotism" of church
and state were twin obstacles to the improvement of the race. He insisted that
a rational investigation of the laws. of nature disclosed the basis of ethical principles as well as religious ones and that both condemned the subjugation of
women, the enslavement of peoples of color, and the coercion of conscience.
Using the lecture circuit and the printed word, he spread his message with an
eloquence and intellectual sophistication that forced even his most intractable
opponents to take him seriously. He was, in short, not only the leading deist
and social activist of his day but was one of the Early Republic's finest thinkers.
After him, neither popular religion nor theological discourse in the United
States would be quite the same.
The son of a Connecticut farmer, Palmer was educated at Dartmouth
College and ordained in the Presbyterian tradition. After losing at least two
pulpits because of his increasingly liberal interpretations of Christian doctrine,
he relocated to Philadelphia in 1791 and joined the newly founded Universal
Society, an organization espousing a rather confused mixture of liberal Christianity and deism. Palmer's association with the society was brief. After attempting under its auspices to deliver a discourse against the divinity of Jesus,
he was run out of town by an outraged mob. He retreated with his wife and
children to western Pennsylvania, where he read law with a brother and was
admitted to the bar.
In the spring of 179 3 Palmer forsook the wilderness and returned to Philadelphia to establish himself in law. Although there is no record, it is unlikely
that the city's inhabitants had forgotten or forgiven his earlier apostasy enough
for him to have picked up much business as an attorney. To make matters
worse, Palmer refused to retreat from his radical religious views. During a
Fourth ofJuly oration at Federal Point, he took the opportunity to repeatedly
denounce "priestcraft" as an enemy to "reason and liberty," which only rein-
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forced orthodox Philadelphia's dismissal of him as a godless and dangerous
infidel.
But a worse fate than the calumny of his fellow citizens soon befell Palmer.
One month after his Federal Point oration, the great yellow fever epidemic of
1793 swept through the city. Both Palmer and his wife fell ill. She died, while
Palmer was left permanently and totally blind. Many Philadelphians sanctimoniously saw Palmer's aflliction as divine retribution. Benjamin Rush less piously
suggested that Palmer lost his sight because he had refused to be bled during
his illness. In any case, blindness spelled an end to his legal career, and Palmer
knew it. Upon his recovery, he embarked on his final calling: He became a freelance deistical preacher.
In the thirteen years remaining to him, Palmer tirelessly stumped the eastern seaboard, spreading the deistic message. After spending some time in
Georgia immediately after his recovery, he made his way north, where he
helped found the Deistical Society of New York in late 1795 and drafted the
organization's statement of principles. New York City henceforth became his
base of operations. From there, he helped organize deistical societies in other
states, dictated scores of journal articles and pamphlets, and periodically traveled to Baltimore, Newburgh, Philadelphia, and other cities to deliver his increasingly popular lectures against the "double despotism" of religious bigotry
and political oppression. He helped found and later assumed editorship of The
Temple ofReason, the first major deistic newspaper in the Early Republic. When
The Temple ceased publication in 1803, he replaced it with the Prospect, a
weekly that ran for two years and was almost solely written by Palmer himself.
At his death in 1806 (which occurred, characteristically, while he was on a
lecture tour), Palmer was the best known-and hated--deist of his time.
Despite both his blindness and his crushing schedule, Palmer somehow
found the time and energy to compose one of the Early Republic's philosophical classics: Principles of Nature; or, A Development of the Moral Causes ofHappiness and Misery among the Human Species (1801 ). The book is a distillation
and refinement of the hundreds of speeches, tracts, and newspaper articles
Palmer had produced in earlier years. Its primary purpose was to argue for a
naturalistic ethics based on the notions of "reciprocal justice" and "universal
benevolence," but it was much more than just a treatise on ethics. It was also
a textbook of militant deism, providing a complete critique of Christianity's
supernaturalistic assumptions as well as a thorough explanation of deism's
naturalistic ones. The book was an immediate success, notwithstanding its
occasional stylistic clumsiness (partly attributable, no doubt, to the fact that it
had been dictated), and ran through three editions in Palmer's lifetime. Its
chief merit was that it defended deism in an accessible yet rigorous manner. It
avoided conceptual intricacies and technical jargon, which might baffle popular
audiences, without eschewing logical argumentation and demonstration. It
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was the only Early Republic treatise on deism that was more philosophical than
polemical. It was also the first philosophical work of the new nation to enjoy
such widespread popularity.
In the selections here from Principles of Nature, the standard by which
Palmer both criticizes Christianity and advocates deism and naturalistic ethics
is reason-"righteous and immortal reason," "the glory of our nature." For
Palmer as for most Enlightenment thinkers, the definitive characteristic of the
human species is its ability to dispassionately collect and appraise empirical
evidence and then logically infer generalizations from it. If used correctly, this
rational faculty is capable of exploring the natural realm, promoting social utility, enhancing individual felicity, and ensuring progress. If retarded through
bigotry, superstition, or ignorance, it mutates to the point where it can be
invoked as a justification for spiritual and political oppression. Palmer's entire
career as a deist was devoted to encouraging his listeners to employ their reason
freely and courageously and to distrust authority, whether theological or political. His Principles is just such a judicious exercise, as it demonstrates what he
takes to be the absurdities of revealed religion, and then elucidates the normative and conceptual superiority of the religion of nature.
Palmer's case against Christianity attacks on two fronts. First, he dismisses
it on logical grounds. The doctrine of eternal damnation is absurd, because it
treats what by definition must be finite acts on the part of humans as if they
were infinitely deserving of punishment. The doctrine of miracles violates the
uniformity, consistency, and perfection of nature, thereby establishing religion
"upon the ruin of the consistent harmony of the divine perfection; upon the
ruin of all principle and all confidence." It is an "affront to the character" of the
deity because it implies that God plays a catch-up game with creation, seeking
to redress past errors or oversights through miraculous intervention. But such
an assumption does violence to the divine attributes of wisdom, power, and
goodness. Finally, Palmer rejects the doctrine of scriptural revelation as likewise
inchoate. Following Paine's lead in The .Age of Reason, Palmer argues that
revelation can only be direct communication from God to a specific individual.
AB such, even though the revealed message or commandment may be binding
to its immediate recipient, it can scarcely be so to others to whom the recipient
relays it. At that point, it is mere hearsay and properly subject to the same
doubts that any rational person has about all secondhand information.
Next, Palmer rejects Christianity because of what he sees as the immorality
ofits tenets. For Palmer, "all morality that is genuine, is drawn from the nature
and condition of rational beings." Reason tells us, for example, that the virtuous person is one who acts consistently, who takes responsibility for his or her
actions, and who refuses to punish innocents. But Christian dogma violates
each of these premises. Scripture defends an ethical double standard, in which
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God performs with impunity actions that would be condemned if performed
by a human. The doctrine of original sin suggests that vices and virtues are
transferable from one person to another, thereby eroding personal responsibility. Moreover, the doctrines of grace and rejuvenation imply that human virtue
is insufficient for either individual felicity or morality, thus depriving humans of
liberty as well as dignity. The atonement makes a virtue out of savagely punishing a blameless person-a futile attempt to eradicate evil with evil that violates common intuitions about distributive justice. In short, given the irrational
basis of its moral prescriptions, Christianity twists the God of nature into an
"arbitrary and malevolent tyrant," unworthy of either veneration or respect.
Although certain isolated moral maxims in Christianity are admittedly praiseworthy, Palmer denies they are uniquely Christian in origin since they were
defended earlier by pagan philosophers. It is not enough for a religious system
to contain a few noble principles. It must provide a "system of genuine morality," based on reason, benevolence, and consistency. This Christianity utterly
fails to do.
Palmer's alternative to Christianity, as expressed here in the selections "The
Religion ofNature" and "Principles of the Deistical Society of the State ofNew
York," is typically deistic. God is described as the First Cause, immutable and
good, who sets in motion equally immutable laws of nature. But in his reflections on the basis of moral principle in Principles of Nature, Palmer breaks new
ground, for no other deist in the American tradition so systematically applied
the Enlightenment's naturalistic orientation to ethical theory.
For Palmer, "moral principles," or the foundations of ethics, must be based
on "the physical constitution of human nature." Evil and virtue are the products of human actions, not the mysterious interventions of a god or a devil. In
fact, Palmer goes so far as to say that morality does not depend on the existence
of the deity. Instead, it is "founded in the nature of man" and "rests upon the
relations and the properties of human life." In accepting this naturalistic
premise as his starting point, Palmer obviously parts company with the traditional Christian ethical theory of divine command, which argues that an action
is only virtuous or wicked insofar as it is commanded or forbidden by God.
But what are the relations and properties of human life from which ethical
principles can be inferred? Sensation, answers Palmer, the physical capacity of
experiencing pain and pleasure. It is obvious that the former is destructive of
human well-being, while the latter is promotive ofit. Reason dictates that the
sensible person, then, will act in such a way as to maximize his or her chances
for pleasure and minimize the possibility of pain. But the rational person also
recognizes that his or her actions toward others are reciprocated in kind. Consequently, prudential self-interest demands that the individual behave toward
others in such a way as to encourage reactions on their parts beneficial to his
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or her well-being. Otherwise, human existence is reduced to a condition of
pain and vicious competition very much reminiscent ofThomas Hobbes's state
of nature.
This analysis of the physical basis of well-being gives rise to Palmer's two
primary ethical principles: "universal benevolence" and "reciprocal justice."
The first argues that the actions of sensitive, communal creatures always result
in "perpetual reprisals." Consequently, self-interest dictates that the most reasonable mode of behavior is one of benevolence to all of sentient creation. The
second argues that since all sentient creatures are equally capable of experiencing deleterious pain or promotive pleasure, each has an equal right to avoid the
one and nurture the other. This suggests that all humans have an obligation to
treat others as they themselves would rationally desire to be treated.
Clearly Palmer's naturalistic ethics has affinities with other ethical models of
his day. The similarity to Hobbes has already been noted, and there are also
parallels with the moral theories ofJames Stewart (1749-1822) and Volney.
But, as mentioned previously, Palmer's naturalistic ethical theory, despite its
partially derivative character, is the only attempt by an American deist to extend Enlightenment naturalism to its logical normative conclusion. Given
deism's emphasis on the primacy of virtue, this is no small accomplishment.

Principles of Nature; or, A Development
of the Moral Causes of Happiness
and Misery among the Human Species
Critique of Christianity
Ignorance and Christianity
Believers in the Christian system of religion, are seldom aware of the difficulties into which their theological theories have plunged them. They are in
habits of bestowing on this religion the most unqualified applause, and in most
cases, no doubt, the most sincere approbation; but the errors and absurdities,
the immorality and the incorrectness of principle, have never made any serious
impression upon their minds. The dreadful idea of opposing that which has
been called divine, strikes with terror the uninstructed mind, and ignorance
feeds the ecclesiastical deception. Ignorance is an excellent friend to an ancient
system of error, to the church and the different projects by which mankind
have been enslaved. If you can once persuade a man, that he is totally ignorant
of the subject on which you are about to discourse, you can make him believe
any thing. Impositions of this kind are furnished by every days experience; and
the victim of such imposition, is commonly the first to applaud the instrument
of his ruin.
Nothing can be more true, nothing more certain, or important, than that
man owes to himself due respect, that his intellect is an object of veneration,
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and its result interwoven with the best interest of human society. The distorted
exhibitions of imaginary beings contained in all ancient theology, ought to
excite within us a strong desire to discover truth, and reclaim the dignity which
namre gave to man. Fanaticism, when armed with the artillery of Heaven,
ought not to be permitted to shake the throne or empire of reason; the base
is immortal, and the superstructure will be augmented in beauty and excellence, in proportion to the progress of knowledge and the destruction ofreligious bigotry. It is remarkable that, with many honest minds, the consciousness
of intellectual independence has never been realized, and fear has prevented
the activity of thought and the development of truth.
Sacred Scripture and Revelation
The Christian religion is compound and combination of all the theological
writings of the followers of Moses and Jesus. We have no evidence that either
of these men wrote any part, either of the Old or New Testament. From
Genesis to the Apocalypse of St. John, a vast variety of fact, fable, principle,
wickedness, and error is exhibited to view. The book, though bound together,
appears to be in many respects discordant; the historical part has no accurate
connection; the moral part is distorted, deficient, or wicked; the doctrinal parts
are either unintelligible, or contrary to moral and philosophical truth. These
positions shall be proved in the course of the examination of these sacred
writings; it is sufficient for the present that the consideration which relates to
the origin and namre of such productions, should form the basis of our inquiry.
It is because man has forgotten the dignity of his nature; it is because he does
not realize the force of his faculties, that he consents to yield to the impositions
of superstition. What is a book, whether it be denominated sacred or not,
unless the human mind is capable of discovering the evidence by which the
truth of such book can be substantiated? The Bible, which means nothing
more than a book; the scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, which mean
nothing more than the heterogeneous writings contained in the former, and
the incoherent and unintelligible will of various beings contained in the latter;
what are all these to the correct decisions of human intellect, unless the matter
therein contained can be collated with the immortal principles of truth in the
system of nature ....
If the sentiments and the doctrines be consistent with the namre of things,
[one] may, on this account, pronounce them true; but they are true because
they are consistent, and not because they have been revealed .... But ... this
book is said to be given by divine inspiration; but is it possible that inspiration
can be either transferred, translated, altered, or revised? Certainly the very
nature of the thing forbids it. If the scripmres be given by divine inspiration,
their contents must be communicated to certain individuals by supernatural
power. These individuals had no such power to transfer to other individuals
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with the same force of authority, the celestial information which they had
received. Ifit were binding on the first persons who received it, it could not be
equally so upon the second, for the nature and force of the communication
were essentially destroyed. The first power that communicated was divine, the
second was human; the first was incapable of error, the second deceptive and
fallacious. If it were therefore to be admitted that any human beings were ever
inspired, it would not follow that the result of that inspiration could be communicated with certitude or divine authority to any other minds. The idea of
transferring celestial information received by supernatural means, is absurd and
impossible; it is as impossible as that man could become a God, and exercise the
attributes of the Divinity. The idea of translating a supernatural system of religion, is equally incorrect. The readers of such a system, even in the original
languages, could not know that the things therein contained were inspired by
God himself, if those few be accepted who were supposed to be the recipients
of such sacred instruction; much less could the reader in subsequent ages be
assured of the truth or validity of such translated doctrines. To render this
system correct, and keep up the chain of divine connection, it is not only
necessary that the first prophets and apostles should have been inspired, but
that all the translators, transcribers, printers, and printers' boys, should have
been inspired also. In deficiency of such arrangement, the Christian believer at
the present day, must be uncertain whether he believes in holy writ, or the
imaginary conceptions and wild reveries of the human understanding. If inspiration be a thing founded in truth, there can be no occasion to alter or revise
it. It is defect alone that creat~s the necessity of alteration and revision. If,
therefore, the Bible was right at first, every alteration is a deviation from that
rectitude; and consequently, in proportion as the scriptures have been altered
and revised in modern times, the Christian believer has been led astray; he has
not believed in the real and true word of God. If the scriptures were wrong at
first, the faith of the primitive Christian, was nothing more than a delusive
error; in either of these cases we are thrown into a dilemma, from which,
clerical ingenuity alone will be able to extricate us ....

Original Sin, Atonement and Faith
We shall now proceed to an examination of the doctrines of the Christian
religion, and compare them with the principles of a genuine and natural morality, the nature and character of man, and the perfections of the intelligent
Creator of the universe. If the founder of this religion was destitute of authority
in his mission, the doctrines which are applicable to him will fall of course; but
so strong are the prejudices of mankind in favour of these doctrines, that it
becomes necessary to expose the immorality of them before we can expect that
they will be relinquished. The most important doctrines of this supposed celestial scheme, are those of original sin, atonement, faith .. .. This strange and
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unnatural system, called the Christian religion, commences the development
of its dogmas, by the destruction of every principle of distributive justice. It
makes the intelligent beings who are now in existence accountable for the
errors and vices of a man who lived six thousand years ago; a man who, its
advocates say, God created upright, free from every kind of impurity, and
placed in a state of uniform happiness, with a strong natural propensity to the
practice of every virtue, and an equally strong aversion to every vicious and
immoral principle; created in the image of God himself, and possessing an
unqualified attachment to celestial purity and goodness. This man, nevertheless, transgressed the divine law, and this solitary violation becomes temporarily
and eternally fatal to the human race. Moral impurity assumes a new shape, and
becomes transferable through successive generations. Though none of this
man's descendants could possibly be partakers of this original criminality, they
are, nevertheless, implicated in the consequences and effects of his primary
apostasy. They sinned with him, and fell with him, in his first transgression. This
is the language of pious and learned divines, and of the rectitude of the principle, we are not permitted to doubt, under pain of eternal damnation. But
truth compels us to assert, that this doctrine, called original sin, is, in the first
place, totally impossible, and in the second place, that it is as immoral and
unjust, as the Creator is righteous and benevolent. The virtues and the vices of
intelligent beings are not of a transferable but of a personal nature. In a moral
point of view, the amiable or useful qualities of one man cannot become those
of another, neither can the vices of one be justifiably punished in the person of
another. Every man is accountable for himself; and when he can take no cognizance of the intentions or actions of any other man, how can he be justly
responsible for their injurious effects, or applauded for any benefits resulting
from them? If Adam or any other man, who lived several thousand years ago,
was guilty of any immoral conduct, what has that to do with the moral condition of the present generation? Is a man to become criminal before he has
existed? or, is he to be criminated afterwards, by the immoral conduct of those
who lived long before him? Has not every man errors enough of his own to
answer for, without being implicated in the injurious consequences resulting
from the bad conduct of his neighbour? Shall there be no line of moral precision, by which human beings can be tried, condemned, or acquitted? It seems
by the general tenor of this doctrine, that every rule of moral precision is here
totally disregarded, and setting aside the want of justice, the whole business
wears a farcical and ludicrous appearance. This original evil so destructive to the
human race, commences by the eating of what is called the forbidden fruit.
Whether this fruit was an apple, a peach, or an orange, is not material for us to
know; if it was either the one or the other of these, and the truth was good,
there could be no harm in eating it, and if bad, let him take the consequence
whose ignorance or temerity induced the action. But whether good or bad,
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whether eaten or not eaten, is nothing for us, and we are neither worse nor
better for reading this foolish story. The moral impurity of the heart can bear
no possible relation to the criminality of Adam, or any other man of that day
or generation. Let Adam, therefore, and his partner Eve, together with the
Devil and his snakes, attend to their own concerns, and if they have fallen into
difficulties by their own follies and vices, let them extricate themselves as well
as they are able. For myself, I have so much regard for all of them, that I hope
they will not be damned forever. For notwithstanding much noise and clamour
has been raised, I think that neither party was so bad as the pious ambassadors
of Heaven have represented them. The story is almost too foolish to deserve
a serious examination. Let intelligent man study his own nature, and the passions of his heart, let him observe his relative condition and the springs of his
action, and he will soon discern the causes of his calamity. He will find that
disorganization or physical death is an unavoidable appendage of animal life.
That the very construction of his nature insures the certainty of a subsequent
derangement, and that the primary qualities of all sensitive beings gradually
lead to dissolution. No organic perfectibility of animal existence has been discovered yet, which is capable of excluding the anticipation of decay through
the progressive operations ofphysical causes upon the constitution; and perfect
moral rectitude, though it were capable ofextending the period, could not give
ultimate durability to beings organized like ourselves; nevertheless, we are told
that death spiritual, temporal, and eternal, are the consequences of his primitive apostasy. By spiritual death, is meant moral turpitude of heart and character; but this in many beings, obtains but partially, and is always the effect of
personal infraction of moral principle, bearing no possible relation to Adam. By
temporal death, is meant that death which experience teaches us to be the fate
of every creature in the present world, and this death, though an essential
ingredient in the constitution of nature, is foolishly and unphilosophically attributed to the sin of Adam. If Adam, previous to his supposed apostasy, had
been thrown into a fire, or immersed in water, would not one of these elements
have disorganized him, or the other have drowned him? or would he have
returned from these trials with all the beauties of youth and vivacity in his
appearance? If it be contended that he would, a constitution must then be
attributed to him of which the human mind can form no conception. If it be
admitted that he must have perished, temporal death can then no longer be
attributed to the commission of moral evil, and it must be acknowledged as an
essential property of our primary and physical organization; and that death is
as natural as life in the order of the world. By eternal death, is meant a state of
endless punishment; and so powerful is the influence of this sin of Adam, upon
the human race, that they all become liable to eternal torments on this account. One would have supposed that after having brought temporal death
into the world, by this transgression, and after having corrupted every moral
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principle of the human heart, the contrivers of the scheme might have been
contented, without annexing to this crime, any other fatal consequences; but
fanaticism and superstition delight in murder, misery, and eternal fire; and to
this flaming lake I wish them a speedy passage, never more to rise to insult the
dignity, or destroy the happiness of the human race. To punish the temporary
and finite crimes of a finite life with eternal fire, would be to relinquish every
principle of distributive justice, and to act like an arbitrary and malevolent
tyrant. All the sins that ever have been committed do not deserve this unlimited severity of punishment; and to attribute to one solitary infraction of a
moral law, these terrible consequences, is to lose sight of infinite benevolence
and eternal justice. It is to represent the God ofNature as cruel and vindictive,
and even less merciful than the majority of his creatures; it destroys all degrees
in moral turpitude, and inflicts on a petty offender, a punishment not merited
by the greatest criminal. It is therefore evident that this original sin has not
produced, and that it could not produce, any of the consequences which have
been attributed to it, for death is one of the physical properties of our nature.
Vice is the result of individual and personal infractions of moral law, and an
eternal hell is a bugbear of superstition, which has never answered, and never
can answer any valuable purpose even in preventing crimes.
Another important doctrine of the Christian religion, is the atonement
supposed to have been made by the death and sufferings of the pretended
Saviour of the world; and this is grounded upon principles as regardless of
justice as the doctrine of original sin. It exhibits a spectacle truly distressing to
the feelings of a benevolent mind, it calls innocence and virtue into a scene of
suffering, and reputed guilt, in order to destroy the injurious effects of real vice.
It pretends to free the world from the fatal effects of a primary apostasy, by the
sacrifice of an innocent being. Evil has already been introduced into the world,
and in order to remove it, a fresh accumulation of crimes becomes necessary.
In plain terms, to destroy one evil, another must be committed. To teach
mankind virtue, they are to be presented with the example of murder; to
render them happy, it is necessary to exhibit innocence in distress; to provide
for them the joys of Heaven, wretchedness is to be made their portion on
earth. To make them love one another, they must be taught that the Deity,
regardless of this principle, voluntarily sacrificed his only begotten Son. In fine,
to procure for intelligent beings, the happiness suited to their nature, cruelty
and vindictive malice must be exhibited for their contemplation. This doctrine
presented in its true colours contains neither justice nor utility. Its principle is
vicious, and its consequences are not beneficial. The reflecting mind which
views the operation of causes and their natural effects, possesses a nice and
accurate power of discrimination. Moral precision is an important object of
attention, and although it traces the nature of the infinitely combined relations
subsisting among beings of the same species, it cannot discern either the justice
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or the utility of the relation which suffering virtue can bear to the destruction
of moral evil. No connection can be discovered between the exclamations of
expiring innocence, and the triumphant march of vice over an apostate world.
Does the suffering of the virtuous man destroy the evil habits or propensities
of him who is vicious and abandoned, especially when he is told that these
sufferings are to annihilate his own crimes? Can this induce the mind to exhibit
any efforts wearing the appearance of reformation? Does it not rather contribute to the practice of vice, from the belief that the burden and effect must be
sustained by another person? Yet this is the true ground on which this scheme
of atonement is promulgated. It is exhibited as a substitute for moral perfection. It teaches man that his own virtues are insufficient for his felicity; that the
cultivation of his faculties, and the discovery and practice of moral truth, can
never lead to substantial happiness. This must be obtained from the sufferings
and expiring groans of the Deity himself. But even on Christian principles,
what useful purpose has this atonement answered? Though the believers of this
religion have sacrificed the God of Nature, to gratify their pride, have they by
this means accomplished their end? Have they established a sure foundation for
the destruction of moral evil? Have they insured permanent happiness to every
intelligent being? No; this desirable end is not completed. Sin, say they, is an
infinite evil. Was the atonement infinite? Alas! No; for although Jesus Christ,
who suffered, was equal to God himself, yet all of them acknowledge that it
was the human, not the divine nature that partook of this suffering. If therefore, it was the human nature only that suffered, this suffering could make only
a finite atonement, and if the sin was infinite, this atonement could not reach
its nature or destroy its effects; for to have done this, the atonement must have
been commensurate with the evil to be destroyed; but as the one is finite and
the other infinite, no relation could have subsisted between them, and no
beneficial effect has been, or can be produced from it. This method of destroying evil is an unfortunate one; it is essentially unjust in its principles, and useless
in its effects; it professes to sacrifice an infinite being, but it denies the possibility of this sacrifice producing any thing more than a finite atonement. If an
atonement was necessary, it ought to have been as extensive and complete in
its nature, as the offences intended to be destroyed by its influence. But instead
of this, every thing is reversed. According to believers themselves, this atonement has not reached the condition of more than one tenth part of the human
race. The efforts of Trinitarian wisdom have all failed, and notwithstanding the
pretended good news of the gospel, every living creature is destined to never
ending torment. The elect themselves are incapable of escaping eternal damnation, for without an atonement, they cannot be saved, and the atonement
that has been made is not equal to the crime committed. If, therefore, our
hopes of salvation are to rest on this vicarious suffering, we shall be essentially
disappointed, and endless misery must be the lot of man. Priests and fanatics
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of the world! is this your scheme of infinite benevolence? this your theme of
divine eloquence? Is this the only way in which you can exhibit the perfections
of your God, and adore his eternal wisdom? Are murder, carnage, and injustice,
the objects in which you delight? Have you lost all attachment to moral virtue,
all veneration for the dignity and faculties of your nature? Have you dismissed
all respect for nature and for truth? Will you never learn wisdom from the book
of nature, will you never derive instruction from the permanency of her laws?
Is it only among miracles, ghosts, and crucified Gods that you delight to walk?
Oh! prejudiced and superstitious man, look at the splendid beauties of nature,
look at the vast machinery of the universe, and through these thou mayest
discover the intelligent organizer of the whole, perfect in all his attributes, and
worthy of thy adoration.
The next principle of discussion is, that of Christian faith; and this among
the believers of this religion, has been considered as a great virtue. But is this
substantially true? What is the real meaning of the word Faith? It is necessary
to inquire concerning its true definition, and from this inquiry we shall be able
to draw a conclusion whether or not the principle of faith is meritorious. Faith
is an assent of the mind to the truth of a proposition supported by evidence.
If the evidence adduced is sufficient to convince the mind, credence is the
necessary result; if the evidence be insufficient, belief becomes impossible. In
religion therefore, or in any other of the concerns of life, if the mind discerns
that quantum of evidence necessary to establish the truth of any proposition,
it will yield to the force and effect of the proofs which are produced; if, on the
other hand, the intelligence of man does not discern the necessary influence of
such evidence, infidelity will be the natural and unavoidable result. Why then
is the principle of faith considered as a virtue? If a man beholds the sun in its
meridian splendor, and declares the truth of this exhibition, is he meritorious
in making this acknowledgment? If any truth in nature is well substantiated and
supported by the testimony of his mind or his senses, does he deserve credit for
his mental acquiescence? No. Why then have the christian world annexed to
this principle of belief any degree of merit? Is necessary acquiescence a virtue?
Does man become entitled to praise for the acknowledgment of facts guaranteed by his senses, or essentially supported through the channel of his mental
faculties? Does truth really exist in the system of nature? And is this truth
discoverable by the operations of the human mind? And shall man, notwithstanding this, arrogate to himself a high degree of importance, for the rejection
of the splendid testimonies which are exhibited for his contemplation? No;
after a full display of evidence, the mind must yield to its necessary and unavoidable influence; when therefore, the Christian religion represents faith as
being meritorious, it loses sight of the natural operations of the human mind;
it betrays an ignorance of nature, and becomes censurable by its deviation from
the primary and essential arrangements. Yet in this holy book, we are told, that

251

Elihu Palmer

252

"he that believeth not shall be damned." But what are we to believe? Are we
to believe that the Creator of the universe is the parent and friend of the whole
human race? Are we to believe that his wisdom acts .i n coincidence with general
felicity, or operates on the ground of universal happiness? Are we to believe that
the establishment of general laws is sufficient for the well being of intelligent
agents? Are we to believe the vast machinery of the universe to be under the
guidance and direction of eternal perfection? Are we to believe that the primary principles of our nature are sufficient for our improvement and ultimate
perfectibility? Are we to believe that the practice of moral virtue is essentially
connected with the dignity and final improvement of the human species? Are
we to believe that the establishment of good laws, and the exhibitions of moral
energies are essentially interwoven with the permanent happiness of sensitive
creatures? No! We are not permitted to believe this. What then is Christian
belief? What are the dogmas and principles to which we are required to give an
unqualified credence? However painful it may be to declare it, they are of the
following nature:-That the great Creator of the world sacrificed his only
begotten Son for the happiness of the human race; that he sent numerous
prophets and apostles, to teach and instruct mankind; that they were charged
with the disclosure of every species of celestial knowledge, relative to the future
felicity of intelligent beings; that they were unwearied in their attention to
enlighten and inform the human race; that they exhibited every possible effort
for the accomplishment of this desirable end, and all this to no valuable purpose; that man is to be criminated for the bad conduct of a person who lived
six thousand years ago; that he can be made happy only by a crucified God; that
he can perform no virtue of himself, and yet, that without being perfectly holy,
he cannot be happy; that he must give an unlimited credence to the greatest
absurdities, and most palpable contradictions, and view the most immoral
specimens of human actions as sanctioned by the Deity; that he must venerate
the most senseless opinions, admire the most unexampled ignorance, and love
the most detestable crimes; in fact, that he must believe in a book which
contains, systematically considered, neither truth nor morality, neither purity of
sentiment nor principle, neither propriety of arrangement, nor progression of
human improvement; erroneous in all its primary establishments and vindictive
in all its consequences; unjust in its origin and malevolent in all its subsequent
movements; incorrect in its relations and impure in its intentions; destructive
to science, an insult to morality, and essentially injurious to human felicity. This
then is Christian faith. Great God of Nature! Must we then renounce the
justifiable exercise of all our faculties, in order to be happy? To attain felicity,
is it necessary that we believe in contradictions? Must we deem cruelty one of
the attributes of divinity? Must the benevolent mind be called to the view of
murder, in order to be fitted for the performance of its essential duties? Must
injustice and revenge be interwoven with the morality of man? Shall we never
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be permitted to love truth, admire nature, and practise a pure and genuine
morality? Oh, superstition! how much thou hast to answer for! Thine influence
has corrupted the faculties of man, debased his heart, and rendered wretched
the whole human race. Thou hast spread ruin, misery, and devastation over a
beautiful and productive earth, and thou art deserving of the curses of every
intelligent being in every part of the universe.

Eternal Damnation
Man is a being possessed of certain powers and faculties; of certain passions
and propensities to actions, and these, by a primary law of nature, are subjected
to the control of reason, and are to be directed by conscience or an internal
moral sense of right and wrong. But what are these faculties, what these passions, which are essentially connected with the character and condition of intelligent agents? Our existence and all the properties of it are of a limited and
finite nature; there is not a single quality of man, that is not imperfect; the parts
of the aggregate of his life, do not constitute any thing like infinity. In all his
movements, in all his energies, in all the capacities of his being, he is regulated
by finite and not by infinite principles. He is incapable of any actions which do
not result essentially from the faculties which he is possessed of; all his conduct
must have a strict reference to the causes which have produced it, and every
effect must bear a proportion to its productive cause. If the cause be limited
and imperfect, the effect must also be imperfect, for the effect can never rise
superior to the cause, which has given it birth. Before we speak, therefore, of
an infinite sin, or an infinite evil, we should consider the capacity of those
beings, to whom this evil is attributed; if the acting agents are infinite in their
nature and character, the effects of their operations may be so too, but if they
are finite, their actions can lay no claim to an infinite effect. Sin is the consequence of the infraction of moral law; if this infraction be made by an infinite
being, the criminality would be like the being who made it, that is of an infinite
quality; but if the infraction be made by an imperfect being, the criminality is
finite, and limited in its essential nature. It follows of course, as man is a finite
and imperfect agent, he is incapable of the performance of any infinite act; if
he cannot do an infinite act, he is incapable of an infinite evil, and does not
deserve an infinite punishment; consequently, the idea of eternal death is unjust and unreasonable. But further, if every sin were an infinite evil, which is the
Christian doctrine, it would merit an infinite punishment; but if one sin deserves an infinite punishment, what must be the punishment of him who is
guilty of ten thousand sins? According to this doctrine he must be liable to ten
thousand infinite punishments, which is a physical and moral absurdity. This
doctrine of eternal death or infinite punishment, disregards the nature of human actions, and every principle of distributive justice. It inflicts on the smallest
offender, as great extent and severity of punishment as on the most abandoned
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criminal. It goes to the destruction of all moral virtue, by inducing man to
believe, that the commission of one vicious action is as odious in the sight of
God, and deserves as much punishment as a thousand violations of moral
rectitude. It destroys all relations between the actions of men and the beneficial
arrangements of corrective improvement. It makes man infinite, and the Deity
unjust; both of which are inconsistent with the nature of things and the principles of eternal truth.

Miracles
The productions of the earth are subject to no supernatural derangement;
they are exhibited with a constancy and specific similarity which discard every
idea of perversion in physical law, and present the material world as a theatre
of certitude which the efforts of superstition cannot destroy. The tides of ebb
and flow, and all the relative operations of nature are preserved entire in despite
of the malignity of superstition. This vast whole, this extensive universe thus
subjected to the operation of immutable laws, is, nevertheless, distorted and
deranged by Christian theology; its author is insulted, and the scientific deductions of human intellect perverted or destroyed. Religion, not content with the
consistency and harmony of Nature, has sought for redress in the violation of
her laws, and nothing short of miracles could satisfy the extravagant desires of
pious and holy fanaticism . ...
A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature, by supernatural power. In the
act of such violation, there must have been some great object in view, which
could not otherwise be accomplished; the violation therefore must have been
considered as the least of two evils, and the result as productive upon the
whole, of the greatest possible good. But this represents an omnipotent GOD,
surrounded with difficulties, and like imperfect creatures, disposed to make
the best of a bad condition. It will be necessary for those who advocate the
doctrine of miracles, to recur to the cause and primary establishment of the
laws of nature. God is infinite in all his perfections; the laws of nature are an
effect of the divine attributes, and must have been modified in the best possible manner, and to answer the best and wisest purposes. To alter, therefore,
that which already had been done in the best possible manner, would be to
make it worse, for no alteration or amendment could make that better which
was already as good as it could be. If the world and the laws by which the
world was governed, are the offspring of infinite wisdom, they must have been
right in the first place, for it is a necessary character of infinite wisdom to
perform whatever it does perform in the best possible manner. All alterations
or violations in any system or set of laws, argues imperfection and want of
discernment; but such imperfection and want of discernment cannot be the
property of a perfect being. If God therefore is perfect, such perfection would
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enable him to conceive and execute with a masterly hand. The mechanic who
builds a machine, frequently alters his plan, and is under the necessity of attending to amendments and repairs; but his ignorance was the ground work of
this, and a competent knowledge of the principles by which the machine was
constructed, would have precluded the necessity of subsequent correction and
amendment. The Creator of the world knew perfectly well the force and effect
of principle before it was applied to the accomplishment of the variegated
motions and operations of existence; ignorance, therefore, could have no
share in modifying the vast powers of the universe, or the immutable principles
by which it is directed. Wisdom, power, and goodness, combined in the management of the whole, and consequently the whole is formed exactly in such
a manner as these three leading perfections of the divine character at first
intended. To work a miracle therefore, would answer no very valuable purpose, and is derogatory to the attributes of God, by which it is supposed to be
wrought. To establish a system of religion by evidence drawn from miracles, is
to establish it upon the ruin of the consistent harmony of the divine perfection; upon the ruin of all principle and all confidence. When the consistent
character of the author of such religion is destroyed, the religion itself is not
worth much. Either God did things in the first place as they ought to be done,
or he did not; if he did them as they ought to be done, there could have been
no need of alteration, and consequently there could have been no such thing
as a miracle; if he did not, then he must have been either imperfect, or have
acted inconsistent with good principle; in either of which cases, his character as
God would be destroyed, and the perfection of his existence sacrificed upon
the altar of human folly. Fanaticism, which attempts to exalt its God by making him work wonders, is as great an enemy to true Theism as the open and
professed Atheist. A wonder working God, who violates his own laws, and acts
inconsistently with the principles which he himself has established, is no God
at all. It is an immoral phantom conjured up on the wild vagaries of a superstitious imagination. It is easy to perceive that if there be in nature, a perfect
God, he cannot be the author of those marvellous and even ridiculous violations of the laws of nature detailed in the Old and New Testament. His character must be uniform, consistent and perfect, just and equitable, and in perfect coincidence with the immortal laws of the moral and physical world. All
things it is said, are possible with God. This is one of the maxims of that
religion which has perverted all the principles of truth and justice; but this
maxim is not true; it is not possible, for instance, that God should destroy his
own excellence; it is not possible that he should act inconsistently with the
properties and principles of his nature. This extravagant assertion instead of
exalting the character of the Creator, would absolutely destroy it, by causing
him to act without rule and without justice. But superstition can never do
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enough for her God, until she has done a great deal too much. A consistent
and immutable Deity, acting in strict conformity to the essential properties of
his existence, would be, in the estimation of inconsistent superstition, an object far inferior to those wild and unruly divinities, who overturn states and
empires, pervert the general order of nature, and occasionally, by way of
amusement, drown the whole world, with all the inhabitants and animals
therein existing. A man walking regularly upon the earth, and performing with
fidelity all his moral duties, is by no means an object of attachment, but one
walking upon the water, without doing any good, will draw forth the admiration of a gazing, foolish, and superstitious world. The passion for the marvellous has carried man from earth to heaven, and in the ranting fury of his zeal,
he has supposed that his God would be pleased with all those moral distortions
which at such unhappy moments agitated his own delirious mind. The idea of
the existence of a miracle will be wholly destroyed by a just recurrence to the
counterbalancing evidence, drawn from the experience of mankind. This experience bears testimony to the uniform operation of Nature's laws; it teaches
man to repose in them unqualified confidence, and in all the common concerns of life, this confidence serves as the foundation of his courage, his activity, and his consolation. Here are then, two kinds of evidence opposed to each
other; the one human experience, and other human testimony. Those who
contend that miracles prove the divinity of the Christian religion, appeal to the
testimony of witnesses to support the truth and existence of such miracles. Let
this case be examined, and the superior weight of evidence will appear with
convincing force. Believers declare that the miracles which were wrought to
prove the truth of the holy Scriptures, were numerous and performed before
great numbers of people. That the credit and veracity of these witnesses cannot be doubted; that they were honest and disinterested men; that they did
not wish to be deceived themselves, nor could they possibly reap any advantage from deceiving others; that some of the eye witnesses were inspired men,
in whom there was no guile, and that others were mere men of the world,
whose feelings and interest would have rejected, if possible, the splendour of
such supernatural evidence; that all these, however, yielded to the mighty
energy of the mighty God; that they pronounced him a wonder working God,
and that such marvellous facts had never before been presented to a wicked
and apostate world. It is also declared and maintained, that the result of these
pure and incorruptible witnesses has been transmitted down for more than
two thousand years through the holy and incorruptible channel of the Church
of Christ; that the present generation might as well doubt of the existence of
Scipio or of Caesar, as to doubt of the existence of Jesus Christ and his
apostles, and the miracles which by them were performed; that the unbeliever
at this time, is working against all his own positions, destroying the nature of
evidence, and unhinging the moral world ....
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The Immorality of Christianity
The next point of examination, is the morality of the Christian religion. On
this head, the advocates of this revealed system have made a mistake injurious
to themselves, by extolling its morality above that of any other moral treatise;
they have provoked inquiry and comparison, and the result serves only to
diminish the pretended excellence of their scheme. It is not denied that this
religion contains some good moral maxims. But it is denied that it contains any
thing like a pure system of genuine morality. Its moral maxims are but thinly
interspersed, and they are inaccurate and incomplete, trifling, and often without utility, destitute of justifiable application to the moral condition of intellectual life. All morality that is genuine, is drawn from the nature and condition
of rational beings. It is calculated to preserve and augment their happiness, to
raise and extend the dignity and utility of social existence. It assumes for its
basis, the genuine principles of a reciprocal justice, and an extensive benevolence. While it regards the felicity of others, it also regards the preservation of
our own life and happiness. But the moral doctrine concerning injuries, contained in the christian religion, is not established upon a principle of this mutual
nature, but solicits an accumulation of insult, by commanding us after being
smitten on one cheek to turn the other also. This is sacrificing the dignity of
our character, and inviting fresh injuries. It is surrendering up the manly part
of our nature, into the hands of him who is sure to trample it under foot. And
again, it is said, "if any man will sue thee at the law, and take away thy coat, let
him have thy cloak also"; that is, after thine enemy hath unjustly taken away
a part of thy property, it becomes thy duty to bestow upon him the remainder.
Ifthy coat is already gone, thou must give away the remainder of thy garments,
and go naked thyself If thine enemy do thee all possible injury, thou must in
return exercise towards him sincere love and affection. If he persecute thee,
thou shouldst bless him for his curses and persecutions. In short, to comply
with the spirit of this morality, we must invert the order of nature, and bestow
on crimes and continued abuse, the most endearing affections of our heart.
Where is the believer who puts this morality in practice? It is not considered by
every one as merely theoretical. Have you who are believers in this system,
coats and other garments to bestow, in order to comply with its injunctions?
Are you willing to surrender your natural dignity, to sink your nature to a level
with the spaniel, in order to become a true christian? And can you with any
appearance of truth and justice, advocate the purity and celestial nature of this
species of moral maxims? It may reasonably be presumed that if one coat had
been obtained through the channel of a law suit, another law suit would be
necessary in order to obtain the cloak. And thus this celestial morality would
become the cause of endless litigation. But if we should accede to the truth of
the assertion, that all the maxims held as moral by the professors of christianity,
were really and truly so, this would not prove the celestial origin of their reli-
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gion. For if we attribute to them all the excellence which is contended for, they
still fall below ancient and modern dissertations on this subject. This religion
does not draw its morality from the right source. But the correct, the elegant,
the useful maxims of Confucius, Antoninus, Seneca, Price and Volney, beautifully display its principles from the physical and moral organization of intelligent beings. The writings of these men are in the hands of the public, and may
be perused by every one whose prejudices do not forbid it, and when examined
with a spirit of candor, they will rise far superior to the boasted morality of the
Christian system. But when the numerous, cruel and immoral maxims contained in the Bible, are placed in the balance, they greatly outweigh all its
genuine morality, and the influence of this religion upon the human heart and
human actions verifies the remark. . . .
When the human mind takes a retrospective view of past ages, through the
mirror of history; when it calls up to its contemplation, the murderous devastations, the horrid wars and cruelties which have desolated the Christian world;
when it beholds the faggot every where lighted up for the destruction of man;
when gibbets, imprisonment, and persecutions are presented on every quarter,
when it sees domestic peace and tranquillity tortured and almost annihilated,
malevolence and sectarian spirit enkindling the most unbridled resentments to
disturb the benevolent sentiments of the human heart; when, in fact, all
Christendom exhibits a spectacle shocking to humanity, the weeping voice of
Nature cries aloud, and demands a disclosure of the causes which have produced this general misery and distress. It asks in the name of Reason and Truth,
whence all these calamities, whence these innumerable evils that have overwhelmed and laid waste a beautiful and productive earth? Where is the source
of these human misfortunes? Where the fountain whence these miseries proceed? Righteous God of nature! What questions are these to ask in the face of
the Christian church? But however painful the task, truth compels us to declare, that to this holy religion they are to be attributed. In this wonderful
system of divine benevolence, we must seek for the origin. "Does the God of
Nature then require devastation for homage, or conflagration for sacrifice?
Would he have groans for hymns? Murderers to worship him, and a desert and
ravaged world for his temple? Yet such, holy and faithful generations, are your
works! these the fruits of your piety! You have massacred the people, reduced
cities to ashes, destroyed all traces of cultivation, made the earth a solitude, and
you demand the reward of your labours. For myself, I solemnly affirm by all
laws, human and divine, by the laws of the human heart, that the hypocrite and
the deceiver shall be themselves deceived. The unjust man shall perish in his
rapacity, and the tyrant in his usurpation; tl1e sun shall change his course, before
folly shall prevail over wisdom and science, before stupidity shall surpass prudential economy in the delicate art of procuring to man his true enjoyments,
and of building his happiness on a solid foundation" [Volney's Ruins].
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... It is strange to observe, that in reasoning upon theological subjects,
men are disposed to abandon the correct ground of moral decision, and contend that those actions which would be unjust in man, would nevertheless be
just when performed by the Creator. This is a mode of reasoning which perverts all the faculties of our existence, destroys the moral excellence of Deity,
and overturns the foundation of principle. In all beings that are intelligent,
moral principle is the same; and God has no more right to violate it, than any
other being. He is essentially bound by the properties of his existence, and his
character cannot be sustained without an undeviating attention to the immutable principle of justice .
. . . The writings of Paul, that heated and fanatic zealot in the christian faith,
are equally noxious to the cause of moral virtue, and are calculated to annihilate
the most virtuous efforts of every individual. «Jt is not of him that willeth nor
ofhim that runneth; not ofworks lest any man should boast; of ourselves we can do
nothing''; together with a hundred other passages of a similar nature, which go
directly to suppress all the elevated exertions of the human faculties, and if
literally followed, would turn man from intelligent activity, to a state of brutal
indolence. It is extremely destructive to the moral happiness of mankind to
teach them the want of powers, or the inadequacy of those they possess; because the fact is otherwise, because it is a solemn truth that the powers of man
are competent to provide for his happiness; they are equal to the exigencies of
his existence. It is superstition that has made him a fool, it is religious tyranny
that has enslaved his mind, perverted his faculties, and tarnished the glory of
his intellectual energies. Christianity has taught him two awful and destructive
lessons; first, that he is incapacitated for the performance of moral actions; and
secondly, in case he should perform them, they would add no merit or superior
excellence to his character; that his best righteousness is like filthy rags which
God would treat with marked abhorrence.
The repetition of such discouraging impressions must necessarily work an
effect remarkably injurious to the virtuous activity of the human race. It is in
conformity to this immoral instruction, that we see fanatic Christians every
where boasting of their own inability, and doing violence to that internal sentiment which would otherwise constantly impel them to the performance of
acts of justice, benevolence, and universal charity. In addition to the pointed
declarations of the holy scriptures against the power and practice of morality, the
inventors and promoters of the Christian religion have set up various kinds of
doctrines, which diminish the motives to good actions, and lead the uninstructed mind to repose confidence in something foreign from its own exertions and merit, such as atonement, baptism, faith, sacramental suppers, obla tions, and ablutions, together with many other idle ceremonies and wild
vagaries of a distempered and fanatic brain.
The idea that Jesus the son of Mary died for the sins of the world, and that
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henceforth moral virtue can have no saving efficacy, is among the most destructive conceptions by which the moral world has been insulted and perverted. The supernatural grace of God, which Christians for so many ages have
been in search of, has hitherto eluded the grasp of all rational and philosophic
men; and to those who pretend to be acquainted with this celestial gift, it has
been at times more trouble than profit; since innumerable doubts have been
created concerning its reality and modes of operation in the human heart.
The cursory survey that has been taken of the immoral precepts and principles contained in the Old and New Testament, clearly proves that these books
are not of divine origin. The God of the Jews and Christians, according to their
own description, is a changeable, passionate, angry, unjust, and revengeful
being; infuriate in his wrath, capricious in his conduct, and destitute, in many
respects, of those sublime and immutable properties which really belong to the
Preserver of the universe. The characters spoken of in the scriptures, as the
favourites of Heaven, such as Moses, Joshua, David, Solomon, Jesus, and Paul,
are none of them good moral characters; it is not probable, therefore, that they
were selected by the Creator as the organs of celestial communication. In the
Old Testament, national and individual justice is disregarded, and God is made
the accomplice of crimes which human nature abhors. The maxims of the New
Testament are a perversion of all correct principles in a code of moral virtue. The
whole system is calculated to take man out of himself, to destroy his confidence
in his own energies, to debase his faculties, vitiate his social affections, and
brutalize the most useful qualities of human existence. The highest dignity of
the human race consists in the practice of an exalted virtue, in the exercise of
a fine sympathetic benevolence, in reciprocating our feelings and affections, in
promoting the justice and order of society, in relieving the unfortunate and
supporting the cause of truth, in diminishing evil and augmenting good; in
short, in promoting universally the science, the virtue, and happiness of the
world. There is, however, no possibility of faithfully performing these duties
while under the shackles of Jewish and Christian superstition. The remedy
consists in a return to nature, and in elevating our views and conceptions above
those theological absurdities which have degraded man to a level with the beast,
and taught him to respect his civil and ecclesiastical tyrants as beings ofan higher
order, or celestial messengers from a vindictive and revengeful God.

Natural Morality
The Origin of Moral Evil
The facts in the physical world are, many of them, difficult of solution;
those of the moral world have perplexed still more the operations of the human
understanding. The subtilty, the abstruseness, the incognizable character of
moral existence, place it beyond the power of clear intellectual perception, and
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the mind loses itself in those metaphysical combinations, whose successive
variations are incalculable. But the difficulties which nature has thrown in the
way of this inquiry, are much less numerous than those presented by superstition .
. . . Reason and theology, philosophy and superstition are at war upon this
subject. The believers in the Christian religion, following the examples of their
theological and fanatic predecessors, have searched the universe in quest of a
satisfactory solution to that long altercated question, Whence came moral evil?
One religious sectary, willing to screen the divinity from any just accusation
relative to so nefarious a concern, has descended into hell, and discovered there
all the characters and distorted machinery necessary to the production of such
an effect; but here metaphysical and fanatic invention indulged itself in all the
extravagance of delusion. It was necessary first to create this infernal country,
and then to create inhabitants suited to the nature of the climate, and the
unfortunate condition in which they were to reside. The idea of a Devil was
accordingly formed, and the reality of his existence rendered an indubitable
truth by the reiterated assertions of superstition. Ignorance and fanaticism
greedily swallowed the foolish infernal dose which had been administered.
There is a remarkable disposition in the human mind, to remove the point of
intellectual difficulty, as far from the reality of the case as possible, and then it
triumphantly imagines that a solution has been given. This is a fact particularly
in theological inquiry, in which a few retrogressive efforts of the mind, have
been considered as an ample illustration of all the difficulties relative to the
subject of Theism, and the existence of the physical universe. Similar to this
idea, is the doctrine concerning moral evil, and the disposition which theologians have exhibited to remove the burden from their own shoulders and place
it upon the devil's back. The whole infernal machinery with which we are
presented by superstition, serves only to detach the mind from the true and real
source of moral evil. While reflection is directed to another world, it is incompetent to a clear view of the facts existing in this, and the habit of such reveries
produces a fanatic delirium subversive of all correctness of judgment. The existence of hell and the beings that dwell therein, being only supported by what
is called divine revelation, it follows of course, that if this revelation is not true,
a belief in any thing that is a mere result of that system, cannot be substantially
founded. Since then it is presumed, that in these chapters a competent refuta tion is given to the doctrine contained in the sacred books of the Jews and
Christians, the idea of descending into hell, or having recourse to a devil, in
search of moral evil, is futile and inconsistent. Another part of the Christian
world, willing to avoid difficulties, which their antagonists had thrown in their
way, abandoned the infernal abodes, and ascended into the celestial world, in
quest of the origin of evil. They exhibited ingenious metaphysical reasoning
upon the subject, declaring that God was the Creator of all things; that sin was
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something and not nothing, and therefore he must be the Creator of sin or
moral evil. This puzzled the advocates of the hell scheme, and a clerical warfare
was engendered concerning two theological opinions, neither of which had
any kind of existence in the nature of things. After heaven and hell had been
searched through and through to find something which did not belong to
either of them, the terror struck inquirer, as if fatigued with his atmospheric
journey, seated himself once more upon the earth, and saw, or might have seen
in the very bosom of society, and the perverted character of man, a clear and
satisfactory solution of that difficult question, which, for so long a time, had
occupied his attention in distant regions. It is in this manner, that the plainest
subject is rendered mysterious, when a superstitious religion is industriously
employed in subverting the independent power of thought. It is neither in the
upper nor lower regions; it is not in heaven nor in hell, that the origin of moral
evil will be discovered; it is to be found only among those intelligent beings
who exist upon the earth. Man has created it, and man must destroy it.
But it is necessary to exhibit the proofs of this last assertion, and convince
Christian theology of the innumerable errors, which for ages past have been
imposed upon a credulous and deluded world. What is it then that constitutes
a moral evil? It is the violation of a law of justice or utility, by any one of the
human species, competent to distinguish between right and wrong. We have
no other cognizable idea upon this subject. Facts and practice are presented
continually to the view of the human mind; the decision of a correct mind, is
always according to the nature and character of the case. The character of a
human being, is made either good or bad by the actions he commits. If these
actions are conformable to the principles of justice and universal benevolence,
they are with great propriety denominated good; if they are unjust, cruel and
destructive to sensitive and intellectual life, they are denominated bad. There
are certain fundamental laws, suitable for the government of rational beings,
and it is a departure from these laws, that vitiates the human character. It is
proved in another part of this work, that virtue and vice are personal qualities,
and that they result from personal adherence to, or personal infraction of moral
law. It is only necessary in this place, to call the attention once more to the
nature of human actions, and to the characteristic difference between them, in
order to establish the position principally assumed in this inquiry; for it ought
to be recollected, that even if it could be proved, which by the way it cannot,
that even a deity or a devil had violated moral law, this would not affect the
decision upon the subject in regard to man; because that evil could not be
transferred from a different kind of beings in the other world, to those who
exist upon earth. As the moral properties of all intelligent agents are personal;
are essentially their own and not another's, as there can be no justifiable transfer
between man and man, so it follows that there can be none between man and
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devil. Every intellectual being must depend upon himself; must rest upon his
own energies and be responsible for himself.
. . . Reason, or the intellectual powers of man, must evenmally become
both the deposit and the guardian of the rights and happiness of human existence. Reason has already acquired such strength and so fur unfolded its powers,
that it has already sealed the future destiny of the human race. It is the peculiar
office of reason to look to the utter demolition of the ancient regimen of
church and state. These twin sisters of iniquity are the moral giants, which have
stalked with huge devastation over the face of the whole globe. Political despotism and supernatural religion have done more to render the human race
vicious and depraved, than all other causes conjointly combined. If the passions
of man and the impulses of his nature have frequently produced a moral eccentricity in his conduct, it is certain that a corrupt government and a corrupt
religion have rendered him habitually wicked; have perverted all the conceptions of the mind upon moral and political subjects, and brutalized his intellectual existence. The most important step which can be taken for the extermination of vice and misery, is to destroy the artificial causes by which such evils
are perpemated. If other causes should be found to exist in the constitution of
nature, they will be progressively removed by the light and power of science,
and a more comprehensive view of the true interest of the human species. But
efforts tending to make the individuals of a nation virtuous and happy, will
never succeed extensively till the civil and religious tyranny under which they
groan shall be completely annihilated .
. . . Despotism gives no encouragement to any kind of improvement, and
the hope of human amelioration from this quarter will ever prove to be fallacious. Reason, righteous and immortal reason, with the argument of the printing types in one hand, and the keen argument of the sword in the other, must
attack the thrones and the hierarchies of the world, and level them with the
dust of the earth; then the emancipated slave must be raised by the power of
science into the character of an enlightened citizen; thus possessing a knowledge of his rights, a knowledge of his duties will consequently follow, and he
will discover the intimate and essential union between the highest interests of
existence, and the practice of an exalted virtue. If civil and ecclesiastical despotism were destroyed, knowledge would become universal, and its progress
inconceivably accelerated. It would be impossible, in such a case, that moral
virtue should fail of a correspondent acceleration, and the ultimate extirpation
of vice, would become an inevitable consequence. Ages must elapse before the
accomplishment of an object so important to the elevated concerns of intelligent life; but the causes are already in operation, and nothing can arrest or
destroy the benignant effects which they are calculated to produce. The power
of reason, the knowledge of printing, the overthrow of political and ecclesias-
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tical despotism, the universal diffusion of the light of science, and the universal
enjoyment of republican liberty; these will become the harbingers and procuring causes of real virtue in every individual, and universal happiness will become
the lot of man.

Moral#y Is Not Based on the Divine
If a thousand Gods existed, or if nature existed independent of any; the
moral relation between man and man would remain exactly the same in either
case. Moral principle is the result of this relation, it is founded in the properties
of our nature and it is as indestructible as the basis on which it rests. If we could
abandon for a moment every theistical idea, it would nevertheless remain substantially true, that the happiness of society must depend upon the exercise of
equal and reciprocal justice. It would also be true, that benevolence is an
amiable trait in the character of man; that the cultivation of his faculties is a
duty imposed on him, because the faithful performance of his duty extends the
circle of his real felicity; that vice is the bane of individual and social existence;
that truth is to be preferred to falsehood, activity to indolence, temperance to
debauchery, and generally, that science and virtue claim preeminently over
ignorance and vice, the universal attachment of the human race . All these, and
many other particulars of a like nature, would stand as immortal monuments
of the real nature of moral principles, even after cultivated intellect shall have
performed the last solemn act of duty relative to the ancient regimen, and shall
have recalled bewildered man to the happy contemplation of the laws and
immutable energies of the physical universe. If this be true, in regard to the
essential nature of theological ideas, how much more powerfully will it hold
upon every sectarian modification of the subject. If pure theism be independent of morality, and morality independent of that, because it rests upon the
relations and the properties of human life, then it will be easy to conceive that
the subordinate descriptions of sectarian theology, must be still more unconnected with the present subject. The character, however, of all the Gods of
antiquity, is, of itself, a sufficient consideration to exclude them from any participation in the concerns of an exalted virtue. The Jewish God commands
theft and murder; he puts a lying spirit into the mouth of his prophets; he
repents and grieves for his past conduct; he is a God of fury, wrath, and vengeance. These actions and qualities are all attributed to him in the Old Testament! Is it possible that any man of common sense can believe, that moral
principles which are so important to the best interests of human society, should
be placed upon such an immoral and vindictive foundation? Can any one
imagine that a being, so destitute of moral justice and benevolence himself,
could serve as a solid basis on which to rest these qualities in human nature?
No, this sectarian God, this malignant phantom offormer ages, this compound
of weakness and wickedness, is calculated to subvert all moral principle, both
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in theory and practice, and present the moral world in the full exercise of the
most detestable passions.
The wrathful and unrelenting character of the christian divinity, is not less
hostile to the immaculate principles of a sound and excellent morality;
imbittered in his anger, and infuriate in his vengeance, he lays his hand upon
his innocent son, and offers him up a living sacrifice for the pmposes which
reason abhors, and justice utterly disclaims. Under the modification, name and
character of the Holy Ghost, this being introduces himself to a woman, and
violates those correct and delicate sentiments which ought to guide an intelligent being in cases of this kind. Under the name and character of Jesus Christ,
he exhibits the most flagrant departures from the purity of moral sentiment
and moral practice .... The sectarian divinity, which christianity presents to us,
is represented as a consuming fire, as a being possessing fiery indignation and
an uncontrollable vengeance; as a being who disregards all just discrimination
upon the subject of moral principle. He declares in some parts of the New
Testament, that every thing shall be regulated by his arbitrary will without
regard to the nature or character of the case. He will have mercy on whom he will
have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth. (See Rom. chap. 9th, etc.) Is it
possible that even a christian believer can suppose for a single moment, that the
principles of genuine morality can rest upon such an arbitrary basis? No, a
divinity of immoral description is the bane of moral virtue. The purest theism
is independent of morality, and morality is independent of that; much less then
can the corrupt and vitiated conceptions of barbarous ages be produced in
support of a principle which could not exist without the intellectual faculties of
man, and which cannot be destroyed while these faculties exist. The principle
and the practice of immortal virtue, will long remain after the plundering and
bloody theology of Moses, Jesus, and Mahomet, has ceased to affiict the human race. The essential principles of morality are founded in the nature of man,
they cannot be annihilated, they are as indestructible as human existence itself.
Universal Benevolence
The sentiment which includes the whole sensitive and intelligent world,
within the sphere of its benignant operations, is justly denominated universal
benevolence. Every organized being, whether of a high or low station in animal existence, is susceptible of pleasure and pain; they are all alternately affected by the wishes, the passions, and the conduct of each other, and this
influence is extended much farther than at first view would strike the mind of
the most correct and accurate observer. The universe is a vast assemblage of
living creatures, whose relations are reciprocal and reciprocated under a thousand different forms, and supported by a thousand different ligaments of an
imperceptible nature. The parts are interested in the whole, and the whole is
interested in the preservation and diversified modification of the parts. Noth-
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ing is foreign or irrelative in the vast fabric to which we belong. Union is most
intimate, and the intellectual destiny which awaits the human race, will ultimately disclose the consoling secret, that man's highest happiness consists in
perspicuously discovering his true connection with nature, and the eternal
duration of this connection. The circumscribed condition of man's excellence,
his wants, his social duties, his appetites, and his passions, constitute a considerable drawback upon the comprehensive conceptions, which he would otherwise have been capable offorrning concerning his relationship with nature, and
the ultimate destination to which the powers of nature have devoted the component and immortal parts of his existence. The intellectual properties of man
are, however, capable of being expanded so far as to indulge an opinion subversive of those narrow views which have excited sentiments of hostility between individuals and nations whose interests were the same, and whose duties
ought to have been universally reciprocated. It is, no doubt, extremely natural
and even absolutely necessary that each individual should feel an anxiety ex tremely impulsive respecting the preservation of his own existence, and the
means by which it is to be rendered tranquil and comfortable; but this sensation, the first which is experienced by a sensitive creature, does not preclude
that expansion of mind which would benevolently extend the circle of man's
moral affections and duties, and which also prepares for himself an additional
portion of exalted enjoyment. Sensation alone, or in other words mere animal
existence, must be deprived in a high degree of the power and the pleasure of
reciprocating those sentiments of moral sympathy, to which intelligent man is
indebted for his highest happiness. The gradual increase of the capacity of
sensation constitutes a continual approach toward the possession of those
properties on which the sublimity of thought depends, and by which human
reason recognizes the benefit of benevolent reciprocation. It is, however, denied by some, that man possesses any other qualities than those which are
merely selfish or individual; that his sensual impulses repel every sentiment of
comprehensive kindness and affection; that in every respect he is a being of
insulated nature and character, and that the powers and properties of his existence are necessarily in a high degree hostile to the interest and well being of
others. Two points of prominent and conspicuous importance invite the activity of mind in the solution of the present difficulty. The one point is the physical
relation of man to all existence; the other is his moral relation to his own species
and to all other inferior animals. The component parts of which man is formed,
are all drawn from the great fountain of existence; they are essentially material
in their nature, and destined to return to the source from which they sprang.
Organized matter cannot lay claim to a preeminent essence; it is modification
and refinement which produce visible exaltation, and not the native properties
contained in the substance of which man is composed. The constant interchange of matter with matter, is a primary and immutable law of nature, and
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should teach man through the channel of observation the ultimate destiny that
awaits him, it should teach him that the pain which he inflicts upon sensitive
existence will return upon himself with interest, and will pave the way for
eternizing a system of misery fatal to the sensations of the whole animal world.
Humanity has lessons of a different kind, pregnant with salutary instructions
calculated to enforce conviction upon the intellectual powers of man. The
spiritualization of human existence has made man a fool, it has taught him to
spurn at matter, to condemn its power and ridicule its essence; whereas on the
contrary, sound philosophy, which unfolds the connection between man and
nature, is calculated to produce in the mind sentiments of respect and tranquillity; respect for the aggregate of existence to which he belongs, and tranquillity
at the idea of an eternal interest in this indestructible mass. The successive
changes through which he is destined to pass, and the impossibility of relinquishing his connection with nature should inspire him with feelings of universal sympathy, and with sentiments of universal benevolence. Human reason has
an important duty to perform in the institutions which it establishes; for these
institutions will effect in succession, all the portions of matter destined to pass
through an organized predicament. It is, no doubt, difficult to convince the
human understanding of this physical or universal connection, or to make man
see his true interest in this respect. It is, nevertheless, a solemn and philosophic
truth that our sensations are, at this moment, suffering under the cruel lash of
ancient institutions; that the whole animal world are reciprocating with each
other a system of extensive and perpetual wretchedness resulting principally
from that contempt which has been thrown upon the capacity of material
substance, and our ignorance of an important and an indestructible connection
with the great body of nature. If man had a comprehensive view of the successive changes of his existence, and a correct idea of the nature of sensation
continually resulting from the renovation of organic forms, sympathy or universal benevolence, would become irresistibly impressive upon his moral powers, and form the basis of his subsequent conduct.
In the second place, man's moral relation to his own species, and to all
other inferior animals, furnishes cogent evidence in favour of moral sympathy
or universal benevolence. If the subject of man's physical connection presents
us with some philosophical difficulties, the repeated and frequent necessity of
performing his moral duties, will furnish a mass of instruction adequate to
every important decision. The single idea of establishing the doctrine of perpetual reprisals, ought to constitute an ample refutation of those selfish opinions which regard only the individual to the exclusion of all the other members
of society. It is the interest as well as the duty of every man to be just and
benevolent; an opposite conduct would become the signal of universal discord,
and the selfish principle which at first had for its object the preservation of self,
would become the procuring cause of self destruction. The powers and the
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properties of human existence are of a similar nature, and require a correspondent method of treatment; beside, the intimate connection which subsists
between us in this respect, our enjoyments and our capacity of enjoying, are
augmented by every effort which the mind makes in a comprehensive system
of philanthropy. The narrow prejudice which makes one man the enemy of
another and one country the enemy of another, is not only disgraceful, but
subversive of the best interests of human society. Political governments, and
the prejudices which have been created and nurtured by these governments,
have set individuals and nations in battle array against each other, without any
good or substantial reason whatever. What is there in the nature of the case
which should make a Frenchman and an Englishman hostile to each other? Are
they not both men, possessed of similar faculties, equally indebted to nature for
the resources of their felicity, and capable of being made happy or miserable by
the operation of the same causes? Yes, and it is the iniquity of corrupt government which has perverted those sentiments of the human heart by which one
human being is bound to another in a general system of interest, sympathy and
universal benevolence. This principle should also be extended to the whole
animal world, so as to exclude acts of cruelty, and annihilate every species of
injustice. The child that is permitted in early life to run a pin through a fly, is
already half prepared to run a dagger through the heart of his fellow creature!
It is the duty of parents and the business of instruction, to correct the ferocious
errors of former ages, and inspire society with sentiments of sympathy and
universal goodness. But to do this with effect, our political institutions must be
changed, and placed upon the broad basis of universal liberty and universal
justice. This will be a work of time, but it is as certain in the ultimate issue of
things, as the progress of the earth around the sun, or the general revolution
of the planetary system. The individual that withholds his intellectual contribution in this respect is either grossly ignorant, or a wicked traitor in the great
cause of human existence.
Moral Principle
In the sacred writings of the Jews and Christians; in all ancient theological
compositions, the idea of correct moral principle, had been so frequently abandoned, and so grossly violated, that the energy of thought, for many ages, was
inadequate to an upright and full investigation of the nature of human actions.
The subject is, no doubt, connected with considerable difficulties; but these
difficulties have been essentially augmented by the rubbish with which superstition has covered the moral character of man. The proofs of any inquiry,
which relate to moral principle, adhere so closely to the realities of physical and
intellectual existence, that the errors of an upright and intelligent mind, can
never assume a frightful and destructive character. They will be continually
modified, and undergo frequent corrections by the new information of which
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the mind is continually susceptible. Moral science cannot, perhaps, be reduced
to absolute certitude, or become susceptible of absolute perfection; it is in its
nature progressive, and the infinite diversity of sensations, which constitute the
essential basis of all our intellectual combinations and deductions, will furnish,
at least, a suspicion, that the decisions of the mind upon this subject, ought
frequently to be reexamined and subjected to a new and more accurate scrutiny. All the theological systems, that ever have been written, have never
thrown a particle of light upon this most interesting inquiry; they have established precepts, some few of which are good, and others extremely immoral;
but no analysis of the physical or moral powers of man has ever been exhibited;
no development of the principle of causation, or the nature of those effects,
which have essentially resulted from the constitution of animal or intellectual
existence. In all these cases, supernatural theology has prudently observed an
absolute silence, probably from a consciousness of the most profound ignorance. This single truth, of itself, evinces the moral deficiency of supernatural
religion, and the necessity of returning to the basis of nature for a correct
development of principle. Every thing that is discordant to this, has been established by the force of authority, and the reasonableness of such establishment,
has never been a ground of serious inquiry.
If it should be objected, that it is impossible, even upon the basis of nature,
to find an universal standard of morality, it will nevertheless appear, that a
continual approach toward such a standard, must be fur preferable to those
arbitrary decisions, which theology has made upon this subject. There can be
no internal force or excellence connected with a system established solely by
external power, without reference to the essence, or character of the principles,
which constitute the body of such a system. The internal excellence of the
principle itself, together with capacity of mental discernment, is essential to the
ultimate benefit, which may be expected from the natural operation of legal
codes. But there is no better method of rendering a principle intelligible, than
by shewing that it is consistent with nature, that it has resulted from her laws,
that it is useful in its effect, that it is capable of being reduced to practice; in a
word, that it is suited to the powers, condition, and character of the human
species. There is another previous consideration also, which ought to be taken
into the account before we shall be able to comprehend the essence of moral
principle, or to understand the nature of those duties, which result from our
original constitutions. That intellectual part of man, which supernatural theology has denominated a soul, has been viewed separate and distinct from the
body, as a kind of spiritual and celestial inhabitant of a mean and material
tenement; that their union would be of short duration, and that their final
destination was extremely different. This led to reasonings and conjectures,
that were erroneous; for as the corporeal sensations were entirely excluded
from a participation in the cause, by which moral influence was produced, an
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accurate knowledge of the sources of action, was necessarily excluded, and
spiritual mystery was substituted for philosophic demonstration. The human
mind is incapable of forming any conception of that which is not material; man
is a being whose composition is purely physical, and moral properties or intellect, are the necessary results of organic construction. To ascertain, therefore,
the foundation of moral principle, it is necessary to revert to the physical constitution of human nature, it is necessary to go to the source of sensation, to
the cause of impressions, and the diversity of these impressions; to the universality of the fact, that all human nature possesses the same, or similar sensations,
together with all the other additional circumstances resulting from the subsequent intellectual combinations of our existence. All human beings are susceptible of pain, they are also, all susceptible of pleasure; they are all possessed of
the same senses, subjected to the same wants, exhibit the same desires, and are
satisfied with the same enjoyments. These positions cannot be controverted,
they are true in the general features of their character, and the inconsiderable
deviations resulting from the variations of animal structure, cannot, in any
eminent degree, shake the rectitude or universality of these positions. The
modification of the principle of animal structure in intelligent existence, is, no
doubt, diversified by a nice and inscrutable gradation, but the aggregate
amount of organic result must be nearly the same, and though the animal
sensation were to vary in a still higher degree, yet it would, nevertheless, be
substantially true, that certain comprehensive axioms might be laid down,
which would necessarily include within the sphere of their imperious effect,
every possible diversification of the sensitive faculties of human nature. That
happiness is to be preferred to misery, pleasure to pain, virtue to vice, truth to
falsehood, science to ignorance, order to confusion, universal good to universal
evil, are positions which no rational being can possibly controvert. They are
positions to which mankind, in all ages and countries, must yield assent. They
are positions, the truth of which, is never denied, the essence of which, is never
controverted; it is the form and application only, which has been the cause of
social contention, and not the reality or excellence of the axioms themselves.
The universality of the principle of sensation, generates universal capacity of
enjoying pleasure, and suffering pain; this circumstance modifies the character
of human actions, and renders it necessary that every man should regard every
other man with an eye of strict justice, with a tender and delicate sensibility,
with a constant reference to the preservation of his feelings, and the extension
of his happiness; in a word, that the exercise of eternal justice should be constantly reciprocated by all the individuals of the same species. If I assume to
myself the pretended right of injuring the sensations, the moral sentiments, or
general happiness of my neighbour, he has, undoubtedly, an equal right to
commit the same violence upon me; this would go to the destruction of all
right, to the total subversion of all justice; it would reduce society instantly to
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a state of warfare, and introduce the reign of terror and of misery. It is a
contradiction in terms to assert that any man has a right to do wrong; the
exercise of such a pretended right, is the absolute destruction of all right, and
the first human being who commits violence, has already prepared for himself
a hell of retaliation, the justice of which, his own mind can never deny. It is,
therefore, inconsistent with truth to say, that there is no such thing as a general
standard of moral principle; this standard has a real existence in the construction of our nature; it is ascertained and regulated by the rule of reciprocal
justice. It is absolute in the most important duties of human life; but in other
cases of less weight and magnitude, it is discovered, by the calculations of
judgment, by the process of the understanding, and will sometimes vibrate
between the impressions of sense, and the subtile combinations which constitute an ultimate moral decision. If it be objected upon the suggestion of this
idea, that the system of natural morality, is less perfect than that which has been
revealed, the true answer is, that revealed morality, in the most intelligible
cases, is incorrect and absurd: and in the more refined cases of difficulty, a total
ignorance is manifested, so that it is evident, upon the very face of the record,
that the subject of moral principle, in its subtile discriminations, was never
examined or understood by Theological writers. The boasted maxim of the
Christian religion, "All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you,
do ye even so to them," is incorrect in point of phraseology, and in point of
principle does not exceed any of the moral writers of antiquity, who lived many
hundred years before Jesus Christ. If this scriptural declaration means to establish the doctrine of reciprocal justice, it is incontrovertibly right; but the idea
of placing the essence of virtue in the wishes of the human heart, is not very
correct. It is very possible that one human being may desire another to do unto
him many things which ought not to be done, and which are, in their own
nature, improper or immoral. To say, therefore, that our desires should constitute the basis of moral decision, is a declaration not consistent with truth, and
which, in many cases, would subvert the very essence of moral principle. There
is a fitness of suitableness in the thing itself, united with the consideration of the
good or bad effect that would be produced, which ought to become the
ground of uniform and universal judgment in the human mind. My neighbour
may wish me to do unto him an act of serious and substantial injury, which
being performed, ought to be returned to me in manner and form exactly the
same; and thus, by an adherence to this maxim as it is now stated, a double
injury would be produced, and the foundation of virtue be shaken to the
centre. But waiving any criticism of this kind, and giving to this scripture declaration the full extent of what is contended for, it is, nevertheless, no more
than a plain maxim of justice, which had been known and practised, in a greater
or less degree, at all times and in all countries. All the local and unjust institutions of mankind in former ages, have not destroyed the essential relation
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which man bears to man, nor have they been able, wholly to efface a knowledge of those duties, which result from these relations, and from the powers
and principles of human existence. The more the subject of moral principle is
examined, the more it will appear that there are certain general features in it,
which the experience of man has partially recognized, and being fully developed and reduced to practice, would constitute a solid foundation for human
felicity. The approach to such a standard of perfection, will be gradual and slow,
but it must, nevertheless, from the very nature of man, be constant and certain.
The following, says Volney, is conceived to be the primordial basis, and physical
origin of all justice and right; whatever be the active power, the moving cause
that directs the universe, this power having given to all men the same organs,
the same sensations, and the same wants, has thereby declared, that it has also
given them the same rights to the use of its benefits, and that in the order of
nature, all men are equal. Secondly, inasmuch as this power has given to every
man the ability of preserving and maintaining his own existence, it clearly
follows, that all men are constituted independent of each other, that they are
created free, that no man can be subject, and no man sovereign, but that all
men are the unlimited proprietors of their own persons. Equality, therefore,
and liberty, are two essential attributes of man, two laws of the divinity, not less
essential and immutable, than the physical properties of inanimate nature;
again, from the principle that every man is the unlimited master of his own
person, it follows that one inseparable condition in every contract and engagement is the free and voluntary consent of all the persons therein bound; farther,
because every individual is equal to every other individual, it follows that the
balance of receipts and payments in political society, ought to be rigorously in
equilibrium with each other; so that from the idea of equality, immediately
flows that other idea, equity and justice.
Again, the same author observes, that there existed in the order of the
universe, and in the physical constitution of man, eternal and immutable laws,
which waited only his observance to render him happy. 0 men of different
climes! look to the heavens that give you light, to the earth that nourishes you;
since they present to you all the same gifts; since the power that directs their
motion has bestowed on you the same life, the same organs, the same wants,
has it not also given you the same right to the use of its benefits? Has it not
hereby declared you to be all equal and free? What mortal then shall dare refuse
to his fellow creature, that which is granted him by nature? 0 nations, let us
banish all tryanny and discord! let us form one society, one vast family; and
since mankind are all constituted alike, let there henceforth exist but one law,
that of nature; one code, that of reason; one throne, that of justice; one altar,
that of union. The foregoing impressive sentiments of this celebrated writer,
disclose with clearness to the view of the human mind, the nature of moral
principle and the foundation of all right and virtue. It is the reciprocation of
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sensation, the mutuality of condition, of powers and wants, that constitute the
immortal basis of justice, and lead to the establishment of rules, whose operation must ever be in strict coincidence with the happiness of the human species.
The exceptions to those fundamental principles are so few, and so unimportant, as to form no strong objection against the general assertion, that there
exist in the constitution of human nature, those essential properties which
confer upon man the character of moral agent. To controvert, therefore, the
existence of these moral principles, or the idea of a general standard in the
morality of human actions, is to fly in the face of all experience, to oppose the
universal consciousness of the human understanding, and deny the most conspicuous facts connected with the life of man.

The Religion of Nature
It is this religion which, at the present period of the world, creates such
frightful apprehensions in the household of faith, and threatens to shake to the
centre, the chief corner stone on which the Church is built. These apprehensions are daily disclosed by Christian professors, and they depict in such strong
colours, the fatal effects of Deism, that ignorant fanaticism believes it to be an
immoral monster, stalking with gigantic strides over the whole civilized world,
for the detestable purpose of producing universal disorder, and subverting all
the sound principles of social and intelligent existence. Such are the horrid
ideas which the enemies of this pure and holy religion are every where propagating amongst their credulous and deluded followers. This circumstance renders it necessary, that the true idea of Deism be fairly stated, that it may be
clearly understood by those whose minds have hitherto been darkened by the
mysteries of faith. Deism declares to intelligent man the existence of one perfect God, Creator and Preserver of the Universe; that the laws by which he
governs the world, are like himself immutable, and of course, that violations of
these laws, or miraculous interference in the movements of nature, must be
necessarily excluded from the grand system of universal existence; that the
Creator is justly entitled to the adoration of every intellectual agent throughout the regions of infinite space; and that he alone is entitled to it, having no
copartners who have a right to share with him the homage of the intelligent
world. Deism also declares, that the practice of a pure, natural, and uncorrupted virtue, is the essential duty, and constitutes the highest dignity of man;
that the powers of man are competent to all the great purposes of human
existence; that science, virtue, and happiness, are the great objects which ought
to awake the mental energies, and draw forth the moral affections of the human race.
These are some of the outlines of pure Deism, which Christian superstition
so dreadfully abhors, and whose votaries she would willingly consign to endless
torture. But it is built upon a substantial foundation, and will triumphantly
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diffuse happiness among the nations of the earth, for ages after Christian superstition and fanaticism have ceased to spread desolation and carnage through
the fair creation of God.
In surveying the history of man, it is clearly discovered, that the miseries
and misfortunes ofhis existence are, in a high degree, the result of his ignorance
and his vices. Ignorance renders him savage and ferocious; while science pours
into his mind the benign sentiments of humanity, and gives a new colouring to
his moral existence. Reason, which every kind of supernatural theology abhors;
reason, which is the glory of our nature, is destined eventually, in the progress
of future ages, to overturn the empire of superstition, and erect upon its ruins
a fabric, against which the storms of despotism may beat in vain; against which
superstition may wreak her vengeance without effect, from which she will be
obliged to retire in agonizing tortures. It has been the opinion of some honest
and intelligent minds, that the power of intellect is inadequate to the moral and
political emancipation of man. This opinion, though sometimes it is found to
be operative upon benevolent hearts, seems, however, to be at war with the
intellectual structure of our existence, and the facts furnished by modern history. In the great question which relates to human improvement, the cause
which is productive of thought, cannot, in any high degree, be included as
influencing the final decision. It is probable, however, that the opinion which
refers intellect to organic material combination would favour most an unlimited improvement of the human species. If thought to be an effect of matter
finely organized, and delicately constructed, the best method of augmenting
its power would be, to preserve the whole human system in the most pure,
regular, and natural mode of operation. Parents and instructors, in this respect,
are capable of doing great injury, or of producing most important benefits to
future ages.
The science of the world has been, in some measure, diminished by the
propagation of an opinion, that there are only a few human beings who are
possessed of what is called genius, to the exclusion of all the rest. This looks too
much like mystery, and seems to include in it the idea that mind is sent from
heaven, to occupy for a short time, a miserable and material tenement, and then
return to its native home. It ought to be recollected that earth is the abode of
man, and that of this the materials of his existence are composed, all are confined to this place of residence, and to the amelioration of sensitive and intelligent life, all his labours ought to be directed. He should learn to respect, and
not despise his reason. He should learn to consider moral virtue, as the greatest
good, as the most substantial joy of his existence. In order, however, to be
eminently good, a full scope must be given to the operation of intellectual
powers, and man must feel an unqualified confidence in his own energies. The
double despotism of Church and state, has borne so hard upon human existence, that man is sunk beneath its dreadful weight; but resuscitated nations are
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about to teach kings and tyrants, a lesson awfully impressive, in regard to the
destiny which awaits the aggregate injustice of the world. The period is at hand,
in which kings and thrones, and priests and hierarchies, and the long catalogue
of mischiefs which they have produced, shall be swept away from the face of the
earth and buried in the grave of everlasting destruction. Then will arrive the era
of human felicity, in which the heart of unfortunate man shall be consoled; then
will appear the moment of national consolation, and universal freedom; then
the empire of reason, ofscience, and of virtue, will extend over the whole earth,
and man, emancipated from the barbarous despotism of antiquity, will assume
to himself, his true predicament in nature, and become a standing evidence of
the divinity of thought and the unlimited power of human reason.
. . . In examining the vast machinery of the universe, presented for our
contemplation, by the great Creator, the human mind is lost in a labyrinth of
reflection, and swallowed up in the most profound meditations! We behold on
every side, the most ineffable beauties and the most astonishing wonders; the
most splendid exhibitions of eternal wisdom, the most unbounded displays of
infinite benevolence, and the most testimonies of an incomprehensible power.
In this vast system, there are many things inexplicable to man; many events
beyond the power of human solution, and many arrangements incomprehensible by the most scrutinizing efforts of human wisdom. But man should consider himself as an unit in the totality of existence; as a part of a widely extended
whole, bearing a relation to every other part, and every other part bearing a
relation to his own modification of life. He should reflect that the world is
governed by general and immutable laws, and that the immutable operation of
these laws produces perpetual mutability in the infinitely diversified parts and
portions of the great fabric of nature. He ought to learn that change is the
eternal order in the established arrangements of the world, and he ought not
to be excluded from the general influence of fundamental laws established by
eternal wisdom. He should learn to be reconciled to his fate, and consider
death as a necessary and justifiable appendage of the present modification of
existence. He should be taught to love and practice virtue, but not through the
fear of an eternal hell; but because it is useful to society, and contributes to his
individual happiness. He should be taught to revere the power, which animates
and enlivens the great system of nature; but not to fear God on the one hand,
nor flatter him on the other, with an expectation of obtaining his favour. He
should disregard all ideas of ghosts, demons, and malignant spirits, and reason
on the cognizable properties of real existence. The mind of man should be
elevated above the practice of vice, above the frowns of fortune, and the fears
of death. He ought to be the strong advocate of nature, and have confidence
in his own energies, his principles should be just and correct, his actions strictly
moral, and his sentiment in coincidence with the system of benevolence and
utility. No bugbears of superstition, no ghosts of fanaticism, no demons ofhell
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should be permitted to disturb his brain; but rising above all vice and all prejudice, he should consider himself as an associated being, and live for the benefit
of himself and his fellow creatures.

Principles of the Deistical Society
of the State of New York
Proposals for forming a society for the promotion of moral science and the
religion of nature-having in view the destruction of superstition and fanaticism-tending to the development of the principles of a genuine natural
morality-the practice of a pure and uncorrupted virtue-the cultivation of
science and philosophy-the resurrection of reason, and the renovation of the
intelligent world.
At a time when the political despotism of the earth is disappearing, and man
is about to reclaim and enjoy the liberties of which for ages he has been deprived, it would be unpardonable to neglect the important concerns of intellectual and moral nature. The slavery of the mind has been the most destructive of all slavery; and the baneful effects of a dark and gloomy superstition have
suppressed all the dignified efforts of the human understanding, and essentially
circumscribed the sphere of intellectual energy. It is only by returning to the
laws of nature, which man has so frequently abandoned, that happiness is to be
acquired. And, although the efforts of a few individuals will be inadequate to
the sudden establishment of moral and mental felicity; yet, they may lay the
foundation on which a superstructure may be reared incalculably valuable to
the welfare of future generations. To contribute to the accomplishment of an
object so important, the members of this association do approve of the following fundamental principles:1. That the universe proclaims the existence of one supreme Deity, worthy
of the adoration of intelligent beings.
2. That man is possessed of moral and intellectual faculties sufficient for the
improvement of his nature, and the acquisition of happiness.
3. That the religion of nature is the only universal religion; that it grows out
of the moral relations of intelligent beings, and that it stands connected with
the progressive improvement and common welfare of the human race.
4. That it is essential to the true interest of man, that he love truth and
practise virtue.
5. That vice is every where ruinous and destructive to the happiness of the
individual and of society.
6. That a benevolent disposition, and beneficent actions, are fundamental
duties of rational beings.
7. That a religion mingled with persecution and malice cannot be of divine
origin.
8. That education and science are essential to the happiness of man.

Reason, the Glory of Our Nature

9. That civil and religious liberty is equally essential to his true interests.
10. That there can be no human authority to which man ought to be
amenable for his religious opinions.
11. That science and truth, virtue and happiness, are the great objects to
which the activity and energy of the human faculties ought to be directed.
Every member admitted into this association shall deem it his duty, by
every suitable method in his power, to promote the cause of nature and moral
truth, in opposition to all schemes of superstition and fanaticism, claiming
divine origin.

277

Philip Freneau
The Reasoning Power, Celestial Guest,
the Stamp upon the Soul Impressyd

Philip Freneau (1752-1832) is popularly remembered as the "poet of the
American Revolution" and the "founder ofAmerican poetry." Both these titles
could be debated: Joel Barlow, for example, might be equally in the running
for the first, Anne Bradstreet for the second. But one unbestowed honorific
Freneau indisputably deserves is "poet of American deism." More than any
other Early Republic bard, he captured and celebrated in his verse the themes
of Enlightenment rational religion. It is arguable that his influence was more
pervasive than even Paine's or Palmer's, especially since he was less controversial. Many Early Republic readers (like readers today) may have been reluctant
to plow through lengthy and demanding philosophical defenses of deism, but
few could resist glancing at short and pithy poems scattered throughout newspapers and journals.
Of all the American deists, Freneau's beginnings were the most propitious.
He was born in New York City, on 2 January 1752, into a prosperous and
cultured family. Young Freneau grew up surrounded by books, art, and intelligent conversation. Privately educated by tutors, he entered the College of
New Jersey (Princeton) at fifteen, where he enjoyed a distinguished career
during his four-year stint.
Even as a student, Freneau's interests clearly ran toward writing. When the
American Revolution erupted shortly after his graduation, he supported the
cause by penning no less than eight satirical pamphlets aimed at the British and
Tories. But wanderlust soon overwhelmed revolutionary fervor, and in 1776
Freneau sailed to Santa Cruz, where he remained for almost three years. There
he wrote some of his best poetry, including "The Jamaica Funeral" and "The
House of Night," each of which served as exemplars for the later romantic
poets.
Freneau briefly returned to the United States in 1778 but quickly shipped
out again for the West Indies. Luck was against him. The frigate on which he
was a passenger was captured by a British man-of-war, and for a time Freneau
was remanded to a prison ship in New York harbor. After nearly dying from ill
treatment and privation, he was finally released. In 1781 he dramatically described his ordeal in the masterful British Prison-Ship; A Poem, in Four Cantoes.
During the next four years, Freneau was an employee of the Philadelphia
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Post Office. Although he appears to have despised his job, it left him enough
spare time to versify, and a steady stream of his poetry appeared in newspapers
and journals. His passion for the ocean and adventure once more proved irresistible, however, and in 1784 he took to sea again, only returning to the
United States five years later. In 1789, having finally exhausted his wanderlust
(and, incidentally, having written some of his best seafaring poetry), he married
and threw himself into journalism and governmental work. He edited several
newspapers, including the anti-Federalist Aurora, served in the Department of
State during Jefferson's administration, and finally retired to a New Jersey farm
to devote himself to poetry. In December 1832, while returning home from
a country store, he was caught in a sudden blizzard, lost his way, and perished.
It was an appropriately romantic end for a man who his entire life had relished
the unexpected.
Although Freneau had briefly studied for the ministry following his gradu ation from Princeton, he was by temperament and intellectual conviction ill
suited for the clerical life. In company with the other American deists, he had
imbibed early on the New Learning of Locke and Newton, becoming convinced that the only worship worthy of humans was one based on a rational
investigation of nature and morality. His deistic writings, prose as well as poetry, reflect that belief Interestingly, Freneau did not tend to be as anticlerical
as his fellow deists, although he did lambast what he took to be priestly hypocrisy in several of his pieces. He was more concerned with lyrical celebrations of
nature's God than with vindictive diatribes against supernaturalist dogma. Nor
did he militantly propagandize for deism. Although an acquaintance of
Palmer's, a correspondent of Paine's, and a sometime member of the New
York Deistical Society, Freneau by and large preferred the contemplative to the
activist life, at least when it came to religious matters. Indeed, most of his
deistic poetry, although written throughout his entire career, was only published late in life.
The selections from Freneau here include both prose and poetry. The verse
generally centers on the key deistic concepts of God, nature, reason, and
morality. "Reflections on the Constitution, or Frame ofNature," argues, along
lines reminiscent of Ethan Allen's Reason the Only Oracle, that God's revelation is nature and nature's laws: "TIIou, nature's self art nature's God /
Through all expansion spread abroad, / Existing in the eternal scheme, / Vast,
undivided, and supreme." "On a Book Called Unitarian Theology," "On the
Uniformity and Perfection of Nature," and "On the Universality, and Other
Attributes of the God of Nature" all echo the claim that God is revealed
through the constant and immutable laws of nature. In addition, the first, with
its reiteration of a sun metaphor, hints at an almost platonic relationship between the divine Mind and the created world. The second insists, in typical
deistic fashion, that the doctrine of miracles, if taken seriously, demolishes the
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integrity of nature as well as the dignity of God: "Could [Nature] descend
from that great plan/ To work unusual things for man,/ To suit the insect
of an hour-/ This would betray a want of power."
In "On the Powers of the Human Understanding," "On Superstition,"
and "Belief and Unbelief," Freneau considers the nature ofrationality. The first
argues that human reason will continue to evolve, perhaps even after death,
more and more closely approximating the divine Reason of which it is a reflection. The second claims that "true" religion is "on nature and reason built,"
but that sectarian bigotry and ignorance reduces it to an irrational system that
encourages error and anxiety. Only when humans "No more fictitious gods
revere,/ Nor worship what engenders fear," will religious sensibility resume its
original purity. "Belief and Unbelief" argues, a la Volney, for the relativity of
sectarian doctrines and concludes by suggesting that faith, properly understood, is inductive rather than mysteriously supernatural: "Nor can conviction
bind the heart / Till evidence has done its part: / And, when that evidence is
clear, / Belief is just, and truth is near."
"Science, Favourable to Virtue," "On False Systems of Government,"
"The New Age," "On the Abuse of Human Power," "On the Religion of
Nature," "On the Evils of Human life," "On Happiness," and "The Millennium" each reveal Freneau's deistic conviction that morality is the supreme
goal of natural religion, that it is properly based on reason's control of the
passions, and that it enhances social utility as well as individual felicity. Rational
religion, then, encourages the progress of the natural sciences, because they are
the vehicles best suited to cultivate human reason and promote morality.
Moreover, freedom of conscience and release from political oppression and
social inequality are requisite conditions for the flourishing of human reason.
Finally, in lines that recall Pope's "All that is, is right," Freneau argues that evil
does not arise from natural law, which necessarily reflects divine goodness and
providence, but rather from human error and prejudice. If humans but regulate their behavior to conform to the lessons of nature, evil can be extirpated.
This is because "That moral track to man assign'd" is "A transcript from the allperfect mind."
The prose pieces reprinted here are delightful illustrations ofFreneau at his
satirical best. They also contain two of his infrequent assaults on institutionalized Christianity and the clergy. As mentioned, Freneau rarely employed his
pen directly against revealed religion but instead concerned himself with highlighting the positive attributes of deism. Occasionally, however, exasperated by
what he interpreted as egregious abuses or absurdities on the part of the Christian establishment, he entered the fray-although even then he usually dressed
his criticisms in humor rather than invective. His prods were indirect stabs
rather than frontal attacks. As such, they were probably more effective than the
angry recriminations of a Paine or Palmer. They encouraged readers to laugh
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at supernaturalist doctrine, sectarian rituals, and stuffy clergy. And humor, after
all, is a sure antidote to authoritarianism: One cannot take seriously what one
finds laughable.
The first selection is part of a series entitled "Letters on Various Interesting
and Important Subjects," which Freneau ran in his Aurora. It is both a defense
of the ideals of the French Revolution and a slap at the perceived hypocrisy of
American religionists. The protagonist in the little vignette is Robert Slender,
a homespun philosopher whom Freneau frequently used as his mouthpiece.
Robert is everyman, a seemingly naive, nonbookish character who disingenuously trusts common sense and experience and is consequently always finding
himself on the wrong side of his more "learned" clerical neighbors. His ability
to cut through the sophistries of theological nonsense calls to mind the disarmingly acute innocence of two ofFranklin's "commonplace" philosophers: Poor
Richard and Silence Dogood.
In this piece, Robert finds himself perplexed about the correct definitions
of "orthdoxy" and "heterodoxy." Before the French Revolution (which
Freneau always fervently admired), the Calvinist clergy had never missed a
chance to blast from the pulpit Catholicism and papacy. Such denunciations,
Robert had been led to believe, were "orthodox." But now that France has
overthrown the monarchy, established democracy, and broken the hegemony
of the church, Robert is puzzled to discover that the American clergy praises
Catholicism, defends the pope, and adulates such non-Protestant enemies of
liberalism as "Suwarrow" ( a reference to the Russian field marshal Suvarov,
who was instrumental in savagely breaking the back of the democratic Polish
insurrection in 1794). This reversal is now likewise "orthodox." How?
The cleric to whom Robert addresses his question proceeds to explain away
the "merely apparent" discrepancy by leading Slender through a hilarious maze
of sophisms. But the real explanation for the about-face is obvious: Whenever
established Christianity feels itself threatened by either political liberalism or
rational religion, it expeditiously aligns itself with what was previously condemned as heretical. When Slender mildly suggests that such a move is less than
consistent, the clergyman who is instructing him sternly thunders, "I hope ...
you don't pretend to argue religion with me!" and declares poor Robert anathema.
The second prose selection is from "The Voyage ofTimberoo-Taho-Eede,
an Otaheite Indian." In it, Freneau pokes fun at both Christian ritual and
values. The story is a report from an Otaheite sent as an emissary to New
England. He tells his curious chief that the religion of the foreigners he visited
is bizarre, holding as it does that the deity is both one and three persons and
that God, though eternal, was murdered. The adherents of this religion indulge in every species of wickedness, including slavery; they are "intolerably
proud, selfish, vain, malevolent, and lazy"; and they appear to worship "little
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plates of metal" which they hoard. The emissary concludes his report by assuring his chief that the Otaheite priest attempted to instruct the foreigners in the
one true Otaheite religion but barely escaped being soundly drubbed for his
pains. This leads him to surmise that "these people seem to be under some
indissoluble obligation to believe only what has previously been believed for
them by their progenitors"-a subtle jab at religious bigotry that reminds one
of the eloquent opening stanza of Freneau's "On the Abuse of Human
Power": "Must man at that tribunal bow/ Which will no range to thought
allow, / But his best powers would sway or sink, / And idly tells him what to
THINK."

On the Powers of the Human Understanding
This human mind! how grand a theme:
Faint image of the Great Supreme,
The universal soul,
That lives, that thinks, compares, contrives;
From its vast self all power derives
To manage or control.
What energy, 0 soul, is thine:
How you reflect, resolve, combine;
Invention all your own!
Material bodies changed by you
New modes assume, or natures new,
From death or chaos won.
To intellectual powers, though strong,
To moral powers a use belong
More noble and refined;
These lift us to the power who made,
Illume what seems to us all shade,
The part to man assigned.
Both nurtured in the heart of man
Serve to advance his social plan,
And happier make his race;
Hence Reason takes her potent sway,
And grovelling passi,ons bids obey
That harm us and debase.
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0 ye, who long have walked obscure;
Forever must those clouds endure
Which darken human bliss?
Though for some better state designed,
Is there not rigour in the mind
To make a heaven ofthisEternal must that progress be
Which Nature through futurity
Decrees the human soul;
Capacious still, it still improves
As through the abyss of time it moves,
Or endless ages roll.
Its knowledge grows by every change;
Through science vast we see it range
That none may here acquire;
The pause of death must come between
And Nature gives another scene
More brilliant, to admire.
Thus decomposed, or recombined,
To slow perfection moves the mind
And may at last attain
A nearer rank with that first cause
Which distant, though it ever draws,
Unequalled must remain.
Its moral beauty thus displayed
In moral excellence arrayed
Perpetually it shines:
Its heaven of happiness complete
The mass of souls united meet
In orbs that heaven assigns.

Reflections on the Constitution, or Frame of Nature
From what high source of being came
This system, Nature's aweful frame;
This sun, that motion gives to all,
The planets, and this earthly ball:
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This sun, who life and heat conveys,
And comforts with his cheering rays;
This image of the God, whose beam
Enlivens like the GREAT SUPREME.
We see, with most exact design,
The WORLD revolve, the planets shine,
In nicest order all things meet,
A structure in ITSELF complete.
Beyond our proper solar sphere
Unnumbered orbs again appear,
Which, sunk into the depths of space,
Unvarying keep their destined place.
Great Frame! what wonders we survey,
In part alone, from day to day!
And hence the reasoning, human soul
Infers an author of the whole:
A power, that every blessing gives,
Who through eternal ages lives,
All space inhabits, space his throne,
Spreads through all worlds, confined to none;
Infers, through skies, o'er seas, o'er lands
A power throughout the whole commands;
In all extent its dwelling place,
Whose mansion is unbounded space.
Where ends this world, or when began
This spheric point displayed to man?No limit has the work divine,
Nor owns a circumscribing line.
Beyond what mind or thought conceives,
Our efforts it in darkness leaves;
And Nature we, by Reason's aid,
Find boundless as the power that made.
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nature's self art nature's God
Through all expansion spread abroad,
Existing in the eternal scheme,
Vast, undivided, and supreme.
THOU,

Here beauty, order, power, behold
Exact, all perfect, uncontrouled;
All in its proper place arranged,
Immortal, endless, and unchanged.
Its powers, still active, never rest,
From motions, by THAT GOD impressed,
Who life through all creation spread,
Nor left the meanest atom dead.

Science, Favourable to Virtue
The mind, in this uncertain state,
Is anxious to invc;:stigate
All knowledge through creation sown,
And would no atom leave unknown.
So warm, so ardent in research,
To wisdom's source she fain would march;
And find by study, toil, and care
The secrets of all nature there.
Vain wish, to fathom all we see,
For nature is all mystery;
The mind, though perched on eagle's wings,
With pain surmounts the scum of things.
Her knowledge on the surface floats,
Of things supreme she dreams or dotes;
Fluttering awhile, she soon descends,
And all in disappointment ends.
And yet this proud, this strong desire,
Such ardent longings to aspire,
Prove that this weakness in the mind
For some wise purpose was designed.
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From efforts and attempts, like these,
Virtue is gained by slow degrees;
And science, which from truth she draws,
Stands firm to Reason and her cause.
However small, its use we find
To tame and civilize mankind,
To throw this brutal instinct by,
To honour Reason, ere we die.
The lovely philanthropic scheme
(Great image of the power supreme,)
On growth of science must depend;
With this all human duties end.

On a Book Called Unitarian Theology
In this choice work, with wisdom penned, we find
The noblest system to reform mankind,
Bold truths confirmed, that bigots have denied,
By most perverted, and which some deride.
Here, truths divine in easy language flow,
Truths long concealed, that now all climes shall know:
Here, like the blaze of our material sun,
Enlightened Reason proves, that GOD 1s ONEAs that, concentered in itself, a sphere,
illumines all Nature with its radiance here,
Bids towards itself all trees and plants aspire,
Awakes the winds, impels the seeds of fire,
And still subservient to the Almighty plan,
Warms into life the changeful race of man;
So--like the sun-in heaven's bright realms we trace
One POWER OF LOVE, that fills unbounded space,
Existing always by no borrowed aid,
Before all worlds-eternal, and not madeTo THAT indebted, stars and comets burn,
Owe their swift movements, and to THAT return!
Prime source of wisdom, all-contriving mind,
First spring of REASON, that this globe designed;
Parent of order, whose unwearied hand
Upholds the fabric that his wisdom planned,
And, its due course assigned to every sphere,
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Resolves the seasons, and sustains the year!Pure light of TRUTH! where'er thy splendours shine,
Thou art the image of the power divine;
Nought else, in life, that full resemblance bears,
No sun, that lights us through our circling years,
No stars, that through yon' charming azure stray,
No moon, that glads us with her evening ray,
No seas, that o'er their gloomy caverns flow,
No forms beyond us, and no shapes below!
Then slight-oh slight not, this instructive page,
For the mean follies of a dreaming age;
Here to the truth, by REASON'S aid aspire,
Nor some dull preacher of romance admire;
See ONE, SOLE GOD, in these convincing lines,
Beneath whose view perpetual day-light shines;
At whose command all worlds their circuits run,
And night, retiring, dies before the sun!
Here, MAN no more disgraced by Time appears,
Lost in dull slumbers through ten thousand years;
Plunged in that gulph, whose dark unfathomed wave
Men of all ages to perdition gave;
An empty dream, or still more empty shade,
The substance vanished, and the form decayed!Here Reason proves, that when this life decays,
Instant, new life in the warm bosom plays,
As that expiring, still its course repairs
Through endless ages, and unceasing years.
Where parted souls with kindred spirits meet,
Wrapt to the bloom of beauty all complete;
In that celestial, vast, unclouded sphere,
Nought there exists but has its image here!
All there is MIND!-That INTELLECTUAL FLAME,
From whose vast stores all human genius came,
In which all Nature forms or REASON'S planFLOWS TO THIS ABJECT WORLD, AND BEAMS ON MAN!

On False Systems of Government, and the Generally
Debased Condition of Mank.ind
Does there exist, or will there come
An age with wisdom to assume,
The RIGHTS by heaven designed;
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The Rights which man was born to claim,
From Nature's God which freely came,
To aid and bless mankind.No monarch lives, nor do I deem
There will exist one crown supreme
The world in peace to sway;
Whose first great view will be to place
On their true scale the human race,
And discord's rage allay.
REPUBLICS! must the task be your's
To frame the code which life secures,
And RIGHT from man to manAre you, in Time's declining age,
Found only fit to tread the stage
When tyranny began?

How can we call those systems just
Which bid the few, the proud, the first
Possess all earthly good;
While millions robbed of all that's dear
In silence shed the ceaseless tear,
And leeches suck their blood.
Great orb, that on our planet shines,
Whose power both light and heat combines
You should the model be;
To man, the pattern how to reign
With equal sway, and how maintain
True human dignity.
Impartially to all below
The solar beams unstinted flow,
On all is poured the RAY,
Which cheers, which warms, which clothes the ground
In robes of green, or breathes around
Llfe;-to enjoy the day.
But crowns not so;-with selfish views
They partially their bliss diffuse
Their minions feel them kind;-
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And, still opposed to human right,
Their plans, their views in this unite,
To embroil and curse mankind.
Ye tyrants, false to HIM, who gave
Llfe, and the virtues of the brave,
All worth we own, or know:Who made you great, the lords of man,
To waste with wars, with blood to stain
The Maker's works below?
You have no iron race to swayillume them well with Reason's ray;
Inform our active race;
True honour, to the mind impart,
With virtue's precepts tame the heart,
Not urge it to be base;
Let laws revive, by heaven designed,
To tame the tiger in the mind
And drive from human hearts
That love of wealth, that love of sway,
Which leads the world too much astray,
Which points envenomed darts:
And men will rise from what they are;
Sublimer, and superior, far,
Than SOLON guessed, or PlATO saw;
All will be just, all will be goodThat harmony, "not understood,"
Will reign the general law.
For, in our race, deranged, bereft,
The parting god some vestige left
Of worth before possessed;
Which full, which fair, which perfect shone,
When love and peace, in concord sown,
Ruled, and inspired each breast.
Hence, the small GOOD which yet we find,
Is shades of that prevailing mind
Which sways the worlds around:-
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Let these depart, once disappear,
And earth would all the horrors wear
In hell's dominions found .
Just, as yon' tree, which, bending, grows
To chance, not fate, its fortunes owes;
So man from some rude shock,
Some slighted power, some hostile hand,
Has missed the state by Nature planned,
Has split on passion's rock.
Yet shall that tree, when hewed away
(As human woes have had their day)
A new creation find:
The infant shoot in time will swell,
(Sublime and great from that which fell,)
To all that heaven designed.
What is this earth, that sun, these skies;
If all we see, on man must rise,
Forsaken and oppressedWhy blazes round the eternal beam,
Why, Reason, art thou called supreme,
Where nations find no rest.What are the splendours of this ballWhen life is closed, what are they all?
When dust to dust returns
Does power, or wealth, attend the dead;
Are captives from the contest ledIs homage paid to urns?
What are the ends of Nature's laws;
What folly prompts, what madness draws
Mankind in chains, too strong:Nature, to us, confused appears,
On little things she wastes her cares,
The great seem sometimes wrong.
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The New Age: Or, Truth Triumphant
In reason's view the times advance
That other scenes to man disclose,
When nature to her children grants
A smiling season of repose;
And better laws the wise will trace,
To curb the wicked of our race.
Those happy ages, years of bliss,
Had many an ancient sage foretold,
Who, if they err'd or aught amiss,
Predicted of this age of gold,
It was, that crowns and courts and kings
Would still attend this charge of things.
Strange thought, that they whose god is gain,
Who live by war, who thrive on blood,
Of half that live the curse the bane,
Could ever rule among the good:
These did some hateful fiend engage
To banish peace and vex the age.
Man to be happy, as he may
As far as nature meant him here,
Should yield to no despotic sway
Or systems of degrading fear;
And sovereign man, new modell'd now,
To sovereign man alone should bow.
The civil despot, once destroy' d ,
With all his base, tyrannic laws,
The mind of man will be employ' d
In aiding virtue and her cause:
Enlighten'd once, inform'd and free,
The mind admits no tyranny.
I saw the blest benignant hour
When the worst plague of human race,
Dread superstition, lost her power,
And, with her patrons, black and base,

291

Philip Freneau

292

Fled to the darkest shades of hell,
And bade at least one world farewell.
Fanatic flames extinguish'd all
The energy of thought will rise:
I see imposture's fabric fall,
Each wicked imp of falsehood dies;
And sovereign truth prevails at last
To triumph o'er the errors past.
The moral beauties of the mind
If man would to a blessing turn,
And the great powers to him assign'd
Would cultivate, improve, adorn:
The sun of happiness, and peace
Would shine on earth and never cease.

On Superstition
Implanted in the human breast,
Religion means to make us blest;
On reason built, she lends her aid
To help us through life's sickening shade.
But man, to endless error prone
And fearing most what's most unknown,
To phantoms bows that round him rise,
To angry gods, and vengeful skies.
Mistaken race, in error lost,
And foes to them who love you most,
No more fictitious gods revere,
Nor worship what engenders fear.
0 Superstition! to thy sway
If man has bow'd and will obey,
Misfortune still must be his doom
And sorrow through the days to come.
Hence, ills on ills successive grow
To cloud our day of bliss below;
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Hence wars and feuds, and deadly hate,
And all the woes that on them wait.
Here moral virtue finds its bane,
Hence, ignorance with her slavish train.
Hence, half the vigor of the mind
Relax' d, or lost in human kind.
The social tie by this is broke
When we some tyrant god invoke:
The bitter curse from man to man
From this infernal fiend began.
The reasoning power, celestial guest,
The stamp upon the soul impress'd;
When Superstition's awe degrades,
Its beauty fails, its splendor fades.
O! turn from her detested ways,
Unhappy man! her fatal maze;
The reason which he gave, improve,
And venerate the power above.

On the Abuse of Human Power, As
Exercised over Opinion
What human power shall dare to bind
The mere opinions of the mind?
Must man at that tribunal bow
Which will no range to thought allow,
But his best powers would sway or sink,
And idly tells him what to THINK.
Yes! there are such, and such are taught
To fetter every power of thought;
To chain the mind, or bend it down
To some mean system of their own,
And make religion's sacred cause
Amenable to human laws.
Has human power the simplest claim
Our hearts to sway, our thoughts to tame;
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Shall she the rights of heaven assert,
Can she to falsehood truth convert,
Or truth again to falsehood tum,
And at the test of reason spurn?
All human sense, all craft must fail
And all its strength will nought avail,
When it attempts with efforts blind
To sway the independent mind,
Its spring to break, its pride to awe,
Or give to private judgment, law.
Oh impotent! and vile as vain,
They, who would native thought restrain!
As soon might they arrest the storm
Or take from fire the power to warm,
As man compel, by dint of might,
Old darkness to prefer to light.
No! leave the mind unchain'd and free,
And what they ought, mankind will be,
No hypocrite, no lurking fiend,
No artist to some evil end,
But good and great, benign and just,
As God and nature made them first.

On the Uniformity and Perfection of Nature
On one fix'd point all nature moves,
Nor deviates from the track she loves;
Her system, drawn from reason's source,
She scorns to change her wonted course.
Could she descend from that great plan
To work unusual things for man,
To suit the insect of an hourThis would betray a want of power.
Unsettled in its first design
And erring, when it did combine
The parts that form the vast machine,
The figures sketch'd on nature's scene.
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Perfections of the great first cause
Submit to no contracted laws,
But all-sufficient, all-supreme,
Include no trivial views in them.
Who looks through nature with an eye
That would the scheme of heaven descry,
Observes her constant, still the same,
In all her laws, through all her frame.
No imperfection can be found
In all that is, above, around,All, nature made, in reason's sight
Is order all, and all is right.

On the Universality, and Other Attributes
of the God of Nature
All that we see, about, abroad,
What is it all, but nature's God?
In meaner works discover' d here
No less than in the starry sphere.
In seas, on earth, this God is seen;
All that exist, upon him lean;
He lives in all, and never stray' d
A moment from the works he made:
His system fix'd on general laws
Bespeaks a wise creating cause;
Impartially he rules mankind,
And all that on this globe we find.
Unchanged in all that seems to change,
Unbounded space is his great range;
To one vast purpose always true,
No time, with him, is old or new.
In all the attributes divine
Unlimited perfections shine;
In these enwrapt, in these complete,
All virtues in that centre meet.
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This power who doth all powers transcend,
To all intelligence a iii.end,
Exists, the greatest and the best
Throughout all worlds, to make them blest.
All that he did he first approved
He all things into being loved;
O'er all he made he still presides,
For them in life, or death provides.

On the Religion of Nature
The power, that gives with liberal hand
The blessings man enjoys, while here,
And scatters through a smiling land
The abundant products of the year;
That power of nature, ever bless'd,
Bestow'd religion with the rest.
Born with ourselves, her early sway
Inclines the tender mind to take
The path of right, fair virtue's way
Its own felicity to make.
This universally extends
And leads to no mysterious ends.
Religion, such as nature taught,
With all divine perfection suits;
Had all mankind this system sought
Sophists would cease their vain disputes,
And from this source would nations know
All that can make their heaven below.
This deals not curses to mankind,
Or dooms them to perpetual grief,
If from its aid no joys they find,
It damns them not for unbelief;
Upon a more exalted plan
Creation's nature dealt with man-
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Joy to the day, when all agree
On such grand systems to proceed,
From fraud, design, and error free,
And which to truth and goodness lead:
Then persecution will retreat
And man's religion be complete.

On the Evils of Human Life
To him who rules the starry spheres,
No evil in his works appears:
Man with a different eye, surveys,
The incidents in nature's maze:
And all that brings him care or pain
He ranks among misfortune's train.
The ills that God, or nature, deal,
The ills we hourly see, or feel,
The sense of wretchedness and woe
To man may be sincerely so;
And yet these springs of tears and sighs
Be heaven's best blessings in disguise.
Some favorite late, in anguish lay
And agonized his life away:
You grieved-to be consoled, refused,
And heaven itself almost accused
Of cruelty, that could dispense
Such tortures to such innocence.
Could you but lift the dreary veil,
And see with eyes or mind less frail
The secrets of the world to come,
You would not thus bewail his doom,
To find on some more happy coast
More blessings, far, than all he lost.
The seeming ills on life that wait
And mingle with our best estate,
Misfortune on misfortune grown,
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And heaviest most, when most alone;
Calamities, and heart oppress'dThese all attend us, for the best.
Learn hence, ye mournful, tearful race,
On a sure ground your hopes to place;
Immutable are nature's laws;
And hence the soul her comfort draws
That all the God allots to man
Proceeds on one unerring plan.
Hold to the moral system, true,
And heaven will always be in view;
0 man! by heaven this law was taught
To reconcile you to your lot,
To be your friend, when friendship fails,
And nature a new being hails.

Belief and Unbelief: Humbly Recommended
to the Serious Consideration of Creed Makers
What some believe, and would enforce
Without reluctance or remorse,
Perhaps another may decry,
Or call a fraud, or deem a lie.
Must he for that be doom'd to bleed,
And fall a martyr to some creed,
By hypocrites or tyrants framed,
By reason damn'd, by truth disclaim'd?
On mere belief no merit rests,
As unbelief no guilt attests:
Belief, if not absurd and blind,
Is but conviction of the mind,
Nor can conviction bind the heart
Till evidence has done its part:
And, when that evidence is clear,
Belief is just, and truth is near.
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In evidence, belief is found;
Without it, none are fairly bound
To yield assent, or homage pay
To what confederate worlds might say.
They who extort belief from man
Should, in the out-set of their plan,
Exhibit, like the mid-day sun
An evidence denied by none.
From this great point, o'erlook'd or miss'd,
Still unbelievers will exist;
And just their plea; for how absurd
For evidence, to take your word!
Not to believe, I therefore- hold
The right of man, all uncontrol'd
By all the powers of human wit,
What kings have done, or sages writ;
Not criminal in any view,
Nor-man!-to be avenged by you,
Till evidence of strongest kind
Constrains assent, and clears the mind.

On Happiness, as Proceeding from
the Practice of Virtue
This truth, upon the soul impress'd,
Has been by every age confess'd,
That in the course of human things
Felicity from virtue springs.
Where vice prevails, or baseness sways,
Remorse and pain the fault repays,
The man of vice has no resource,
But even in pleasure finds a curse.
If happiness can be sincere
A virtuous conduct makes it here,
That moral track to man assign'd
A transcript from the all-perfect mind.
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Should virtue sometimes fail of bliss,
Plung'd in misfortune's dark abyss,
Still, in the event she would not fall,
But rise, triumphant o'er it all.
Should life's whole course replete with ill,
To virtue prove a bitter pill;
Another life has heaven design'd
Where she her due rewards will find.
Nay, though through life perplex'd and pain'd
And though no other life remain'd;
A life well spent itself would prove
A due reward from HIM above.
And to be conscious we have done
The worthy part, though frown'd upon,
Can every seeming ill destroy
And grief and sadness change to joy.

The Millennium-To a Ranting Field Orator
With aspect wild, in ranting strain
You bring the brilliant period near,
When monarchy "'ill close her reign
And wars and warriors disappear;
The lion and the lamb will stray,
And, social, walk the woodland way.
I fear, with superficial view
You contemplate dame nature's plan:She various forms of being drew,
And made the common tyrant-man:
She form'd them all with wise design,
Distinguish'd each, and drew the line.
Observe the lion's visage bold
His iron tooth, his murderous claw,
His aspect cast in anger's mould;
The strength of steel is in his paw:
Could he be meant with lambs to stray
Or feed along the woodland way?
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Since first his race on earth began
War was his trade and war will be:
And when he quits that ancient plan
With milder natures to agree,
He will be changed to something new
And have some other part to do.
One system see through all this frame,
Apparent discord still prevails;
The forest yields to active flame,
The ocean swells with stormy gales;
No season did the God decree
When leagued in friendship these should be.
And do you think that human kind
Can shun the all-pervading lawThat passion's slave we ever findWho discord from their nature draw;
Ere discord can from man depart
He must assume a different heart.
Yet in the slow advance of things
A time may come our race may rise,
By reason's aid to stretch their wings,
And see the light with other eyes;
And when the ancient mist is pass'd;
To find their nature changed at last.
The sun himself, the powers ordain,
Should in no perfect circle stray;
He shuns the equatorial plane,
Prefers an odd setpentine way,
And lessens yearly, sophists prove,
His angle in the voids above.
When moving in his ancient line,
And no oblique ecliptic near,
With some new influence he may shine
But you and I will not be here
To see the lion shed his teeth
Or kings forget the trade of death-
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Letters on Various Interesting
and Important Subjects: Letter 13
Some time ago, I thought that I had gained such an entire mastery over my
fears that the whole troop, so remarkable for printer-flogging here or elsewhere, could not make me tremble-and so I walked about in open day,
ventured even to talk in favour of the Aurora in the little beerhouse at the
corner, and indeed was so fool-hardy as to assert that the clergy were now
behaving in the most inconsistent manner by praying for the success of
Suwarrow, the pope, and the re-establishment of the Romish religion, for the
downfall of which they, and their fathers before them in the church, have
prayed heartily for at least these two hundred years-But this conduct raised
such a buzz about my ears that I have been forced to run away in good earnest.
What chiefly led to this was the following-One day, having gained a little
time, I took my stick in my hand, adjusted my wig, and walked out to see an
acquaintance. Who happened to be there, as ill luck would have had it, but his
reverence-So after some chit chat about dry weather, water works, sickness,
and some thoughts on death, which I thought made the parson's face longer
than ordinary, though it is not short at any time, he thus addressed me-So
Robert, I am informed that the reason why you no longer attend to hear God's
word preached on the Sabbath is because you neither like our prayers nor our
preaching. I confess, Mr. Editor, I knew not what to say-I looked on the one
side, and then on the other, rose from my chair, spit in the sand box, and threw
a segar I had but just lighted into the fire . - I had never contradicted the clergy
because my good father had often said to me, "Robert, never meddle with the
clergy-they are edge-tools"; but father's advice had slipped out of my
memory at that time-so, giving three pretty loud hems, by way of practice,
I answered-And pray your reverence, said I, can I have a better reason? If,
Robert, answered he, our preaching or praying were not orthodox, then you
would have a right to quit us and go elsewhere; but what fault have you?-Why
sir, said I, as to what is orthodox, and what do you call it, the other doxHeterodox, replied he-Aye, aye, says I, that's it; I never clearly knew what
they meant-I have but a poor head at best, and these are hard words-I
would be much obliged to your reverence to tell me what they mean, and then
I will try to answer your question. The parson, putting on one of his airs, went
on thus: I am astonished, Robert, to hear you talk thus-You have appeared
in public, censured men and measures in that democratical sheet called the
Aurora, and your name is familiar in every company. Some say you're a man of
sense; others, that you are a fool; yet both laugh at your productions; and you
ask what is the meaning of two plain English words.-They may be English or
Spanish for me, said I, much ashamed of my own ignorance; but if you please
to tell me, I'll thank you kindly sir, and if I can I won't forget what you say.Why, said he, with a smile of superior wisdom, orthodoxy is the whole body of
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principles taught in our church-and every opinion contrary thereto is heterodox--So, said I, this is indeed to me very strange-but I'll remember it-But,
adde:i I, can a principle be heterodox one year and orthodox another year?No sir, answered his reverence, with much authority; orthodoxy is ever the
same; the principles I have the honour to preach were taught by Christ, his
apostles, and so on to the present day, without the smallest alteration.-It may
be so, answered I; I have but a poor brain-but I confess I think it otherwise.
And pray, sir, said the parson, what is this great fault that we have been guilty
of, and of which your wise head is so full?-Sir, says I, before you came to
preach at our church, the reverend Dr. * * * * never went into the pulpit but he
prayed for the fall of Antichrist, that man of sin, and this I think was orthodox
praying-He preached very often against the errors of the church of Rome,
and from the prophecies proved that the Pope was Antichrist; and this, because
you know it was taught in our church, was orthodox preaching-Now sir, you
pray for the re-establishment of the Rornish religion, and preach that the
French have committed a damning sin in pulling Antichrist from his chair,
converting images into money, consecrated bells into democratic cannon,
shutting up the nunneries, and sending the poor girls into the world to answer
the end of their creation-Now sir, is this also orthodoxy? Undoubtedly sir,
answered he, for you know it is taught in our church. But, says I, how sir can
this be? You told me but just now that orthodoxy did not change, but was
always the same-I acknowledge, said his reverence, that you have, Robert,
stumbled on something like a contradiction, and it deserves a reply. We prayed
for the downfall of the Pope because we thought religion would be benefitted
by it-we now see that religion is much hurt by it, and therefore we wish it
restored-If indeed God had brought down Antichrist in some other way, and
established the true Calvinistic Presbyterian religion in its room, then we would
not have desired its restoration-and this is orthodox. It may be orthodox, said
I, for ought I know to the contrary, but one thing I'll venture to say, that it is
neither agreeable to Judaism or Christianity-I hope, Robert, said his reverence, you don't pretend to argue religion with me!-God forbid sir, says I;
excuse me for speaking rashly; but if you please sir, I'll tell you a story-Let's
hear it, says he; but I tell you aforehand, there must be nothing about the
French in it, for I hate them heartily-Indeed, said I, there is not one word
about the French in it, for I believe it is somewhere in the Bible or TestamentOnce upon a time, there was a very great man, but he was not a Jew, who had
the bad fortune to be afflicted with the leprosy-all the doctors in his own
country were consulted in vain, and he was pronounced incurable. At length
he was informed that in the land of Jewry there lived a very good man who
could cure him in an instant. The great man set forward immediately on his
journey. His equipage was splendid-his retinue numerous. He arrived-the
man of God paid no respect to him, although he was very great-but sent him
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word to go and wash himself a number of times in the river Jordan. The great
man was enraged. Are not, said he, the rivers of my own country much better
than the rivers of Israel? I thought he would have come out to me-put his
hand on the place, called on God, and so healed me. However, being a man
of some sense, and having some wise men about him, he was induced to obey
the prophet. He did so, and was cured. You have my story. I can make nothing
of it, said the parson. Well, said I, I'll apply it. God had his way (like the
prophet) of bringing down Antichrist; but you, like the great man, say his way
was not a good way, and if he had taken counsel with the very wise Christians
of the day, they would have taught him that it would have been much better
to have left him standing than to have made use of such instruments; and now
you would instruct him to govern his providential dispensations by your advice, and once more erect spiritual Babylon, bring back the images, catch the
poor nuns, and shut them once more in their cells. As I said this, his reverence
leaped to his feet. I declare, Robert, said he, you are unfit to live in society; 'tis
such men as you who are bringing the curse of God on our city. I pronounce
you an infidel, a despiser of the clergy, constituted authorities, holy customs,
and a dangerous man in society, and I hope we shall shortly have it in our power
to lay such fault-finding, ignorant fellows by the heels, that so they may learn
to reverence the most useful and honourable of all men, the clergy. Having said
this, he stalked out of the house with great consequence. Shortly after I took
my leave. The story ran like lightning-Robert Slender is an infidel, said oneWhy, he argued with the Reverend ____ , and the parson told him he
ought to be imprisoned for the good of society. Mrs. Slender went to visit her
neighbour-I am very sorry, says Goody Rattle, that it is so bad. What's the
matter~ said she? Why, I need not hide it-Mr. Slender is an infidel-a speaker
against the clergy-a puller down of religion- and his reverence says so!-In
short, I had once more to shut myself up in the house; and I have moved into
the country among my friends till the story blows over.

The Voyage of Timberoo-Taho-Eede, an Otaheite Indian
. . . Their places of worship are far superior in point of size to any thing of the
same. sort in your majesty's island of Otaheite. But we gained, while amongst
them, a very imperfect idea of their religion, owing to our not staying long
enough to acquire a perfect knowledge of their language. We found out, however, with some difficulty, that they worship three Gods, first, second, and
third, whom they yet hold to be only one and the same. If we comprehended
them aright, they asserted that the second one formerly came down from the
clouds, and was put to death for the offences of the island. This, may it please
your majesty, appeared to us a very strange conceit; but, if the matter has been
really so, your slave is inclined to think, that it is high time for some benevolent
divinity to descend upon the island a second time, as it is at present overrun
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with every species of wickedness; particularly injustice, falsehood, and cruelty.
The white people are intolerably proud, selfish, vain, malevolent, and lazy; and
are supported by a miserable race of black slaves, whom they steal away from
a distant country, and force them to undergo the severest labours. The slightest
punishments inflicted for the slightest offences upon these wretched men, are
infinitely more severe than your majesty would think due to the crime of high
treason itself.
But, we must do the white men the justice to say, that they did not seem
at all urgent that we should be acquainted with the particulars of their religion;
nor did the priests themselves take much notice ofus. The reason given us for
this conduct was very odd. A man in red told us, that the high priest of the
island and his deputies never took any notice of those, who had not in their
possession considerable quantities of small circular plates ofyellow metal. There
was some superstition in this matter, which we never could unravel. Possibly,
sir, these little plates of metal may be the image or sign of theirgod, as Tieraboo,
my first lieutenant, has more than once told me, that he saw the representation
of a man's head on one of them. Be the matter as it may, the islanders are so
amazingly tenacious of these trinkets, that we never could lay our fingers on a
single one of them to bring away only for your majesty's inspection .
. . . The worship in their churches consists principally in gazing upon each
others faces. We went to these places several times, but gained very little instruction. A man in black had a good deal to say from an elevated station, but
we could make nothing of his discourse. Another sat a few steps below him,
who at certain intervals opened his mouth very wide, uttering strange and
dismal noises, in which the greatest part of the assembly joined him. Towards
the conclusion of the service we saw several old men coming towards us with
long black sticks, polished very nicely, which we supposed were to chastise
those who had been inattentive to the words of the man in black. From one
end of each of these sticks was suspended a small black cap. -As far as we could
perceive, the inattentive persons had no other way to avoid being beaten than
by throwing a piece of metal into one of these caps, which in an instant pacified
the chastiser. As we had nothing wherewith to make atonement, we fled with
precipitation before the black stick had reached us. Our own priest, after he had
gained some little knowledge of the barbarian language, did his endeavour not
only to convince the citizens and islanders in general of their being under the
influence of a false religion, but also offered to instruct them in the true faith
and enlightened theology of our own country. We are sorry to inform your
sublime majesty, that his success was by no means answerable to his labours,
and it was with some difficulty he escaped three or four sound drubbings from
the priests of the infidels, for even attempting to make converts. -These
people seem to be under some indissoluble obligation to believe only what has
previously been believed for them by their progenitors. . . .
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The Temple of Reason
In Defence of Pure Religion

Elihu Palmer, along with a group oflike-minded religious and political radicals,
founded the Deistical Society of New York in the winter of 1796-97 for the
grandiose purpose of systematically "promoting the cause of nature and moral
truth" and "opposing ... all schemes of superstition and fanaticism." The
fraternity initially limited its activities to regular private meetings and occasional
public lectures. But as popular interest in its tenets grew, the Deistical Society
decided to appeal to a larger audience. On 8 November 1800 it proudly
launched a weekly entitled Ihe Temple of Reason.
The newspaper's first editor, Dennis Driscoll, was one of those curiously
ephemeral Early Republic deists who suddenly emerged from obscurity and
just as quickly faded back into it. We know nothing about him except that he
had immigrated from Ireland shortly before Ihe Temple's inauguration and
that he was a defrocked Jesuit. He rather clumsily nurtured the society's fledgling weekly until 7 February 1801, when he sadly announced in its columns
"the necessity of suspending the publication for a moment" and urgently pled
that those "indebted to the paper will immediately come forward and pay what
they owe."
Ihe Temple's momentary suspension stretched into almost three months,
until Palmer-Driscoll having left the scene-relocated its offices to Philadelphia and assumed the editorship. The first issue of the reborn Temple appeared
on 22 April 1801. The paper continued in print, albeit sporadically toward the
end, until 19 February 1803, when it again and finally shut down its presses.
Although it appears to have drawn a wide readership throughout the middle
Atlantic and New England states, it was plagued by chronic financial embarrassment.
Despite its short and debt-ridden existence, the weekly quickly became
infamous as a bastion of "infidelity." Its notoriety eventually even prompted
the appearance in Baltimore of Ihe Temple of Truth, a periodical that ran from
1 August to 31 October 1801 and was edited by John Hargrove, whose express purpose was to provide an antidote to the "gross and ungenerous
mistatement of the Scriptures" perpetrated by the "atheistic" Temple of Reason. There was good cause for Hargrove's (and others') concern. Ihe Temple's
inaugural issue unabashedly proclaimed its militancy in political as well as religious matters, insisting that religious bigotry was the bane of both spiritual and
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social progress. It ran didactic pieces on rational religion, astronomy ("of sciences . . . the most sublime and best calculated to elevate mens minds to a
proper understanding of the Creator and themselves"), and ethics, in addition
to the standard deistic critiques of Christianity. Moreover, it regularly provided
its readers with serializations from the writings of British and European freethinkers such as Jeremy Bentham, Locke, Hume, Voltaire, Volney, Helvetius,
and d'Holbach. The prose in The Temple was complemented by poetry-most
of it execrable, although charmingly fervent-and occasionally nestled within
its pages were brief communications on political events of the day. As Palmer
emphasized in the 22 April 1801 issue, The Temple sought to be more than
merely a religious periodical. Its intention was to combine "Politics with Pure
Religion .... Contrary to the opinion of most men, we hold, that Deism and
Liberty should go hand in hand." Finally, The Temple-especially after Palmer
assumed its editorship--served as a ready means to advertise the public lectures
for which the Deistical Society had become notorious. The following announcement, for example, appeared in issue after issue and reflected the militancy of The Temple as well as its broad scope of concerns.

Mr. Palmer, still continues to deliver public discourses every Sunday
evening at six o'clock, at Lovett's long room in Broadway. The object
of these discourses, is to disclose and mark with discriminating precision, moral principles by which human existence ought to be governed-To develope some of the fundamental rules and laws of physical
philosophy and astronomy-To prove that God is immutable, and that
the working of miracles is inconsistent with the nature of his character-That a religion built upon a miraculous foundation is false-That
Christian superstition has been one of the most scourges of the human
race-That the powers of men are competent for human happinessThat the triumphant reign of pure morality and sound philosophy can
alone restore to the species that dignity, energy and virtue, which superstition for ages past has destroyed.
The selections here are culled from original articles in The Temple written
by Driscoll, Palmer, and their fellow American deists. As the newspaper entered
its last year and a half, fewer original pieces and more serialized ones from
European freethinkers filled its pages-to such an extent that there is little in
the periodical after late 1801 truly representative of the American deistic tradition.
Driscoll probably wrote or at least collaborated in the composition of "To
the American Reader" and "The Deists Creed." Both are conventional statements ofdeism's insistence on the natural and constitutional primacy offreedom
of conscience, as well as the superiority of naturalistic religion and morality.
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"A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God," which appeared
in The Temple's first and second issues, is particularly interesting. Although
published anonymously, it was probably largely or solely written by Driscoll,
whose Jesuit training in Ireland would have centered around Thomistic scholasticism. Certainly more Thomistic elements emerge in this short catechism
than in any other American deistic tract. Driscoll defends natural theology, but
in a way more reminiscent of Catholic natural law than of Enlightenment
rationalism. In discussing "proofs" for God's existence, he appeals to arguments from causation and necessity that are almost identical to Aquinas's second and third demonstrations in the Summa Theologiae (part I, question 2,
article 3). Moreover, again, in keeping with the Thomistic tradition, Driscoll
argues that God's essence or substance is intrinsically unknowable, even
though divine attributes such as eternity, immutability, freedom, intelligence,
goodness, and so on are logically deducible. In good deistic form, however,
Driscoll parts company with Thomistic natural theology in his insistence that
God is unitary rather than triune. He also relies more heavily than did Aquinas
on design arguments in his analysis of divine attributes. "A Demonstration,"
then, is one of the most remarkable mixtures of orthodox natural theology and
deistic rationalism to appear in the American tradition.
There is no clue as to who wrote "An Ode to Reason" and "A New Hymn
for The Temple of Reason," although the two poems' clumsiness suggests an
amateur author or authors. The former deprecates religious superstitions, concluding that "the philosophic eye" can "Discern in them aught but a lie." The
latter deplores the irrationality of a Triune, dying God and applauds the normative and philosophical superiority of a naturalistic Creator "Who hung the
Starry Worlds on high, / Whose wisdom shines through all his ways, / Whose
goodness is for ever nigh ."
"Christian Morality Compared with That of the Pagan Philosophers" and
"Natural Ideas Opposed to Supernatural" are also anonymous, but it is likely
they were contributed by Palmer. They are written in his style and reflect many
of the central themes in the Principles of Nature. The first piece argues that the
best of Christian morality was anticipated by pagan philosophers such as Plato
and Cicero. Consequently, it is unwarranted to claim that scriptural moral
principles are revelatory in origin or even unique. Indeed, Palmer goes so far
as to call Jesus a "sincere and good Deist" whose original religion of nature was
debased by subsequent supernaturalism. In the second piece, Palmer elucidates
what for him and other deists was a recurring theme: that supernaturalism is
bred from ignorance and fear, encourages ecclesial and social oppression, and
impedes the progress of the individual as well as society. As such, orthodox
theology is the "Kingdom of Darkness" that "has for its object only things
incomprehensible," mutating light into darkness and good sense into madness.
Such a "science," he concludes, "is a continual insult to the reason of man."

In Defence of Pure Religion

To the American Reader (8 November 1800)
The torrents of illiberal reflections and unqualified abuse poured forth every
day, through the channels of bigotry and intolerance, against Deists, have provoked this publication. It is the settled maxim of the philosophic Deist, to let
all men rest in peace and enjoy their speculative opinions, however absurd,
without animosity or persecution: But it is, unfortunately, the settled maxim
and practice of others, to abuse and revile all those who are not of their creed.
This is certainly, a perverse disposition, and has ever been productive of very
many evils to society. In justice to what we conceive, and are convinced, to be
the Truth, we can no longer remain silent. We are determined to shew to the
world, the purity of our doctrines and the soundness of our principles, exposing
at the same time, the corruption of those of our adversaries.
If we were to conclude from the intemperance of over-heated bigots,
whose constant study is to denounce and cry down Deism in America; we must
think that the inquisition had been established, with all its terrors in the United
States; and that the christian religion, in all its sects and branches, had been
placed under its holy protection. But fortunately for the peace and prosperity of
America, Mahometism is as much established by law, there, as christianity. The
immortal framers of the constitution, wisely thought, that in matters of religion, all men have an equal right to private and public opinion; and therefore,
left them all on the same level- On this level we stand; and if we shew our
religion to be superior to that of others, it shall be by the force of Reason, not
by scurrility, deception, or persecution .
. . . The Temple of Reason is not dedicated wholly to the investigation and
defence of pure religion; in it will be found philosophical enquiries and moral
disquisitions also.

The Deists Creed (8 November 1800)
I believe that there is one, eternal, infinite, intelligent, all-powerful and wise
Being, the creator, preserver and governor of all things. That this supreme
cause is a Being of infinite justice, goodness and truth, and all other moral as
well as natural perfections. That he made the world for the manifestation of his
power and wisdom, and to communicate his goodness and happiness to his
creatures; that he preserves it by his continual all-wise providence, and governs
it according to the eternal rules of infinite justice, equity, goodness, mercy and
truth; That all created rational beings, depending continually upon him, are
bound to adore, worship and obey him; and to praise him for all things they
enjoy; That they are all obliged to promote in their proportion and according
to the extent of their several powers and abilities, the general good and welfare
of those parts of the world, wherein they are placed; in like manner as the
divine goodness is continually promoting the universal benefit of the whole;
That men in particular are every one obliged to make it their business by an
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universal benevolence, to promote the happiness of all others; That in order to
do this, every man is bound always to behave himself so towards others, as in
reason he would desire they should in like circumstances deal with him; That
therefore he is obliged to obey and submit to his superiors in all just and right
things, for the preservation of society and the peace and benefit of the community; to be just, honorable, equitable and sincere in all his dealings with his
equals, for the making inviolable the everlasting rule of righteousness, and
maintaining an universal trust and confidence, friendship and affection
amongst men; and towards his inferiors, to be gentle, easy and affable, charitable and willing to assist as many as stand in need of his help, for the promotion of universal love and benevolence amongst mankind, and in imitation of
the goodness of God, who preserves and does good to all creatures, which
depend entirely upon him for their very being and all that they enjoy: That in
respect of himself, every man is bound to preserve as much as in him lies, his
own being and the right use of all his faculties, so long as it shall please God
who appointed him his station in this world, to continue him therein: That
therefore he is bound to have an exact government of his passions, and carefully to abstain from all debaucheries and abuses of himself, which tend either
to the destruction of his own being, or to the disordering of his faculties, and
disabling him from performing his duty, or hurrying him into the practice of
unreasonable and unjust things; Lastly, that according as men regard or neglect these observations, so they are proportionably acceptable or displeasing
to God, who being supreme governor of the world, cannot but testify his favor
or displeasure at some time or other; and consequently, since this is not done
in the present state, therefore there must be a future state of rewards and
punishments in a life to come.
All this reason tells me, and all this I do firmly believe. Now if men will act
up to the foregoing Creed, they must be more happy, wise and virtuous, than
the most exact observer of what is called divine revelation, in as much as they
are free from idolatry and superstition, the disgrace of religion, and the gan grene of morality.
Such is the God that all enlightened Deists do worship in SPIRIT and in
TRUTH-And such is the simple religion of nature, worthy of rational creatures,
and becoming the majesty of a pure spirit, all-wise and omnipresent. Any other
oblations are childish-Any other offerings are ridiculous-Any other incense
is gross and unbecoming. Cakes are for children; Wine for drunkards; bullocks,
rams and calves for epicures; but the holy and spiritual God of nature
delighteth not in such mean and puerile ceremonies; nor can philosophers be
so foolish or absurd as to offer them. The finest and most acceptable victim that
can be presented to the Father of the Universe, is a grateful heart and a virtuous
mind-and the priest the highest in his favor, must be an Honest Man.
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A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God
(8 and 15 November 1800)
I. First then, it is absolutely and undeniably certain, that something has existed
from all eternity. This is so evident and undeniable a proposition, that no
Atheist in any age has ever presumed to assert the contrary; and therefore there
is little need of being particular in the proof of it. For since something now is,
'tis evident that something always was: Otherwise the things that now are,
must have been produced out of nothing, absolutely and without cause: Which
is a plain contradiction in terms. For, to say a thing is produced, and yet that
there is no cause at all of that production, is to say that something is effected,
when it is effected by nothing; that is, at the same time when it is not effected
at all. Whatever exists, has a cause, a reason, a ground of its existence; ( a faun dation, on which its existence relies; a ground or reason why it doth exist,
rather than not exist;) either in the necessity ofits own nature, and then it must
have been of itself eternal: Or in the will of some other Being; and then that
other Being must, at least in the order of nature and causality, have existed
before it.
That something therefore has really existed from eternity, is one of the most
certain and evident truths in the world; acknowledged by all men, and disputed
by none. Yet as to the manner how it can be; there is nothing in nature more
difficult for the mind of man to conceive, than this very first plain and self
evident truth. For, how any thing can have existed eternally; that is, how an
eternal duration can be now actually past; is a thing utterly as impossible for our
narrow understandings to comprehend as any thing that is not an express
contradiction can be imagined to be: And yet to deny the truth of the proposition, that an eternal duration is now actually past; would be to assert something still far more unintelligible, even a real and express contradiction.
II. There has existed from eternity, some one unchangeable and independent
Being.
Either there has always existed some one unchangeable and independent
Being, from which all other Beings have received their original; or else there has
been an infinite succession of changeable and dependent Beings, produced one
from another in an endless progression, without any original cause at all. According to this latter supposition; there is nothing, in the universe, self-existent
or necessarily-existing. And if so; then it was originally equally possible, that
from eternity there should never have existed any thing at all; as that there
should from eternity have existed a succession of changeable and dependent
Beings. Which being supposed; then, What is it that has from eternity determined such a succession of Beings to exist, rather than that from eternity there
should never have existed any thing at all? Necessity it was not; because it was
equally possible, in this supposition, that they should not have existed at all.

311

The Temple of Reason

312

Chance, is nothing but a mere word, without any signification. And other
Being, 'tis supposed there was none, to determine the existence of these. Their
existence therefore was determined by nothing; neither by any necessity in the
nature of the things themselves, because 'tis supposed that none of them are
self existent; nor by any other Being, because no other is supposed to exist.
That is to say; Of two equally possible, (viz. whether any thing or nothing
should from eternity have existed) the one is determined, rather than the
other, absolutely by nothing: Which is an express contradiction. And consequently, as before, there must on the contrary, of necessity have existed from
eternity, some one immutable and independent Being. Which, what it is, remains in the next place to be enquired.
III. That unchangeable and independent Being, which has existed from etern#y, without any external cause of its existence; must be self-existent, that is, necessarily-existing. For whatever exists, must either have come into Being out of
nothing, absolutely without cause; or it must have been produced by some
external cause; or it must be self existent. Now to arise out of nothing, absolutely without any cause; has been already shewn to be a plain contradiction.
To have been produced by some external cause, cannot possibly be true of
every thing; but something must have existed eternally and independently; as
has likewise been shewn already. It remains therefore, that that Being which has
existed independently from eternity, must of necessity be self-existent. Now to
be self-existent, is not, to be produced by itself; for that is an express contradiction. But it is, (which is the only idea we can frame of self-existence; and
without which, the word seems to have no signification at all:) It is, I say, to
exist by an absolute necessity originally in the nature of the thing itsel£ And this
necessity must be antecedent; not indeed in time, to the existence of the being
itself; because that is eternal: But it must be antecedent in the natural order of
our ideas, to our supposition of its Being. That is; This necessity must not
barely be consequent upon our supposition of the existence of such a being;
(for then it would not be a necessity absolutely such in itself, not be the ground
or foundation of the existence of any thing, being on the contrary, only a
consequent of it) but it must antecedently force itself upon us, whether we will
or no, even when we are endeavoring to suppose that no such Being exists.
From this Third Proposition, it follows:
1st. That the only true idea of a self-existent or necessarily-existing Being, is
the idea of a Being, the supposition of whose not-existing is an express contradiction.
If any one now asks, what sort of idea the idea of that Being is, the supposition of whose not existing is thus an express contradiction: I answer, 'tis the
first and simplest idea we can possibly frame; an idea necessarily and essentially
included or pre-supposed, as a sine qua non, in every other idea whatsoever; an
idea, which (unless we forbear thinking at all) we cannot possibly extirpate or
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remove out of our minds; of a most simple Being, absolutely eternal and infinite, original and independent. For, that he who supposes there is no original
independent Being in the Universe, supposes a contradiction; has been shewn
already.
2d. From hence it follows, that there is no man whatsoever, who makes any
use of his reason, but may easily become more certain of the Being of a supreme
independent cause, than he can be of any thing else besides his own existence. For
how much thought soever it may require to demonstrate the other attributes
of such a Being, as it may do to demonstrate the greatest mathematical certainties: (of which more hereafter). Yet, as to its existence; that there is something
eternal, infinite, and self-existing, which must be the cause and original of all
other things; this is one of the first and most natural conclusions, that any man,
who thinks at all, can frame in his mind: And no man can any more doubt of
this, than he can doubt whether twice two be equal to four.
3d. Hence we may observe, that our first certainty of the existence of God,
does not arise from this, that in the idea our minds frame of him, ( or rather in
the definition that we make of the word, God, as signifying a Being of all
possible perfections) we include self-existence: But from hence, that it is demonstrable both negatively, that neither can all things possibly have arisen out
of nothing, nor can they have depended one on another in an endless succession; and also positively, that there is something in the Universe, actually existing without us, the supposition of whose not existing plainly implies a contradiction.
4th. From hence it follows, that the material World cannot possibly be the
first and original Being, uncreated, independent, and of itself eternal. For since
it hath been already demonstrated, that whatever Being hath existed from
eternity, independent, and without any external cause of its existence, must be
self-existent; and that whatever is self-existent, must exist necessarily by an
absolute necessity in the nature of the thing itself: It follows evidently, that
unless the material World exists necessarily by an absolute necessity in its own
nature, so as that it must be an express contradiction to suppose it not to exist;
it cannot be independent, and of itself eternal. Now, that the material World
does not exist thus necessarily, is very evident. For absolute necessity of existing, and a possibility of not existing, being contradictory ideas; 'tis manifest the
material world cannot exist necessarily, if without a contradiction we can conceive it either not to be, or to be in any respect otherwise than it now is: Than
which nothing is more easy. For whether we consider the form of the World,
with the disposition and motion ofits parts; or whether we consider the matter
of it, as such, without respect to its present form; every thing in it, botl1 the
whole and every one ofits parts, their situation and motion, the form and also
the matter, are the most arbitrary and dependent things, and the farthest removed from necessity, that can possibly be imagined.
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N. What the substance or essence of that Being, which is self-existent, or necessarily-existing, is; we have no idea, neither is it at all possible for us to comprehend it. That there is such a Being actually existing without us, we are sure, (as
I have already shewn) by strict and undeniable demonstration. Also what it is
not; that is, that the material World is not it, as modern Atheists would have
it; has been already demonstrated. But what it is, I mean as to its substance and
essence: This we are infinitely unable to comprehend. Yet this does not in the
least diminish the certainty of the demonstration of its existence. For 'tis one
thing, to know certainly that a Being exists; and another, to know what the
essence of that Being is. And the one may be capable of the strictest demonstration, when the other is absolutely beyond the reach of all our faculties to
understand. A blind or deaf man has infinitely more reason to deny the Being,
or the possibility of the Being, of light or sounds; than any Atheist can have to
deny, or doubt of, the existence of God. For the one can at the utmost have
no other proof, but credible testimony, of the existence of certain things,
whereof 'tis absolutely impossible that he himself should frame any manner of
idea, not only of their essence, but even of their effects or properties: But the
other may, with the least use of his reason, be assured of the existence of a
Supreme Being, by undeniable demonstration; and may also certainly know
abundance ofits attributes, (as shall be made appear in the following propositions) though its substance or essence be entirely incomprehensible.
V. Though the substance or essence of the self-existent Being, is itself absolutely
incomprehensible to us; yet many of the essential attributes of his nature, are
strictly demonstrable, as well as his existence. Thus, in the first place, the self
existent Being must of necessity be eternal. The ideas of eternity and selfexistence are so closely connected, that because something must of necessity be
eternal independently and without any outward cause of its Being, therefore it
must necessarily be self-existent; and because 'tis impossible but something
must be self existent, therefore 'tis necessary that it must likewise be eternal. To
be self existent, is (as has been already shewn) to exist by an absolute necessity
in the nature of the thing itself Now this necessity being absolute, and not
depending upon any thing external, must be always unalterably the same:
Nothing being alterable, but what is capable of being affected by somewhat
without itself. That Being therefore, which has no other cause of its existence,
but the absolute necessity of its own nature; must of necessity have existed
from everlasting, without beginning; and must of necessity exist to everlasting
without end.
As to the manner of this eternal existence; 'tis manifest, it herein infinitely
transcends the manner of the existence of all created Beings, even of such as
shall exist forever; that whereas 'tis not possible for their finite minds to comprehend all that is past, or to understand perfectly all things that are at present,
much less to know all that is future, or to have entirely in their power any thing
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that is to come; but their thoughts, and knowledge, and power, must of necessity have degrees and periods, and be successive and transient as the things
themselves: The eternal, supreme cause, on the contrary, (supposing him to be
an intelligent Being, which will hereafter be proved in the sequel of this discourse) must of necessity have such a perfect, independent and unchangeable
comprehension of all things, that there can be no one point or instance of his
eternal duration, wherein all things that are past, present, or to come, will not
be as entirely known and represented to him in one single thought or view: and
all things present and future, be equally and entirely in his power and direction;
as if there was really no succession at all, but all things were actually present at
once. Thus far we can speak intelligibly concerning the eternal duration of the
self-existent Being.
VI. The self-existent Being must of necessity be infinite and omnipresent. The
idea of infinity or immensity, as well as of eternity, is so closely connected with
that of self-existence that because 'tis impossible but something must be infinite, independent and of itself, (for else it would be impossible there should be
any infinite at all, unless an effect could be perfecter than its cause;) therefore
it must of necessity be self existent: And because something must of necessity
be self existent, therefore 'tis necessary that it must likewise be infinite. To be
self-existent, (as has already been shewn) is to exist by an absolute necessity in
the nature of the thing itself Now this necessity being absolute in itself, and
not depending on any outward cause: 'tis evident it must be everywhere, as
well as always, unalterably the same. For a necessity which is not everywhere
the same, is plainly a consequential necessity only, depending upon some external cause, and not an absolute one in its own nature: For a necessity absolutely such in itself, has no relation to time or place, or any thing else. Whatever
therefore exists by an absolute necessity in its own nature must needs be infinite
as well as eternal. To suppose a finite Being, to be self existent; is to say that 'tis
a contradiction for that Being not to exist, the absence of which may yet be
conceived without a contradiction. Which is the greatest absurdity in the
world. For if a Being can without a contradiction be absent from one place, it
may without a contradiction be absent likewise from another place, and from
all places: And whatever necessity it may have of existing, must arise from some
external cause, and not absolutely from itself; and consequently, the Being
cannot be self existent.
From hence it follows.
1st. That the infinity of the self-existent Being; must be an infinity of fullness as well as of immensity; that is, it must not only be without limits, but also
without diversity, defect, or interruption.
2d. From hence it follows, that the self-existent Being, must be a most
simple, unchangeable, incorruptible Being; without parts, figure, motion, divisibility, or any other such properties as we find in matter. For all these things
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do plainly and necessarily imply finiteness in their very notion, and are utterly
inconsistent with complete infinity.
'Tis evident therefore, that the self existent Being must be infinite in the
strictest and most complete sense. But as to the particular manner of his being
infinite or every where present, in opposition to the manner of created things
being present in such or such finite places; this is as impossible for our finite
understandings to comprehend or explain, as it is for us to inform an adequate
idea of infinity. Yet that the thing is true, that he is actually omnipresent, we are
as certain, as we are that there must something be infinite; which no man, who
has thought upon these things at all, ever denied.
VII. The self-existent Being, must of necessity be but one. This evidently follows from his being necessarily existent. For necessity absolute in itself, is simple
and uniform and universal, without any possible difference, deformity, or variety whatsoever: And all variety or difference of existence, must needs arise
from some external cause, and be dependent upon it, and proportionable to
the efficiency of that cause, whatsoever it be. Absolute necessity, in which there
can be no variation in any kind or degree, cannot be the ground of existence
of a number of Beings, however similar and agreeing: Because, without any
other difference, even Number is itself a manifest deformity of inequality (if I
may so speak) of efficiency or causality.
VIII. The selfexistent and original cause of all things, must be an intelligent
Being. In this proposition lies the main question between us and the Atheists.
For that something must be self-existent; and that that which is self existent,
must necessarily be eternal and infinite and the original cause of afI things, will
not bear much dispute. But all Atheists, whether they hold the World to be of
itself eternal both as to the matter and form, or contingent, or whatever hypothesis they frame: have always asserted and must maintain, either directly or
indirectly, that the self-existent Being is not an intelligent Being, but either
pure unactive matter, or (which in other words is the very same thing) a mere
necessary agent. For a mere necessary agent must of necessity either be plainly
and directly in the grossest sense unintelligent; which was the ancient Atheists
notion of the self existent Being: Or else its intelligence, (which is the assertion
of Spinoza, and some moderns) must be wholly separate from any power of
will and choice; which, in respect of any excellency and perfection, or indeed
to any common sense, is the very same thing as no intelligence at all.
Now that the self existent Being is not such a blind and unintelligent necessity, but in the most proper sense an understanding and really active Being;
does not indeed so obviously and directly appear to us by considerations a
priori; because, (through the imperfection of our faculties) we know not
wherein intelligence consists, nor can see the immediate and necessary
connexion of it with self-existence, as we can that of eternity, infinity, unity, etc.
But a posteriori, almost every thing in the world, demonstrates to us this great

In Defence of Pure Religion

truth; and affords undeniable arguments, to prove that the world, and all
things therein, are the effects of an intelligent and knowing Cause.
IX. The self existent and original cause ofall things, is not a necessary agent,
but a Being indued with liberty and choice. The contrary to this proposition, is
the foundation and the sum of what Spinoza and his followers have asserted
concerning the nature of God. What reasons or arguments they have offered
for their opinion, I shall have occasion to consider briefly in my proof of the
proposition itself. The truth of which appears, in that it is a necessary consequence of the foregoing proposition. For intelligence without liberty, (as I
there hinted) is really (in respect of any power, excellence, or perfection) no
intelligence at all. It is indeed a consciousness, but it is merely a passive one; a
consciousness, not of acting, but purely of being acted upon. Without liberty,
nothing can in any tolerable propriety of speech, be said to be an agent, or
cause of any thing. For to act necessarily, is really and properly not to act at all,
but only to be acted upon.
X. The self-existent Being, the supreme cause of all things, must of necessity
have infinite power. This proposition is evident and undeniable. For since nothing (as has been already proved) can possibly be self-existent besides himself;
and consequently all things in the Universe were made by him and are entirely
dependent upon Him; and all the powers of all things are derived from Him,
and must therefore be perfectly subject and subordinate to Him; 'Tis manifest
that nothing can make any difficulty or resistance to the execution of his will;
but he must of necessity have absolute power to do every thing he pleases, with
the perfectest ease, and in the perfectest manner, at once and in a moment,
whenever he wills it.
1st. That infinite power reaches to all possible things; but cannot be said to
extend to the working any thing which implies a contradiction: As, that a thing
should be and not be at the same time; that the same thing should be made
and not be made, or have been and not have been; that twice two should not
make four, or that which is necessarily false should be true. The reason whereof
is plain: Because the power of making a thing to be, at the same time that it is
not; is only a power of doing that which is nothing, that is, no power at all.
2d. Infinite power cannot fail to extend to those things, which imply natural imperfection in the Being to whom such power is ascribed: As, that it should
destroy its own Being, weaken itself, or the like. These things imply natural
imperfection, and are by all men confessed to be such as cannot possibly belong
to the necessary self existent Being. There are also other things which imply
imperfection in another kind, viz. moral imperfection: Concerning which,
Atheism takes away the subject of the question, by denying wholly the difference of moral good and evil; and therefore I shall omit the consideration of
them, 'til I come to deduce the moral attributes of God.
XI. The supreme cause and author of all things, must of necessity be infinitely
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wise. This proposition is evidently consequent upon those that have already
been proved: And those being established, this, as admitting no further dispute, needs not to be insisted upon. For nothing is more evident, than that an
infinite, omnipresent, intelligent Being, must know perfectly all things that are;
and that He who alone is self existent and eternal, the sole cause and author
of all things, and on whom they continually depend; must also know perfectly
all the consequences of those powers, that is, all possibilities of things to come,
and what in every respect is best and wisest to be done: And that, having
infinite power, he can never be controuled or prevented from doing what he
so knows to be fittest. From all which, it manifestly follows, that every effect
of the supreme cause, must be the product of infinite wisdom. More particularly: The supreme Being, because he is infinite, must be every where present:
And because he is an infinite mind or intelligence, therefore wherever he is, his
knowledge is, which is inseparable from his Being, and must therefore be infinite likewise. And wherever his infinite knowledge is, it must necessarily have
a full and perfect prospect of all things, and nothing can be concealed from its
inspection: He includes and surrounds every thing with his boundless presence; and penetrates every part of their substance with his all seeing eye: So that
the inmost nature and essence of all things, are perfectly naked and open to his
view; and even the deepest thoughts of intelligent beings themselves, manifest
in his sight. Further: All things being not only present to him, but also entirely
depending upon him, and having received both their being itself, and all their
powers and faculties from him; 'tis manifest that, as he knows all things that are,
so he must likewise know all possibilities of things, that is, all effects that can
be. For, being himself alone self-existent, and having alone given to all things,
all the powers and faculties they are endued with; 'tis evident he must of necessity know perfectly what all and each of those powers and faculties, which
are entirely from himself, can possibly produce: And seeing at one boundless
view, all the possible compositions and divisions, variations and changes, circumstances and dependences of things; all their possible relations one to another, and their dispositions or fitnesses to certain and respective ends; he must,
without possibility of error, know exactly what is best and properest in every
one of the infinite possible methods of disposing things; and understand perfectly how to order and direct the respective means, to bring about what he
knows to be, in its kind, or in the whole, the best and fittest in the end. And
having before shown, (which indeed is also evident of itself) that the supreme
cause is moreover all-powerful; so that he can no more be prevented by force
or opposition, than he can be hindered by error or mistake, from effecting
always what is absolutely fittest and wisest to be done: It follows undeniably,
that he is actually and effectually, in the highest and most complete sense,
infinitely wise; and that the world and all things therein, must be and are effects
of infinite wisdom. This is demonstration a priori. The proof a posteriori, of the
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infinite wisdom of God, from the consideration of the exquisite perfection and
consummate excellency of his works; is no less strong and undeniable. But I
shall not enlarge upon this argument, because it has often already been accurately and strongly urged, to the everlasting shame and confusion of Atheists,
by the ablest and learned writers both of ancient and modern times. I shall here
observe only one thing; that the older the world grows, and the deeper men
enquire into things, and the more accurate observations they make, and the
more and greater discoveries they find out; the stronger this argument continually grows: Which is a certain evidence of its being founded in truth. If Galen,
so many ages since, could find in the construction and constimtion of the parts
of a human body, such undeniable marks of contrivance and design, as forced
him them to acknowledge and admire the wisdom of its author; what would
he have said if he had known the late discoveries in anatomy and physic, the
circulation of the blood, the exact structure of the heart and brain, the uses of
numberless glands and valves for the secretion and motion of the juices of the
body; besides several veins and other vessels and receptacles not at all known,
or so much as imagined to have any existence, in his days; but, which now are
discovered to serve the wisest and most exquisite ends imaginable? If the arguments against the belief of the being of an all-wise creator and governor of the
world, which Epicurus and his follower Lucretius drew from the faults which
they imagined they could find in the frame and constimtion of the earth, were
so poor and inconsiderable, that, even in that infancy of natural philosophy, the
generality of men contemned and despised them as of no force; How would
they have been ashamed, if they had lived in these days: when those very
things, which they thought to be faults and blunders in the constimtion of
namre, are discovered to be very useful and of exceeding benefit to the preservation and well-being of the whole? And, to mention no more: IfTully, from
the partial and very imperfect knowledge in astronomy, which his times afforded, could be so confident of the heavenly bodies being disposed and
moved by a wise and understanding mind, as to declare, that, in his opinion,
whoever asserted the contrary, was himself void of all understanding; What
would he have said, ifhe had known the modern discoveries in astronomy? The
immense greatness of the world; (I mean of that part ofit which falls under our
observation) which is now known to be as much greater than what in his time
they imagined it to be, as the world itself, according to their system, was greater
than Archimedes' sphere? The exquisite regularity of all the planets' motions,
without epicycles, stations, retrogradations, or any other deviation or confusion whatsoever? The inexpressible nicety of the adjustment of the primary
velocity and original direction of the annual motion of the planets, with their
distance from the central body and their force of gravitation towards it? The
wonderful proportion of the diurnal motion of the earth and other planets
about their own centers, for the distinction of light and darkness; without that
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monstrously disproportionate whirling of the whole heavens, which the ancient astronomers were forced to suppose? The exact accommodation of the
densities of the planets, to their distances from the sun, and consequently to
the proportion of heat which each of them is to bear respectively; so that
neither those which are nearest to the sun, are destroyed by the heat; nor those
which are farthest off, by the cold; but each one enjoys a temperature suited
to its proper uses, as the earth is to ours? The admirable order, number, and
usefulness of the several moons (as I may very properly call them,) never
dreamt of by antiquity, but now by the help of telescopes clearly and distinctly
seen to move about their respective planets; and whose motions are so exactly
known, that their very eclipses are as certainly calculated and foretold, as those
of our own moon? The strange adjustment of our moon's motion about its
own center once in a month, with its motion about the earth in the same
period of time, to such a degree of exactitude, that by that means the same face
is always obverted to the earth without any sensible variation? The wonderful
motions of the comets, which are now known to be as exact, regular, and
periodical, as the motions of other planets? Lastly, the preservation of the several systems, and of the several planets and comets in the same system, from
falling upon each other; which in infinite past time, (had there been no intelligent governor of the world) could not but have been the effect of the smallest
possible resistance made by the finest aether, and even by the rays of light
themselves, to the motions (supposing it possible there ever could have been
any motions) of those bodies; What, I say, would Tully, that great master of
reason, have thought and said; if these and other newly discovered instances of
the inexpressible accuracy and wisdom of the works of God, had been found
out and known in his time? Certainly Atheism, which then was altogether
unable to withstand the arguments drawn from this topic; must now, upon the
additional strength of these latter observations, (which are every one an unanswerable proof of the incomprehensible wisdom of the Creator) be utterly
ashamed to shew its head. We now see with how great reason the author of the
book of Ecclesiasticus, after he had described the beauty of the sun and stars,
and all the then visible works of God in heaven and earth; concluded, chap.
xliii, v. 31, (as we, after all the discoveries oflater ages, now no doubt still truly
say) There are yet hid greater things than these, and we have seen but a few of
his works.
The supreme cause must in the first place be infinitely good; that is, he must
have an unalterable disposition to do and to communicate good or happiness:
Because, being himself necessarily happy in the eternal enjoyment of his own
infinite perfections, he cannot possibly have any other motives to make any
creatures at all, but only that he may communicate to them his own perfections; according to their different capacities, arising from that variety of natures, which it was fit for infinite wisdom to produce; and according to their
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different improvements, arising from that liberty which is essentially necessary
to the constitution of intelligent and and active beings. That he must be infinitely good, appears likewise further from hence; that being necessarily all sufficient, he must consequently be infinitely removed from all malice and envy,
and from all other possible causes or temptations of doing evil; which 'tis
evident, can only be effects of want and weakness, ofimperfection or depravation. Again; The supreme cause and author of all things, must in like manner
be infinitely just: Because, the rule of equity being nothing else but the very
nature of things, and their necessary relations one to another; and the execution of justice, being nothing else but a suiting the circumstances of things to
the qualifications of persons, according to the original fitness and agreeableness, which I have before shewn to be necessarily in nature, antecedent to will
and to all positive appointment; 'tis' manifest, that He who knows perfectly this
rule of equity, and necessarily judges of things as they are; who has complete
power to execute justice according to that knowledge, and no possible temptation to deviate in the least therefrom; who can neither be imposed upon by
any deceit, nor swayed by any bias, nor awed by any power; must of necessity,
do always that which is right; without iniquity, and without partiality; without
prejudice, and without respect of persons. Lastly, That the Supreme Cause and
Author of all things, must be true and faithful, in all his declarations and all his
promises; is most evident for the only possible reason of falsifying, is either
rashness or forgetfulness, inconstancy or impotency, fear of evil, or hope of
gain; from all which, an infinite wise, all-sufficient and good Being, must of
necessity be infinitely removed; and consequently, as 'tis impossible for him to
be deceived himself, so neither is it possible for him in any wise to deceive
others. In a word: All evil and all imperfections whatsoever, arise plainly either
from shortness of understanding, defect of power, or faultiness of will; And this
last, evidently from some impotency, corruption, or depravation; being nothing else, but a direct choosing to act contrary to the known reason and nature
of things. From all which, it being manifest that the supreme cause and author
of all things, cannot but be infinitely removed; it follows undeniably, that he
must of necessity be a Being of infinite goodness, justice and truth, and all
other moral perfections.
To this argumentation a priori, there can be opposed but one objection
that I know of, drawn on the contrary a posteriori, from experience and observation of the unequal distributions of Providence in the world. But (besides the
just vindication of the wisdom and goodness of Providence in its dispensations,
even with respect to this present world only, which Plutarch and other heathen
writers have judiciously made) the objection itself is entirely wide of the question. For concerning the justice and goodness of God, as of any governor
whatsoever, no judgment is to be made from a partial view of a few small
portions of his dispensations, but from an entire consideration of the whole;

321

The Temple of Reason

322

and consequently, not only the short duration of this present state, but moreover all that is past and that is still to come, must be taken into the account:
And then every thing will clearly appear just and right.
From what has been said upon this argument, we may see how it comes to
pass, that though nothing is so certain and undeniable as the necessary existence of God, and the consequent deduction of all his attributes; yet men, who
have never attended to the evidence of reason, and to the notions that God
hath given us of himself, may easily be in great measure ignorant of both. That
the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, is so certain and
evident, that whoever affirms the contrary, affirms what may very easily be
reduced to an express contradiction. Yet whoever turns not his mind to consider it at all, may easily be ignorant of this and numberless other of the like
mathematical and most infallible truths.
Yet the notices that God has been pleased to give us of himself, are so many
and so obvious; in the constitution, order, beauty, and harmony of the several
parts of the world; in the frame and structure of our own bodies, and the
wonderful powers and faculties of our souls; in the unavoidable apprehensions
of our own minds, and the common consent of all other men; in every thing
within us, and in every thing without us: That no man of the meanest capacity
and greatest disadvantages whatsoever, with the slightest and most superficial
observations of the works of God, and the lowest and most obvious attendance
to the reason of things, can be ignorant of Him; but he must be utterly without
an excuse. Possibly he may not indeed be able to understand, or be affected by
nice and metaphysical demonstrations of the being and attributes of God; But
then, for the same reason, he is obliged also not to suffer himself to be shaken
and unsettled, by the subtle sophistries of Sceptical and Atheistical men; which
he cannot perhaps answer, because he cannot understand. But he is bound to
adhere to those things which he knows, and those reasonings he is capable to
judge of, which are abundantly sufficient to determine and to guide the practice of sober and considering men.

An Ode to Reason (8 November 1800)
REASON DMNE! thou gift of Heaven,
The greatest gift that e'er was given,
In human hearts resume thy throne,
Let all to thee subjection own.
To search for wisdom, be our pride,
And thou! 0 thou! our only guide:
Aided by thee our breasts shall burn
With indignation just, and spurn
At all the slavish fearful fools
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Of priest.s, as well as priestly tools;
Nor dread the sceptr'd tyrant's frown;
(For tyrants, reason's sons disown.)
With perseverance, strong we'll grow,
And like a river onward flow,
Whose steady course obstructions brave,
Until it meets great ocean's wave.
For long have priests devoid of shame
Abused-Nay, spurned thy sacred name!
Their triple Gods, these Gods but one,
Their married Virgin, and her son;
How snakes could speak, and asses too,
What wond'rous feats some fish could do,
Could swallow prophets and could bring
The cash for taxes to a King!
How Moses over Egypt's land,
Dispers'd the frogs by his command;
How fleas and lice came at his call,
And plagu'd Egyptians one and all,
How coat and shoes for forty year
Though always worn-did never wear.
How gen'ral Joshua stopt the sun,
Until his men the battle won.
How gates and bulwarks kiss'd the ground,
When nought but horns and trumpets sound.
How Endors witch could raise the dead,
And make heroic Saul afraid.
How Babylon's king with pride so full
Became at last a lusty bull!
And thus for seven long years remain'd
E're he again his shape regain'd;
(What pity kings of modern days
Could not be sent as long to graze.)
How God bid one go eat his bread,
Bespread with t __ d in butter's stead,
But when at this his heart did spurn
Cow's dung, God said, would serve the turn,
Such foolish, childish tales as these,
A barbarous race of men might please,
But sure such tales can never claim
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From Reason's sons, of Truth the name;
Nor can the philosophic eye
Discern in them aught but a lie.
Though raging priests aloud proclaim,
Damnation, Hell and endless flame,
To ev'ry son of man who dare
But doubt what they solemnly swear;
The God of Nature says not so,
He ne'er can doom a man to woe,
For disbelieving when he's told
That silver is as yellow's gold;
And sure where common sense prevails,
As foolish are those bible tales.
Fair Reason needs no aids like these,
Her simple rules are rules of ease.
To view the Universe around,
That work of Wisdom most profound!
The varying seasons as they go,
The summer's heat-the winter's snow;
These-these the Mighty God proclaim;
These cry aloud his mighty name;
These teach us equal love to shew
To wipe the tear of human woe,
To give misfortune quick relief,
To cheer the heart oppress'd with grief:
In short-Do ev'ry good we can
To all our brethren-fellow man.

Christian Morality Compared with That
of the Pagan Philosophers (29 November 1800)
Far be it from us to find fault with christian morality, though some of its
principles may be so refined, as that men in the present state of affairs, are not
able fully to comply with them. We appeal to the sense, experience and practice
of the most canting christians, how far they return good for evil-forgive their
enemies, and reduce certain other precepts to operation, which they so earnestly recommend by the authority of Jesus Christ: All we wish to insist on and
shew in this place is, that this branch of divine revelation is not of so modern
a date as it is pretended.
The best morality of the new testament has been long known, taught and
practiced before Jesus Christ or his disciples; and therefore cannot possibly be
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considered as immediate and divine revelation, communicated to us by God
the Son.
The advocates for revelation will not allow, nor do we want them to allow
it, that Socrates, Plato, Cicero, Epictetus and many other philosophers in and
before their times, had been inspired, by God the Holy Ghost!-It was not at
all necessary: they had their morality from reason and their predecessors; for
moral truths are as old as the creation: Christ may refine on them, but he did
not invent, nor was he the first to promulgate them. The striking likeness that
appears between the morality of the gospel, and that of Socrates and Plato,
even in the most refined parts, shews that Jesus Christ was acquainted with the
works of these Greek philosophers, and that he wished to introduce them
among his country-men the Jews, who, it would appear from their own history
even, had much need of them.
We may as well suppose and believe that Christ had travelled for his information, during the time there is no account of him in Judea, as that Solon,
Lycurgus, and many other eminent patriots and philosophers of antiquity, had
done the same for the benefit and improvement of their countries. It is somewhat more rational, and indeed more probable, to think that Jesus Christ had
drawn his knowledge and morality from Greece and Egypt, than immediately
from the celestial regions.
Having made these preliminary observations, leaving the reflecting reader
to make many more to the same purpose, we shall quote a few moral precepts
from some of the ancient philosophers, and then leave others to compare them
with corresponding passages in the new testament.
Plato tells us in his Apology, that Socrates did nothing else but go continu ally about, persuading both old and young, not to be so much solicitous to
gratify the appetites of the body: or to heap up wealth; or gain any outward
advantage whatever; as to improve the mind by the continual exercise of all
virtue and goodness; teaching them a man's true value did not arise from
riches, or from any outward circumstances in life; but that true riches and every
real good, whether public or private, proceeded wholly from virtue.
It would be tedious to cite all the passages in the new testament, that are
in sense, and nearly in expression, the same as this in Plato-To the sagacious
reader it will certainly appear plain, that in his moral system, Jesus Christ had
taken Socrates and Plato for his masters and models; and he could not have
taken better.
Plato in Critone, says that no one ought to do willingly any hurt or mischief to any man; no, not even to those that have first injured him; but ought,
for the public benefit, to endeavor to appease with gentleness, rather than
exasperate with retaliations.- Here we have forgiveness to our enemies, and
a return of good for evil preached about four hundred years before Christ was
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born! and now what becomes of Christian morality, and the new commandments?
For a full and satisfactory elucidation of this subject, we must refer our
readers to the works of Plato, which we could wish to be more generally
known, that the public may see how clearly this illustrious philosopher and his
master Socrates, treated of the existence of one God, of moral philosophy and
the immortality of the soul. The new testament appears, as to these three
subjects, to be a mere copy of Plato's works.
It is evident, says Cicero, every man is bound by the law of his nature, to
look upon himself as a part or member of that one universal body or community, which is made up of all mankind; to think himself born to promote the
public good and welfare of all his fellow creatures; and consequently, obliged,
as the necessary and only effectual means to that end, to embrace them all with
universal love and benevolence; so that he cannot without acting contrary to
the reason of his own mind, do willingly any hurt or mischief to any man-And
to comprehend all in one word-for man to love his neighbour as himself:
Thus far Cicero, who has expressed himself as distinctly on this head, as any
Philosopher of the present day could possibly do.
As morality in its full extent, and in its niceties and refinements, has been
known and taught many centuries before the christian era, it is evidently false
to say, that it forms a part of divine revelation. The blindest bigots must see the
truth of this and feel its force; let us not hear them any longer therefore, insult
our understanding with the unparalleled purity of their morality, or with its
novelty either. Until now, their best and only excuse could have been their
ignorance; but if they still persist in their error, we shall very justly say to them,
what the Jewish writer had said to his countrymen, "They have eyes, and they
cannot see--ears, and they cannot hear!"
Having shewn that Christ's moral system is not by divine revelation, we
shall soon shew also, that there is nothing new in the theoretic or mysterious part
of his religion, or the religion of his disciples and followers rather; for we are
decidedly of opinion, and we have published our reasons for thinking so, that
Christ was a sincere and good Deist: hence we must conclude, that Pagan
theology had been introduced in his name, and that after his death. We say,
Pagan theology; for we shall prove that the Egyptians, Greeks and Romans,
long before the birth of Christ, had believed dogmas similar to those of the
new testament-whether of Trinities, incarnations, metamorphoses--celestial
love-intrigues-whether of feasts of bread and wine--oftransfigurations-resurrections, ascensions to heaven, etc. etc. All these extravagant fables calculated
to subjugate the mind to sacerdotal influence, to ignorance, blind obedience
and superstition, were well known and successfully practiced, before Paul figured away in Asia, or Peter in Rome. And of course, cannot be new, or of divine
origin, as pretended by the advocates for christianity.
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A New Hymn for the Temple of Reason
(16 September 1801)
While others sing a Triune God,
Of Three in one-and one in three;
In Reason's Temple we have trod,
And sing alone a Deity.
We sing the great Creator's praise,
Who hung the Starry Worlds on high,
Whose wisdom shines through all his ways,
Whose goodness is for ever nigh.
While others sing a changing God,
And make his wrath and love their theme;
In Reason's Temple we have trod,
And sing a God thats e'er the same.
E'en let them sing a Dying God,
And to his blood for shelter fly;
In Reason's Temple we have trod,
And say a God could never die.
Yet when they sing th' atoning blood
Of him who knew himself no sin,
We ask, (tho' long their faith has stood,)
Could reason e'er such faith begin?
Tho' bold fanatics sing aloud
Of love from God to them alone,
And deal damnation to the crowd;
A God so partial we disown.
Then lift ye sad unhappy souls,
With hopes of heaven-and fears of hell;
The knell of superstition tolls,
'Tis reason tolls her passing knell.

Natural Ideas Opposed to Supernatural (30 December 1801)
When we coolly examine the opinions of men, we are surprised to find, that in
those, which they regard as the most essential, nothing is more uncommon
than the use of common sense; or, in other words, a degree of judgment
sufficient to discover the most simple truths, to reject the most striking absur-
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dities, and to be shocked with palpable contradictions. We have an example of
it in theology, a science revered in all times and countries, by the greatest
number of men; an object they regard as the most important, the most useful,
and the most indispensable to the happiness of societies. Indeed, with little
examination of the principles, upon which this pretended science is founded,
we are forced to acknowledge, that these principles, judged incontestable, are
only hazardous suppositions, imagined by ignorance, propagated by enthusiasm or knavery, adopted by timid credulity, preserved by custom, which never
reasons, and revered solely because not understood. Some, says Montaigne,
make the world think, that they believe what they do not; others, in greater
number, make themselves think, that they believe what they do not, not knowing what belief is.
Restless meditations upon an object, impossible to understand, in which,
however, he thinks himself much concerned, cannot but put a man in a very
ill humor and produce in his head dangerous transports. Let interest, vanity
and ambition, cooperate ever so little with these dispositions, and society must
necessarily be disturbed.-This is the reason that so many nations have often
been the theatres of the extravagances of senseless dreamers, who, believing or
publishing their empty speculations as eternal truths, have kindled the enthusiasm of princes and people, and armed them for opinions, which they represented as essential to the glory of the Deity, and the happiness of empires. In
all parts of our globe, intoxicated fanatics have been seen cutting each other's
throats, lighting funeral piles, committing without scruple and even as a duty,
the greatest crimes, and shedding torrents of blood.
Fierce and uncultivated nations, perpetually at war, have in their origin
under divers names, adored some God, conformably to their ideas; that is to
say, cruel, carnivorous, selfish, blood-thirsty. We find, in all religions of the
earth, a God of armies, a jealous God, an avenging God, a destroying God, a
God, who is pleased with carnage, and whom his worshippers, as a duty, serve
to his taste.-Lambs, bulls, children, men, heretics, infidels, kings, whole nations are sacrificed to him. Do not the zealous servants of this so barbarous
God, even think it a duty to offer up themselves as a sacrifice to him? We every
where see madmen, who, after dismal meditations upon their terrible God,
imagine, that to please him, they must do themselves all possible injury, and
inflict on themselves for his honor invented torments. In short, the gloomy
ideas of such a divinity, far from consoling men under the evils of life, have
every where disquieted and confused their minds, and produced follies destructive to their happiness.
Infested with frightful phantoms, and guided by men, interested in perpetuating its ignorance and fears, how could the human mind have made any
considerable progress? Man has been forced to vegetate in his primitive stupid-

In Defence of Pure Religii-.,,

ity: nothing has been offered to his mind, but stories of invisible powers, upon
whom his happiness was supposed to depend. Occupied solely by his fears, and
unintelligible reveries, he has always been at the mercy of his priests, who have
reserved to themselves the right of thinking for him, and directing his actions.
Thus man has been, and ever will remain, a child without experience, a slave
without courage, a stupid animal, who has feared to reason, and who has never
known how to extricate himself from the labyrinth, where his ancestors had
strayed. He has believed himself forced to groan under the yoke of his gods,
whom he has known only by the fabulous accounts of his ministers, who, after
having bound him with the cords of opinion, have remained his masters; or
rather have abandoned him, defenceless, to the absolute power of tyrants no
less terrible than the gods, whose representatives they have been upon earth.
Crushed under the double yoke of spiritual and temporal power, it was
impossible for the people to know and pursue their happiness. As religion,
politics, and morality became sanctuaries, into which the ungodly were not
permitted to enter, men had no other morality, than what their legislators and
priests brought down from the unknown regions of the Empyrean. The human mind, confused with its theological opinions, forgot itself, doubted its
own powers, mistrusted experience, feared truth, disdained its reason, and
abandoned her direction, blindly to follow authority. Man was a mere machine
in the hands of his tyrants and priests, who alone had the right of directing his
actions: always led like a slave, he ever had his vices and character. These are the
true causes of the corruption of morals, to which superstition ever opposes only
ideal barriers, and that without effect. Ignorance and servitude are calculated
to make men wicked and unhappy. Knowledge, reason and liberty, can alone
reform them, and make them happier; but every thing conspires to blind them,
and confirm their errors. Priests cheat them, tyrants corrupt, the better to
enslave them. Tyranny ever was, and ever will be, the true cause of the corruption of morals, and the habitual calamities of men; who, almost always fascinated with religious notions, and metaphysical fictions, instead of turning their
eyes to the natural and obvious causes of their misery, attribute their vices to
the imperfection of their nature, and their unhappiness to the anger of the
gods. They offer up to heaven vows, sacrifices and presents, to obtain the end
of their sufferings, which, in reality, are chargeable only to the negligence,
ignorance and perversity of their guides, the folly of their institutions, their silly
customs, false opinions, irrational laws, and above all, to the want of knowledge. Let men's minds be filled with true ideas; let their reason be cultivated;
let justice govern them; and there will be no need of opposing to the passions,
such a feeble barrier, as a fear of devils. Men will be good, when they are well
instructed, well governed, and when they are punished or despised for the evil
and justly rewarded for the good, they do to their fellow creatures.
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In vain should we attempt to cure men of their vices, unless we begin by
curing them of their prejudices. It is only by shewing them the truth, that they
will know their dearest interests, and the motives that ought to include them
to do good. Fatigued with an inconceivable theology, ridiculous fables, impenetrable mysteries, puerile ceremonies, let the human mind apply itself to the
study of nature, to intelligible objects, sensible truths, and useful knowledge.
Let the vain chimeras of men be removed and reasonable opinions will soon
come of themselves, into those heads, which were tho't to be forever destined
to error.
To learn the true principles of morality, men have no need of theology, of
revelation, or gods: They have need only of reason. They have only to enter
into themselves, to reflect upon their own nature, consult their sensible interests, consider the object of society, and of the individuals, who comprise it; and
they will easily perceive, that virtue is the interest, and vice the unhappiness of
beings of their kind. Let us advise men to abstain from vice and crimes; not
because they will be punished in the other world, but because they will suffer
for it in this. -There are, says a great man, means to prevent crimes-these are
punishments; there are those to reform manners-these are good examples.
Truth is simple; error is complex, uncertain in its progress, and full of windings. The voice of nature is intelligible; that of falsehood is ambiguous, enigmatical, mysterious; the way of truth is straight; that ofimposture crooked and
dark. Truth, forever necessary to man, must necessarily be felt by all upright
minds; the lessons of reason are formed to be followed by all honest men.Men are unhappy only because they are ignorant; they are ignorant only because every thing conspires to prevent their being enlightened: they are so
wicked only because their reason is not yet sufficiently unfolded.
By what fatality, then, have the first founders of all sects given to their gods
the most ferocious characters, at which nature recoils? Can we imagine a conduct more abominable, than that ascribed by Moses to his God, towards the
Egyptians, where that assassin proceeds boldly to declare, in the name, and by
the order of his God, that Egypt shall be afflicted with the greatest calamities,
that can happen to man. Of all the different ideas, which they wish to give us
of a Supreme Being, of a God, creator and preserver of men, there are none
more horrible, than those of these imposters, who believed themselves inspired
by a divine spirit.
Why, 0 theologians! do you presume to rummage in the impenetrable
mysteries of a first being, whom you call inconceivable to the human mind?
You are the first blasphemers, in attributing to a Being, who must be infinitely
perfect, so many horrors, committed towards creatures, whom he has made
out of nothing.
There is a science, that has for its object only things incomprehensible.
Contrary to all other sciences, it treats only of what cannot fall under our
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senses. Hobbes calls it the Kingdom of Darkness. It is a country, where every
thing is governed by laws, contrary to those which mankind are permitted to
know in the world they inhabit. In this marvelous region, light is only darkness;
evidence is doubtful or false; impossibilities are credible; reason is a deceitful
guide; and good sense becomes madness. This science is called theology, and
this sort of theology is a continual insult to the reason of man.
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Prospect; oi; View of the
Moral l-lvrld
Virtue, the Highest Dignity of Man

When The Temple of Reason printed its last issue on 19 February 1803, it
promised its readers that a new periodical would soon take its place. Unhappily,
logistic and financial problems delayed the appearance ofits successor, Prospect;
or, View of the Moral World, for almost a year. But the new weekly was well
worth the wait. When the inaugural issue finally appeared on 10 December
1803, it was clear the publication was a cut above The Temple. The reason for
the Prospect's superiority was not hard to discern: It was edited and for the most
part written by the tireless and brilliant Elihu Palmer.
The Prospect's first issue declared that "the period has at length arrived in
which the civilized world has recognized the necessity of moral principles to
regulate the conduct of intelligent beings," and it proudly announced that the
paper's primary goal would be to elucidate the foundations and nature of those
principles. It was as good as its word. Until it ceased publication on 30 March
1805, the Prospect ran articles on religion, biblical criticism, ethics, natural
philosophy, politics, economics, and literature that for the most part revolved
around the themes of moral progress and human improvement. The necessary
conditions for such improvement were rational standards of behavior as well as
thought. These standards in turn, so the Prospect assured its audience, were
derivable from the investigation of natural philosophy, or science. Reason, "the
highest and noblest faculty of man," had the power to throw off the "shackles
of prejudice" and the "trammels of superstition." As such, reason was not
merely a tool for the promotion of commerce, social utility, and the conquest
of nature. It also served as the catalyst for human liberty, freedom of conscience, rational religion, and moral perfection. As Palmer so eloquently says in
"Moral Philosophy" (31 December 1803), "The true point of wisdom is to
regulate conduct by principle, to control passion by reason, elevate the mind
above common prejudices, to discard superstition, to love truth, and practice
an incorruptible virtue."
The Prospect's acuteness, diversity, and sheer readability quickly earned it a
circulation far surpassing that of The Temple. Subscription agents in New York,
Newburgh, Philadelphia, and Baltimore were kept busy throughout the
paper's sixteenth-month history. Although the number of paid subscribers
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ultimately proved insufficient to keep the weekly afloat, Palmer's words were
undoubtedly read and discussed by thousands of nonsubscribers. When he
boasts in the 16 June 1804 issue that there were "thousands and tens of thousands of deists in the United States and Europe," he may have been guilty of
hyperbole. But it is more than likely that the Prospect was followed with interest by what for the times represented a huge readership. In quality as well as
popularity, then, the Prospect was the most successful of all Early Republic
deistic papers.
The Prospectwas also the most militant of the deistic newspapers. It repeatedly denounced the "double despotism" of church and state---one of Palmer's
favorite themes--claiming that oppressive political structures worked hand-inhand with ecclesial authority to encourage fear, superstition, ignorance, and
social tractability. It ran a series of devastating textual analyses of Scripture,
written completely by Palmer and covering Genesis and Exodus in minute
detail, which underscored logical and ethical inconsistencies and absurdities in
Holy Writ. It was unabashedly anticlerical, arguing that "the clergy have always
found it to their advantage to keep the people in utter ignorance, and it has
been a part of their profession from those of Apollo to the present day" to
inflict "misery and distress ... upon the human race" (25 February 1804, 28
January 1804). And it continuously reaffirmed, in both prose and poetry, the
superiority of deism's rational religion over the supernaturalist dogma of traditional Christianity. Unlike many of the earlier "moderate" deists, Palmer was
convinced that the lay reader was intelligent and emotionally stable enough to
throw off the orthodox "shackles of prejudice" without succumbing to despair
and nihilism, and the straightforward militancy of the Prospect reflects that
confidence.
In the selections from the Prospect included here, Palmer criticizes traditional Christian doctrines such as faith, miracles, and revelation by claiming
that they are either unjust or irrational and hence unworthy of both humans
and the divine: "God will not reveal that which is unjust, and to reveal that
which is unintelligible would be ofno use" (7 April 1804). In "Laws of Nature" (28 April 1804), he defends a Baconian model of inferential generalization, arguing that observation of experience and the logical deduction from it
of uniform patterns is an appropriate methodology for the human as well as the
physical sciences. In "More of Human Reason" (28 July 1804), he suggests
that Christianity's insistence that human reason is corrupt and thus insufficient
as an epistemological standard is self-contradictory and absurd. If human reason is too corrupt to rationally assent to the proposition that reason is
untrustworthy, then humans cannot properly believe it; if the proposition can
be rationally grasped, then reason is not corrupt. Instead of attempting to
replace reason, "Heaven's best gift to man," with theological sophisms that
deny its sufficiency, humans would be better served if, like "The Indian Stu-
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dent" (24 November 1804), they bowed only to "Nature's God" by trusting
both their experience of physical reality and their logical deductions from it. To
decry reason and instead rest content on emotionalism is to sink into the
subjectivistic trap of"enthusiasm" (2 February 1805), a surrender that breeds
intellectual passivity as well as doctrinal dogmatism.
Especially interesting are two articles criticizing church and state relations:
"Remarks" (25 January 1805) and "For the Prospect" (30 March 1805). The
first piece is a blast against secular antiblasphemy laws. In a discussion reminiscent ofVolney's comparative analysis of credal differences, Palmer argues that
blasphemy is contextually defined: What constitutes an instance of it depends
on the religious perspective to which a particular sect subscribes. Let each
person look to his or her own conscience as a guide, and "let legislators look
to the morals, the science, and the virtues of society-with theology they have
nothing to do."
In "For the Prospect," Palmer assails the legal requirement of oath taking as
a necessary condition for testimony in courts oflaw. When confronted with the
obligation to swear to tell the truth "so help me God," a potential witness who
is also an unbeliever is forced either to pretend allegiance to a God in which he
or she does not believe, or to refrain from participating in the legal process.
Both options, Palmer claims, constitute unwarranted coercion and are founded
on a bigoted assumption by the establishment that non-Christians are innately
untrustworthy. But, as Palmer so eloquently argued in Principles of Nature,
ethics has no necessary foundation in religious belief. For the state to presume
otherwise is to dangerously allow ecclesial superstition to poison what are properly secular proceedings. Such a move is not only ethically unacceptable but
also, in the truest sense of the word, blasphemous, attempting as it does to
usurp in the interests of the state what are rightly matters of private conscience.

Competency of the Human Powers (10 December 1803)
A survey of the infancy of man and of the imbecilities to which he is subjected,
seems to form in some measure an objection against the admissions of an
opinion pre-eminently important in the general improvement of the world. If
superstition be permitted to depreciate human energy and calumniate its character for activity, it will by this coalition, with native weakness, form an insurmountable barrier to the progress of knowledge among the nations of the
earth. The strength of our faculties is diminished by fear or augmented by
moral encouragements, when impressions are frequently made unfavorable to
the right as well as the real exercise of rational powers; it creates in individuals
a consciousness, or rather a belief of self-sufficiency. This becomes the generating cause of a thousand subsequent mischiefs; for when a man is once impressed with an idea that he is either weak or foolish, or that it is a crime to
bring his faculties, small as they are, to bear upon the high sounding topics of
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theological doctrines, he trembles at the idea of intellectual efforts, and cries
out in the language of revealed theology, Lord, what is man! It is a point of
policy in the hierarchy to cherish this submissive temperament, and cultivate in
the soul of man the divine virtue of humility. If the enemies of truth and free
discussion upon religious subjects, have discovered an interest in human degradation, philosophers and philanthropists have recognized in the exaltation of
human power, man restored to his true dignity and in the full possession of
those moral pleasures to which his nature and his station in existence furnish
so indisputable a claim; the zeal and exertions of great and good men during
the last century, were directed to the important subject of giving a new elevation to the powers of man; they directed him to contemplate his organization,
to mark the slow but certain expansion of his faculties, to take a retrospective
and comparative view of what he was in early life, and what relation his intellectual properties bore to the whole visible universe. In this train of instruction
and reflection, he learnt duly to appreciate the energies of his existence, he saw
the whole moral and physical world subjected to the electric movements of
mind, the revolution of the planets were calculated, their relative distances and
magnitudes ascertained, and the universal harmony of the solar system disclosed for the contemplation of an astonished world! But the full recognition
of human competency did not result solely from these splendid and majestic
facts;-another circle of science more circumscribed it is true, but more important to the real interests of society, gave fresh testimony in favor of the strength
and all-sufficiency of our mental powers. The double despotism of the world
had taught man the shameful maxim that his mind and body might be rightfully held in subjection by others; the power of thought revived the discriminative considerations essential to moral science, and society witnessed a new era
in the history of its existence. The rules, principles, laws, customs, and constitutions necessary to peace and social happiness, were demonstrated to result
from the inherent character, and to be essentially interwoven with the rational
constitution of intelligent beings. Superstition declared that man could accomplish nothing; experience taught him that he could accomplish every thing
necessary to his real felicity, and that if it were not for the institutions of supernatural theology, he might have seen himself surrounded with more comforts,
and his life abundantly more tranquil. -When reason, the highest and noblest
faculty of man, asserted the right of moral decision upon questions of vast
importance, the church and its coadjustors issued a writ of proscription and
combined ecclesiastical and military power for the completion of their iniquitous design. The history of the church in Europe furnishes ample verification
to this remark. Galileo, who only asserted that the earth is round, together with
an hundred other philosophers bold in the cause of truth, suffered imprisonment or death under the vindictive cruelty of clerical domination. But if St.
Paul, who is a great stickler for the incapacity of man, for he says of ourselves we
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can do nothing, together with thousands of adherents to christianity, should
labour to demonstrate the incompetency of human powers, let it be remembered that the period is past for this doctrine to obtain celebrity-the realization 0£ the fact is an ample refutation to such destructive calumnies. The arts,
the sciences, all the comforts ofhuman life, bear testimony to the solemn truth,
and if we still suffer evils the fault is our own-it ought not to be charged upon
nature or nature's God.

Explanation of the Principles of Deism (17 December 1803)
Principles, opinions, and doctrines are frequently considered in a destructive
point of light, because they are not well understood. It is a duty which the
mind owes to the dignity ofits character, to examine and discriminate previous
to an ultimate decision, by which sentiments are to be condemned or applauded. Deism is a word which sounds terrible in the ears of those who have
been accustomed from early life to contemplate theological opinions, of a
nature entirely opposite. Prejudices are in some measure unavoidable appendages of imperfect powers, and when reiterated efforts are made for the purpose
of exciting a rancourous spirit against any particular opinions, the mind loses
that just equilibrium which leads to fair inquiry, and honest judgment. It hence
becomes necessary in developing the principles of a subject that has received
any considerable share of popular odium, to state with simplicity, and delineate
with correctness the prominent features of such principles. With a view to this
point, we proceed to explain the properties of a subject, which has so often
excited in christian minds such extreme abhorrence-in doing this there is no
intention to impose a creed upon men whose sentiments are similar-we know
that among those who believe that the religion of nature is the only true
religion, there are shades of difference in their opinions, but these differences
are inconsiderable-less, much less, than those which are every day exhibited
in every part of the christian world. Be this as it may, however, we have an
unquestionable right to state our ideas upon this interesting subject, conceding
to all others the same right. "Deism declares to intelligent man the existence
of one perfect God, creator and preserver of the universe-that the laws by
which he governs the world, are like himself immutable, and of course, that
violations of these laws, or miraculous interferences in the movements of nature, must be necessarily excluded from the grand system of universal existence-that the creator is justly entitled to the adoration of every intellectual
agent throughout the regions of infinite space-and that he alone is entitled to
it, having no copartners who have a right to share with him the homage of the
intelligent world. Deism also declares that the practice of a pure, natural, and
uncorrupted virtue is the essential duty, and constitutes the highest dignity of
man.
That the powers of man are competent to all the great purposes of human
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existence-that science, virtue and happiness are the great objects which ought
to awake the mental energies, and draw forth the moral affections of the human race.
These are some of the outlines of pure Deism, which christian superstition
so dreadfully abhors, and whose votaries she would willingly consign to endless
torture. But it is built upon a staunch foundation, and will triumphantly diffuse
happiness among the nations of the earth, for ages after christian superstition
and fanaticism have ceased to spread desolation and carnage through the fair
creation of God."

Aphorisms (17 December 1803)
Man is born ignorant-it is the expansion of his intellectual powers that constitutes his glory and his happiness.
Science is the sun of the moral world; when its rays shall have penetrated the
darkness of every understanding, a new era will be commenced in history, and
man will become universally the friend of sensative existence.
Superstition has shed the blood of millions-she must answer for her crimes at
the bar of reason, and there she will receive a condemnatory sentence--depart
ye cursed and trouble the world no more.
If the murders which have been committed in the name of religion could be
placed distinctly before the minds of believers, it would at least induce this
interrogatory-is that religion holy and divine whose effects have been so
destructive among the human race?
The energy of thought will one day teach fanaticism that her native home is hell!
War is the curse and scourge of the world-yet revealed religion has generated
more wars than any other cause by which they have been produced.
We look at all mankind through the mirror of history-but he who reads
history without discriminative reflection, might as well pass away his existence
under the influence of the morphean God.
Why does superstition calumniate philosophy? Answer, because philosophy
teaches the purest morals.
Philosophy labors to convince by mild and peaceful means-religious fanaticism by fire and faggot.
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Philosophy teaches that belief must be founded upon evidence---christianity
destroys this moral axiom, in the sentence, he that believeth not shall be
damned.
If meekness consist in murder, then was Moses a meek man.
Human merit is in proportion to talents and virtues---celestial merit cannot be
transferred from heaven to earth.
"The unjust man shall perish in his rapacity, and the tyrant in his usurpation."

Moral Philosophy (31 December 1803)
The conduct of human beings ought to be regulated by principles just and
useful. The source of these principles is essentially interwoven with the character of man; his moral position in life, his powers and the general properties of
his existence constitute the fundamental basis of enquiry and deduction. Theological superstition has taught lessons of dreadful heresy-it has instructed man
to believe that he ought to depart from the present world to procure for
himself joys suitable to the character of his present existence. The philosophy
of which we speak has provided for man a variety of comforts in his present
predicament, and this philosophy instructs him to diminish by intellectual exertion, the force of evil by which his life is afflicted. It teaches him that the ills
of life are not always real but frequently fabricated from causes of a trifling
nature. There is not perhaps on earth a human being who does not make more
of his misfortunes than he ought-there is not one who does not magnify
beyond the reality!- The human imagination is always awake, it is perpetually
active, and to its combinations, conjectures, and anticipations, there seems to
be no fixed termination. An evil apprehended, but not yet realised, often assumes a shape as terrific as the most dreadful calamity, which has already burst
in thunder upon the world. Earthquakes and volcanos sometimes happenthey happen really in the order of the universe-but how much more frequent
are they in the imaginary apprehensions of human beings. The true point of
wisdom is to regulate conduct by principle, to control passion by reason, elevate the mind above common prejudices, to discard superstition, to love
truth, and practice an incorruptible virtue.

Religious Self-Conceit (21 January 1804)
The very worst effect of an excessive self-love is the over-weening conceit of
one's self, relatively to devotion, and the punctual discharge of religious duties.
This is sure to declare itself in a contempt of every one who does not make the
same parade of sanctimony. Not a day passes in which people of this cast do not
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sacrifice some innocent victim at the altar of their malignant passions. Surmise
is their very food, slander their delight, altercation the whetstone of their wit,
rancour the fire which animates their discourse, and revenge the mobile of their
actions. For gluttony, imperiousness, avarice, and cruelty, they are noted-the
loss of a dollar sets their soul in an uproar, and under the cloak of devotion they
trample on common probity. But they indeed distinguish themselves by a strict
attendance on divine service, and their preparations at the approach of high
festivals. The word christianity is perpetually on their tongues-in visiting the
sick they affect an agonizing tenderness-they pay a most profound respect to
the clergy, and sigh and groan about the spread of infidelity: but after all their
hypocrisy, these hypocrites deceive their own consciences more than the
world-they are the detestation of the truly good, and men of common understanding laugh at their farcical sanctimoniousness.

On the Christian Religion (28 January 1804)
The Christian System, from the day of its birth, appears to have opened to the
world a new and melancholy scene of contention, animosity and bloodshed.
During its three first centuries it was frequently and severely persecuted, even
to the destruction of millions of its devotees. Either from state policy, or otherwise, about this time it began to be encouraged and was afterwards embraced by the Roman emperors, who then gave laws to all the christian world.
Thus were the christians reconciled to their enemies and relieved from former
sufferings: having now no external persecutions, the system soon furnished the
means of converting friends into enemies-they split and were divided by its
mysteries, and the sword of enthusiasm was drawn to explain them. -So great
were the massacres, carnage, and distress occasioned thereby, that even in the
days of the greatest superstition it was made a question, whether their existing
notions of religion had not done the world more harm than good: and a great
defender of christianity has long since acknowledged, that the mischiefs attending the christian system had cost the lives of fifty millions of the human race.
Oh! that the cause had never existed-these horrid effects could not have
taken place. Ambition, intrigue and fanatical madness in the priests, and bigotry and superstition in the people, led on these dreadful and savage barbarities
which distracted and almost desolated the christian world.
It is well known that priestcraft is an imposition of early date. Cato, the
great Roman orator was surprised that two priests could possibly meet without
bursting into fits oflaughter-but tears of blood would not have atoned for the
misery and distress they brought upon the human race. Dark and mysterious
things are the essence of imposition. The craft and secrecy practised by the
clergy of Rome, served to obscure the avenues of light, to encourage superstition and religious bigotry, and became a lasting source of corruption, imposition and pious fraud. Hence, the sale of pardons and dispensations, the forgiv-
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ing of sins, and praying the souls of the dead out of purgatory: besides public
worship was at all times administered in a foreign language. None were permitted to read the bible, and to be detected with it, in their known language, was
a criminal matter in the people. Hence, they became the ignorant dupes, the
slaves, and mere sport of the priests; and thus the priests became superior to
check restraint or responsibility-fraud, tyranny, and imposition appears to
have reigned triumphant!
The privilege of forgiving sin, must have been a most sublime acquisition
to these holy fathers. Hence, were they deified by the very means adopted for
their lucrative purposes, their lust, and ambition:-" lVhosoever sins ye remit,
they are remitted unto them-and whosoever sins ye retain, they are retained."
John, xx. 23. The Sovereign Ruler of the universe gave being to man, he called
forth the globe we inhabit, and gave existence to numerous worlds that surround us; directing their order and course, all firmly supported without visible
agency or apparent foundation; yet permanently secure, and free from clashing
or confusion. -The author of such wisdom and power could not act inconsistently: we know that he gave us reason for our guide; consequently, we
cannot know, nor ought we to believe, that he gave us this system of religion
which in fact is diametrically opposite to reason. His wisdom and power must
have been competent to the support of his rational creation, able to affect their
ultimate and lasting good, without the necessity of a miraculous conception,
divine suffering, or the eternal damnation of any individual.
The common opinion of christians in these matters is nothing more, than
the result of that pride and prejudice, which originated in deception and intrigue. They have no foundation in nature or reason, and ought to be rejected
as inconsistent and contradictory to the wisdom, the power, and justice of the
great and eternal Source of Nature.
The supposed Saviour must either have been of the divine essence or of the
human. If of the divine essence, it was impossible he could have suffered, and
being of the human, it was equally impossible that his sufferings should redeem
the sins of the world, or the sins of any part thereof:-God could not have
suffered, nor could man have redeemed us.
We are told in Scripture, that not many wise, not many mighty are called;
that God has chosen the weak things to confound the strong, and foolish
things to confute the wise. "I thank thee, 0 Father! Lord of heaven and earth,
because thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed
them unto babes." These texts, thus disguised, are the great support, the joy,
and comfort of the bigot-but divest them of mystery and they appear less
flattering, viz. the weak and foolish things are the most suitable objects of craft
and imposition, they can believe every thing that is inconsistent with reason,
that radical and powerful enemy of revelation.
The wise and prudent, when divested of prejudice and interest, will recur
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to reason as their safest guide. They must be fairly convinced before they assent
to matters of importance. They have no interest in deceiving or in being deceived: they endeavor to avoid the one and guard against the other. They see,
they know, and regret, that mankind have been long duped and imposed
upon. They consider the inhabitants of the whole world as one great family of
the deity, and that the precepts necessary for one part extend universally to all.
They regret that the pretended holiness of religion is frequently made a pretext
for war. That this idle pretence has quietly excused for the murder of millions
of the human race.-"And truly the Son ofMan goeth as it was determined, but
woe unto that man by whom he is betrayed." Thus it was decreed by God that
Jesus should be betrayed by a certain man, and that as a reward for performing
the divine will, this man was doomed to eternal punishments. "Those that thou
gavest me have I kept, and none of them is lost but the son ofperdition, that the
scriptures might be fulfilled."

Communication on Science from "A Subscriber"
(25 February 1804)
Science gives activity to the human mind, expands the intellect, raises and
exalts the understanding: the scientific character is placed above all vulgar
prejudice, he surveys the wonders of creation with an inquisitive eye- he beholds the order and regularity of the different planets-studies the laws by
which they are governed, and admires the wisdom of the great author of nature, displayed in all his wondrous works. 'Tis owing to science that men are
enabled to throw off the shackles of prejudice, divest themselves of the trammels of superstition, and erect the religion of nature on the firm basis of truth.
To science we owe the dissipation of error, the extension of human happiness,
and the consequent prevalence of liberty. 'Tis the object of tyrants to keep their
subjects in blindness, to make ignorance the subject of panegyric, and science
that of contempt. They endeavour to create prejudice in all minds against it;
the literati they hold up as men devoid of principle or of virtue, for well do they
know that as soon as the mind is enlightened their power receives a deadly
blow. The annihilation thereof is the consequence they expect if men are suffered to think for themselves, to investigate the conduct and motives of their
rulers. If we examine history, if we study the progress of mankind from the
barbarous to the civilized state, we shall immediately discover that as men are
involved in ignorance and superstition, they are subjected to the uncontrolled
force of tyrannic sway: a tyrant rules them with a rod of iron or thunders over
their heads the terrors of excommunication and eternal misery: -The imposters who have governed mankind, were well acquainted with this . Zoroaster,
Mahomet, and Christ, owe their success to the universal prevalence of Ignorance. The power of the Pope depended altogether upon the ignorance and
superstition of the people, it was owing to this cause that he could denounce
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vengeance against his enemies, and hurl his anathemas and excommunications
against both the princes and their subjects. The catholics were buried in the
profoundest ignorance, believing that ifhe pronounced judgment upon them,
their eternal doom was fixed, that his was the power to exalt them to heaven,
or make them undergo eternal misery. The clergy have always found it to their
advantage to keep the people in utter ignorance, and it has been a part of their
profession from those of Apollo to the present day; but happily for mankind
they have not been latterly so successful, learning has revived, philosophy has
burst asunder the bands of prejudice, dissipated error, promoted happiness,
and enabled the votaries of science to behold with astonishment the degradation of their species.
Many and important advantages have been derived therefrom-it was
owing to science that the enlightened mind of Columbus gave to the astonished eye of Europe the western hemisphere, his expansive mind was thereby
capacitated to conceive and execute a design that has changed the condition
and situation of half the inhabitants of the globe. 'Tis owing to science that
mankind are enabled to draw down the lightning from the clouds and conduct
it harmless to the earth-to it we owe the extension of commerce, the progress
of civilization and the increase of humanity-by it we are enabled to assume
almost a portion of the divinity to create earthquakes, to decompose and recombine, to pursue our way over the pathless ocean, and to ride on the wings
of the wind.

Miracles (31 March 1804)
Suppose for instance, that a miracle-monger and a dexterous juggler both
perform alike things to appearance, though the one be real, and the other
delusory, while the evidence of the facts seems to be equal on both sides; who
but those that are skilled in the one, or the other, can distinguish the one from
the other? How many juggling tricks of Heathen and Popish priests are recorded in history for miracles; and other impositions for the wonderful works
of their Gods and Saints, all for the honour and glory of religion, and sometimes to subdue men's minds to virtue: Are they capable of the same evidence
as other historical facts? How easy is it for a pious soul to be induced to believe
notorious frauds, that have the face of piety, and seem done to promote it; are
the reports of strange things, which they are not in a condition to make a true
judgment of, equal to those of other historical facts? Tho' all historical facts
recorded are not true, yet there is a vast difference between the probable and
improbable. If a man tells me he came over Westminster bridge to day, it may
be true, though a little objection may be against it, because it is not quite
finished, which may occasion some further questions, in order to be better
satisfied of the truth of it; but ifhe tells me he took a running jump, at low tide,
and leapt it over just by the bridge, I know it to be impossible, therefore a lie,
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and enquire no more about it. Is this latter story as credible as the former? no
sure, though I may know the relater, and know him to be an honest man, that
is not used to lye; and tho' it be attested by many others, I ought to have
extraordinary evidence, to induce me to believe extraordinary things, that are
supernatural, which cannot be so credible as ordinary things which are natural.
In cases where there is difficulty and danger in trusting to ones own senses and
judgment, there is much more in trusting to the senses and judgment of others, and confiding in their report: therefore such reports are not as capable of
the same evidence, nor as fit to be believed as other historical facts. Since we
are warned against the impositions of false miracles, we have certainly a right
to enquire what are true, and whether any? And therefore we should be most
careful of trusting those that are most capable of deceiving. Not only the
histories of miracles should be cautiously received, but the performer of them;
for as a man possessed of uncontrollable power is not a proper person to be
trusted with-any property, neither is such a person proper to be the director of
my judgment, who can by his power play upon my weakness, by his art impose
upon my understanding, and by his tricks deceive my senses: a miracle worker
has it in his power to do all these things. Men are often deceived without a
wonder, but wonders are very capable of deceiving; and therefore a wonderworking man may be a powerful deceiver; he that can alter things, or the narure
of them in any case, can also alter the appearances of things, by either of which
the rules of truth and certainty are destroyed; because either the observer is
deceived, or there is no trace left for his judgment; for what confounds the
order of nature must confound man's judgment. When a point is to be proved
by miracle, we give up reason to authority, and by the same means, if it can be
done, it may raise any sort of deity, or establish any doctrine. Suppose but the
power and possibility of deception in a miraculous operator, which I think may
be reasonably supposed, and then there is not the same reason to believe a
miracle, as in cases, where no possibility of such power is; for the appearances
of things are more easily changed, than the reality of them. Therefore miracles
are not capable of the same evidence, nor have an equal right to be believed as
other historical facts, let the evidence be reputed ever so credible. Both a
miracle-worker and the reporters of miracles, are of all mankind the least fit to
put confidence in, and the most to be guarded against; because we ought
always to be on our guard against the appearance and possibility of deception;
therefore the miracle-worker, the work, and reporter have not an equal right
to be believed, nor are as credible as other common facts, by those that would
neither be imposed upon, nor impose on others. Common sense teaches us,
that stories probable and improbable are not on the same foundation, nor have
or deserve equal credit. Besides, an easy belief upon hearsay, a surprise, incurious enquiry, the fondness of novelty, and of telling a surprising tale, loving that
others should believe as we do; add to these downright fibbing for pleasure or
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profit, render the stories of miracles, not so credible as other historical facts. It
is certain, that nothing has been more pernicious and deadly to the reason,
freedom and happiness of mankind, than men's giving up their understandings
to the faith of wonderful stories. It has introduced and established spiritual
tyranny in teachers, and slavery in believers.

Revelation (7 April 1804)
If we examine the component parts and the structure of human existence, it
will not be difficult to perceive the source and inlets of all our ideas and all our
knowledge. The powerful agents that surround us, the universe which we
behold, act with constancy and with force upon the senses of men. It is the
relationship subsisting between sensitive and intelligent life on the one part,
and the material world on the other, that forms the natural basis of all science,
and the diversified improvements which society has been capable of exhibiting.
Religious fanaticism, is, however, never contented to see things as they are, but
possesses an eternal desire for moral and theological distortions. Bigots always
pretend to hate the world in which they live, they sigh and groan for some
unknown paradise, of which, however, they can give but an imperfect account,
but where, however, according to their dreams and visions, they are to live in
a continual state ofidleness, and sing loud Hallelujahs to the Lord forever. This
enthusiastic spirit by which supernaturalists are so much influenced, blinds the
human understanding to all clear views of the nature of man, and the causes by
which his faculties are expanded. The maxim in the scripture, set your affections
on things above and not on things upon the earth, has turned the heads of thou sands and withdrawn the human attention from those objects to which it
ought to have been devoted. Whoever lives perpetually in the clouds will never
do any good upon earth. Wherever the holy ghost absorbs all the tender and
sympathetic affections, it is not to be expected that such a being will be capable
of benevolent emotions to his species. If man would study his own nature, and
understand his true predicament in life, he would cease to wander after phantoms, he would reject with just indignation religious impositions, whether they
came in the name of Jesus or Mahomet, whether they were sanctioned by the
bible or the koran, the Sadder or the Zendavesta. Revelation is a system of
juggling, in which each dexterous imposter plays off a game of folly or fanaticism to accumulate interest, or gratify the enthusiastic feelings of the heart.
Among inspired idiots there is also more of pride than is generally imagined, he
who elevates himself to the third heavens, and there holds divine conversation
with God himself, must have no contemptible opinion of his own dignity; but
sometimes in the delirium produced by religious enthusiasm, he sinks as much
below the standard of manhood, as his fancy had taught him to believe he had
been raised above it. There is an intellectual insanity attached to those who run
after religious ideas of a supernatural kind. . . .
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If the matters contained in the old and new testament be brought to the
true criterion, it would be found that they do not partake at all of the character
ofrevelation. An excellent writer, (Paine) has more than once observed in his
writings, that history is not revelation, for as he very justly observes, if a man
has said or done a thing, it requires no revelation to tell him that he has said
or done it; if the knowledge of the fact be communicated to others down
through successive generations, this transmission can never be considered in
the light of revelation from God, -it is mere historical detail, and however
dignified with the name of holy writ, must forever remain at the standard of its
own true character.
The greater part of the Old Testament, is a mere jumble of stories, bloody
stories, too many of them by far too bloody, to possess the sanction of the most
high God; intermingled with these scenes of human carnage, are several love
intrigues, such as those of David and Solomon. These two royal wretches, these
splendid debauchees of antiquity, have been dignified by the christian church
with appellations of the most honorable nature, the one is said to be the wisest
man, and the other a man after God's own heart; their transactions, however,
with their female companions, are destitute of all the features of divine revelation. In short, the whole class of facts and of falsehoods contained in the old
testament, sinks into nothing, when we reflect that a revelation is something
communicated from the Creator to man, by means of divine or supernatural
power.
The precepts contained in the bible, whether immoral or moral, are surely
not entitled to the name of revelation; no one will contend in favor of the first
class, that is the bad precepts, and as to the second class, that is the good
precepts; these are also destitute of all the characteristic features of a supernatural communication from the creator.
Moral principles are plain, simple rules, by which the conduct of man ought
to be regulated; they grow out of the powers and relationships of human
beings, they are deducible from the structure of man's existence, and reason is
the power by which they are discovered and applied to the important purposes
of human life. But there is a third class of ideas contained in the christian
religion, to which believers especially annex the name and character of revela tion; in this are included all the mysterious doctrines of the new testament,
such as atonement, regeneration, doctrine of the trinity, etc. The answer to
those who contend us in this ground is very short and easy. The doctrines are
all either unjust or unintelligible, and in either case they cannot be called divine
revelation. God will not reveal that which is unjust, and to reveal that which is
unintelligible would be of no use-it would be a revelation unrevealed, it
would be a revealed mystery which is no revelation at all. But it will perhaps be
said that the position which has been laid down is wrong, that these doctrines
are neither unjust, nor unintelligible; but we affirm that the doctrine of the
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atonement is unjust, because it sacrifices innocence at the shrine of vice; the
doctrine of the trinity, christians themselves do not pretend to understand, they
only pretend to believe it, because they think it is heresy not to believe it; the
doctrine of regeneration is as little capable of being understood, it is a mysterious change that nobody can give any account of; Jesus himself was puzzled
with it, for when Nicodemus asked him how a man could be born again, he
evades the enquiry, by saying, the wind bloweth where it listeth ....

Laws of Nature (28 April 1804)
It is by long observation, that man discovers the true character of the laws, by
which the world is governed, the united experience of nations and ages bears
such ample testimony, to a general, universal and immutable establishment,
that doubts in the present case, seem tantamount to a willful attack upon the
mass of evidence, which is calculated to work general conviction in the human
mind; where Phenomena are constant and uniform, they ought most undoubtedly to become the basis of the highest confidence. !fit were possible for
a single individual, to possess all the rational powers, with a knowledge of one
solitary fact, that the sun has risen in the Eastern hemisphere, he could not
affirm that there existed a certainty of his ever beholding the same phenomenon again: from a single case, no general deduction can be drawn, but from
thousands and thousands of cases, conclusions may be made, against which
nothing but folly and fanaticism could be induced to make any opposition.
When the Bible asserts that the sun stood still, or that the regular operations
of the laws of nature were suspended in the planetary system, the universal
observation of mankind, the experience and the testimony of ages are against
the assertion: to say that it is a lie, is perfectly consistent with all those rules of
judging, by which the reason of man ought to be regulated; nay, further, in all
other cases where religion is not concerned, men of common understanding
would be ashamed to acquiesce in decisions of a similar nature. When the New
Testament affirms that Jesus turned water into wine, we know or ought to
know, that the assertion is false; first, because the practicability or possibility of
such a thing is denounced by the nature of the case,-by the reason and experience of mankind; secondly, because the science which man has acquired, has
exposed innumerable impostures of this kind, and so many detections have
thrown a coloring of suspicion over all the rest. Credulity, however, and especially religious credulity, seems to be a leading property to which the imbecility
of man has exposed his existence. In proportion as the human mind becomes
improved and enlightened, it becomes less credulous, less disposed to swallow
absurd and marvellous doctrines. The sublime and elevated power of contemplation excludes all credulity, and surveys with steadiness, the character of different beings or objects; it enquires with patient perseverance, and never suffers
itself to be thrown off from that well balanced position, which takes in all the
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points and bearings of any given portion of Physical existence. Intellectual
precipitancy leadeth to error; it is the character of the mind in search of truth,
to move in an easy and happy medium of doubt-always disposed to be influenced by the greatest opacity of evidence which the nature of the case presents
to view, when a man in a state of intellectual finity reads in holy writ, the story
of Jonah and the whale, or in other words the big fish; it is scarcely possible to
refrain from a burst oflaughter. If religious superstition were not blinded by the
inherent nature of her own character, she would be ashamed of the gross
attempts to impose upon men, such miraculous tales, for a system of truth and
genuine theology; but nothing will tend to destroy superstition, more than a
persevering attention to the laws of nature; no man who understands these
laws, and who perspicuously surveys the immutable properties which they
possess, can possibly believe in the hobgoblin stories of antiquity. It may be
objected here that Newton was a good philosopher;-that he understood well
the laws of nature, and yet, that he was a believer in the christian religion; in
the first place, it is uncertain in what respects he was a believer, or how far in
his own mind he might have rejected certain absurd and ridiculous parts of the
Old and New Testament: It is well known, that he did not believe in the
doctrine of the Trinity, and his knowledge of the solar system, must have
elevated him above any kind of credence in the following declaration in holy
writ, Sun stand thou still upon Gideon, and thou moon in the valley ofAgalon;
but if we concede what has generally been considered as a fact, that he was a
christian upon a graduate scale, it will prove nothing in the present case. A
correct knowledge of the laws of nature, includes something more than mere
mathematical calculation, or demonstration; it includes something more than
planetary revolutions, eccentricity of comets or magnitude of celestial bodies;
that important and useful science, which embraces all the operations of the
human mind, and on which in fact the welfare of the intelligent world depends,
was not well understood by Newton; he understood physical nature, but with
the moral science he was much less conversant; he had not compared the
operations of the understanding, with the doctrines and opinions contained in
the Bible. From such a comparison made without prejudice, deductions must
have followed hostile to the sentiments of the church, and to that system of
religion, from which the church has drawn its tenets; these tenets must eventually give way to a thorough knowledge of moral and physical existence.

On Christian Faith (12 May 1804)
The nature of human credence as it relates to common objects, is a matter
extremely clear and intelligible, it is an assent of mind to the truth of a proposition when that proposition is supported by sufficient evidence; but christian
faith assumes quite a different character: it is wild extravagance and pretends to
a thousand things, to the performance of which it is totally incompetent. In the
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New Testament it is said if a man have faith like a grain of mustard-seed, he shall
say to yonder mountain, remove hence and it shall be removed! Now every
christian that has common sense knows, that there is not a word of truth in this
declaration. I say to one, do you believe in the christian religion? he answers in
the affirmative, speak then to the Allegheny Mountain to march beyond the
Mississippi and I will believe too. The mountain does not move-I press him
for the evidences of his faith. He stands and either looks like a fool or grows
angry. Will you start the mountain?-! cannot. Then you have no faith-I
have. Then the book tells a lye, and so you must either prove the truth of the
book by your faith, or I will prove the book is not entitled to credit. Believer
how canst thou escape from this dilemma? The signs or evidences of christian
faith are specifically stated in the last chapter of Mark, verse 17, 18. And these
signs shall follow them that believe: in my name shall they cast out devils; they
shall speak with new tongues; they shall take up serpents; and if they drink any
deadly thing it shall not hurt them; they shall lay hands on the sick and they
shall recover. Now we challenge the whole phalanx of christian believers to
verify the scriptures by exhibiting the above mentioned signs. They know that
they cannot do it, and yet they say they believe every word contained in the
Old and New Testament. It is a pity that the Reverend the Clergy, of all
denominations, who make so much noise about infidels and infidelity, will not
be so very obliging as to give at least one of these signs as proof of the sincerity
of their faith. Take, for instance, that which would be most useful in yellow
fever times-they shall lay hands on the sick and they shall recover. Surely if
they had faith they would have humanity enough to exercise that faith in behalf
of their distressed friends and neighbours destined to death by the raging influence of Yellow Fever. But no, they can give us no such testimony-they
make false the sacred word of God in which they pretend to believe. They have
faith that the country air is purer than that of the city-away they run, in this
they are right enough, but how does this conduct comport with their pretended faith in divine revelation and the signs which this revelation ascribes to
their faith . Such inconsistencies denounce the divinity of the book, and prostrate it in silence before the throne of reason.

More of Human Reason (28 July 1804)
"Reason," says a believer to an infidel, "is a deceitful and blind guide, and in
spiritual concerns will infallibly lead to destruction." "How are you assured of
it?" says the other-"to which of my faculties is this addressed? Does reason by
exercising its own powers discover its own treachery? If so, does it not in the
act of communicating give the lie direct to the sentiment? If your reason can
so clearly discern that it is obscured, it cannot surely be that very blind guide
you would represent it- !fit cannot so discern, the assertion is evidently made
at random, and requires examination."-"! am enabled (replies the believer) to
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see spiritually, and you only carnally-your mind is not yet endued with divine
grace, and until an inward change is effected, which cannot be wrought but by
God himself, you cannot perceive the force of what is addressed to you. -Be
not however led astray by the subtle and specious arts of sophistry; but believe,
and trust in God to work the change in your heart at his own good pleasure."
Now one of these beings makes a serious and solemn assertion which the
other verily disbelieves and denies. -Supposing them both equally honest and
sincere (for the unbeliever cannot surely be censurable for not using that which
the believer tells him he has not and cannot have till God sends it) how is their
difference of opinion to be canvassed, and the error corrected? With what
mental powers are they respectively to set about the inquiry? Is the truth of the
question to be on both sides~xamined by the help of reason or without it,
or with some other and what faculty? Or is one party (who has nothing better)
to exercise his single talent on the occasion, while the other opposes to it a
power which to reason is declared incomprehensible. If the carnal man and the
spiritual are conveying their thoughts through a different medium, how can
they ever come to a point? and where is the utility of the latter's sowing where
nothing can be reaped, or in other words, of casting pearls before swine? For
the spiritual man says, the carnal one cannot understand him when he
speaks the truth spiritually, though according to his own account, he is at the
same moment opposing to a mere human faculty, one that partakes of the
divine.
If a book called profane be put into the hands of a stranger, it will be
admitted that he is to examine it with his natural understanding; but how is he
to act when the bible is produced to him, particularly when informed by the
human producer, that it is a divine communication and not to be examined like
productions merely human? How is he to set about considering that to the
proper examination whereof his reason is declared incompetent? Is he with his
unassisted faculties to examine and judge of it as well as he can until he hears
express from heaven with better, or is he to rely implicitly on human intelligence which accompanies it, and lay down or lock up the book till celestial
optics are given for the purpose? The contents of the bible being first received
through the same channels as those of any other work, can the reason of a
believer, like the stops of an organ, be shoved aside and the faculty fitted for
this occult study introduced at pleasure into its room?-The canonical books
of the Old and New Testament must no doubt be read with the spiritual faculty
and the uncanonical apocrypha with the natural, but how suddenly to convey
the matter of these respective works through the eyes and ears of their readers
to the appropriate powers of the mind is the difficulty. -Is there in the bible
(dictated as is said by God) any passage signifying that the understanding of its
readers shall not take cognizance of its sentiments, and if such should (upon
spiritualizing something for the purpose) be found in it how can reason, while
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it reads, avoid controverting the position and refusing to knuckle to a usurper?
-To what faculty of the human mind is the bible supposed originally to have
been addressed? How can it be a revelation to man, ifit must steer clear of his
reason as a ship avoids a shoal? If it be not intended to be examined by the
faculty which distinguishes man from brute, why is it not as fit to be addressed
to brutes as to men? If the prime and essential quality of man is not to meddle
with it, why is it addressed to man in particular? -We are not it is said, to
examine a divine communication with a human and imperfect understanding.
How then must it be examined? We cannot do it with any thing divine, and if
not cognizable by human reason, why must it be examined with something
inferior to reason which is still human? - I f there be any fault in examining a
divine present with human powers, with whom do believers contend that such
fault originates? It is said to have been revealed for the benefit of human sinners, who nevertheless are declared incapable of reading it to any purpose until
they can send to Heaven for spectacles. - I f the book is not to be examined
by unassisted human faculties, why has the supposed revelation been made to
human beings, or why did not a divine key or glossary accompany it?
The truth is, that this same thing called a revelation, is, according to the
believer's own account ofit, not a thing revealed or made plain; but something
placed by God in the sight of man requiring abundance of explanation, which
nevertheless cannot be had-without further supernatural assistance. This
same supernatural assistance, too, of which ( though said to be given for the
important purpose of expounding God's word to his creatures) no proof has
ever been exhibited, causes its pretended possessors to put different and contradictory constructions upon the same divine passages ( thereby increasing
the difficulty) and in effect to charge each other as madmen or imposters. They are unanimous only (where they cannot help it) in failing to produce
evidence of their authority, and yet arrogantly claim from their fellow mortals
a blind and passive assent to all their jarring and inconsistent assertions, taking
fire even at the expression of a doubt. A system of religion thus aiming to
subvert Heaven's best gift to man, and involved in such a budget of absurdity,
is at war with every attribute of divinity and deserves the solemn reprobation
of every upright mind.

Superstition (24 November 1804)
It is by the slow progress of the human understanding that the evils of human
life can be diminished or destroyed. Superstition presents a formidable obstacle to the diffusion of science and the augmentation of human happiness.
Nothing important can be done for the benefit of man, without a development of the moral energies of his nature; but superstition holds him fast, tells
him it is a crime to think, and frightens him almost out of his senses with
spiritual spectres that have no real existence. Thousands of gods, ghosts and
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devils have been fabricated with vast variety of characters on purpose to terrify
weak and deluded man. A subordinate class of spiritual lackeys have also been
created and sent as Missionaries over the whole earth to frighten women and
children. Of this sort were the witches, the fairies and the sprights of former
days, and which, even now, form the basis of universal terror in many countries. The Bible sanctioned these incongruous ideas, and gave to nonentity the
form, character and effect of real existence. The clergy declare to the people
that this is the best book in the world; they found their discourses upon the
incoherencies therein contained, and the people are swallowed up in a gulph
of superstition from which they know not how to escape. Ye spiritual instructors of a lost and wicked world! read over once the Books of Genesis and
Exodus, and ask yourselves the question, whether you would think it any
honour to yourselves to be the authors of such a production? Would you not
blush for many of the sentiments therein contained, and do you imagine that
such composition would render your names illustrious in the great republic of
letters? Superstition and interest have combined to create and perpetuate an
attachment to the sacred writings of the Jews and Christians. The age of happiness must be that in which all theological conceptions shall be concentered
in the Theism of Nature, or the belief of one God. This God must be destitute
of all irascible passions and malignant attributes of every kind; he must be a
very different being from the God of the Old Testament, for the belief in such
a God produces the most destructive consequences. Superstition has always
ascribed to the divinities in whose existence she has placed confidence, a surplus of properties, and these properties were generally of a pestilential and
contagious kind. The disease thus caught was worse than the yellow fever; it
spread desolation and death to all around; it carried conflagration and carnage
over the whole earth; it shook to the foundation the tranquility of the world.
Man, cultivate thy reason and truth; virtue and happiness will be the necessary
consequences.

The Indian Student; or, Force of Nature
(24 November 1804)
From Susquehanna's farthest springs
Where savage tribes pursue their games,
(His blanket tied with yellow strings,)
A shepherd from the forest came.
Not long before, a wandering priest
Express'd his wish, with visage sad"Ah, why," he cry'd, "in Satan's waste,
Ah, why detain so fine a lad?
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"In white man's land there stands a town
Where learning might be purchas'd lowExchange his blanket for a gown,
And let the lad to college go."
From long debate the council rose,
And viewing Shalum's tricks with joy
To Cambridge Hall, o'er wastes of snows,
They sent the copper-colour'd boy.
One generous chief a bow supply'd,
This gave a shaft, and that a skin:
The feathers, in vermillion dy'd,
Himself did from a turkey win:
Thus dress'd so gay, he took his way
O'er barren hills, alone, alone,
His guide a star, he wander'd far,
His pillow every night a stone.
At last he came with foot so lame,
Where learned men talk heathen Greek,
And Hebrew lore is gabbled o'er,
To please the Muses,-twice a week.
A while he writ, a while he read,
A while he conn'd their grammar rules(An Indian savage so well bred
Great credit promis'd to the schools.)
Some thought he would in law excel,
Some said in physic he would shine;
And one that knew him, passing well,
Beheld, in him, a sound divine.
But those of more discerning eye
Even then could other prospects show,
And saw him lay his Virgil by
To wander with his dearer bow.
The tedious hours of study spent,
The heavy moulded lecture done,
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He to the woods a hunting went,
Thro' lonely wastes he walk'd, he ran.
No mystic wonders fir'd his mind;
He sought to gain no learn'd degree,
But only sense enough to find
The squirrel in the hollow tree.
The shady bank, the purling stream,
The woody wild his heart possess'd,
The dewy lawn, his morning dream
Infancy's gayest colours dress'd.
"And why (he cry'd) did I forsake
My native woods for gloomy walls;
The silver stream, the limpid lake
For musty books and college halls:
"A little could my wants supplyCan wealth and honour give me more
Or, will the sylvan god deny
The humble treat he gave before?
"Let seraphs gain the bright abode,
And heaven's sublimest mansion seeI only bow to Nature's GodThe land of shades will do for me.
"These dreadful secrets of the sky
Alarm my soul with chilling fearDo planets in their orbits fly,
And is the earth, indeed, a sphere?
"Let planets still their course pursue,
And comets to the centre runIn him my faithful friend I view,
The image of my God-the Sun.
"Where nature's ancient forests grow,
And mingled laurel never fades,
My heart is fixed;-and I must go
To die among my native shades."
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He spoke, and to the western springs,
(His gown discharg'd, his money spent,
His blanket tied with yellow strings,)
The shepherd of the forest went.

Remarks (26 January 1805)
The subject of Blasphemy has been viewed in different points of light, in different countries; and the opinions of individuals in the same country have been
so diversified, that an enquiry into the nature of the case, and the character of
Blasphemy, seems to have become extremely necessary. The ignorance, the
timidity, and the superstition of man, have created a thousand spiritual phantoms which have no positive or real existence in nature; these frightful productions of the human imagination are, however, very highly estimated by their
legitimate progenitors. The more distorted the object of adoration is, the more
it seems to excite the pious affection of its devoted victim. Fanaticism and folly
are always the concomitants of false religions; and when once the human mind
is subjugated and placed completely under the dominion of superstition, reason loses all the energy ofits character, and the moral world becomes a chaos
of ignorance, vice, and misery. It is amidst this general darkness that hotheaded, religious enthusiasm sets about the business of protecting the phantoms ofits own creation. This must be done either by civil or ecclesiastical law,
annexing a terrifying penalty to each violation. But who is this law to protect?
The answer to this would be different in different countries; and even among
the sectaries professing substantially the same religion. Among the Christians,
the Trinitarians would contend for a law which should cover over the sublime
and mysterious doctrine of the Trinity, and guard the Father, Son, and Holy
Ghost against human outrage and profane obloquy. Among Arians and
Socinians, the law would go only to protect Jehovah himself, leaving the Son
and Holy Ghost to shift for themselves, and defend their character in the best
manner they can. We do not mean to insinuate here that the Arians and the
Socinians have no regard to the character of Jesus; on the contrary, it is true
that the Arians ascribe to him a superangelic nature; and the Socinians consider
him as a mere man, endowed with extraordinary gifts and graces, and both
view him as an agent from God, to restore a lost world to Divine favour. These
sectaries do not wish for a law to protect the character of Jesus against Blasphemy, and as to the Holy Ghost, they have dismissed him entirely and thrown
him out of their spiritual service. Thus Christians themselves would be unable
to agree upon the persons or beings whose character the law of Blasphemy
ought to protect. The most numerous and ruling sectaries, however, regulate
this matter as they please; and subjecting, at the same time, all other sectaries
to the unjust criminations of their spiritual tyranny. In countries not professing
the Christian religion, another and distinct class of spiritual idols are set up as
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objects of adoration, and of course, all these Blasphemous laws, as they ought
to be called, go to the point of guarding their character, such as it is, against
the slanderous insults of all those who come under their jurisdiction. The character of Mahomet is as sacred in Turkey, as that of Jesus is among the Christians. Zoroaster commands the adoration of the Persian world, and his character there is profoundly sacred. Penetrate into the Indies, and you will find the
sacred name of Fot, commanding the adoration of millions, and it would be
blasphemy there to speak against his Divinity. The same remark, in spirit and
principle, will apply to all the sublime and dignified phantoms of all the other
nations of the earth. But the advocates for the laws of Blasphemy will say, that
there is one supreme God, and that his character ought to be protected, whatever may be said concerning the inferior Divinities. But it may be answered,
who gave to legislators on earth, the right and the power of making laws
concerning the character of the Creator? Is he not fully competent to protect
his own character, without recourse to the malignant and persecuting arm of
human flesh? Yes, and there is no man, or set of men, on earth, that has a right
to make laws respecting the religious opinions of individuals-let those opinions be what they will. The laws should take cognizance only of immoral
actions, leaving to each individual the absolute right of modifying his theological ideas according to the best judgment which human reason can form upon
the subject. Whoever is not sufficiently civil to the Divinity he adores, must
look to that matter himself, and settle the dispute in the best manner he can.
Let legislators look to the morals, the science, and the virtues of society-with
theology they have nothing to do; it is beyond the sphere of their jurisdiction.

Enthusiasm (2 February 1805)
Immediate revelation being a much easier way for men to establish their opinions and regulate their conduct than the tedious and not always successful
labour of strict reasoning; it is no wonder that some have been very apt to
pretend to revelation, and to persuade themselves that they are under the
peculiar guidance of heaven in their actions and opinions, especially in those of
them which they cannot account for by the ordinary methods of knowledge
and principles of reason. Hence we see, that in all ages, men in whom melancholy has mixed with devotion, or whose conceit of themselves has raised them
into an opinion of a greater familiarity with God, and a nearer admittance to
his favour, than is afforded to others, have often flattered themselves with a
persuasion of an immediate intercourse with the Deity, and frequent communications from the Divine Spirit. God, I own, cannot be denied to be able to
enlighten the understanding by a ray darted into the mind immediately from
the fountain of light. This they understand he has promised to do; and who
then has so good a title to expect it as those who are his peculiar people, chosen
by him, and depending on him?
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Their minds being thus prepared, whatever groundless opinion comes to
settle itself strongly upon their fancies, is an illumination from the Spirit of
God, and presently of Divine authority; and whatsoever odd action they find
in themselves a strong inclination to do, that impulse is concluded to be a call
or direction from heaven, and must be obeyed; it is a commission from above,
and they cannot err in executing it.
This I take to be properly enthusiasm; which, though founded neither on
reason nor divine revelation, but rising from the conceits of a warmed or overweening brain, works yet, where it once gets footing, more powerfully on the
persuasions and actions of men, than either of those two or both together: men
being most forwardly obedient to the impulses they receive from themselves;
and the whole man is sure to act more vigorously, where the whole man is
carried by a natural motion. For strong conceit, like a new principle, carries all
easily with it when got above common sense; and freed from all restraint of
reason and check ofreflection, it is heightened into a divine authority in concurrence with our own temper and inclination.

For the Prospect (30 March 1805)
The Law of this State, the Constitution of which professes to secure the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, to all mankind, declares, in regard to oaths, that any person
who believes in a Supreme Being, and a future state of rewards and punishments, shall be admitted to give testimony in its courts, and in order to discover
(when occasion requires it) whether a person produced as a witness be or be
not competent to be admitted, it has been the practice of Judges to propound
to the individual, questions relative to his or her belief, for the express purpose
of ascertaining by answers, given when not under oath, whether such witness
will speak the truth when sworn. The same law, by annexing a penalty to
perjury, virtually admits the possibility of false swearing, and the uncertainty of
an oath. If, then, it be evident that a person after swearing, can yet violate the
oath which he has taken, and declare what is false, by what reasoning is it
inferred that the answers of the same person, before he is sworn, to questions
relating to his right to be examined, can be a correct or infallible standard,
whereby to regulate its exercise? Is a simple promise to execute an obligation,
more sure and sacred than the instrument itself, when sealed? Or, can the
preliminary engagement be held inviolable, while the final query is insecure? As
well might the effect of a muzzle upon a mastiff be tried, by first turning the
animal loose amongst crows, or Jupiter's belts be looked for, with the naked
eye, in order to ascertain whether they be discoverable by a telescope, as the
bare word of a man, under such circumstances, be taken as a criterion whereby
to measure his attachment to an oath. If two Universalists, or other unbelievers, are called as witnesses on the same occasion, one of whom in obedience to
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the law professes to believe what in reality he thinks false, while the other
honestly declares his disbelief, what is the consequence? The testimony of the
latter, who, by his scrupulous adherence to truth, has proved himself deserving
of the highest credit, is rejected, with a stigma into the bargain, upon his
candour; while that of the timid or time-serving hypocrite is received without
hesitation, and even with comparative applause. The character of this law .. .
savours highly of spiritual domination. The true definition of the word orthodox, as it respects religion, when simplified and examined, will in every country
be found to be neither more nor less than uppermost; and the law in question,
framed by legislators whose individual bible opinions might for the time being
have the ascendency, operates as far as it goes as a religious establishment or
direct preference of one sect over others, and so far from leaving to each the
free exercise and enjoyment of its own profession, as intended by the constitution, leaves only the exercise, but robs and deprives some of their most valuable
and inherent rights and enjoyments:, viz. the benefit of a good name and reputation, until lost or strained by immoral conduct. Shame! that a republican
legislature should attempt thus to domineer in affairs of conscience, and prove
themselves incompetent to discriminate between the different duties owing to
their Creator and their constituents. A person of the strictest integrity and
veracity may, by operation of this law, have his credit impeached without fault
of his own, ifhe does not happen either to embrace a creed chalked out for him
by his neighbours, or in default consent to play the hypocrite; while a profligate
and abandoned wretch, who for interest or convenience can make and alter his
professions at pleasure, may raise his reputation upon the other's misfortune.
Such a proceeding is both in principle and practice in direct and open violation
of the constitution, and iniquitously aims to usurp to man prerogatives pertaining exclusively to God.

357

The Theophilanthropist
The Love of God and Man

The nineteenth century's first decade witnessed the final and rather pathetic
convulsions of Enlightenment deism in the United States. Palmer, the leader
of American deists, died in 1806; Paine, the grand old man of free thought, in
1809. A new generation of rational religionists, including such figures as Abner
Kneeland and Robert Owen, would emerge in midcentury. But they were of
a different stripe from their colonial and Early Republic predecessors, influenced less by Enlightenment rationalism than by Spencerism and social
utopianism. Deism as an offshoot of the eighteenth century's New Learning,
then, fizzled out with a whimper by the end of 1811. The short-lived and
anemic Theophilanthropist was its swan song.
Following Palmer's death, the Deistical Society of New York and its kindred societies in Maryland, Pennsylvania, and elsewhere tended to break apart
and dissolve. In a last-ditch effort to salvage something of the movement's
earlier vitality, the New York Society of Theophilanthropy was organized
shortly before Paine's death. The Theophilanthropist was launched in January
1810 as the society's official organ. Originally intended as a monthly, only the
first five issues appeared on schedule. Four more followed, irregularly and
undated, between June 1810 and late 1811.
As financially precarious as The Temple and the Prospect had been, The
Theophilanthropistwas even more straitened. Its money problems illustrated in
part the decline of popular interest in deism; subscriptions by and large were
limited to the sparse membership of the society. But the obvious lack of quality,
imagination, and fervor in The Theophilanthropisfs pages probably also contributed to its lack of appeal. Its articles, quite frankly, made for dull reading.
There was certainly nothing original in either the topics covered or the way in
which they were approached. Unlike its two sister periodicals, The Theophilanthropist had no intrinsic philosophical merit, and its value today is primarily
historical.
Even the periodical's title was secondhand. Theophilanthropy as a "system" was first introduced in September 1795, when a small work appeared in
Paris entitled Manual of the Theoantropophiles. Although the somewhat barbarous name was soon amended, for obvious reasons, its message remained the
same. A theophilanthropist was a lover (philos) of both God ( theos) and man
(anthropos). The original Parisian fraternity, of which Paine was a member,

The Love of God and Man

had but two creeds, both expressed in the 1795 Manual: "Les Theophilantropes croient a!'existence de Dieu, et a l'immortalite de l'ame." [The Theophilanthropists believe in the existence of God and the immortality of the
soul.] But the way in which these two tenets were spelled out in the Manual
revealed them to be thoroughly deistic in nature. Paine himself admitted that
the principles of the Parisian society were identical to those defended in his
Age ofReason. The word theophilanthropy presumably was adopted first by the
Parisians and later by the descendants of the New York Deistical Society because it had more benign connotations than deism, which smacked too much
in the popular mind of infidelity and atheism. The very fact that the last
American periodical devoted to deism chose to style itself in this fashion indicates the extent to which the movement had shed its earlier unashamed militancy.
Most of The Theophilanthropist was devoted to reprinting previously published essays by Paine. Occasionally, however, there were original pieces. As can
be seen from the selections included here, none of them evoke the vitality of
either The Temple or the Prospect. Both the "Prospectus" and "Introductory
Address" are predictable statements of deistic principles which deplore supernaturalist superstition and insist on the primacy of reason and science. The
"Character of Jesus Christ" repeats a favorite theme of American deism: the
original purity of Jesus' religious teaching and its subsequent corruption by
metaphysical nonsense. Of all the pieces to appear in the periodical, "Intercourse between Intelligent Beings" is the most interesting. In it, the author
appeals to the Great Chain of Being metaphor to dismiss the possibility of
revelatory knowledge. Just as human capacities render the race incapable of
communicating with "inferior" species, so they likewise preclude direct intercourse with "superior" ones-including God. Consequently, the scriptural
claim of direct communication between humans and the divine is logically
unacceptable: "All direct and immediate communications must be made between beings in some degree, and in some circumstances, respectively consonant and equal to each other; but what degree of equality, or relationship, or
consonancy or correspondence, can there possibly be between a limited and an
unlimited being; between finite and infinite?-None."
The final selection, "Humanity," reiterates American deism's faith in the
liberating effects of popular education. If ignorance and fear breed oppression,
it follows (at least for The Theophilanthropist) that universal education will
encourage open-minded tolerance as well as the desire to promote the welfare
of all members of the human family. This argument, of course, had been asserted by earlier American deists ( and, indeed, by the entire Enlightenment
tradition) time and again. The tragedy of The Theophilanthropist was its assumption that merely echoing that tradition, instead of aggressively pursuing
its actualization, was sufficient.
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Prospectus (January 1810)
The object of this publication is, to present to the public such critical, moral,
theological and literary essays, as may tend to correct false opinions, promote
the progress of reason, and increase the sum of human happiness.
Truths, which we deem important, will be boldly advocated, and pernicious errors exposed in all their deformity. Bigotry and superstition, those tyrants, which have so long held the world in bondage, and destroyed the peace
and repose of man, will meet with merited chastisement; and the mild, tolerant
religion of virtue, which the Creator has wisely revealed to the consciences of
all mankind, will be asserted and maintained.
Of all subjects, correct religious opinions are the most important to the
happiness of man; but, unfortunately, there are none in which deceit and imposture have been more successfully practised.
Theologians, by their contempt of virtue, and by substituting in its place
puerile, nonsensical creeds, have bewildered the mind of man, and involved it
in darkness, mystery and terror.
The sincere enquirer after truth, checked in his progress by contradictory
opinions, called orthodox by their respective votaries, and claiming divine
authority under the cabalistic term mystery, finds himself under the necessity
of making a choice of absurdities, or of retiring from a pursuit which promises
so little satisfaction. "The dreams of the timid and whimsical-the cheats of
the cunning-the suborned villainies of the wicked-every tale, folly and contradiction huddled together, are called religion!-What violence to language!"
How a system, where never-ending and excruciating torments are pronounced the doom of the wicked, and according to which, all have been criminal can be benign and consolatory, outdoes all the labyrinths and repugnances
of theology. When it is observed that men, the dreams of a shadow, believe
they may suffer immortal punishment, who can refrain pronouncing with
Pliny, "that man is at once the most vain, and miserable of all animals."
To have faith in a system which preaches torments infinite in excess and
duration, is to stand on a precipice with closed eyes, that you may fling yourself
into immeasurable destruction.
The last and consummate effort of the soul, is the religion of philosophy:
whose only dogma is, that one God superintends the universe; whose mysteries
are the means most conducive to human happiness; whose ceremonials are acts
of charity, benevolence, generosity, and public spirit; whose discipline and
designs are to refine the sympathies, direct the passions, strengthen and enlarge
the mind, and facilitate the communication of wisdom and science.
Our feeble talents shall be exerted to establish these holy principles, so
natural, and so consoling to the human mind; and from which nothing but the
most villainous imposture could have deluded it.
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We shall avail ourselves of the works of those luminaries of thought, whose
lives have been devoted to humanity, and whose writings are little known by
the public in general; and we solicit the co-operation of all who may be disposed to volunteer in this cause.
Biographical sketches, and critical reviews of modern literary productions,
will form a part of this publication.
Improvements in agriculture; the advancement of American manufactures;
useful discoveries; and new invented machinery for lessening labour, will be
duly noticed.
Occurrences, important to the future historian; political essays upon general, and liberal principles; and articles of mere amusement, will occasionally
find admittance in this work.
Communications on any of the above subjects will be gratefully received.

Introductory Address (January 1810)
It is highly proper, at the threshold of this work, to develop the views and
motives of the publishers more particularly than has been done in the Prospectus. This we shall do with that candid frankness, which is at all times the companion of truth, and the handmaid of reason. Although the principles indicated
by the title of the work, are as ancient as philosophy, and, in fact, co-existent
with man, the term Theophilanthropist has but lately been introduced into our
language. It may, therefore, be pertinent accurately to define its meanings, in
order to silence ignorant fanaticism, and interested priestcraft; whose clamorous declarations we expect to encounter, for our exposition of the frauds,
which have been, and still are practised on the great majority of mankind.
Unappalled, however, by these clamours, we shall march straight forward in
the path, to which truth and reason point.
Theophilanthropist is of Greek origin, and is compounded of three of the
strongest words in that refined and sonorous language, viz. Theos, God; philos,
a lover, and anthropos, man. It therefore means a lover of God and man; or one
who not only entertains a profound respect for his Creator, but unites therewith, kind and benevolent affections towards his fellow creatures, not merely
on account of human sympathies, but from a conviction of the relative situation they stand in, along with himself, to "the great first cause of all."
From this definition it is easy to comprehend the creed of the Theophilanthropist. His dogmas are contained in the name he bears. He believes in
one supreme and incomprehensible Deity, and with pious reverence acknowledges his power and perfections. He adores and venerates him as the Creator
and conservator of the universe. Hence his devotion partakes not of that debasing servility which characterizes Christian and Mahometan worshippers,
but is merely the spontaneous and genial effusion of the soul.
From his relative situation in the scale of being in which he is placed, he
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readily learns the duties he owes to his fellow men. He at once perceives that
the nature of these are simple, and are in unison with the best affections of the
human heart, and may be comprehended under the general titles ofjustice and
benevolence. From his very nature, he with equal ease perceives that the duties
he owes to himself, consist in the due regulation of his passions. His, therefore,
may emphatically be styled the religion of nature. His creed and his duties are
imprinted on every leaf of its vast volume. When he contemplates the planets
as they roll; the variety, the order, the economy and the harmony of the little
globe he inhabits: he is fired with devotion, and penetrated with astonishment
at the sublimity, and grandeur of the scene, and his mind is naturally elevated
to contemplate the all perfect Deity, by whose wisdom the wonderful system
of nature is preserved, and by whose power it was originally created.
In reviewing the beautiful perspective, he painfully perceives that man has
not profited as he ought by the superior reason with which he has been endowed. Tracing him through every state of society, he observes that the greatest portion of the species have been the ready dupes of the crafty, or the willing
slaves of superstition; that the image of the incorruptible God has been defaced, the empire of reason overturned, and the horrors of Cirnmerian darkness
permitted to brood over the human mind. He perceives that though civil
tyranny carries along with it the elements of its own destruction, that, which
is founded on religion, is strengthened by age, and entailed on its unfortunate
victims from generation to generation. From this picture of debased reason he
turns with disgust, and truly and sincerely pities the condition of the votaries
of superstition. With these impressions we shall not hesitate to expose the
cheats practised on degraded man, under the pretended sanction of religion;
and shall endeavour to uproot from the social garden, those prejudices, which
like noxious weeds are destructive to the soil, and pestiferous to the atmosphere. We are aware of the extent of the task, which we have voluntarily
imposed on ourselves; but we shall not shrink from the irksome duty, for ifwe
did, we should be unworthy the name of Theophilanthropists.
It is time that man return to reason, which he has so ungratefully abandoned; that he relinquish his chimerical fears; that he at length place confidence in the justness and goodness of that God, who is not the patron of any
particular sect or nation, whether Jew or Gentile, but the Creator and preserver
of all nature and of all worlds; "ofwhose existence no mind can doubt, without
being involved in the most inextricable absurdities; but in search of whom,
o'erstretched idea bursts, and thought rolls back on darkness." This God, to
whom the speculative opinions of mankind must be sovereignly indifferent,
punishes naught but crimes, and those in proportion to their magnitude. What
a consoling reflection to the moral man! He sees the path of salvation and
happiness open before him, which he cannot mistake without doing violence
to that best gift of God to man, his reason: to which all Bibles, Korans and
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Vedams, must eventually make their final appeal.
We shall urgently press upon our readers the importance of this subject; the
necessity of discharging those puerile prejudices, which they imbibed with their
mother's milk, which their nurses have copiously infused, and which their spiritual guides still continue through interested motives, to rivet upon them. We
by no means wish to wound the feelings of theological teachers, they do exactly
the same as other men would do in their situation. The people oblige them to
preach the stupid doctrine, which they have inherited from their forefathers.
Let the people change, and their teachers will soon follow. Let the people build
temples of reason, and they will soon find priests to officiate at their altars. This
fact has been proved in France, where formerly monkish priestcraft reigned
triumphant. The sun of reason arose; it was permitted to shine; its rays spread
like lightning throughout the nation; priests and people became illumined, and
chanted together the funeral dirge of superstition. But in that country, unfortunately, the monster despotism, which cannot flourish in the meridian sun of
reason, is again nursing and invigorating the decrepit hag, superstition. So
much light, however, had been shed abroad in France, that its tyrant dare not
attempt to stifle it wholly at once. He has therefore only declared that the
government is Catholic; intending thereby to render that religion fashionable,
knowing that the greatest portion of mankind are governed by fashion.
In fine, America is the only country in which "reason is left free to combat
error." If we do not profit by this privilege, the fault will lie at our own door.
Let us then think freely, and express our thoughts like freemen. We shall on our
part endeavour to demonstrate the genial influence of true religion upon the
morals and social happiness of men; and, at the same time, shall warn our
readers against the baneful effects of fostering ignorance and superstition,
those deadly enemies to all the joys of life; which, having broken down all the
barriers established by Deity, between virtue and vice, right and wrong, and
not content with robbing man of the little happiness which this world might
afford, insultingly threaten him with an eternity of misery in the world to
come.

Character of Jesus Christ (February 1810)
Much as we esteem Mr. Volney, and highly as we prize his literary productions,
we cannot agree with him in doubting the existence ofJesus Christ. Although
much mythological fable has been artfully interwoven into his biography, by
his interested followers, yet we fully believe that such a person lived in Judea,
about two thousand years ago. Tacitus, who, by the way, is the only historian
that says any thing that can be supposed to relate to Jesus Christ ( the passage
in Josephus respecting him having been proved to be an interpolation) observes, that a sect arose at this time, ( the period in which Christ is supposed to
have lived) which made some disturbance in Judea. The Jewish tradition, al-
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though no doubt interlarded with fable, is at least some evidence of the fact;
which acknowledges that such a person actually sprang up amongst them, and
after, as they say, deluding many, suffered an ignominious and cruel death. We
therefore have no more doubt on our minds that there was such a man, than
we have that there existed such legislators as Moses and Mahomet.
In that age it appears that the Mosaic superstition, which, from its commencement, was a grievous burthen on the Jewish nation, had been shamefully
corrupted, and that the priests possessed unbounded power over the property
and consciences of the people-hence they increased the rituals of worship to
such a pitch as to render them an intolerable tyranny. The Romans also, at that
period, had partially subdued the Jewish nation, and left them but the shadow
of their ancient independence.
At this important crisis, this obscure reformer, whose youth had been spent
in the mountainous parts of Palestine, daringly attacked their national prejudices, and attempted to uproot that corrupt system of religious mummery,
with which they were oppressed.
His political principles were those of a republican, for he taught the lessons
of political equality.
His religious dogmas were those of the Theophilanthropist, for he inculcated reverence to the deity, and benevolence towards the whole human family. It is true that his tenets have since been veiled and enshrouded in the robes
of impiety by the knavery and craft of some of his fanatical disciples;-but we
shall, in future numbers, endeavour to sift and separate the wheat from the
chaff, and show that the morality which he preached to his followers was the
same as that taught by Plato, Socrates and Epictetus, who lived before him.
In that rude and barbarous age, it was the practise of men who wished to
govern the passions of the ignorant, to pretend to be messengers sent from
heaven; it is therefore probable that Jesus Christ, like many of his contemporaries, made use of this stratagem, more powerfully to enforce his doctrines
upon the minds of the vulgar. However that may be, we find that the Jewish
Sanhedrin became alarmed at this growing popularity; for, from his obscure
retreat, we find him advancing into their very capital, and in their very temple
bearding their authority; ridiculing their ridiculous superstitions, and assuming
a controul over the pettifogging retailers of offerings in the porches, and also
over the horde of usurers that infested the temple. After numerous expedients
had failed, they at length hit upon one, which they hoped would be effectual,
to take off their dangerous rival. They therefore denounced him as a traitor,
and an enemy to Caesar.
The Roman governor, to gratify the revenge of the infuriated priests,
whose power he had shaken delivered him over to their will, after a mock trial;
at the same time declaring that he found him guiltless. They therefore doomed
him to suffer crucifixion, the common punishment for heinous offences.
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Thus the man who had humanely endeavoured to ameliorate the condition
of his countrymen, and to rescue them from civil despotism and religious
tyranny, prematurely fell a victim to the bigotry and superstition of the age in
which he lived, and became a martyr in the cause of philanthropy. His character
was adorned with an assemblage of amiable virtues, and his ethics were calcu lated to render his fellow-creatures individually happy, and socially benevolent.
Such, in our opinion, are the true characteristics ofJesus Christ. But, several
centuries after his death, interested and fanatical men founded a monstrous and
impious system of religion in his name. - I t is not pretended that he wrote a
single line of this himself. His expositors however, to suit their own purposes,
taking the heathen mythology as their guide, first deified him, and then intermixed with his rational ethics the most abominable frauds that were ever imposed upon human credulity.

Intercourse between Intelligent Beings (March 1810)
The intercourse between intelligent beings depends entirely on their capacity
for reciprocating intelligence. This faculty in man is improved by education: it
is also improvable, and by the same means, in dogs, horses, and other quadrupeds. The congeniality, in some particular points, of their natures with ours,
appears indispensably necessary to this intercourse. With fish and fowl, the
ability to correspond is, on both sides, very inadequate: but it is in exact proportion to the disparity of their several natures. Descend still lower on the scale
of existence, and man, though surrounded by myriads of sentient beings, finds
society totally at an end. 'Tis the same if he attempts to ascend the scale. The
reports of the existence of such beings as angels, it is difficult to conceive. We
necessarily conclude that as the exercise of power and intelligence universally
indicate mind, the infinite power and intelligence manifested in the organiza tion of vegetables, animals, and the world, must have proceeded from an infinitely powerful and wise being; and these conclusions are the only possible
intercourse that we are capacitated ever to have with such a being. For if
neither our physical, nor our moral powers, qualify us for corresponding with
the beings the next below, or the next above us, on the great scale of existence,
how is it possible that we should hold communication with beings a great many
degrees higher? And if such intercourse with finite beings is impossible, how
much more impossible must it be to correspond viva voce, with the highest and
first of all beings, viz. with the In.finite and Eternal Mind? It also must appear,
from the great disparity between the infinite mind and the effects of its opera tions, that the infinite being cannot, in our present circumstances, communicate, or hold correspondence with us, in any other manner, or by any other
means, than through the medium of the vast creation, or, its operations on
matter. The small degree of power and intelligence in the being called man, is
not sufficient, as yet, to comprehend the organization of even a blade of grass,
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or a grain of wheat; and for such a being to pretend to hold a direct, spontaneous, and immediate intercourse and correspondence with the great creating
and sustaining cause of grass and grain, an intercourse he is not capacitated for,
and therefore cannot be benefitted by, is a pretence that can be founded only
on extreme ignorance and presumption--or worse.
In tracing the manifestation of power and intelligence, whether in a solar
system, a man, or a grain of wheat, we find that they all, universally and necessarily lead to the same conclusions, and the same source; i.e. to a perfectly
intelligent and powerful cause, that must have designed, and made them all
exactly what they are, consequently must have had this perfect power, intelligence and design, before they had existence; and that without the aid of such
a cause it is not possible to account for their existence, organization, or nature,
at all.
I am led to say, "that the infinite and eternal mind cannot correspond with
a limited and finite mind, except through the operations of the creation, or of
what is, in other words, commonly called nature," from the necessary impossibility of such a correspondence. Let us not start at the supposition. All direct
and immediate communications must be made between beings in some degree, and in some circumstances, respectively consonant and equal to each
other; but what degree of equality, or relationship, or consonancy or correspondence, can there possibly be between a limited and an unlimited being;
between finite and infinite? -None.
The marks of the perfections of the eternal mind, or intelligent cause of
that most great and complete effect which we call nature, are, to us, so manifest
and so numerous, that we cannot suppose any thing imperfect, or absurd, in
that cause; for it.follows, that ifwe did, we should suppose a manifest contradiction.
Circumscribed as our knowledge is of the vast creation, we know, however,
finite and frail as we are, and it is a great deal for us to know, that infinite power
and wisdom cannot contradict itself; cannot cause a greater number to be
taken from a less; cannot cause two hills without a valley between them; cannot
cause a thing to be, and not be, at the same time; cannot cause a part to be
equal to the whole. The laws that govern the universe, appear to have been the
offspring of an infinitely powerful, wise, and immutable mind. All viva voce
correspondence, therefore, between this mind and man, for any particular
purpose whatever, suggests a mutability which all nature loudly contradicts;
and all such reports and pretensions, must consequently be founded on ignorance, presumption, policy, or imposture.

Humanity (April 1810)
is the child of sensibility, the parent of charity, and the companion
of philosophy; the possessor of this inestimable attribute can never be truly
HUMANITY
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unhappy, for he is in the constant enjoyment of a quiet conscience. The recollection of the past, and the anticipation of future acts ofbenevolence, so absorb
his reflections, that no vacuum remains to be filled by the gloomy meditations
of the niggardly, or the plodding designs of the monopolist.
Like the light of heaven, humanity dispenses its favours with impartiality;
the wretched and desponding seek her castle, and there find an antidote and
a home; the houseless beggar, the widow and the orphan, the lame and the
blind all claim kindred with this angel of beneficence, and "have their claims
allowed."
Our city has produced many charitable institutions, where the humane
citizen may give his aid to suffering humanity, and to the great work of forming
and reforming the rising generation. Education is a principal and almost indispensable source of morality; it is the best security for liberty, the greatest boon
of freemen; as its suppression by the tyrants of Europe constitutes their only
safety against the just vengeance of their insulted subjects. Education in a free
country, conducted on the principles of sound philosophy prepares the mind
for those great efforts of genius, which render society useful and happy; it tends
to substitute wholesome and just laws, in the place of those tyrannical and
oppressive systems of Europe, which are the bane of social felicity. It lessens
labour by the ingenuity of artificers, erects comfortable mansions in the place
of miserable thatched hovels, and converts a howling wilderness into fruitful
fields and populous cities.
Whilst on the subject of education it would be unpardonable not to bestow
a tribute of praise on the establishment of the New-York free-school, which if
not the most important institution of the city, promises to become a nursery
of morals and useful knowledge.
Happy the individual, who, considering himself one of the great family of
mankind, knowing and acknowledging the necessity of reciprocal dependence
and mutual protection, the happiness of extending and receiving alternate
benefits, contributes his aid to the promotion ofeducation, of moral virtue, and
the enaction of humane laws. Such an individual fulfils the duties of humanity,
and feels thrilling through his heart the indescribable pleasure of doing good.
How different the selfish worldling, who, concentrating all his hopes and
wishes in the gratification of sordid passions, without sensibility, pines,
dissatisifed in the midst of plenty and luxury, because his inordinate wants
cannot be supplied, or his unbounded avarice satiated. How basely mean is the
man in office, who exercises power but to extort and torment! How cruelly
unjust the pawn-broker, who demands the usurious interest of one dollar
weekly for the loan of twenty, and reimburses himself by the sacrifice of ten
dollars worth of the borrowers property! How void of humanity must that
creditor be, who can consign to a loathsome prison, where no provision is
made for his sustenance, an unfortunate but honest debtor!
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How doubly unfeeling and brutal is that landlord, who, at quarter day can
wrest the bed from under a sick woman, to remunerate himself for an exorbitant rent!
Such beings unfortunately exist; they belong to the numerous family of
evils that afflict this world, which otherwise might have continued a paradise
of bliss.
But with all their ill-gotten gains they are not happy; thrice more happy, in
most instances, are the objects of their cruelty, their perfidy and injustice.
The image of a reproaching conscience continually haunts them and disturbs their repose.
The blush of guilt, suffusing itself through the paleness of a tortured visage,
leaves to the sight, nothing but the horrid picture of inhumanity.
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XIV.3. Of the Importance of the Exercise of Reason .. . , 472-77

Constantin Fran,;ois Chasseboeuf, Comte de Volney
Volney,s Ruins; or, Meditation [sic} on the Revolutions of Empires (1791), no
translator cited (Boston: Charles Gaylord, 1835).
Problem of Religious Contradictions, 93-112
Solution of the Problem of Contradictions, 170-74
The Law of Nature and Condition of Man in the Universe, 175-86, 199-201, 206-8

Thomas Paine
Ihe Age of Reason (New York: D. M . Bennett, 1878). (Headings mine.)
The Author's Profession of Faith, 5-6
Of Missions and Revelations, 6-8, 13
OfJesus Christ, 9-10
Of Scripture, 19-21
Of Redemption, 22-23
Of Miracles, 49, 50-51, 52
Of the Immorality of Christianity, 143-46

371

Sources and Permissions

372

Of Christian Theology and True Theology, 28, 29-32
Of True Revelation; and of God, 24-27
Conclusion, 146-51

"The Existence of God: A Discourse Delivered to the Society ofTheophilanthropists at Paris," The Great Works of Thomas Paine (New York: D. M.
Bennett, 1878), 280-87.
My Private Thoughts on a Future State, in Great Works, 270-71.

Elihu Palmer
Principles of Nature; or, A Development of the Moral Causes of Happiness and
Misery among the Human Species, 3d ed. (New York: 1806). (Headings mine.)
Critique of Christianity
Ignorance and Christianity, 18-19
Sacred Scripture and Revelation, 25-29
Original Sin, Atonement and Faith, 35-48
Eternal Damnation, 175-77
Miracles, 79, 81-85
The Immorality of Christianity, 52-56, 110, 115-18
Natural Morality
The Origin of Moral Evil, 126-30, 134-36
Morality Is Not Based on the Divine, 191-94
Universal Benevolence, 194-99
Moral Principle, 212-20
The Religion of Nature, 240-44, 178-80

"Principles of the Deistical Society of the State of New York," Posthumous
Pieces. By Elihu Palmer, being three chapters of an unfinished work intended to
have been entitled ccThe Political World.» To which are prefixed a Memoir of Mr.
Palmer by his friend Mr. John Fellows of New York, and Mr. Palmer's ccPrinciples
of the Deistical Society of the State of New York,» edited by John Fellows ( London: R. Carlile, 1828), 11-12.

Philip Freneau
Poems Written and Published during the American Revolutionary War .
(Philadelphia: Lydia Bailey, 1809).
"On the Powers of the Human Understanding"
"Reflections on the Constitution, or Frame of Nature"
"Science, Favourable to Virtue"
"On a Book Called Unitarian Theology"

A Collection of Poems, and a Variety of Other Subjects, Chiefly Moral and Political; Written bet:ween the Year 1797 and the Present Time (New York: David
Longworth, 1815).
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"On False Systems of Government, and the Generally Debased Condition of Mankind"
"The New Age: or, Truth Triumphant"
"On Superstition"
"On the Abuse of Human Power, as Exercised over Opinion"
"On the Uniformity and Perfection of Nature"
"On the Universality, and Other Attributes of the God of Nature"
"On the Religion of Nature"
"On the Evils of Human Life"
"Belief and Unbelief: Humbly Recommended to the Serious Consideration of
Creed Makers"
"On Happiness, as Proceeding from the Practice of Virtue"
"The Millennium-To a Ranting Field Orator"

"Letter 13" (originally appeared in the 8 August 1799 issue of the Aurora),
Letters on Various Interesting and Important Subjects . . . by Robert Slender
(Philadelphia, 1799).
"The Voyage ofTimberoo-Taho-Eede, an Otaheite Indian," The Miscellaneous
Works of Mr. Philip Freneau, Containing His Essays, and Additional Poems
(Philadelphia, 1788), 211-12, 213-14.

The Temple of Reason
"To the American Reader" (8 November 1800)
"The Deists Creed" (8 November 1800)
"A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God" (8 and 15 November
1800)

"An Ode to Reason" (8 November 1800)
"Christian Morality Compared with That of the Pagan Philosophers" (29
November 1800)
"A New Hymn for the Temple of Reason" (16 September 1801)
"Natural Ideas Opposed to Supernatural" (30 December 1801)

Prospect; or View of the Moral World
"Competency of the Human Powers" (10 December 1803)
"Explanation of the Principles of Deism" (17 December 1803)
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"Aphorisms" (17 December 1803)
"Moral Philosophy" (31 December 1803)
"Religious Self-Conceit" (21 January 1804)
"On the Christian Religion" (28 January 1804)
"Communication on Science from 'A Subscriber',, (25 February 1804)
"Miracles" (31 March 1804)
"Revelation" (7 April 1804)
"Laws of Nature" (28 April 1804)
"On Christian Faith" (12 May 1804)
"More of Human Reason" (28 July 1804)
"Superstition" (24 November 1804)
"The Indian Student; or, Force of Nature" (24 November 1804)
"Remarks" (26 January 1805)
"Enthusiasm" (2 February 1805)
"For the Prospect" (30 March 1805)

The Theophilanthropist
"Prospectus" (January 1810)
"Introductory Address" (January 1810)
"Character of Jesus Christ" (February 1810)
"Intercourse between Intelligent Beings" (March 1810)
"Humanity" (April 1810)
All three deistic newspapers are available on microfilm in Lamont library,
Harvard University.

Bibliographic Essay
The bibliographical information here is not intended to be exhaustive. Instead,
it lists and discusses those titles that may be of most use to the reader interested
in exploring further American deism, its intellectual background, and its immediate aftermath. Most of the works cited contain excellent bibliographies.
There are also three general bibliographical resources which are extremely
helpful. Freethought in the United States: A Descriptive Bibliography (Westport,
Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978), edited by Marshall G. Brown and Gordon
Stein, is an excellent guide to both primary and secondary literature. Less
detailed is A Critical Bibliography of Religion in America (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1961), edited by Nelson R . Burr; sources on
American deism are listed and annotated on pages 184-210. The Encyclopedia
ofUnbelief(Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1985), edited by Gordon Stein,
provides succinct articles on deism as well as its individual proponents.
For those interested in comprehensive histories of religious thought in
America, the two best works are unquestionably Winthrop S. Hudson, Religion in America (New York: Scribner's, 1965), and Sydney E. Ahlstrom's
encyclopedic A Religious History of the American People (New Haven, Conn.:
Yale University Press, 1972). Both contain extensive bibliographies.

The New Learning and the Enlightenment
The three luminaries of the Enlightenment were Francis Bacon, John Locke,
and Isaac Newton; Jefferson admired them so much that he hung their portraits in his Monticello study. Complete editions of their works as well as anthologies are readily available, and the interested reader is referred to citations
in the Introduction for specific titles.
The secondary literature on all three men is encyclopedic, but a few titles
are especially pertinent to the subject of their influence on Enlightenment
philosophy and religion. Benjamin Farrington's Francis Bacon: Philosopher of
Industrial Science (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1957) focuses on the instrumental bent ofBacon's new logic. In The Philosophy ofFrancis Bacon (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1948), F. H . Anderson provides an exhaustive
treatment of Bacon's philosophy of science as well as his criticisms of the Aristotelian system, as does Peter Urbach more recently in Francis Bacon,s Philosophy of Science: An Account and R eappraisal (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court Press,
1987). Paolo Rossi, Francis Bacon: From Magic to Science, translated by Sacha
Rabinovitch (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), and John C.
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Briggs, Francis Bacon and the Rhetoric of Nature (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1989), explore Bacon's style of discourse and its relation to
the investigation of nature. Charles Whitney's Francis Bacon and ModerniPy
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1986) argues that Bacon is best
viewed as the prophet and founder of the modern scientific temperament.
James Gibson's Locke,s Theory of Knowledge and Its Historical Relations
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960) examines the epistemology
of the Essay and discusses its relation to the thought of Locke's contemporaries.
A convenient overview of Locke's entire philosophical project, including his
religious attitudes, is presented by John W. Yolton in Locke: An Introduction
(London: Basil Blackwell, 1985). Yolton, who is probably the preeminent
modern Locke scholar, also discusses the influence of Lockean philosophy on
the continental savants in his recent Locke and French Materialism (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1991). The metaphysical implications of Locke's
epistemology are the subject of John L. Kraus's John Locke: Empiricist,
Atomist, Conceptualist, and Agnostic (New York: Philosophical library, 1968 ).
R. S. Woolhouse, Locke,s Philosophy of Science and Knowledge (New York:
Barnes and Noble, 1971), provides an interesting discussion of Locke's account of natural or scientific laws.
Newton's methodology is the centerpiece of two excellent essays: Alexandre Koyre, "Concept and Experience in Newton's Scientific Thought," in
Newtonian Studies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), and
N. R. Hanson, "Hypotheses Fingo," in The Methodological Heritage of Newton, edited by Robert E. Butts and John W. Davis (Oxford: University of
Toronto Press, 1970). Frank E. Manuel analyzes Newton's religious beliefs in
The Religion of Isaac Newton (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), and
an especially fine collection of essays on the same topic is to be found in Essays
on the Context, Nature, and Influence of Isaac Newton,s Theo/,ogy, edited by
James E. Force and Richard H. Popkin (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer
Academic, 1990). Of particular interest in this collection are Popkin's "Polytheism, Deism, and Newton" and Force's "The Newtonians and Deism." The
Principia as a "verification" of eighteenth-century empiricism is discussed by
Ernan McMullin in "The Significance of Newton's Principia for Empiricism,"
in Religion, Science, and Worldview: Essays in Honor of Richard S. Westfall,
edited by Margaret J. Osler and Paul Lawrence Farber (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985 ). Westfall's Never at Rest: A Biography of Isaac
Newton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980) is modestly titled.
Much more than just a biographical study, it is an exhaustive treatment of
Newtonian natural philosophy and its impact on eighteenth-century thought.
Finally, the collection of essays in Let Newton Be!, edited by John Flauvel et al.
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), is a richly illustrated discussion of
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Newton's scientific and religious thought. Especially interesting is John
Brooke's contribution, "The God of Isaac Newton."
A number of studies focus on the intellectual foundations of the Enlightenment ethos. Richard S. Westfall's Science and Religion in Seventeenth-Century England (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1973) is a masterful
study of natural religion, faith, and reason in pre-Enlightenment Britain.
Herbert Butterfield, Ihe Origins of Modern Science, 1300-1800 (New York:
Macmillan, 1959); E. A. Burtt, Ihe Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955); and E. J. Dijksterhus, Ihe Mechanization of the World Picture, translated by C. Dikshoorn (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1969), all discuss the impact of the scientific revolution on
subsequent European and British thought. Nature and optimism in Enlightenment thought are examined in chapters 6 and 7 of Arthur 0. Lovejoy's Ihe
Great Chain of Being (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1936);
also see Basil Willey's Ihe Eighteenth-Century Background: Studies on the Idea
ofNature in the Thought ofthe Period (London: Chatto & Windus, 1940 ). The
Enlightenment's drive to subdue and manage natural forces is treated by William Leiss, Ihe Domination of Nature (Boston: Beacon Press, 1974), and
Carolyn Merchant, Ihe Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scientific
Revolution (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1980). The scientistic consequences of this endeavor for the study of humans and society are explored in
Floyd W. Matson, The Broken Image: Man, Science, and Society (New York:
George Braziller, 1,964), and in my Tbe Sane Society Ideal in Modern Utopianism (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 1989).
There are several good studies of Enlightenment thought as a whole. Most
comprehensive is probably Peter Gay's Tbe Enlightenment: An Interpretation
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966-69). His companion volume, Ihe Enlightenment: A Comprehensive Anthology (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973),
offers almost one thousand closely printed pages of texts from the European,
British, and American Enlightenment. Less inclusive but still useful is Tbe Portable Age ofReason, edited by Crane Brinton (New York: Viking Press, 1956 ).
Two histories of Enlightenment thought have acquired the status of classic:
Carl Becker, The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers (New
Haven, Conn.: Yale University press, 1932), and Ernst Cassirer, Ihe Philosophy
ofthe Enlightenment, translated by Fritz C . A. Kaelin and James P. Pettegrove
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1965). Two studies that focus on the Enlightenment's
impact on religious sensibilities are Ernest Campbell Mossner, Bishop Butler
and the Age of Reason: A Study in the History ofihought (New York: Macmillan, 1936), and Margaret C. Jacob, Tbe Radical Enlightenment: Pantheists,
Freemasons, and Republicans (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981 ). In the
latter, chapters 3 ("The Newtonian Enlightenment and Its Critics") and 7
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("Pantheistic Religion, Revolution, and the New Science") are particularly
pertinent.
The American Enlightenment has received less attention than its European
counterpart, but there are still several good historical studies. Among the best
are Henry May's The Enlightenment in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), Donald H. Mayer's The Democratic Enlightenment (New
York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1976), and Daniel Boorstin's The Lost World of
Thomas Jefferson (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964). Boorstin's study suffers, however, from a total disregard of the influence of Scottish common sense philosophy on American Enlightened thought. May and Meyer discuss the issue, as do
Mark A. Noll in Princeton and the Republic, 1768-1822 (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1989) and Elizabeth Flower and Murray G.
Murphey in the first volume of their History of Philosophy in America (New
York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1977). Less comprehensive treatments of the
American Enlightenment include Ernst Cassara, The Enlightenment in America (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1988), and Garry Wills,
Cincinnatus: Geor;ge Washington and the Enlightenment (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday, 1984). John Corrigan's essay, "The Enlightenment," in the Encyclopedia ofAmerican Religious Experience, vol. 2 ), edited by Charles H. Lippy
and Peter W. Williams (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1988), is an excellent short introduction. The impact of the Enlightenment on American political thought is dealt with by Bernard Bailyn, "Political Experience and Enlightenment Ideas in Eighteenth-Century America," American Historical Review
67 (1962); Henry Steele Commager,Jefferson, Nationalism, and the Enlightenment (New York: George Braziller, 1975); Morton White's masterly The
Philosophy of the American Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press,
1978 ); and Garry Wills, Inventing America: Jefferson ,s Declaration ofIndependence (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1978). In The Empire of Reason (New
York: Anchor Press, 1977), Henry Steele Commager argues that the American
experiment "realized" by enacting in public and social policy the ideals of the
European Enlightenment. Adrienne Koch discusses Franklinian pragmatism
and the Jeffersonian concept of happiness in Power, Morals, and the Founding
Fathers: Essays in the Interpretation of the American Enlightenment (Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1961). Paul Merrill Spurlin examines the influence of French thought on the American Enlightenment in The French Enlightenment in America: Essays on the Times of the Founding Fathers (Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 1984). Finally, American science in the Enlightenment period is explored by John C. Greene, American Science in the Age of
Jefferson (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1984), and Brooke Hindle, The
Pursuit ofScience in Revolutionary America, 1735-1789 ( Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1956).
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Deism
Garland Press recently has issued facsimile editions of the works of a few of the
British deists-John Toland, Matthew Tindal, and some of the lesser figuresbut most primary texts from the British tradition remain long out of print and
generally inaccessible. Two anthologies, neither of them very good, collect a
few selections from the British deists: Peter Gay, Deism: An Anthology (New
York: Van Nostrand, 1968), and E. Graham Waring, Deism and Natural Religion: A Source Book (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1967).
Gay's anthology reproduces a meager selection from Palmer. Waring concentrates on British deism but also includes selections from eighteenth-century
critics such as William Law. For a general introduction to Enlightenment deism, see "The Religion of Nature," chapter 13 of John Herman Randall, Jr.'s
The Making of the American Mind: A Survey of the Intellectual Background of
the Present Day (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1926), which covers the period between 1650 and 1800; and also Alfred Owen Aldridge's "Deism" in
The Encyclopedia of Unbelief.
A good treatment of liberal Christianity and the rise of deism in Britain may
be found in John Redwood, Reason, Ridicule, and Religion: The Age of Enlightenment in England, 1660-1750 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1976). For readers who can locate it, John Leland's View ofthe Principal
Deistical Writers (1754), covering Toland to Hume, is still a good resource,
although Leland sometimes grinds a sectarian ax. Its 1837 reprint (London: T.
Tegg and Sons) is available in many research libraries. The first volume of Leslie
Stephen's History ofEnglish Thought in the Eighteenth Century (New York: G.
P. Putnam's Sons, 1908) gives four comprehensive and well-documented
chapters to the British deists; Stephen divides deism into two functional camps,
"constructive" and "critical." E. Royston Pike's Slayers ofSuperstition: A Popular Account ofthe Leading Personalities of the Deist Movement (London: Watts
& Co., 1931) is a highly readable account but lacks documentation. Rather
biased is the treatment by John Orr, English Deism: Its Roots and Fruits ( Grand
Rapids, Mich.: W. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1934). Three works dealing
with specific British deists are worthy of note: James O'Higgens, Anthony
Collins: The Man and His Works (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff,
1970); Stephen H. Daniel, John Toland: His Methods, Manners, and Mind
(Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1974); and Robert E . Sullivan,
John Toland and the Deist Controversy: A Study in Adaptations ( Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982). The works ofO'Higgens and Sullivan
are especially fine, painstakingly researched and documented. An account of
early French deistic thought, ending with Voltaire's Lettres philosophiques
(1734), is C . J. Betts, Early Deism in France (The Hague, Netherlands:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1984).
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The two standard works devoted to American deism proper, as opposed to
the American Enlightenment in general, are G. Adolf Koch, Republican Religion: The American Revolution and the Cult of Reason (New York: Henry
Holt, 1933), and Herbert A. Morais, Deism in Eighteenth-Century America
(New York: Russell & Russell, 1960). Koch's work sheds some interesting light
on American deism's tenuous historical association with Freemasonry and has
a good chapter on Palmer. Morais covers much of the same ground but also
provides a discussion of the influence of French thought on American deism.
Neither work, however, is analytical or critical. Instead, both offer descriptive
historical accounts.
The Infidel: Free Thought and American Religion ( Cleveland, Ohio: World
Publishing Co., 1961) is one of Martin E. Marty's earlier works and does not
demonstrate the sophistication of his later books. Although its initial chapters
cover the high points of American deism, they tend to be sloppily general and
uncritically negative in tone. More judicious accounts of American deism may
be found in I. Woodbridge Riley, American Philosophy: The Early Schools (New
York: Dodd, Mead, 1907), and "Early Freethinking Societies in America,"
Harvard Theological Review 11 (1918): 247-84, as well as Ernest Sutherland
Bates, American Faith (New York: W.W. Norton, 1940), chapter 20, "The
Rise of Deism," and Edwin Scott Gaustad, Dissent in American Religion ( Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973). Gaustad discusses, inter alia, the
deism of Franklin and Jefferson in his more recent Faith of Our Fathers (San
Francisco: Harper and Row, 1987), and Norman Cousins excerpts selections
from Franklin, Jefferson, and Paine in The Republic of Reason: The Personal
Philosophies of the Founding Fathers (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1988;
reprint of the 1958 In God We Trust). Cousins's selections are not always astute
or accurate. Finally, I have discussed the rise and fall of American deism in my
Rational Infidels: The American Deists (Wolfeboro, N.H. : Longwood, 1992).
For treatments of post-Enlightenment, nearly nineteenth-century American infidelity, Albert Post's Popular Freethought in America, 1825-1850 (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1943) is the best documented, but James
Turner's Without God, Without Creed: The Origins of Unbelief in America
(Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985) must be regarded as
definitive. Turner's book also contains a good discussion of American deism.
Herbert Hovenkamp, Science and Religion in America, 1800-1860 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1978), explores the effect of eighteenth-century natural philosophy on early nineteenth-century styles of theologizing.
Two recent studies, both ground-breaking and extensively documented,
deal with postdeistic Christianity in the nineteenth century: Charles D.
Cashdollar's The Transformation of Theology, 1830-1890 (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1989) and Nathan 0 . Hatch's The Democratiza-
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tion of American Christianity (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,
1989). Cashdollar traces the influence of positivism on Christian theology, and
Hatch examines the "popular religion" of evangelism in the Early Republic.

Benjamin Franklin
The definitive edition of Franklin's collected works, The Papers of Benjamin
Franklin, edited by Leonard W. Labaree and Whitfield J. Bell, Jr. (New Haven,
Conn.: Yale University Press, 1959- ), has now published twenty-eignt volumes, running through early 1779. The Labaree edition is the only one that
contains Franklin's early Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity, Pleasure and
Pain. Curiously, both the Sparks and Smyth editions mention but do not
reproduce it. These two earlier editions of Franklin are neither as comprehensive nor scholarly as Labaree's but are still useful: The Works of Benjamin
Franklin, edited by Jared Sparks (Boston: Charles Tappan, 1844), ten volumes, and The Writings of Benjamin Franklin, edited by Albert Henry Smyth
(New York: Macmillan, 1907), ten volumes. Of historical interest is the early
edition that Franklin's grandson William Temple Franklin helped prepare:
Memoirs of the Life and Writings of Benjamin Franklin, second edition (London: Henry Colburn, 1818), six volumes. This edition, needless to say, is quite
incomplete. Two good anthologies of Franklin's writings are also available:
Benjamin Franklin: Representative Selections, edited by Chester E . Jorgenson
and Frank Luther Mott (New York: Hill and Wang, 1962 ), and Writings (Library ofAmerica series), edited by J. A. Leo Lemay (New York: Viking, 1987).
Jorgenson and Mott's anthology is an especially fine piece of work, with generous annotations to the texts and an excellent 150-page introduction containing an extremely able analysis of Franklin's religious beliefs.
The publishing ofFrankliniana has been a major industry for two centuries,
and titles run in the thousands. Biographical treatments are numerous, but one
of the best documented is still Carl van Doren's Benjamin Franklin (New
York: Viking Press, 1938). Three recent biographies deserve mention: Ronald
W. Clark, Benjamin Franklin (New York: Random House, 1983 ), David Freeman Hawke, Franklin (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), and Esmond
Wright, Franklin ofPhiladelphia (Cambridge, Mass. : Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1986). While each of them is competent and contains extensive bibliographies of the secondary literature, Wright's is the most scholarly.
Hawke's, however, is the most readable and is a nice companion piece to his
Paine (see below). Unfortunately, all three focus primarily on Franklin the
statesman and only briefly deal with his religious or ethical thought.
Fortunately, there are a number of solid discussions of Franklin's religious
perspective. James Madison Stifler's The Religion of Benjamin Franklin is
unimaginative but provides a decent introductory overview. A. Owen Aldridge
examines Franklin's early dogmatic materialism in "Benjamin Franklin and
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Philosophical Necessity," Modern Language Quarterly 12 (1951): 292-309,
his connections with the European Enlightenment in Franklin and His French
Contemporaries(New York: New York University Press, 1957), and his empiricist approach to religious inquiry in "Franklin's Experimental Religion," in
Meet Dr. Franklin, edited by Roy N. Lorren (Philadelphia: Franklin Institute,
1981). Especially noteworthy is Aldridge's Benjamin Franklin and Nature,s
God (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1967), acknowledged as the best
single study of Franklin's religion. Unfortunately, Aldridge's treatment is
flawed by his bizarre argument that Franklin advocated an eighteenth-century
religious polytheism, a thesis partially inspired by David Williams's "More
Light on Franklin's Religious Ideas," American Historical Review 43 (1938):
803-13. The polytheistic thesis, at least in my judgment, simply does not hold
up, and a fresh look at Franklin's rich religious thought is badly needed. More
acceptable but still somewhat tainted by the polytheism thesis is Aldridge's
Benjamin Franklin: Philosopher and Man (New York: Lippincott, 1965).
Several other treatments of Franklin's religious views deserve mention.
Charles L. Sanford maps their permutations in "An American Pilgrim's Progress," American Quarterly 6 (1954): 297-310. I. Bernard Cohen traces the
impact of Franklin's empiricism on his moral system in Benjamin Franklin: His
Contributions to the American Tradition (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1953).
Two studies focus on the ambivalence in Franklin's deism: Donald H. Meyer,
"Franklin's Religion," in Critical Essays on Benjamin Franklin, edited by
Melvin H. Buxbaum (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1987), and David L. Parker, "From
Sound Believer to Practical Preparationist: Some Puritan Harmonics in
Franklin's Autobiography," in The Oldest Revolutionary: Essays on Benjamin
Franklin, edited by J. A. Leo Lemay (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1976). I likewise deal with Franklin's religious ambivalence in chapter 2
of my Rational Infidels: The American Deists. Finally, Melvin H. Buxbaum
entertainingly and painstakingly examines Franklin's tolerant attitude to sectarian allegiances as well as his dislike of religious bigotry in Benjamin Franklin
and the Zealous Presbyterians (University Park: Pennsylvania State University
Press, 1975).

Thomas Jefferson
Twenty volumes, running through the year 1792, of the comprehensive Papers
of Thomas Jefferson, edited by Julian P. Boyd (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1950-), have appeared to date. The edition does for Jefferson
what Labaree's does for Franklin: It provides an exhaustive and scholarly access
to the complete works of a major American thinker. Until the Boyd edition is
completed, readers will find useful the still respectable Writings of Thomas
Jefferson (Monticello edition), edited by Albert Ellery Bergh (Washington,
D.C.: Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1903), twenty volumes, and
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the sometimes risky Writings of Thomas Jefferson, edited by Paul L. Ford (New
York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1892-99), ten volumes. Merrill D. Peterson has
edited a convenient anthology of Jefferson's essential writings, The Portable
Thomas Jefferson (New York: Viking Press, 1975). Peterson's introduction is
rather cursory, but his selections are judicious. His edition contains all of
Jefferson's Notes on the State of Vit;ginia, several of Jefferson's public papers
and addresses, and over two hundred pages of correspondence. Especially invaluable to the student of Jefferson's religious and ethical thought are two
collections: The Adams-Jefferson Letters, edited by Lester J. Cappon (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959), andJefferson,s Extracts.from
the Gospels, edited by Dickinson W. Adams (Princeton, N .J.: Princeton University Press, 1982). Cappon's collection contains all of the extant correspondence between Adams and Jefferson, running from 1771 to 1826. The selections from 1813 on, after the two men had retired from public life and thus
could afford the luxury of unhurried philosophizing, provide a wealth of information concerning Jefferson's views on religion, ethics, and Christianity.
Adams's volume has Jefferson's "The Philosophy of Jesus" and "The Life and
Morals ofJesus," prefaces them with thoroughly researched introductions, and
concludes with one hundred pages of Jefferson's correspondence in which he
specifically deals with religious issues. These two collections are arguably the
most important references for anyone interested in Jefferson's religion and
ethics.
As in the case of Franklin, there is a seemingly inexhaustible mine of secondary literature on Jefferson the man and thinker. Among biographies,
Dumas Malone's massive Jefferson and His Times (Boston: Little, Brown,
1948-81), six volumes, is unquestionably the most comprehensive. Noble
Cunningham's In Pursuit of Reason: The Life of Thomas Jefferson (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1987) takes a look at Jefferson the
Enlightenment thinker, and Edwin Thomas Martin's Thomas Jefferson: Scientist (New York: H. Schuman, 1952) focuses on Jefferson's interests in natural
philosophy. Karl Lehman emphasizes Jefferson's social thought in Thomas
Jefferson: American Humanist (New York: Macmillan, 1947), and Fawn
Brodie offers a sometimes unsympathetic look at Jefferson the man in Thomas
Jefferson: An Intimate Biography (New York: W. W. Norton, 1974).
Jefferson's religious thought, and particularly his admiration for the moral
teachings of Jesus, have fascinated a long line of commentators. Two older
pieces which attempt short overviews are J. Lesslie Hall, "The Religious Opinions of Thomas Jefferson," Sewanee Review 21 (1913): 164-76, and William
D. Gould, "The Religious Opinions of Thomas Jefferson," Mississippi Valley
Historical Review 20 (1933): 191-208. More recently, Henry Wilder Foote
explored the issue in Thomas Jefferson: Champion of Religious Freedom, Advocate of Christian Morals (Boston: Beacon Press, 1947) and The Religion of
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Thomas Jeffirson ( Boston: Beacon Press, 1960). Two works in particular examine Jefferson's views on religious liberty and freedom of conscience: Robert M.
Healy, Jefferson on Religion in Public Education (New Haven, Conn.: Yale
University Press, 1962), and Frank Swancara, Thomas Jefferson vs. Religious
Oppression (New York: University Books, 1969). The most informative book
to date on Jefferson's religious convictions is Charles B. Sanford's The Religious
Life of Thomas Jefferson (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1984).
Sanford's study draws on the entire Jeffersonian corpus and is generous in its
use of quotations. Its major drawback, however, is that it is more compendium
than analysis: Sanford fails to weave his rich textual expertise around an interpretation. Still, his study is an invaluable resource guide.
To my mind, Adrienne Koch's The Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1943) is still the best study of Jefferson's
epistemology, ethics, and political thought, although there is some merit to the
conventional charge that she anachronistically paints a too positivistic portrait.
Her Jefferson and Madison: The Great Collaboration (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969) examines, inter alia, the relationship between Jefferson's
political and religious views. Stuart Gerry Brown examines Jefferson's ethical
theory in "The Mind of Thomas Jefferson," Ethics 73 (1963): 79-99, as I do
in chapter 4 of my Rational Infidels: The American Deists. Charles A. Miller,
in his recent Jeffirson and Nature: An Interpretation (Baltimore, Md.: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1988), provides an intriguing look at Jefferson's
metaphysical and ethical thought that may well replace Koch's earlier treatment. His opening chapter, "Jefferson, Nature, and the Enlightenment," analyzes the importance for the Enlightenment of the concept of nature.

Ethan Allen
Most of the first edition of Allen's Reason the Only Oracle of Man, or a
Compenduous System of Natural Religion (Bennington, Vt.: Haswell &
Russell, 1784) was destroyed by fire while it sat in the printer's warehouse, but
pirated editions, some of them abridged, appeared through the middle of the
nineteenth century. A facsimile republication of the first edition (New York:
Scholars Facsimiles and Reprints, 1970), appeared recently, but it is difficult to
read in certain places, probably because of photographic difficulties. Most of
Allen's other publications, mainly political pamphlets, are of little interest to
the nonspecialist. But his memoirs, A Narrative of Colonel Ethan Allen,s
Captivity . .. (Philadelphia, 1779), still make for lively if not always reliable
reading. Several modern editions have appeared.
There are four standard biographies of Allen: Henry Hall, Ethan Allen
(New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1892), Stewart H. Holbrook, Ethan Allen
(New York: Macmillan, 1944), Charles Jellison, Ethan Allen: The Frontier
Rebel (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1969), and John Pell, Ethan
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Allen (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1929). Jellison's is clearly the best of
the four, although sparse on specific documentation. But none of them provides more than a cursory sketch of Allen's deism or its relationship to the
broader American Enlightenment.
B. T. Schantz's "Ethan Allen's Religious Ideas," Journal of Religion 18
(1938): 183-217, gives an informative although somewhat dated overview of
the pertinent literature. Discussions of Allen's Reason the Only Oracle may be
found in Dana Doten, "Ethan Allen's Original Something," New E111Jland
Quarterly 11 (1938): 361- 66, and 'Ethan Allen's Philosophy," ibid.; Clarence
Gohdes, "Ethan Allen and His Magnum Opus," Open Court43 (1929): 148;
and chapter 3 of my Rational Infidels: The American Deists. An intriguing
discussion of the problem of authorship of the Oracles is provided in George
Pomeroy Anderson, "Who Wrote 'Ethan Allen's Bible'?" New England Quarterly 10 (1937): 685-96. Finally, Darlene Shapiro draws connections between
Allen's religious and political thought in "Ethan Allen: Philosopher-Theologian to a Generation of American Revolutionaries," William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 21 (1964): 236-55 .

Constantin Fram;ois Chasseboeuf, Comte de Volney
Les Ruines, ou meditations sur les revolutions des empires; par M Volney, Depute
a PAssemblee Nationale de 1789, appeared in Paris in 1791. Thomas Jefferson
began a translation ofit subsequently completed by Joel Barlow and published
as Ruins; or Meditations on the Revolutions of Empires (New York, 1799). The
Ruins went through numerous editions in the l)jneteenth century and has
recently been reissued in France (Paris: Editions d'Aujourd'hui) and retranslated into English by Burton Feldman and Robert Richardson (New York:
Garland Press, 1979). Nineteenth-century editions often printed along with
the Ruins translations ofVolney's La Loi naturelle (Paris, 1793), which first
appeared in the United States as The Law of Nature, or Principles of Morality
Deduced from the Physical Nature ofMankind and the Universe (Philadelphia,
1796). The impact of these two works on late American deism was profound,
as was Volney's defense of deism in Answer to Dr. Priestley, on a Pamphlet
Entitled Observations on the Increase of Infidelity (Philadelphia, 1797). Both of
these works, along with Volney's Voyage en Egypte et en Syrie (1787), are in his
posthumous Oeuvres completes (Paris, 1821), eight volumes.
Secondary literature on Volney is scarce. Gilbert Chinard edited and discussed Volney's correspondence with Jefferson in Volney et PAmerique d'apres
des documents et sa correspondance avec Jefferson (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1923), and Jean Gaulmier's Volney (Paris: Hatchette,
1959) is the only recent biography. Mouza Raskolnikoff, in "Volney et les
Ideologues: Le Refus du Rome," Revue d'Histoire 267 (1982): 357-73, discusses a 1795 series of lectures by Volney in which he unfavorably compares
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classical Roman culture to the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. Discussions
ofVolney's influence on American deism may be found in Koch's Republican
Religion, Morais's Deism in Eighteenth-Century America, and Leon Howard's
The Connecticut Wits(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943), chapter 9.

Thomas Paine
Paine published his major deistical treatise The Age of Reason in 1794-95.
Since that time, scores of editions have appeared. Four standard collections of
his writings are especially comprehensive: The Writings of Thomas Paine, edited
by Moncure Daniel Conway (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1894-96 ), four
volumes; The Life and Works of Thomas Paine, edited by William M. Van der
Weyde (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Thomas Paine Historical Association, 1925), ten
volumes; The Complete Writings of Thomas Paine, edited by Philip S. Foner
(New York: Citadel Press, 1969), two volumes; and The Life and Writings of
Thomas Paine, edited by Daniel Wheeler (New York: V. Park & Co., 1915),
ten volumes. Foner's edition includes a chronological table of Paine's writings
and substantial editorial notes. Thomas Paine: Representative Selections, edited
by Harry Hayden Clark (New York: Hill and Wang, 1961), offers a less comprehensive selection but has the advantage of a closely argued introduction
dealing with the influence of the New Learning on Paine's thought. It also
contains a helpful bibliography.
Biographical studies of Paine abound. Moncure Daniel Conway's twovolume Life of Thomas Paine (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1892) is the
best from the nineteenth century but offers little documentation and probably
overstresses the influence of Quakerism on Paine's thought. Alfred Owen Aldridge's Man of Reason: The Life of Thomas Paine (New York: Lippincott,
1959) is a carefully documented study of Paine's life and work. A more popular
but well-researched treatment is David Freeman Hawke, Paine (New York:
Harper and Row, 1974). Two recent studies are generally unreliable. David
Powell's Tom Paine: The Greatest Exile (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985)
contains a wealth of factual errors, and British philosopher A. J. Ayer's Thomas
Paine (New York: Atheneum, 1988) is uncritically derivative in its history and
more Ayeresque than Paine-ish in its philosophy. More trustworthy is Audrey
Williamson, Thomas Paine: His Life, Work, and Times (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1973), as well as the excellent updated version of Jerome D. Wilson and
William F. Ricketson, Thomas Paine (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1989). Wilson and Ricketson include a brief but helpfully annotated bibliography.
Works dealing primarily with Paine's radical republicanism include A.
Owen Aldridge, Thomas Paine's American Ideology (Newark: University of
Delaware Press, 1984), S. M. Berthold, Thomas Paine: America's First Liberal
(Boston: Meader Publishing Co., 1938), Mary A. Best, Thomas Paine, Prophet
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andMartyrofDemocracy(NewYork: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1927), and Eric
Foner, Tom Paine and Revolutionary America (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1976), Aldridge's study is the best, and Foner's, which approaches
Paine's thought from a Marxist perspective, is the most original, even if not
entirely convincing.
Studies dealing solely or in large part with Paine's religious views are numerous. After The Age ofReason appeared, a rash of contemporary replies were
published. Two of the best that are still of interest to the modern reader are
Joseph Priestley, An Answer to Mr. Paine)s Age of Reason (1794), and Richard
Watson, An Apology for the Bible in a Series of Letters, Addressed to Thomas
Paine (1796). Unfortunately, both are out of print and difficult to locate.
More accessible is Ira M . Thompson, Jr., The Religious Views of Thomas Paine
(New York: Vantage Press, 1965 ), a published thesis somewhat short on analysis. Arnold Smithine in his Natural Religion in American Literature (New
Haven, Conn.: College and University Press, 1966) offers more trenchant
insights into the relationship between Paine's thought and American natural
religion, but it is not devoted to Paine alone. Chapter 5 of my Rational Infidels: The American Deists discusses Paine's deism as well as its relation to his
radical republicanism. No definitive book-length study of Paine's deism exists,
but a handful of articles examines specific points. Of these, the most useful
include Harry Hayden Clark's "An Historical Interpretation of Thomas
Paine's Religion," University of California Chronicle 35 (1933): 56-58, and
"Toward a Reinterpretation ofThomas Paine," American Literature 5 (193334): 133-45. Both stress Paine's reliance on the New Learning. Robert P. Falk,
"Thomas Paine: Deist or Quaker?" Pennsylvania Magazine of History and
Biography62 (1938): 52-63, is a valuable counterweight to M. D. Conway's
overzealous argument that Paine's religious thought is largely an offshoot of
his youthful Quakerism. Jack Fruchtman, Jr., examines an aspect of the
Priestley-Paine debate in "The Revolutionary Millennialism of Thomas
Paine," in Studies of Eighteenth-Century Culture, vol. 13 (Tempe: University
of Arizona Press, 1984). Henry Leffinann's "The Real Thomas Paine, Patriot
and Publicist," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 46 (1922):
81-99, and Franklin K Prochaska's "Thomas Paine's The Age ofReason Revisited," Journal of the History of Ideas 33 (1972): 561-76, examine the origins
and subsequent misreadings of Paine's deistic treatise. Finally, two comparative
studies are interesting: Michael Payne's "Priestley, Paine, Blake, and the Tradition of English Dissent," Pennsylvania English 10 ( 198 3): 5-13, and Margaret
M. Vanderhoar's "Whitman, Paine, and the Religion of Democracy," Walt
Whitman Review (March 1970): 14-22, trace the connections between
Paine's religious thought and, respectively, eighteenth-century British liberalism and nineteenth-century American romanticism.
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Elihu Palmer
In spite of his blindness and hectic pace of activities, Palmer's literary output
was respectable. It includes three published speeches: Extracts from an Oration, Delivered by Elihu Palmer, the 4th ofJuly, 1793, in Political Miscellany,
edited by G. Forman (Philadelphia, 1793); An Enquiry Relative to the Moral
and Political Improvement of the Human Species. An Oration Delivered in the
City of New York on the Fourth ofJuly . .. (New York, 1797); and The Political
Happiness of Nations; an Oration. Delivered at the City of New York, on the
Fourth ofJuly . .. (New York, 1800). In keeping with the spirit of their delivery
dates, these pieces discuss the blessings of liberty and decry the "double despotism" of church and state which seeks to curtail freedom of conscience.
Palmer's magnum opus, Principles of Nature; or, A Development of the Moral
Causes of Happiness and Misery among the Human Species, first appeared in
1800 or 1801. It went through three revised editions before Palmer's death in
1806 and continued to be reissued in England as well as the United States well
into the nineteenth century. In addition to the work published under his name,
Palmer contributed scores of articles, some of which found their way into the
Principles, for The Temple of Reason, and the Prospect. Indeed, most of the
latter's contents are from his pen. Palmer left unfinished a treatise on republican politics that his friend John Fellows published along with his speeches a few
years later: Posthumous Pieces. By Elihu Palmer, being three chapters ofan unfinished work intended to have been entitled ((The Political World.» To which are
prefixed a Memoir ofMr. Palmer by hisfriend Mr. John Fellows of New York, and
Mr. Palmer1s ccPrinciples of the Deistical Society of the State of New York» (London: R. Carlile, 1828).
The sad obscurity into which Palmer has fallen is suggested by the almost
complete lack of secondary literature. Although he is at least mentioned in
most histories of the American Enlightenment, few studies are devoted to him.
One notable exception is Roderick S. French's fine "Elihu Palmer, Radical
Deist, Radical Republican: A Reconsideration of American Freethought," in
Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture, vol. 8 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979). French also contributed the article on Palmer in The Encyclopedia of Unbelief I discuss Palmer's life and thought, as well as its Enlightenment background, in the introduction to my Elihu Palmer1s (Principles of
Nature 11: Text and Commentary (Wolfeboro, N.H.: Longwood, 1990), chapter 6 of Rational Infidels: The American Deists, and "Elihu Palmer's Crusade
for Rational Religion," Religious Humanism 24 (Summer 1990): 113-29,
146. A full-length treatment of Palmer's thought and his pivotal role in the
deist movement is sorely needed. American deism, especially its later, militant
period, cannot be adequately understood except in comparison to Palmer's
contributions.
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Philip Freneau
Freneau was one of the more prolific of the lesser American deists, and his
journalistic essays and poetry were collected and published during his lifetime
in many volumes. Philip M. Marsh provides an exhaustive survey in Freneau 1s
Published Prose: A Bibliography (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1970) and
The Works of Philip Freneau: A Critical Study (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow
Press, 1968). The most significant ofFreneau's works are: The Poems of Philip
Freneau (Philadelphia: Francis Bailey, 1786); The Miscellaneous Works of Mr.
Philip Freneau (Philadelphia: Francis Bailey, 1788); Poems Written between the
Years 1768 and 1794 (Monmouth, N.J.: By author, 1795); Letters on Various
Interesting and Important Subjects ... by Robert Slender (Philadelphia: D.
Hogan, 1799); Poems Written and Published during the American Revolutionary War (Philadelphia: Lydia Bailey, 1809), two volumes; and A Collection of
Poems ... Written between the Year 1797 and the Present Time (New York:
David Longworth, 1815), two volumes. Of particular interest for the student
ofFreneau's deism are the Miscellaneous Works, the Letters, and the 1809 and
1815 editions of poetry. In addition to his bibliographies, Philip M. Marsh has
rendered large portions ofFreneau's poetry and prose accessible to the modern
reader in two collections: The Prose of Philip Freneau (New Brunswick, N.J.:
Scarecrow Press, 1955), and A Freneau Sampler (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow
Press, 1963). The second of these is especially invaluable because it reproduces
a good quantity of the deistic poetry omitted in Fred Lewis Pattee's threevolume The Poems of Philip Freneau (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1902). Pattee's otherwise fine collection neglects to include Freneau's
religious and philosophical poems because the editor curiously judged them
uninteresting.
Lewis Leary's That Rascal Freneau, a title Washington ungraciously bestowed on the poet, is the best available biography (New York: Octagon
Books, 1964), nicely documented and with insightful reflections on Freneau's
intellectual development. Other biographical treatments of slightly less caliber
include Mary Stanislas Austin's Philip Freneau: The Poet of the Revolution (Detroit: Gale Research Co., 1968) and Mary Weatherspoon Bowden's Philip
Freneau (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1976).
Critical studies are rather sparse. One of the best, and the only one that
focuses on Freneau the deist, is Nelson F. Adkins's Philip Freneau and the
Cosmic Enigma: The Religious and Philosophical Speculations of an American
Poet (New York: New York University Press, 1949). Adkins's study examines
Freneau's fidelity to natural religion without losing sight of its protoromantic
undercurrents, and he makes an interesting case for the claim that Freneau was
significantly influenced by the Roman materialist Lucretius; however, the volume is too slender to do more than cut a rather impressionistic swath. Still, it
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points the reader in the right direction, and I flesh out Adkins's cursory treatment in chapter 7 of my Rational Infidels: The American Deists. Jacob Axelrod
examines Freneau's social and political views in Philip Freneau: Champion of
Democracy (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1967). Although not directly
interested in Freneau's deism, Richard C. Vitzthum's Land and Sea: The Lyric
Poetry of Philip Freneau (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1978) explores the romantic element in Freneau's thought.

Deistic Periodicals
No work devoted to an examination of eighteenth-century deistic journalism
in America exists, but interesting discussions of the issue may be found in
Koch's Republican Religion and Morais's Deism in Eighteenth-Century
America. Morais's bibliography contains an extensive listing of pertinent journals and periodicals, as does an appendix to the second volume of The Encyclopedia of Unbelief

Index
Alcott, Bronson, 42
Alembert, Jean Le Rond, d', 6
Allen, Ethan (1737-1789)
on faith, 169- 71
francophilia of, 24
on God, arguments for existence of,
146-50
on Jesus, character of, 171- 72, 172-77
on miracles, 167--69
on natural law, 148, 162--67
on punishment for sin, 152- 54, 158
on reason, 158--62
on sin, 150-52
on superstition, 145--46
on virtue, 162--67
on virtue, origin of, 156-57
on virtue and reason, 179- 81
Ames, William, 14
Aquinas, Thomas, 308
Aristotelianism in colleges, 14
Arminianism, 17, 20, 22. See also
Calvinism in America
Autobiography (Franklin)
Articles of Belief, 93
Dissertation, 92
on habituation to virtue, 94-96
on Presbyterian doctrine, 92-93
on Quakers, 98-99
on Whitefield, George, and revivalism,
96-98
youthful reading of deistic tracts, 91
Bacon, Francis, 7-8, 11, 14, 23
Barlow, Joel, 182, 279
Becker, Carl, 5
Beecher, Lyman, 1, 43
Benezet, Anthony, 98
Bentham, Jeremy, 307
Blackmore, Richard, 70n
Bliss, William, 15
Blount, Charles, 141
Bolingbroke, Henry Saint-John, Viscount,
25
Bradstreet, Anne, 278
British deism, 12- 13, 26-27
Burke, Edmund, 26
Burtt, Edwin, 37

Calvin, John, 16
Calvinism in America, 16-23
and covenant of grace, 18
and depravity of reason, 17, 20- 21
Five Points of, 17-18
introspection of, 20-21
and scheme of salvation, 19-20
and war of self against self, 19-20
Campbell, Alexander, 43
Cassirer, Ernst, 6
Channing, William Ellery, 1
Cheyne, George, 11, 15
Christianity
and angels, 365- 66
and atonement, 249-51
and faith, 251-53, 269-71, 347--48
intolerant attitude of, 83-87, 88-89,
111-14, 115- 16, 130, 145--46, 18592, 193- 96,206-7,244--45,263-64,
298-99,302-5,309,327,331,35051,354-57,363
and Jesus, 29, 105, 118-19, 120- 22,
129-30, 131, 132, 136, 215-16,
324-26,363--65
and miracles, 29-30, 123, 133-34, 135,
137-39, 140,220-21,254-57,33941,342--44
morality of, 31, 221-23, 257-60, 26162, 324-26
and revelation, 30-31, 140, 185-86,
188- 92,213-15,223,226-27,24546,344--46
and scripture, 30, 117, 120-22, 21618, 22 l, 245,258,259,260
and sin, 150-58, 246--49, 253-54
See also under individual authors
Churches, reactions of to deism, 2- 3
Clap, Thomas, l
Clarke, Samuel, 11, 15
College of New Jersey (Princeton), 1, 14
College of William and Mary, 1, 107
Collins, Anthony, 12, 15
Copernicanism in colleges, 14
Dartmouth College, 1, 240
Declaration of Independence, l 07
Deism. See British deism; Rational
Religion

Index

392

Deistical Society of New York, 241, 307,
359
principles of, 276---77
Diderot, Denis, 6
Driscoll, Dennis, 306, 307
Dudleian Lectures, establishment of, 15
Dummer, Jeremiah, 14
Edwards, Jonathan, 13, 15, 20-21. See
also Calvinism in America
Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 42
Enlightenment, characteristics of, 5- 7
Ethics in deism, 33, 57- 59, 64-65, 7879, 80-82, 94-96, 105, 124-26,
127-29,156---57, 162---67,177-81,
203--4,205-6,210,264, 265---67,
268-71,285-86, 297-98,299- 300,
338, 366---67. See also under individual authors
Faith, Christian. See Christianity
Fenelon, Archbishop ofCambrai, 70n
Five Points, 17, 18
Franklin, Benjamin (1706- 1790)
conversion to deism, 15
francophilia of, 24
on free will and necessity, 57-59, 78- 79
on God, 56---66, 67-68, 73-74
Great Awakening, reaction to, 22
on immortality, 64-65, 105
on Jesus, 105
on Job story, 99-100
on Lord's Prayer, 89-91
motion for prayers in convention,
103--4
on pain and pleasure, 60-63
on providence, 64---65, 75-79, 104
on Scottish philosophy, 14
on subordinate gods, 67
on tolerance, 83-87, 88-89
on virtue, 80-82
See also Autobiography
French enlightenment, 23-24, 44
French revolution, 24-26
Freneau, Philip (1752-1832)
on Age of Reason, 3
on Christian practices, absurdity of,
304-5
on ethics, 285-86, 297-98
on freedom of conscience, 298-99
on happiness and virtue, 299- 300
on hypocrisy, 302--4
on liberty, 287-90, 291-92, 293-95
on natural law, 283-85
on rational religion, 286-87, 296---97,
300-301

on reason and superstition, 282-83,
292-93
on science, 285-86
Fuller, Margaret, 42
Galileo (Galileo Galilei), 335
Gay, Ebenezer, 20
Gibbon, Edward, 2, 25
God,4,29,56---66,67-68,73- 74,96,
146---50,162---67,188- 92,227-29,
232-38,273-75,276---77,295-96,
310,311-13,314-22,365-66. See
also under individual authors
Goodwin, George, 19
Great Awakening, 20-23. See also
Calvinism in America
Green Mountain Boys, 141
Hall, Robert, 25
Hamilton, Alexander, 106
Hargrove, John, 206, 332
Harvard College, 1, 2, 14, 15
Hawley, Joseph, 15
Helvetius, Claude, 182, 307
Hobbes, Thomas, 294,331
Holbach, Paul Henri Thiery, Baron d' , 41,
187,307
Hume, David
on miracles, 30
on skepticism, 14, 25, 32, 35- 36, 38,
39,307
Hutcheson, Francis, 14, 23
Infidelity, post-deistic expressions of, 42,
358
Intolerance, doctrinal . See Christianity
Jefferson, Thomas (1743-1826)
on ancient philosophers, 119, 120-22,
133
on Book of Revelations, 140
on Christianity, Platonic corruptions of,
123, 133-34, 135, 137-39, 140
francophilia of, 24
on freedom of conscience, 111 - 14,
115-16, 130
free-thinking table talk of, 2
on natural aristocracy, 124-26
on natural law, 118
on reason, 116---18
and Scottish philosophy, 14
on scriptural exegesis, 117, 120-22
on virtue, 127-29
Jesus. See Christianity
Kant, Immanuel, 6, 36, 39
Kneeland, Abner, 358

Index
Laplace, Pierre Simon, Marquis de, 9
Laws of Nature. See Natural Law
Leland, John, 15
Leslie, Charles, 15
Liberal Christianity, 11-13, 15
Locke,John,6, 7-11, 14,23
Macquarrie, John, 44
Mather, Cotton, 15, 52
Mechanism, Newtonian, 36-39. See also
Newton, Isaac
Miller, Perry, 19
Milton, John, 70
Miracles. See Christianity
Mitchell, John, 19
Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, Baron
de, 183
Morality. See Ethics
Napoleon, 182
Natural law, 118, 124-26, 156-57, 16367, 177-79, 180-81,196-206,22326,264,265-67,268-71,283-85,
287-90,291-92,293-95,360,36667. See also under individual authors
Natural religion. See Rational religion
New Learning, 5-11, 15-16, 20, 23
Newton, Isaac, 7, 8-11, 14, 23
Ogden, Uzal, 3
Owen, Robert, 43, 358
Paine, Thomas, (1737-1809)
onGod,227-29,232-38
on immorality of Christianity, 221-23
on immortality, possibility of, 238-39
on Jesus, 215-16
on miracles, 220-21
on natural religion, 212-13, 223-26,
229-32,233-38
on New Testament, 216-18
on Old Testament, 221
personal credo, 212-13
on redemption, 218-20
on revelation, 213- 15, 223, 226-27
Palmer, Elihu (1764-1806)
on the atonement, 249-51
on despotism, 263-64
on evil, 261-62
on immorality of Christianity, 257-60
on natural religion, 273-75, 276-77
on original sin, 246, 253-54
on reason, 244-45, 263
on reciprocal justice (ethics), 33, 26871
on revelation, 245--46

on scripture, 245,258, 259, 260
on superstition, 244--45
on universal benevolence (ethics), 33,
264,265-67
Pascal, Blaise, 38, 39
Pope, Alexander, 9, 15
Priestley, Joseph, 55
Prospect
on Christianity, 339--41, 347--48, 35556
on ethics, 338
on miracles, 342--44
on natural law, 346--47
on natural religion, 336-37, 351-54
Palmer's contributions to, 332, 333-34
on reason, 334-36, 348-50
on revelation, 344--46
on science, 341--42
on tolerance, 338-39
on tolerance and blasphemy, 354-55,
356-57
Rational religion, 1, 3, 4, 15, 25-28, 195,
212-13,223-26,229-32,233-38,
273-75,276-78,286-87,296-97,
300-301,327-31,336-37,351-54,
360-61, 366-67. See also under
individual authors
Ray, John, 70n
Reason,31-33, 116-18, 145--46, 158-62,
196-206,244--45,263,282-83,
285-86,292-93,309,322-23,33436, 348-50, 362-63. See also under
individual authors
Reciprocal justice. See Palmer, Elihu
Reid, Thomas, 14, 23
Religion of Nature. See Rational religion
Revelation. See Christianity
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 6
Royal Society (British), 11
Rush, Benjamin, 241
Scottish common sense school, 14-15
Scriptures, Christian. See Christianity
Second Great Awakening, 42, 43. See also
Calvinism in America
Sin, original. See Christianity
Small, William, 106
Stewart, James, 244
Stiles, Ezra, 1, 2, 16, 20, 24, 43, 53, 105,
143
Synod of Dort, 17, 18
Taylor, Charles, 5
Temple of Reason, The
on Christian morality, 324-26
on deism, 309-10

393

Index

394

Temple of Reason, The ( continued)
onGod,310,311-13,314-22
on Jesus, 324, 325, 326
on pagan philosophy, 325-26
on r<!ason, 309, 322- 23
statement of purpose, 309
on supernaturalism, 309, 327- 31
tolerance, defense of, 309, 327, 329-30
Tennent, Gilbert, 20, 21
Theophilanthropist, The
on angels, 365---66
on God, 365---66
on humanity, 366-67
on Jesus, 363-65
on liberty, religious, 363
on rational religion, 360, 366-67
on reason, 362- 63
theophilanthropy, meaning of, 361
Thoreau, Henry David, 42
Ticonderoga, Fort, 142
Tillotson, John, 15
Tindal, Matthew, 12, 15
Toland, John, 12, 15, 141
Tolerance, religious, 83- 87, 88-89, 9899, 111-14, 115-16, 130, 193- 96,
206-7,263---64,298-99,302--4,309,
327, 329- 30,338- 39,341 , 354-55,
356-57. See also under individual
attthors
Trumbull, John, 2

Universal benevolence. See Palmer, Elihu
Universal Society (Philadelphia), 240
Virtue. See Ethics
Volney, Constantin, Comte de (17571820)
on diversity of religious doctrines, 195
on intolerance, religious, 193- 96, 2067

on martyrdom, 186
on miracles, 185
on natural law, 196-206
on religious contradictions, 185- 92
on religious doctrines, 188-92
on revelation, 185- 86, 188-92
Voltaire, Frarn;:ois Marie Arouet de, 182
Watson, Richard, 2
Westminster Confession, 52 . See also
Calvinism in America
Whitefield, George, 20, 21, 96-98
Wollaston, William, 15, 55
Woods, Leonard, 43
Woolston, Thomas, 12
Wortman, Tunis, 3
Yale College, 1, 14, 20
Young, Thomas, collaboration with Ethan
Allen, 142

"An excellent anthology, particularly welcome at this
time because of the fresh winds blowing in the field
of American religious history. The major intellectual
assertions of deism have rarely been presented so
cogently or so usefully. This book highlights the
particular arguments, spirit, and opponents of the deist
tendency in the age of the American Revolution. It is
particularly strong in showing how standards of reason,
readings, of Nature, and confidence in human capacity
combined for a number of consequential Americans
to make up a significant contribution to the nation's
religious and intellectual history."
MARK NOLL
author of Between Faith and Criticism: Evangelicals,
Scholarship, and the Bible in America and Princeton
and the Republic, 1768-1822: The Search for a Christian
Enlightenment in the Era of Samuel Stanhope Smith
KERRY S. WALTERS is professor emeritus of philosophy
at Gettysburg College in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. He is
the author of Rational Infidels: The American Deists, Elihu
Palmer's "Principles of Nature": Text and Commentary, and
The Sane Society Ideal in Modern Utopianism.

ISBN 978-0-7006-3177-3

111
9 780700 631773

90000

11

